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All references to Coleridge except for his letters and notebooks, unless otherwise noted, come 
from The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Abbreviations I use are as follows: 
 
AR     Aids to Reflection. Edited by John Beer. London & Princeton: Routledge and  
  Princeton University Press, 1993.  
 
BL  Biographia Literaria. Edited by James Engell and W. Jackson Bate. 2 vols.  
  London & Princeton: Routledge and Princeton University Press, 1983. 
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  Princeton: Routledge and Princeton University Press, 1980-2001.] 
 
LS  Lay Sermons. Edited by R. J. White. London & Princeton: Routledge and   
  Princeton University Press, 1972. 
 
OM   Opus Maximum. Edited by Thomas McFarland. London & Princeton: Routledge  
  and Princeton University Press, 2002. 
 
PL   Lectures 1818-1819: On the History of Philosophy. Edited by J.R. de J. Jackson 
  2 vols. London & Princeton: Routledge and Princeton University Press, 2000. 
 
SW&F  Shorter Works and Fragments. Edited by H.J. Jackson and J.R. de J. Jackson  
  2 vols. London & Princeton: Routledge and Princeton University Press, 1995. 
 
TT  Table Talk of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Edited by Carl R. Woodring. 2 vols.  
  London & Princeton: Routledge and Princeton University Press, 1990.  
 
 
Other Critical Editions of Coleridge’s Work 
 
CL   Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Edited by Ernest Leslie Griggs.  
  6 vols. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1956-71. 
 
CN   The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Edited by Kathleen Coburn. 5 vols in 
  10. London & Princeton: Routledge and Princeton University Press, 1957-2002. 
 
 
NOTE: I have preserved Coleridge’s corrections, substitutions, and strikethroughs from his 
original manuscripts as they are recorded in these critical editions. Unless otherwise noted, italics 
in all quotations are also original.       
		 1 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In Anglo-American scholarship, Samuel Taylor Coleridge has undoubtedly received his 
greatest share of attention from literary scholars – as with English Romanticism in general, since 
it has been seen primarily as a literary-aesthetic movement. In turn, Coleridge scholars will often 
speak as though he were two figures. There is the young Coleridge, the poetic genius whose 
meaningful career ended with the contributions to literary and aesthetic theory made by the 
Biographia Literaria in the mid-1810s. Then there is the older Coleridge who squandered his 
creative abilities on a metaphysical dilettantism that led to unoriginal and obscure musings 
combined with a final, unfortunate descent into orthodox Christianity and political conservatism. 
At best, this later Coleridge contributed to intellectual history by introducing the English-
speaking world to German Idealist thought. At worst, this period of Coleridge’s life serves only 
to provide fodder for biographers to paint a tragic picture of the creative genius’s fall from 
greatness into the mire of opium addiction, strained relationships, and a creative constipation 
caused by adherence to repressive ideologies.  
 Lucy Newlyn provides an illuminating example of this historically dominant approach to 
Coleridge’s thought. Writing about the changes that have occurred in literary studies since the 
1980s, Newlyn points out that one would no longer conceive of organizing an introductory 
course on English Romanticism without appreciating the movement’s authors “historically and 
comparatively, not just according to the standards of taste which have made them classics for 
		 2 
two centuries.”1 This shift means considering Coleridge’s poetry with an eye not only to his role 
as a poet, but “also as a journalist, preacher and lecturer.”2 Such a sentiment illuminates the 
assumed position of Coleridge studies in the academy in at least two important ways. First, until 
the 1980s, Coleridge’s poetry was the primary or even exclusive scholarly focus. Second, even 
though students of Coleridge have begun recognizing the importance of his own extra-literary 
interests, they assume that literature departments, interested mainly in his poetry and, potentially, 
theory of criticism, will remain the primary location for a study of Coleridge.  
 This more expansive and interdisciplinary approach to Coleridge still betrays a belief that 
he was a poet who happened to have political, philosophical, and religious ideas. However, such 
an approach does not justly represent the self-conceptions and, arguably, real value of Blake’s, 
Wordsworth’s, and, above all, Coleridge’s intellectual and artistic programs. On this point, one 
can appreciate the more holistic approach taken by scholars of German Romanticism, who see it 
as a larger social, scientific, philosophical, and theological movement. Correspondingly 
intellectual historians, theologians, and philosophers customarily join literary scholars in the 
study of German Romanticism.3 Scholars of German Romanticism understand the artistic 
creation of these thinkers as illustrative of and expressing the larger intellectual whole of which 
it forms one part. If this approach holds true for the German Romantics, for whom true art was 
																																																						
1 Lucy Newlyn, introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Coleridge, ed. Lucy Newlyn (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1. 
 
2 Newlyn, “Introduction,” 1. 
 
3 One need look no further than The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism, which surveys both German 
Idealism and Romanticism, and includes figures like Hölderlin, Novalis, and Schleiermacher as well as Kant, Fichte, 
Schelling, and Hegel. The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism, ed. Karl Ameriks (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). See also Manfred Frank’s Einführung in die frühromantische Ästhetik 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989); Selbstgefühl (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2003); »Unendliche Annäherung« Die Anfänge 
der philosophischen Frühromantik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1997); and Dieter Henrich’s Der Gang des Andenkens: 
Beobachtungen und Gedanken zu Hölderlins Gedicht (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986). 
		 3 
meant to raise a person above mediate mental representation to a kind of non-cognitive and 
ultimate immediacy, then the same approach should prove that much more important for 
studying Coleridge, for whom German Romantic figures often lacked an appropriate rationalism. 
 While the neglect of Coleridge’s larger intellectual vision arises in part from the state of 
Anglo-American approaches to Romanticism, the nature of Coleridge’s work itself has posed its 
own problems for those who would go beyond his poetry. Coleridge’s prose corpus is truly 
expansive, but much of it remained in draft form or became publicly available only after 
significant editorial redaction. Many of his published works feel unfinished or underdeveloped, 
with Coleridge frequently promising to develop an idea in a work that never saw publication or 
even composition.4 Only with the recent compilation and publication of the massive critical 
editions of his work (Collected Works of Coleridge, his collected letters, and his personal 
notebooks) can the reader see greater cohesion to his overall system of thought and how 
Coleridge further expounded upon many of those otherwise elusive concepts.  
 Furthermore, Coleridge’s thought is both expansive and organic, leading many to the feel 
overwhelmed and to believe that no one person possesses the expertise to unpack any one of 
Coleridge’s texts. Coleridge absorbed an astounding amount of printed material, having read at 
any given point in his life nearly everything in print in Britain up to that time. His lifelong quest 
for a synthetic and unitive intellectual system pushes against the compartmentalized division of 
scholarly labor that has developed in the modern university. Full appreciation of any individual 
piece of Coleridge’s work requires some knowledge not only of the 18th century British 
philosophical and scientific intellectual tradition, but also of Idealism both in its ancient and 
																																																						
4 Most famously his discussion of the imagination in chapters 12 and 13 of the Biographia Literaria (BL 232-306).  
		 4 
modern forms, the tradition of Christian mysticism, and early 19th century developments in 
chemistry and the life sciences.5 
 Coleridge’s philosophical and theological commitments have also put him at odds with 
the dominant styles of philosophy and theology in the English-speaking world. Philosophically, 
Coleridge’s strong commitment to a distinctive form of Idealist metaphysics put his thought at 
odds with the Utilitarian, scientific materialist, and analytic traditions that came to dominate 
philosophical thinking in Great Britain and the United States in much of the 19th and 20th 
centuries. That Coleridge saw a vital unity between theology and philosophy, as well as a 
tendency to under-develop his arguments and over-sell his conclusions have led to some 
philosophers even today asking not only whether Coleridge is philosophically relevant, but 
whether it is even appropriate to call him a philosopher at all.6 
																																																						
5 The ready availability of Coleridge’s unpublished works, as well as scholarly editions of his published works, that 
helped lessen the first internal impediment only exacerbate the problem of expansiveness and the accompanying 
charge of an untidy eclecticism. However, even during his own lifetime, this expansive approach to human 
knowledge often marked Coleridge not as a uniting visionary, but as an eclectic compiler, bogged down by a variety 
of sources at once too broad and too deep for him ever to say anything original. That Coleridge sometimes (most 
notoriously and extensively in the Biographia) failed to adequately recognize his sources for specific quotations has 
only helped to confirm the inferiority of his work: not only was he unoriginal, but he was intellectually dishonest in 
his unoriginality. A good discussion of the complex issues surrounding Coleridge’s plagiarisms can be found in the 
Editor’s Introduction to the Engell and Bate edition of the Biographia Literaria. They explain that while Coleridge 
certainly could have done more to properly attribute the extensive quotations he employs, it is likewise unfair to 
characterize him as having intentionally and maliciously passed off the thought of these thinkers as his own. Since 
Coleridge often uses the quotations more as creative ideational building blocks for his own philosophical vision and 
did not attempt to pass of Kant or Schelling’s (for instance) general thought as his own, the editors think that at least 
some of the guilt for the plagiarisms should be lifted from Coleridge’s shoulders (BL lvii-lviii). 
 
6 See Paul Hamilton’s essay “Coleridge the Philosopher” in the Cambridge Companion. Hamilton concluded that 
Coleridge was not really doing philosophy (or at least anything that can be considered worthwhile philosophy) less 
because of the “untidiness” of Coleridge’s thinking than because Coleridge in the end grounds his philosophy in a 
triune, personal view of God. That doing so revokes Coleridge’s philosophical credentials seems strange considering 
it very well could also do this for Hegel. More importantly, though, Hamilton mistakenly conflates the fact that 
Coleridge did come to accept the Trinity as an essential part of the Christian faith with the idea that he set out to 
develop a system of thought in which the Triune God was a foregone conclusion. Ironically, what comes through in 
this essay is actually a strong tone that seems quite contrary to the spirit of philosophical inquiry, namely that a 
system of thought that includes Christian articles of faith cannot be anything but backdoor theology, regardless of 
how the thinker arrived at those conclusions.   
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 If his unitive (or at least conciliatory) vision of the relationship between theology and 
philosophy made him too theological and unphilosophical for philosophers, it made him too 
philosophical and untheological to many theologians. Douglas Hedley has drawn attention to 
how Coleridge cuts against the grain of the dominant theological moods in both Protestant and 
Catholic thought in the 19th and 20th centuries. On the Protestant side, attempts to see Coleridge 
as a theologian meet “the continuing influence of the anti-Hellenism of the Ritschl-Harnack 
tradition of the nineteenth century and the intransigent hostility to philosophical theology of the 
most influential twentieth-century theologian, Karl Barth.”7 For Catholics, there is the 
impediment erected by “official Roman Catholic Neo-Thomist opposition to Platonism and 
idealism as sources of various dangerous heresies: ‘pantheism,’ ‘ontologism,’ ‘emanationism,’ 
etc.”8 
 Despite these historical challenges, a movement dedicated to Coleridge’s whole system 
of thought has gained momentum, especially since the middle of the 20th century. 1930 saw the 
publication of John Muirhead’s Coleridge as Philosopher9 and 1971 brought Owen Barfield’s 
What Coleridge Thought.10 Importantly, Thomas McFarland’s Coleridge and the Pantheist 
Tradition contextualized and mitigated the charges of plagiarism, thus removing one of the main 
hurdles to approaching Coleridge as an innovative and significant thinker.11  
																																																						
7 Douglas Hedley, Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 4. 
 
8 Hedley, Philosophy and Religion, 4. 
 
9 John Muirhead, Coleridge as Philosopher (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1930). 
 
10 Owen Barfield, What Coleridge Thought (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1971). 
 
11 Thomas McFarland, Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1969). 
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 James Boulger’s Coleridge as Religious Thinker in 1961 provided one of the first 
attempts at a thorough explication of Coleridge’s theology.12 While it does not always come 
down on the side of Coleridge’s originality or importance for the Christian tradition, it does 
represent an attempt to show that a thorough theological orientation can be seen throughout 
Coleridge’s work. J. Robert Barth’s Coleridge and Christian Doctrine continued in the vein of 
providing an overview of Coleridge’s theological thinking, albeit with a greater sense that 
Coleridge could prove fruitful for current theology, particularly with regards to dialogue between 
Catholics and Protestants.13 In the last 20 years, though, the theological world has begun to 
seriously consider Coleridge as a relevant figure for contemporary thought. John Milbank has 
attempted to enlist Coleridge for the cause of Radical Orthodoxy (RO), and RO is arguably one 
of the most important theological developments of the late 20th and early 21st centuries.14 
Seemingly in response, one sees in Douglas Hedley’s detailed and carefully researched 
presentation of Coleridge a desire to marshal him against traditions such as Barthianism, Post-
liberalism, and Radical Orthodoxy, which Hedley sees as fideistic, nonfoundationalist 
overreactions against an Enlightenment overreliance on reason. When Coleridge gets caught in a 
tug of war about whether he belongs to one of the most significant contemporary theological 
movements, I think it safe to assume he should receive consideration as offering potentially 
significant insights for constructive Christian thought.15  
																																																						
12 James D. Boulger, Coleridge as Religious Thinker (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961). 
 
13 J. Robert Barth, S.J., Coleridge and Christian Doctrine (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969). 
 
14 John Milbank, “The Divine Logos and Human Communication,” in The Future of Love: Essays in Political 
Theology (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2009), 3-24. 
 
15 Among those who focus on Coleridge’s poetic compositions, there has likewise been an increasing awareness of 
the theo-philosophical nature of his poetry. Works such as J. A. Appleyard’s Coleridge’s Philosophy of Literature 
and John Beer’s Coleridge’s Poetic Intelligence both seek to show the close link between Coleridge’s poetic work 
and his other intellectual pursuits. Stephen Prickett, whose scholarship combines theological and literary analysis 
		 7 
 In a connection to Coleridge that will form the basis of my argument in this study, I turn 
now to another historically marginal movement in the academy that has also received increased 
attention in recent years as important and influential: 18th century evangelical revival 
movements. In its British-American context, this revival manifested itself as the First Great 
Awakening in America and the Methodist and larger evangelical movements in Great Britain. 
While histories of these movements, and theological expositions of their leading figures, have 
been continually produced since the late 18th and 19th centuries, this scholarship has tended to 
originate from and remain within these movement’s specific confessional traditions. This 
observation does not mean that quality literature did not emerge from denominational historians; 
on the contrary, much excellent scholarship came from American and, in particular, British 
Methodist scholars, especially in the first half of the 20th century.16 Nevertheless, one unfortunate 
consequence has been the development to some degree of a kind of intellectual parochialism, 
often focusing on Methodism as an isolated phenomenon and hesitating to engage with scholars 
from outside of this circle.17  
																																																						
and who has made important contributions to the study of Pan-European Romanticism, has done substantial work to 
demonstrate the religious dimension expressed through Coleridge’s poetry, the diachronic unity of his thought, and 
the influence Coleridge, considered as a theologian, exerted on subsequent English theological traditions. 
Furthermore, Prickett has help put the sequestering of Coleridge to the exclusive domain of literary significance into 
historical context. In his Romanticism and Religion, Prickett shows that while Coleridge’s thought did represent “the 
possibility of a unity between philosophy, theology, and aesthetics” for a “tiny minority within the Church of 
England,” the larger Victorian intellectual establishment did not consider these thinkers of great influence and never 
considered them to have coalesced into a distinct Coleridgean “school.”  
 
16 There are far too many sources to be named. Among them are Maldwyn Edwards’s After Wesley: A Study of the 
social and political influence of Methodism in the middle period (1791-1849) (London: The Epworth Press, 1935); 
John S. Simons’ John Wesley and the Religious Societies (London: The Epworth Press, 1921) and John Wesley and 
the Methodist Societies (London: The Epworth Press, 1923); Leslie F. Church’s The Early Methodist People 
(London: The Epworth Press, 1948) and More about the Early Methodist People (London: The Epworth Press, 
1949); and J. Ernest Rattenbury’s The Evangelical Doctrines of Charles Wesley’s Hymns (London: The Epworth 
Press, 1941). 
 
17 For example, in an email correspondence, Richard Brantley indicated that while he has had luck finding scholars 
in literature departments, general Romanticism studies, and religion and literature programs who engage with his 
work, he has not found those who do specifically Wesleyan studies particularly receptive to his work (Richard 
Brantley, January 24, 2013, email message to author).  
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 Furthermore, when Methodism and Evangelicalism received attention from scholars 
beyond these denomination boundaries, they were treated in a way that only led to further 
stigmatization. Both Whig and Marxist historical traditions have tended toward dismissive or 
negative portrayals of these movements. Those committed to a historical narrative with the 
European Enlightenment and the triumph of rationalism and secularism as a telos tend to 
collapse pietistic and evangelical movements into a larger category of regressive, irrational 
dogmatism, or, at the very least, as propagating a culture of anti-intellectualism.18 Marxist and 
other sorts of materialist historians have likewise tended to see Methodism and Evangelicalism 
as oppressive ideologies that served the purpose of developing a passive and productive 
proletariat, with E.P. Thompson as the progenitor and most famous defender of this position.19   
 In theology, the intellectual architects of Methodism and evangelicalism are regularly 
dismissed as intellectual light-weights because they avoided speculative or systematic thinking. 
One hears, even from scholars belonging to the Wesleyan tradition, that John Wesley was not “a 
theologian’s theologian,” and that he produced relatively unoriginal theological thought that is 
better described as “folk theology.”20 Jonathan Edwards, who is regularly classed as one of early 
America’s best thinkers, stands apart as one of the few exceptions. Even this praise comes across 
as a kind of back-handed complement, akin to a critic referring to a musician as playing “some of 
the finest Jazz – for a French Horn player.”  
																																																						
18 The introductions to both Frank O’Gorman’s The Long Eighteenth Century (London: Hodder Arnold, 1997) and 
Jeremy Black’s Eighteenth Century Britain, 1688-1783, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) provide 
good overviews of the history of 18th century historiography.  
 
19 David Hempton’s article “Wesley in Context” from The Cambridge Companion to John Wesley, eds. Randy L. 
Maddox and Jason E. Vickers (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 60-80, introduces the specific 
historiographic debates surrounding Methodism. 
 
20 Cf. Albert C. Outler, “Preface,” in John Wesley, ed. Albert C. Outler (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 
iii. 
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 One can postulate numerous reasons whence comes this dismissal. The theology guild 
frequently sets before itself 19th and 20th century German thought as the ideal for intellectually 
rigorous and original thinking, and often has as its foil the intellectual shallowness and lack of 
originality of Anglo-American and 18th century thought. Most early evangelical and Methodist 
thinkers fall into both of these latter categories. This attitude is not helped by the reality that a 
Wesley or an Edwards often lacks the originality and gravity of a Hegel, a Troeltsch, a Barth, or 
a Rahner, although the chasm may be narrower than many theologians care to admit.  
 The winds of intellectual change seem upon us, though.  David Hempton has pointed out 
that “although evangelicalism was one a despised and little studied tradition, there is now no 
shortage of good scholarship on how, why, and where it expanded since the early 1700s” and 
“equally no shortage of biographies of leading evangelicals.”21 I believe at least three trends lie 
behind this shift. First, an increasing interest in social history has allowed for a conversation 
about the importance of the lived experience of historically marginalized groups. Second, a 
confluence of historiographic trends has challenged Whig and Marxist conceptions of proper 
historical reconstruction. These newer trends either tend to see religion as a more powerful force 
in 18th century thought than heretofore recognized or promote a conception of “modernity” that 
expands beyond the narrow confines of “Enlightenment,” giving pietistic/evangelical movements 
a claim to being modern when before they were seen as reactionary responses to modernity. 
Finally, and close to this second trend, thinkers like W.R. Ward have proposed that whatever 
may have happened to later forms of Evangelicalism, its originators made significant 
contributions to the course of intellectually history.22 
																																																						
21 David Hempton, Evangelical Disenchantment: 9 Portraits of Faith and Doubt (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2008). 
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 At the intersection of these two historiographical and intellectual traditions sits research 
on the relationship between English Romanticism and British Methodism/Evangelicalism. 
Attempts to map this relationship are not necessarily new; Frederick Gill’s The Romantic 
Movement and Methodism was one of the first attempts and it was published in 1937.23 However, 
until recently, only a few scholars have written extensively on this relationship, with Richard 
Brantley being the most prominent example.24  It is only in the last decade or so that scholars 
part of something approaching an intellectual trend have seriously begun examining the causal 
matrix between English Romanticism and the Evangelical Revival. Serious consideration of the 
relationship between these two movements, even though they are temporally proximate and 
socially significant, has likely only gained momentum in the last few years because of the causes 
listed above, amplified when they intersect with each other. Since most who study English 
Romanticism come from literature departments, academic balkanization has probably prevented 
these scholars from engaging significantly with serious religious history. This is compounded by 
the academic isolation historically characteristic of those studying evangelicalism.   
 Beams of interdisciplinary light have nevertheless begun to shine through cracks in the 
various departmental silos. Several monographs have been published describing the ways in 
																																																						
22 Cf. W.R. Ward, Early Evangelicalism: A Global Intellectual History, 1670-1789 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006).  
 
23 Frederick C. Gill, The Romantic Movement and Methodism: A Study of English Romanticism and the Evangelical 
Revival (London: The Epworth Press, 1937). 
 
24 Cf. Richard Brantley’s Wordsworth’s “Natural Methodism” (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975); 
Locke, Wesley, and the Method of English Romanticism (Gainesville, FL: The University of Florida Press, 1984); 
and Coordinates of Anglo-American Romanticism: Wesley, Edwards, Carlyle & Emerson (Gainesville, FL: The 
University Press of Florida, 1993). Many of the authors in the last 40 or 50 years who have shown interest in the 
theological and religious dimensions of English Romanticism have acknowledged Methodism/Evangelicalism as 
anticipating or influencing certain aspects of Romantic thought. Stephen Prickett provides one of the best examples 
of this phenomena, with his essay on “the religious context” of English Romanticism in The Romantics, ed. Stephen 
Prickett (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1981), 115-63, and Coleridge and Wordsworth: The Poetry of Growth 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1970), especially 106-8. 
		11 
which principle figures in the British Romantic movement came from families with strong ties to 
evangelicalism and how this background provided some of the important forms and emphases 
for their work. Adding to Brantley’s 1975 Wordsworth’s “Natural Methodism,” in which he sees 
Wordsworth’s magnum opus The Prelude as using the form of Methodist conversion narrative to 
describe his own conversion to a kind of pantheistic spirituality of nature, are at least two works 
on how William Blake’s religious thought can be situated among the more ecstatic and mystical 
developments in late 18th century Methodism.25 Furthermore, books such as John Mee’s 
Romanticism, Enthusiasm, and Regulation,26 Robert M. Ryan’s The Romantic Reformation,27 
Daniel E. White’s Early Romanticism and Religious Dissent,28 Orianne Smith’s Romantic 
Women Writers, Revolution, and Prophecy,29 Jasper Cragwall’s Lake Methodism,30 and Helen 
Boyles’s Romanticism and Methodism31 have all endeavored to show the interchange between 
evangelicalism/Methodism (and other forms of late 18th century affective/emotive religion) and 
the development of English Romanticism.  
 The one significant exception to this trend has so far been Samuel Taylor Coleridge. 
There have been several volumes dedicated to expounding Coleridge’s religious views, 
																																																						
25 E.g., Michael Farrell, Blake and the Methodists (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Jennifer G. Jesse, 
William Blake’s Religious Vision (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2013). 
 
26 John Mee, Romanticism, Enthusiasm, and Regulation: Poetics and the Policing of Culture in the Romantic Period 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
 
27 Robert M. Ryan, The Romantic Reformation: Religious Politics in English Literature 1789-1794 (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
 
28 Daniel E. White, Early Romanticism and Religious Dissent (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
 
29 Orianne Smith, Romantic Women Writers, Revolution, and Prophecy: Rebellious Daughters, 1786-1826 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
 
30 Jasper Cragwall, Lake Methodism: Polite Literature and Popular Religion in England, 1780-1830 (Columbus, 
OH: The Ohio State University Press, 2013). 
 
31 Helen Boyles, Romanticism and Methodism (London: Routledge, 2017). 
		12 
particularly his more mature, orthodox positions. Likewise, many of the authors here described, 
notably Gill, Brantley, Prickett, and Mee, believe that Coleridge’s thought shows signs of 
Methodist/Evangelical influence. But unlike Wordsworth and Blake, no single monograph 
dedicated to the relationship between Methodism/Evangelicalism and the development of 
Coleridge’s thought has emerged. While I hope to argue to the contrary, this is likely because 
few have seen this omission as an actual lacuna, in the sense that Coleridge does not seem to 
have been exposed to Methodism/Evangelicalism like Wordsworth and Blake were. Blake was 
raised in a Methodist household and Wordsworth’s family were among the early Anglican 
Evangelicals (and ones who seemed to have some affinity for Wesleyan Methodism, if the names 
of William’s brothers John and Charles are any indication). Coleridge, like Wordsworth and 
unlike Blake, did convert from the family religion to a mixture of rationalist Christianity and 
political radicalism. Unlike Wordsworth, he was raised in what has generally been considered a 
party-line, non-Evangelical Church of England home. Many of Coleridge’s interpreters would 
probably agree with Robert Barth’s assessment that Coleridge’s father John need not be seen as 
more than “a sound if unimaginative Church of England Clergyman.”32 On the standard 
interpretation, Coleridge’s religious biography takes on a parabolic shape: raised in Anglican 
orthodoxy, he traveled through radical Unitarianism only to return to orthodoxy, this time 
undergirded by a healthy dose of Idealist philosophy. Lacking the early, direct formative 
exposure to evangelicalism that Blake and Wordsworth received and having only interacted with 
these traditions as an outside observer, one would naturally expect Coleridge to exhibit a much 
lower and more indirect indebtedness to these traditions.   
																																																						
32 Barth, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine, 1.  
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 However, I will argue that Coleridge, far from being the English Romantic at the greatest 
remove from Methodist/evangelical ideas, developed a theology and religious philosophy that 
distinctly echoes, and owed a great debt to, evangelicalism. In making this claim, I will argue for 
what at this point probably seems even more contentious: among the main currents of religious 
thought in Britain at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries, Coleridge’s mature 
religious thought has the greatest affinity with a group of Evangelicals in the Church of England. 
I will even go so far as to say that Coleridge, in returning to orthodox Anglicanism, returned to a 
distinctively evangelical form of orthodox Anglicanism and that by the time he died, Samuel 
Coleridge had become some form of moderate Anglican Evangelical.  
This position does not mean that Coleridge did not modify or mitigate some evangelical 
emphases. Neither does it mean that one should cease to see in Coleridge’s thought an affinity 
for a metaphysical speculation uncharacteristic of British Evangelical thought at that time.33 
Finally, this assertion does not prohibit one from seeing Coleridge as a synthetic thinker seeking 
a grand theo-philosophical system between the ecstatic “warmth” of Methodist emotionalism and 
the cold “light” of the rationalism of late 18th century Enlightenment religion. However, I think it 
wrong to interpret Coleridge as seeking a solution to this dialectic that sat equidistant, as it were, 
between the two. Instead, I will argue that the relationship between these two poles was weighted 
significantly in favor of evangelicalism in Coleridge’s work and that he ultimately sought to 
infuse a greater degree of rationalist inquiry and intellectual depth into an essentially Evangelical 
theological framework. He may have provided a metaphysical superstructure to reinforce and 
																																																						
33 It would, however, be unfair to single out evangelicalism as particularly anti-metaphysical; It would be more 
accurate to say that all the main currents of British thought going into the early 19th century shared this attitude. 
Coleridge’s affinity for speculative metaphysics, particularly for various forms of Platonism and German Idealism, 
distinguished him from the mainstream of any strand of British religious thought in his time and would not in itself 
have put him at a comparatively greater remove from the evangelicals.   
		14 
underpin his theological convictions that went far beyond that provided by most of his 
contemporary evangelicals, but the core constellation of religious convictions for which 
Coleridge sought such support – and the way these convictions were emphasized – were 
distinctively Evangelical.  
 In making my argument, I will primarily limit myself to Coleridge’s work composed after 
his conversion back to Trinitarian Christianity in 1805 until his death in 1834. During this 
period, while one sees a definite transformation and deepening of his philosophical thought, 
Coleridge remains remarkably consistent in his core Christian beliefs and how he chose to 
emphasize certain of them. Coleridge came to recognize a distinction between those beliefs 
common to all religious traditions such as belief in a God, the creation of the world by this God, 
etc., and those specific to Christianity. What is distinctive about Christianity is the belief that 
humans need a savior, that we have been given one, and that this savior is revealed in the 
Christian Scriptures to be God incarnate in Jesus Christ. In particular, Coleridge emphasized the 
doctrine of original sin (albeit modulated through his own thinking), the priority of God’s grace 
in the order of salvation, a spiritual birth as the subjective consequence of God’s grace and as the 
purpose of Christ’s redemptive work, and the subsequent growth in holiness resulting from this 
spiritual rebirth as the human will becomes more conformed to and united with the Divine will.  
 This specific constellation of beliefs, which among them were emphasized, how they are 
understood, and the rhetoric used to present them make Coleridge’s religious thought look 
remarkably similar to the distinguishing constellation of beliefs, practices, and language of 18th 
and early 19th century British evangelicals, especially that of the moderate Calvinism particular 
to Anglican Evangelicals. This set of affinities, if examined alongside a biographical sketch of 
Coleridge’s religious development, leads to the conclusion that one may plausibly see Coleridge 
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as having undergone a protracted conversion to evangelical Christianity beginning in the mid-
1790s. In “uniting warmth and light” he sought to forge a vision of Anglican Christianity with a 
firmer and deeper metaphysical support and in which evangelicalism’s excesses or defects were 
excised or tempered (such as the Evangelical propensity toward anti-intellectualism), but which 
nevertheless remained at its core a vision of Evangelical Anglicanism.  
 I recognize that this argument will surely raise a few eyebrows and may even elicit a 
visceral rejection from some whose primary understanding (and, in some cases, 
misunderstanding) of evangelicalism arises from its modern instantiations. Those familiar with 
Coleridge’s thought may be inclined to respond that Coleridge never explicitly identified as an 
Evangelical and was ambivalent or even hostile toward Methodism. To the first claim, I would 
respond that while true that Coleridge does not appear to have ever put in ink or charcoal 
something to the effect of “I positively identify myself as an Evangelical,” this proves relatively 
inconsequential to my thesis. In late 18th and early 19th century, even well-established 
Evangelicals exhibited a reticence to identify as “Evangelical,” preferring “Gospel Clergy,” for 
fear of giving the appearance of belonging to a distinct Church party and thus promoting schism. 
Second, “Evangelical” remained, more-often-than-not, a designation for a kind of clergyperson 
rather than a designation for all who subscribed to this approach to Anglicanism. Third, 
Coleridge actually did come to explicitly identify a closer (if not perfectly aligned) affinity for 
Evangelical clergy over their non-Evangelical counterparts. Combined with the first two points, 
the third demonstrates that Coleridge came remarkably close to an explicit identification with 
Evangelicalism. As to his ambivalence toward Methodism, if one combines this with Coleridge’s 
affinity for other Evangelical theological emphases, this point strengthens my proposal. A 
		16 
significant identifying marker of Evangelicals was an ambivalence toward Methodists and other 
dissenting evangelicals, whom they took to lack proper structure and checks on fanaticism.  
 For my argument to be both persuasive and meaningful, I believe that I have three 
increasingly stringent conditions to meet. First, Coleridge’s orthodox Christianity had to 
maintain features characteristic of moderate Evangelical Anglicans while excluding those that 
were antithetical to late 18th and early 19th century Evangelicalism’s essential character. 
However, this move is wholly perambulatory; it only shows that there is no significant prima 
face obstacle to considering Coleridge an Evangelical. Next, Coleridge must have come to a 
Christianity that included beliefs and practices that were distinctively Evangelical. In other 
words, it is not enough to show that Coleridge came to a kind of Christianity that had common 
elements with Evangelicalism if these elements were only those that Evangelicals themselves 
held in common with other strands of non-Evangelical Christianity.  
 Even at this second point, one is left with a significant claim, viz., if one must locate 
Coleridge in relationship to definable larger Christian movements in late 18th and early 19th 
century British Christianity, he stood closest to moderate Evangelical Anglicanism. The thesis I 
am putting forward goes further still, though, and makes a claim not only of resemblance but of 
identity. While saying that it would be improper to consider Coleridge part of some other larger 
Christian movement, one could still argue that his was a sui generis Christianity that while 
refusing to be constrained to any larger movement was nevertheless closest to moderate 
Anglican Evangelicalism. To really stick the landing with my thesis, a third element is necessary. 
I must show that on all or most of those points where Coleridge stands outside the mainstream of 
this tradition, there either existed figures with similar positions who were unquestionably 
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Evangelical or Coleridge came to these dissenting opinions through a kind of characteristically 
Evangelical logic. 
 Fulfilling all three of these conditions can only be accomplished by observing 
Coleridge’s post-1805 Christianity against the backdrop of a fairly exhaustive analysis of forms 
of Christianity available to him as a well-read Englishman in the late 18th and early 19th centuries 
with exposure to Continental European and North American intellectual and religious traditions. 
For this reason, I have provided what I see as an exhaustive summary of the relationships 
between the religious traditions that fit this criterion. This survey looks at the commonalities that 
existed among all, or nearly all, religious traditions because of their belonging to this time and 
space, as well as the bilateral commonalities that differed depending on the specific religious 
movements in question. It will also look at movements with unique features when compared to 
other traditions in 18th and early 19th century Britain. Taking my cue from 18th century scholars 
like Isabel Rivers, I speak here of “movements” and “traditions” rather than “schools of thought” 
or “theologies” because my classification understands forms of religiosity in a non-reductive 
way, taking seriously broader religious “cultures” or “styles” (e.g., characteristic literary genres, 
perceived opponents, perceptions of other groups, rhetorical conventions) in addition to formal 
beliefs and practices.34 This evaluation of religious traditions in Britain’s long 18th century will 
provide constellations or patterns of relationship between beliefs, practices, rhetorical styles, 
literary genres, etc., that allow these traditions to be individuated both by the relationship of 
commonalities they share with other traditions as well as any features that proved unique. With 
these constellations described, I will then apply this more expanded set of identifying criteria to 
																																																						
34 Cf. Isabel Rivers’s “Introduction” in the first volume of her Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A study of the 
language of religion and ethics in England 1660-1780, vol. I Whichcote to Wesley (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991) for a more detailed explanation of the need to see religious movements or trends as defined 
by more than formal, explicit beliefs and practices.  
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Coleridge’s Christianity from the period after his return to Trinitarian orthodoxy, which I believe 
will prove sufficiently persuasive to show that one can confidently locate the kind of orthodox 
Christianity he adopted within the constellation of early 19th century Evangelical Anglicanism.   
 The chapters of this dissertation essentially follow the two-part division described in the 
preceding paragraph. The first two content chapters attempt to map out the religious landscape 
for Britain in the (religious) long 18th century (or roughly the time of the Restoration until the 
Oxford Movement) in which Coleridge’s own Christianity could plausibly be located. Chapter 
two deals with all the movements that would be considered “non-” or even “anti-evangelical.”  
This chapter begins with a description of the evolution of a strand of “radical rationalism” from 
the Deism of the late 17th and early 18th centuries, with its greater hostility to Christianity and 
more combative rhetoric, to the more irenic and optimistic Unitarianism of the later 18th and 
early 19th centuries.  This broad approach tended to elevate the role of human intellective 
capacities, saw the unknown as either the merely undiscovered or as unimportant, rejected 
almost all appeals to special revelation or “supernaturalism,” and saw individual vices and social 
evils as resulting from errors and ignorance to be solved by education and reform rather than 
inherent corruptions in need of divine grace. There also existed a group of apologists who 
doctrinally shared more in common with either Latitudinarian or orthodox Christians and 
positioned themselves explicitly against this “radical rationalist” assault on Christianity, but who 
nevertheless shared with them a common methodological temperament. The fittingly expansive 
category of “Latitudinarians,” who can be thought of as the theological moderates of the 18th 
century at large and the main body of liberals in the Church of England, make up the second 
group under consideration. This group drew from various methodological viewpoints, but uniting 
them was an acceptance of a chastened Christian orthodoxy with fewer necessary doctrines that 
		19 
could be open to greater interpretation; a strong emphasis on the role of religion as supporting 
morality and social order; and a view of the “supernatural” with room for miracles and (some) 
special revelation but which downplayed the role of “mystery.” The final group were the 
“Orthodox” or “High Church” who constituted the majority half of non-evangelical 18th century 
“orthodoxy.” This group formally held most of the same doctrines as their evangelical 
counterparts, but they emphasized ecclesial mediation of saving grace and, by the early 19th 
century, were almost exclusively Laudian style Arminians. All three traditions shared a suspicion 
of “enthusiasm” and believed that salvation was in some way contingent upon good works.  
 The third chapter looks at evangelicalism as a larger movement in the long 18th century 
before turning to features that distinguished first and second generation Anglican Evangelicalism 
from the larger evangelical revival. As a broader movement, evangelicalism shared a sense of the 
need for a living and personal faith and relationship with God and saw this relationship as the 
true goal of salvation rather than a means to attaining it. While generally accepting the same 
formal doctrines as High Church Anglicans, evangelicals emphasized original sin and human 
depravity; justification by faith alone through God’s grace, the need for repentance, conversion, 
and New Birth; and subsequent growth in holiness through the inner working of the Holy Spirit. 
Evangelicals in the broader sense could be Arminian or Calvinist, although the Arminians 
emphasized justification by faith alone to a greater degree than their non-Evangelical 
counterparts and the Calvinists emphasized human agency and moral responsibility to a greater 
degree than theirs. Evangelicals emphasized some degree of emotional fervor in true 
Christianity, even if they diverged on the degree of outward expression it warranted. Anglican 
Evangelicals were distinguished from the larger evangelical movement, particularly in the early 
19th century, by a more circumscribed emotionalism, less emphasis on immediate conversions 
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and greater emphasis on a process of gradual growth in holiness, and a high view of the liturgy 
and polity of the Church of England. They were distinguished from non-Evangelical Anglicans 
in a greater emphasis on the rule of Scripture, a sense of the Church of England as in its essence 
a true Reformation Church, and a positive acceptance of doctrines cast disparagingly by most 
other groups as “Calvinist.”  
 The fourth through sixth chapters locate Coleridge’s orthodox Christianity as it emerged 
explicitly after 1805 in the religious landscape described above. Together, chapters four and five 
present Coleridge’s theology and theologically informed philosophy as they bear on the question 
of his relationship to Evangelicalism. In chapter four I argue that Coleridge’s explicit doctrinal 
summaries, which remained consistent from the time soon after his conversion to orthodoxy until 
only a few years before his death, give the same doctrines with the same emphasis that 
characterized the larger evangelical movement. The discussion of Coleridge’s doctrinal 
summaries becomes the occasion for an exploration of Coleridge’s own statements about his 
affinity with Anglican Evangelicalism, even though he perceived the Evangelicals to be lacking 
in historical and metaphysical learning. A discussion of Coleridge’s understanding of the 
relationship between the will and intellect allows me to argue that Coleridge in some way saw 
himself as shoring up these deficiencies, but that this does not necessarily mean he was 
attempting to move beyond Evangelicalism.  
 In chapter five I defend my concluding assumptions in chapter four by arguing that 
Coleridge’s more detailed treatments of theological themes present a theological vision that 
looks like what a more thorough and philosophically developed Anglican Evangelical theology 
would be. Beyond making original sin and the necessity of Christ’s redemptive work even more 
central to his thinking, Coleridge’s extended theological works also make clear that he held to 
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the kind of moderate Calvinist view of election that was, in the early 19th century, almost 
exclusively held by Anglican Evangelicals. Furthermore, Coleridge does not attempt to remove 
the ambiguity or appeal to mystery on those points that Anglican Evangelicals had come to avoid 
speculation, but instead supplies a rationalization for why one should appeal to mystery on these 
points. Coleridge does present a theory of redemption that subordinates a typical Evangelical 
emphasis on substitutionary atonement to the restorative dimensions of Christ’s work, but even 
here he does so in a way that follows the logic of Evangelicalism. Furthermore, his was not the 
majority position, but it was still well within the boundaries of one minority, but unquestionably 
evangelical, strand of early 19th century Anglican Evangelical thought. 
 I conclude my argument that the shape of Coleridge’s orthodox Christianity should be 
considered within the bounds of Anglican Evangelicalism by looking beyond his explicit and 
explicated beliefs to such things his religious language, sources of authority, forms of piety, and 
understanding of the church. Here I argue that not only does Coleridge believe like an Anglican 
Evangelical, but that he appears to have prayed, read the bible, argued, and, often, spoken like 
one. Among other things, Coleridge used language that was strongly associated with evangelical 
thought, spoke positively about Puritan thinkers, used quotations from Robert Leighton – one of 
the most highly revered thinkers for Anglican Evangelicals – to form the body of his most 
significant work of theology, and held to the more distinctively Evangelical position on 
Baptismal Regeneration. Between Coleridge’s theological position, method, and doctrinal 
emphases aligning significantly with moderate Anglican Evangelicals and his embeddedness in a 
cultural imaginary that included almost every distinguishing mark of the same movement, I think 
that one can confidently affirm that Coleridge should be considered some kind of Anglican 
Evangelical.  
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 I should note a few points about the scope and nature of my argument and the evidence I 
employ for it. First, I acknowledge that I did not include a thorough treatment of all the religious 
movements and theological positions that were, in the abstract, available to Coleridge. I discuss 
neither Eastern Orthodoxy nor Roman Catholicism, even though Coleridge knew of and 
interacted with both. Indeed, Coleridge had significant contact with Roman Catholic thought and 
held some thinkers in extremely high regard. Nevertheless, while I believe that Coleridge’s 
engagement with Roman Catholicism is complex, interesting, and certainly deserves greater 
treatment than it has heretofore received, I do not include it among the religious background for 
the simple reason that Coleridge never gives any indication, serious or otherwise, that he 
considered becoming a Roman Catholic. Moreover, on no point of doctrine emphasized in 
Coleridge’s thought on which there was a significant divergence between Roman Catholics and 
Protestants does Coleridge come down with a more characteristically Roman Catholic position. 
The other possibility I have left out is that I am drawing the circle too narrow by only looking at 
the British context and that Coleridge’s orthodox Christianity, like his philosophy, owed more to 
German than British traditions. If this were the case, then the most likely form this religiosity 
would have taken would have been Moravian, given how highly he esteemed this group. 
However, since Moravians belong to the larger pietistic/evangelical tradition, Anglican 
Evangelicalism was significantly influenced by Moravians, and Coleridge remained within the 
ecclesial structures of the Church of England, I think my claim that he was some form of 
Evangelical Anglican would hold even if the kind exhibited strong affinities with the Moravians.  
 Some may also find it strange that I add the caveat that Coleridge had become a moderate 
Anglican Evangelical by the time he died. The reason for this inclusion is simple. I do not believe 
that Coleridge returned to orthodox Trinitarian Christianity with a fully formed Anglican 
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Evangelical theology. Instead, I believe he only gradually and unevenly came to affirm both the 
Anglican and the Evangelical designators, with the evangelical likely developing more quickly 
than the full embrace of the Anglican. However, this argument, as well as pin-pointing a specific 
point where he crosses this threshold, requires a more extensive reconstruction of Coleridge’s 
spiritual and intellectual biography than I can provide in this space. I do draw on biographical 
information throughout this argument in an ad hoc fashion and provide an abbreviated sketch of 
what this more substantial reconstruction could look like in the conclusion, but I do this only to 
show that Coleridge had too much contact with evangelical and Evangelical thought for him to 
have plausibly developed into what looks like moderate Anglican Evangelicalism through a kind 
of religious convergent evolution. It does not provide enough support for an exact dating of his 
becoming an Anglican Evangelical, and since I draw significantly from Coleridge’s work in the 
late 1820s and early 1830s, I think it safer to simply say that sometime before his death in 1834 
he had become a moderate Anglican Evangelical.  
 The final chapter of the dissertation will tie together the strands of the argument, and will 
also sketch what a more comprehensive intellectual and spiritual autobiography of Coleridge 
may look like. However, this final chapter goes beyond a summary of the research and begins to 
point to how this new context of Coleridge’s thought impacts how contemporary readers should 
engage him. It will serve as an entrée into a larger conversation concerning the need for greater 
clarity about the relationship of Coleridge’s thought to other theological movements. In so doing, 
I hope to open the door to the ways in which understanding Coleridge as a kind of Anglican 
Evangelical can prove productive for contemporary theology in addition to intellectual history. 
While I alluded to the fact that Coleridge has received increasing interest as a potential source of 
inspiration for constructive theology, I did not go into the full significance of how his thought is 
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beginning to be employed. Likely because Coleridge was one of the most original theological 
voices in early 19th century England, understanding how he fits into the Christian tradition has 
become a cipher for a larger conflict over how constructive theology understands the tradition, 
engages with contemporary society, and moves forward into the future. In recent memory, the 
first significantly influential theologian to claim Coleridge for his project was John Milbank.  He 
has implicitly claimed Coleridge as emblematic of a tradition of “counter-modernity” that can 
connect the contemporary Church with what he views as the unified and legitimate Christianity 
of the Middle Ages that was fractured and undermined by the social, political, and economic 
forces of the modern world. Milbank never explicitly admits as such, but one wonders if he has 
an interest in Coleridge because he allows this “counter-modernity” to run decisively through the 
Church of England. Against this vision of Coleridge as a figure who opposed the “universal” 
reason of the Enlightenment, Douglas Hedley has undertaken a project to understand Coleridge 
as presenting a unified vision of human knowledge and the universality of human reason that 
actually may provide a way past the fractured and fideistic state of knowledge he believes 
thinkers like Milbank perpetuate.  
 Milbank’s attempt warrants attention for showing that Coleridge, while certainly not 
representative of mainstream 19th century Anglican theology, demonstrates that the Anglican 
tradition is not a newcomer to the theological big leagues. Furthermore, while this project does 
not call for significant alterations to what has already been developed regarding Coleridge’s 
thought in and of itself, the reinterpretation of how that thought should be located in the 
theological tradition has substantial implications for the way in which the various theological 
traditions within Anglicanism relate to each other. Coleridge’s understanding of the doctrinal 
flexibility needed for a national church has long been recognized as an important factor in the 
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emergence the Broad Church movement, and he also had a significant impact on leaders of the 
Oxford Movement, most notably John Henry Newman. The ability to see Coleridge as either 
most closely aligned with the Anglican Evangelical tradition or even as an extraordinary, but still 
legitimate, member of that tradition would indicate that there may exist greater theological 
continuity between the competing streams of Anglican tradition than is usually recognized.  
 Nevertheless, I ultimately want to locate my work in the same camp as Hedley. While I 
have chosen to focus on a different aspect of Coleridge’s philosophical and religious thought, I 
do not think this project any substantial rejection of his interpretation of Coleridge’s place in the 
theological or philosophical tradition.35 In many ways, this project is undertaken in the same 
spirit, seeking both to further clarify Coleridge’s position in the history of ideas and in so doing 
take away some of the ambiguities that have allowed him to be interpreted in a way that bends 
his thought to that of Milbank. This casting of Coleridge as a kind of proponent of a proto-
Radical Orthodoxy distorts Coleridge’s unitive and conciliatory vision. Coleridge can serve as a 
figure of significant influence in contemporary theology, but it is not by simply making him a 
mouthpiece for theological and philosophical concerns that were not his own – particularly when 
this means stretching him over Radical Orthodoxy’s procrustean bed that makes him little more 
than symbolically important and often takes his work out of context to support views at odds 
with his own larger vision. However, before this project can start, it is necessary to first 
understand how Coleridge fit into and challenged the intellectual and religious climate of his 
time, and it is to this task that I now turn.  
																																																						
35 I do not mean that I accept Hedley’s interpretation uncritically. I think Hedley does less to distort the content of 
Coleridge’s thought than Milbank, but I see in his attempt to positon Coleridge as a 19th century Cambridge 
Platonist something of the same tendency to employ Coleridge in the service of a national intellectual tradition. I 
would not argue in any way that Coleridge was, in his evangelicalism, not a kind of Platonist –  but it was not 
uncommon for evangelicals to be influenced by Platonism of some kind. Instead, I think it safer to say that 
Coleridge developed his own form of broadly Platonist philosophy that found its most fitting partner in the 
Augustinian (and thus Christian Platonic) spirit of early 19th century Anglican Evangelicalism. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THEOLOGICAL AND ECCLESIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY  
AT THE END OF BRITAIN’S LONG 18TH CENTURY 
 
  
 My central claim that Coleridge had become some kind of Anglican Evangelical is at one 
level a simple enough proposition. One need only a thorough and accurate description of early 
British evangelicalism, a thorough and accurate account of Coleridge’s mature religious thought, 
and a persuasive analysis of how the latter fits within the confines of the former. However, 
providing a fair portrait both of evangelicalism and of Coleridge’s own thought requires that both 
the man and the movement be located in the broader context of British religious thought in what 
I am calling the “religious long 18th century.” Painting a picture of the larger landscape allows 
for greater definitional and explanatory precision since it clarifies commonalities as well as 
particularities of the various religious movements under consideration. This approach has the 
advantage of lessening any suspicion that I merely demonstrated that Coleridge held in common 
with evangelicalism those features commonly held by many or all contemporary religious 
movements. Therefore, before diving into a more detailed description of the character of early 
British evangelicalism in its multiple forms, I will use this chapter to point to the outlines of the 
various non-evangelical religious movements36 that formed the backdrop against which 
Coleridge’s own form of Christianity developed. 
																																																						
36 While nearly all the forms of religiosity that I consider identified themselves as a form of Christianity, I prefer the 
term “religious movements” to “Christian movements” or “forms of Christianity” because there were certain 
movements that self-consciously rejected claims to being Christian. While I recognize that one cannot fully escape 
normative judgements as to these sorts of things, the use of this language is not meant to imply that certain 
movements that claimed to be Christian were not in fact deserving of the label. A similar caveat goes for the use of 
“orthodoxy/orthodox” and “heterodoxy/heterodox.” I employ such terms only for groups that took those titles for 
themselves or to describe how these systems of belief were viewed by their contemporaries.  
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 I begin with a note of caution about the nature of the 18th century British religious 
landscape, particularly regarding the messiness of language used to identify individual groups. 
Frist, one encounters a period of polemic where fairly representing an opponent’s views was not 
frequently an intellectual virtue, even if one created strawmen and knocked them down politely. 
Additionally, some of the descriptors, such as High Church, evangelical, orthodox, rationalist, 
moralist, etc., that a contemporary reader may now consider mutually exclusive were not 
necessarily seen in such oppositional relationships at the time, or they had meanings that shifted 
during the course of the long 18th century.37 Furthermore, politics, ecclesiology, and theology 
were very closely intertwined in 18th century British thinking, adding additional complications. 
Certain terms could slip between describing theological commitments and political affiliations 
depending on the perspective and motivations of an author at a given point in time.  
At the same time, while one must wade cautiously into the waters of 18th century religious 
identification, one should not yield to the temptation of thinking that it is impossible to mark off 
different movement. One may be faced with a turbulent sea of religious thought and practice, but 
this is still a sea with distinct and distinguishable currents in it.   
  Even if 18th century scholars often contend a great deal about the precise boundary 
markers between religious tendencies as well as how mutually exclusive certain of them were, 
the various categories themselves do not tend to be matters of great controversy.38 This chapter 
																																																						
37 The most obvious example is that of “High Church.” In the early 18th century, it was a political descriptor (i.e., a 
synonym for Church Toryism) with some loose theological and liturgical associations, while by the end of the 18th 
century it had come more to define a much more specific style of theology and liturgical preferences.  
 
38 One of the main issues in the interpretation of 18th century Britain is the degree to which certain ideas permeated 
the larger culture. For instance, there is a lively debate about whether the long 18th century should be considered 
ideologically a continuation of the ancien régime or the beginnings of a modernized society. However, such 
arguments generally turn on the degree to which certain ideas and practices permeated the larger culture and they 
often disagree about who played on what teams (was Paley truly non-Trinitarian, etc.); however, the arguments are 
not, by and large, about who the teams were.  
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will therefore move through the 18th century’s theological trends (the ones pertinent to 
understanding Coleridge at least) in a way that will clarify each of their distinguishing features as 
well as their commonalities. I do not pretend to explore each movement exhaustively, but I do 
want a survey that sufficiently explores these options so that one can accurately locate Coleridge 
in relationship to them. This chapter does focus primarily on the late 18th and early 19th centuries, 
but to accurately gain a picture of this period one must go back to figures and movements of the 
late 17th and early 18th centuries (especially the Deists, Latitudinarians, and Non-Jurors). These 
movements helped to set the terms of the conversation and some continued to be viable 
theological options well into the 19th century.  
I begin by presenting that religious tradition methodologically most determined by a 
commitment to “rationalism.”39 Deists set the stage for an 18th century tradition of religion 
largely or completely circumscribed by reason, even though this movement had died out for the 
most part by the 1750s. Following Deism was a religious tradition wholly bounded by reason, 
with the majority in this trajectory considering themselves wholly within the Christian tradition 
(such as Priestley’s Unitarianism supported by Hartley’s Lockean naturalism) and with a very 
small minority, such minimal theists and an exceptionally small number of true atheists, that saw 
themselves outside of Christianity. The Deists occasioned a response from some orthodox (or at 
least more orthodox) thinkers, particularly Bishop Butler and then William Paley, who sought to 
defend traditional Christian doctrines and conceptions of revelation. Nevertheless, they still 
																																																						
39 I frequently use the terms “rational,” “rationalist,” and “rationalism” throughout this text. This usage must be 
differentiated from the more technical distinction in the history of modern philosophy in which “Rationalism” stands 
as an epistemological commitment distinguished from “Empiricism.” With few exceptions, I mean by “rational” 
simply “pertaining to human reasoning capabilities, however they are conceived.” Unless otherwise stated (as for 
instance, in describing Coleridge’s distinction between “reason” and “understanding”), “rationalism” and related 
terms do not refer to a commitment to innate ideas and opposition to empiricism. Indeed, the overwhelming majority 
of 18th century British “rationalist” thinkers were empiricists of one sort or another.  
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belong to this larger “rationalist” category because they argued for these doctrines in a 
methodologically similar way to the Deists and the Deists’ rationalist heirs.  
I look next at the Latitudinarian tradition, which began in the late seventeenth century 
and for the most part established the dominant tone for the 18th-century Church of England. 
“Latitudinarainism” represents a shift to a much broader category of thinkers, and one defined by 
a set of political and social goals as much as doctrinal or intellectual commitments. A diverse 
range of positions can be gathered accurately under the umbrella of “Latitudinarianism” as a 
movement because of a shared desire for minimizing the required set of Christian beliefs needed 
to be included in or tolerated by the Church of England. Because of the de-emphasized status of 
religious belief, Latitudinarians tended toward a common ethical vision of Christianity and the 
ability for such a vision to improve society, which in turn tolerated or fostered a principally 
moralistic approach to Christianity. 
 The next chapter will deal extensively with evangelicalism, but evangelicalism can be 
thought of as part of a movement within a larger trend that can be deemed “orthodox.” This 
current chapter will thus conclude with the non-evangelical orthodox Christians of the 18th and 
early 19th centuries, a group that happened to be principally High Church Anglicans. Political 
High Churchmanship (even if it often implied certain liturgical and theological commitments) 
stands at the beginning of this 18th century tradition, although the movements through which 19th 
century and 20th century High Churchmen trace their lineage increasingly inverted the priority 
between political and liturgical and theological identification. What would distinguish this group 
more than any other from other religious traditions at the time, including others who would have 
held to “orthodox” interpretations of the 39 Articles, was the extremely high view they held of 
the Church as the mediator of salvation through properly administered sacraments performed by 
		30 
a church hierarchy supported by the authority of apostolic succession. This group also came, by 
the early 19th century, to identify themselves explicitly against what they saw as “Calvinism.”  
 The 18th century religious was significantly tempered by, and resulted from, the social, 
political, and intellectual trends and events of the 17th century. The dramatic increases in 
knowledge of the natural world brought about by a Post-Baconian approach to the experimental 
sciences imparted an optimism that humans could free themselves, through the exercise of 
reason, not only from slavery to ignorance and nature, but also to despotic political regimes. 
While “a wide variety of influences” worked to bring about this intellectual climate, Isaac 
Newton, the champion of the new experimental science, and John Locke, who provided the 
philosophical scaffolding for the new approach to natural science as well as the theoretical basis 
for political and social liberalism, became the symbols of intellectual authority against which 
18th century thought had to measure itself.40 While the tendency toward an empirical 
epistemology has a history in British thought that predates even Bacon and Hobbes, Locke and 
Newton did serve, probably more than any other figures, to establish this approach to human 
intellectual endeavors as the principle “British” style. Under the shadow of their achievements, 
and often invoking their authority, 18th century thinkers sought to extend this Lockean-
Newtonian model beyond natural science and philosophy to politics, economics, and even social 
reform.  
 Without downplaying the importance of Locke and Newton for informing the spirit of the 
age, one must also account for the significant role played by the political, religious, and social 
turmoil of the greater part of the l7th century for the development of the 18th century British 
cultural imaginary. Granted, Britain did not experience the same kind of overwhelming 
																																																						
40 Gerald R. Cragg, Reason and Authority in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1964), 5. 
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devastation that the wars of religion brought to much Continental Europe.41 Nevertheless, while 
it may not have been as jarring as the 30 Years War, the English Civil War, the execution of 
Charles I, and the interregnum proliferation of radical religious sects with their equally radical 
views of society and morality did have a profoundly unsettling effect on vast swathes of British 
society, giving the impression of a “world turned upside down.” The scale of loss of life in these 
conflicts, in which a larger percentage of the population may have died than in the First World 
War, “was alone enough to cause significant national trauma.”42 However, the attempt to rectify 
the situation through the draconian, and plausibly vindictive, imposition of religious and political 
uniformity during the Restoration proved equally unpalatable to many. Several consequences for 
18th century religious life reverberated out from these events. Some saw “Puritanism” as the 
principle disruptive force, which led to an aversion to forms of piety or theology associated with 
“Puritans.” Others saw a problem not in particular sects, but rather in any attempt at uniform 
imposition of doctrines and practices, which made more room for an openness to restricted 
doctrinal systems and greater toleration of differing systems of belief, polity, and liturgical 
practice. The perceived increase in libertinism that accompany James II’s policy of religious 
toleration could lead equally to seeing Christianity as needing to function principally as an agent 
of moral reform as to calling for a strengthened national church with a strictly enforced policy of 
ecclesial uniformity. The more radical groups imparted to almost everyone a tendency to equate 
“enthusiasm” with “fanaticism,” meaning that subsequent groups had to avoid – or at least 
defend – practices associated with these earlier movements. Those in the 18th century, at least 
																																																						
41 This may help explain why by and large even the more extreme British proponents of rationality did not seek to 
unsettle Christianity, or at least a religion based on a purified Christianity, whereas the Enlightenment as it unfolded 
in France was much more closely linked to hostility toward Christianity or even religion in general. 
 
42 Michael Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire (London and New York: Penguin Books, 2008), Kindle, loc. 168.  
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among the educated classes, held that the “civilized man… would be wise to adhere to his beliefs 
sedately and in a reasonable spirit."43 
 In line with Charles Taylor’s description of one’s “social imaginary” being determined by 
both ideal and material conditions, it seems clear that the most profoundly influential forces 
related to 18th century thought were neither wholly the result of systems of thought constructed 
proactively and objectively, nor of a set of general non-reflexive emotional, political, and social 
reactions that later received intellectual support.44 Intellectual concerns did likely prove the 
primary motivations for some thinkers. However, even Locke, the 18th century’s primary 
philosophical touchstone, seems not only to have been a cause for and architect of liberal notions 
of religious toleration, but his work was also in part occasioned by a larger social and political 
movement in that direction. On the other hand, many, even among the “educated,” found 
themselves averse to “enthusiasm,” “fanaticism,” “Puritanism,” or “Popery” less from 
intellectual than emotional forces that rested on an unreflective sense that whatever was 
associated with these nebulous ideas went against the emerging norms of “polite society,” 
undercut social or national stability, or conflicted with a proper English (or Scottish, or Welsh, or 
British) character and were thus treasonous.  
																																																						
43 G. R. Cragg, The Church and the Age of Reason (London and New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 13. 
 
44 Charles Taylor’s understanding of a “social imaginary” acts as an ever-present subterranean influence on my 
argument. Taylor understands the “social imaginary” as something like the set of acknowledged and 
unacknowledged ideas, modes of reasoning, and practices that a group considers acceptable at any given time. Often 
these boundaries are so ubiquitous that they are only recognized through deeper reflection on one’s place in society, 
if at all. This concept does not imply that thinkers cannot on an individual level come up with ideas that do not fit 
within the social imaginary (an isolated person is not determined by their social imaginary), but it does imply that 
new ideas will rarely gain traction in the larger society without corresponding changes to the imaginary. My attempt 
to look beyond the explicit beliefs and practices of religious movements is an attempt to discern the fabric of the 
“social imaginaries” of the various distinguishable religious movements in Britain at that time. For more information 
on this concept, look at Taylor’s A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2007), 159-211. The discussion of the relationship between the material and ideal follows on pp. 212-218. 
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 The first larger tendency in 18th century British thought under consideration could be 
thought of as the attempt to wholly establish – and, in rare cases, disestablish – religious belief 
on a foundation of what unaided human rational capacities can know. One should see this more 
as a broad methodological disposition rather than as a set of organized positions, and the various 
ways of further distinguishing tendencies within this “style” present different degrees of 
coherence as specific schools. 
 Deists were possibly the most infamous of groups considered within this broader 
category, although their influence (or perceived menace) was certainly disproportionately higher 
than the actual influence they exerted on larger religious sentiments and the strong critical 
response they engendered.45 “Deists”  may have shared “a common outlook,” but they “never 
constituted a cohesive group” or “established anything approaching a school of thought,” and 
“made no attempt to discipline idiosyncrasy or to exclude individual caprice.”46 Samuel Clarke, a 
proponent of rational religion but not himself a true Deist, distinguished four forms of Deism. 
The first group included those who believed that God exists, but that this God remained 
completely unconcerned with any interaction with the world.47 The second group went further 
and accepted a providential dimension to God’s activity, but rejected the idea that God 
concerned Godself with human morality, since this morality could only have been founded on 
arbitrary human laws. The third group included those who accepted the perfection of God’s 
moral attributes, but who accepted no future state of reward or punishment. Finally, the fourth 
																																																						
45 Cragg, Reason and Authority, 64.  
 
46 Cragg, Reason and Authority, 63.  
 
47 This first group begins to border on, or has possibly already entered the territory of, what may even be considered 
“minimal theism,” a category that can also describe David Hume’s religious beliefs. There is certainly no reason to 
believe otherwise, but this would mean that “minimal theism” as a set of beliefs about God could admit of a great 
deal of hostility among its own members, since Hume was at least as critical of the Deists’ confidence in human 
rationality as of those who had faith in the claims of revelation.  
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approach held to the existence of a creator God of perfect moral goodness deserving human 
adoration as well as continued human existence after death when humans would be rewarded or 
punished.48 49  
 Brooks Holifield provides additional distinctions within Deism, this time according to 
their view of the Bible and their view of the goal of religion in general. Some Deists accepted 
that some of the Bible, so long as it reinforced what reason had independently discovered, could 
be accepted. Others showed contempt for any use of the Bible: “the first group saw themselves 
as contributing to a reform of Christian thought in accord with eighteenth-century norms of 
reason; the second group believed that a natural religion should replace Christian superstition.”50 
In Clarke’s fourfold division, one likely saw proponents of the third and fourth varieties 
defending Deism as a form of purified Christianity, while those within the first two divisions 
would have seen their purified religion as moving beyond or supplanting Christianity.51 
 Despite allowing for significant latitude regarding specific belief, Deism as a “common 
outlook” still shared common methodological features and beliefs. Deists had an extremely high 
view of unaided human reason, both in terms of its value and capacities. They believed that the 
																																																						
48 Ernest Gordon Rupp, Religion in England: 1688-1791 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
260-61. I have summarized Rupp’s own presentation of Clarke’s views.  
 
49 While this last group appears very similar to certain Latitudinarian views discussed below, what distinguished 
them as Deists was their belief that all of these ideas were discoverable by reason alone and that one should not rely 
upon divine revelation. 
 
50 E. Brooks Holifield, Theology in America (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003),159-60.  
 
51 This division likely makes Deism unique even among other radical religious movements in Britain at the time; 
while others, particularly Unitarians (who will be discussed below), accepted that human reason could develop a 
true and complete system of religious thought entirely of its own power, almost every other movement saw itself as 
having a greater claim to “true” Christianity than the defenders of doctrinal orthodoxy. Deism appears to be the only 
identifiable movement to include those who rejected Christianity. This is not to say that there were not those who 
rejected both Christianity and non-Christian Deism, but at least during the eighteenth century these tended to be 
based on sui generis reasoning or systems of thought. There were other minimal theists, skeptics, agnostics, and 
even atheists in Britain during this time. However, even on this point, the number of people who openly positioned 
themselves as true atheists was exceedingly low and while this group could include influential individuals, such as 
William Goodwin or the young Robert Southey, their atheism rarely figured significantly in that influence.  
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“light of nature was sufficient for the solution of all religious and philosophical problems.” 52 
Stripped of the darkness of superstition and ignorance, human beings could through reason attain 
to everything humans should ever need to know. For some this optimism about innate human 
capacities might even lead to the belief that unaided human reason could in principle arrive at 
everything knowable. Whether purifying or supplanting Christianity, Deists advocated for a 
“natural religion,” meaning free of appeals to supernatural revelation, that they “regarded as 
simple in itself and sufficient for every human need.”53 Bishop Butler’s arguments against Deism 
indicate that Deists held to a certain enlightenment optimism in which humans (or at least men) 
were as a rule equally capable of using their rational capacities in this way.54 Matthew Tindal, 
whose Christianity as Old as the Creation represented a significant argument for Deism, held 
that since the nature of God never changes, “God must always have treated all men in precisely 
the true same way.” Thus, God “must always have made uniformly accessible to all the 
knowledge both to recognize and to discharge their duties.”55 
 As implied in the title of the Deist John Toland’s work Christianity not Mysterious, 
Deism rejected any positive notion of mystery and, with this rejection, the need for revelation in 
religion. This rejection of mystery came close to a categorical acceptance that nothing in 
principle existed beyond the bounds of discovery through rational human inquiry. On one hand, 
this position flowed from an optimism about the advances being made in the natural sciences: 
“The mounting authority of Newtonian physics inspired the hope that all branches of knowledge 
could be reduced to a few, simple, uniform laws which any educated man could understand and 
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every reasonable person would accept.”56 At the same time, Deists suspected that the clergy 
intentionally invoked “mystery” to ensure that reason remained unexercised and so that they 
could control the masses. Toland understood “mysteries” to be “esoteric, arcane doctrines which 
the priests claim to guard and which they put forward for the acceptance of the faithful.”57 This 
second reason for rejection of mystery flowed in large part from the trauma of the 17th century 
wars of religion. For the Deists, these conflicts demonstrated that appeals to any of the ancient 
standards of authority, whether the monarchy, scripture, or ecclesial dogma, failed to mediate 
conflict in a helpful way. Deists therefore hoped to “emancipate human reason from any kind of 
eternal control” and they saw appeals to any other as invalid and, often, malicious.58 
 Deists likewise shared enough rhetorical tactics that one can fairly understand them as 
having a distinct theological “style.” Like many who would succeed them, Deists claimed Locke 
as their principle intellectual founder and source of authority. Locke was not himself a Deist and 
even “indignantly repudiated the inferences which they drew from him,” but the Deists still 
“insisted that they derived all their principles from him.”59 While Deist likely believed 
themselves to be furthering the spirit of Locke’s work, they frequently advanced their positions 
through select quotations from non-Deist or even anti-Deist thinkers. For instance, “Tindal’s 
favorite stratagem was to advance his work under cover of quotations from Clarke, Sherlock, 
Tenison, or Wake” and Deists in general were “effusive in their praise for Tillotson.”60 
Regardless of the degree that individual Deists felt they maintained the spirit of these other 
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thinkers, this technique doubtless formed part of a calculated strategy to legitimate their position 
in the public eye. 
 Because of their optimism about the universality of human reason, Deists presented their 
arguments to a broader audience than was customary for their theological contemporaries. This 
expanded audience had stylistic implications that reached far beyond the Deists. Far from only 
wanting to influence an intellectual elite, Deists proved themselves “as eager to modify the 
outlook of the ordinary reader as to modify the views of theological experts.”61 They wrote in a 
direct and informal style popularized in the coffee houses.62 The appropriation of this style had 
the effect of raising the “standard of intelligibility” for religious discourse, as well as 
democratizing access to it. Effectively countering the Deist position required opponents “to 
match the simplicity and directness which marked the Deists’ writing.”63  
 While this Deistic style certainly had its virtues, other features of their rhetoric proved 
less benign. 17th and 18th century conventions for what constituted “civil” discourse allowed 
considerably harsher rhetoric than do contemporary standards for intellectual charity, and even in 
that context the Deists’ opponents regularly accused them of engaging in disrespectful, 
hypocritical, and underhanded strategies to sway readers. Deists “frequently demanded that their 
cases be heard with all possible gravity” while using ridicule as a standard rhetorical weapon.64 
																																																						
61 Cragg, Reason and Authority, 64.  
 
62 This point speaks to the way in which Deists saw themselves. Coffee houses often sprung up next to Britain’s 
ancient universities and served as primary meeting places and venues to discuss ideas excluded from the 
universities, such as the new science or modern developments in philosophy. By appropriating this style of writing, 
the Deists were not only able to reach a larger audience, they were associating themselves with an institution that 
symbolized a challenge to established norms for intellectual authority. See Brian Cowan’s The Social Life of Coffee 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005), particularly ch. 4, for a description of the coffee house’s 
relationship to the university, as well as the role coffee houses played to disseminate new modes of knowledge.  
 
63 Cragg, Reason and Authority, 62. Many of the defenders of orthodoxy had to adapt not only to the positions 
argued for by Deists, but also to their mode of argumentation itself. 
 
64 Cragg, Reason and Authority, 73. 
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While characterizing themselves as champions of reason as the only measure of truth and 
charging orthodox Christianity with intellectual obfuscation, Deists regularly used innuendo in 
place of direct argument and “consistently implied more than they were willing to state.”65 In one 
of the most damning instances of Deistic duplicity, Collins made free use of “careless references, 
inexact quotations, inaccurate translations, misconceptions, and distortions” in his Discourse on 
Free Thinking (of all titles).66 Such was the state of Deist rhetoric that even those who may have 
sympathized with a more rational Christianity found the Deists’ writings “intolerable.” William 
Whiston, for instance, professed Arianism but could not abide the “amused contempt” with 
which Collins’s Discourse treated subjects that Whitson thought deserving of greater respect.67 
 A final, and likely among the most unpalatable, characteristic of Deistic conventions was 
a strong inclination toward anti-Semitism: “The one people, the one religion which really got 
under [the Deists’] skins, was Judaism.”68 In Judaism they saw only a “repulsive blend of ritual 
and superstition” all carried out “in the name of a cruel and savage Deity.” This perspective 
prevented any recognition of “the Hebraic traditions of mercy and of righteousness.”69 In 
contrast, the Deists held the ancient Greeks and Romans in the highest regard. Deists certainly 
did not initiate the revival of interest in pagan Hellenistic thought, but they did embrace it with 
passion.70 In a way that prefigured Gibbon’s attitudes, Deists saw educated pagan Greeks and 
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Romans as models for a properly ordered society because they possessed an ability to see 
through the fog of superstition and ritual in their own age.  
 Contemporary proponents of orthodoxy believed that Deism’s attempt to appeal to a 
broader audience posed one of the most pressing threats to Christianity at the time. The orthodox 
counter-attack against the Deists proved extremely effective, and this cause could count among 
its ranks some 18th century Britain’s greatest mind, including Bentley, Berkeley, Swift, Sherlock, 
and Joseph Butler. As the century progressed, Deism found itself fighting an intellectual war on 
a second front as skeptics like David Hume challenged the conception of reason, human 
knowledge, and nature that served as its intellectual foundation. Insofar as it drew sustenance 
popular appeal, Deism encountered increasing competition for the minds, and especially hearts, 
of the British people as the flames of revival grew hotter and brighter in the 1730s and 40s. By 
the 1740s Deist publications “were no longer sensational.”71 For a movement that had sustained 
itself in large part by the controversy it had engendered, this loss not only signaled, but helped 
precipitate, Deism’s twilight. By the 1750s, “the cause seems to have withered” and Deism no 
longer could no longer claim any significant territory in the British intellectual landscape.72  
While no longer an active option by Coleridge’s time, Deism nonetheless shaped the 
theological discourse and religious culture that was. Deism made more space within the 18th 
century British social imaginary for a theology that appealed to no more than the unaided human 
intellect. At the same time, it helped established the boundary markers for this kind of inquiry; 
for the rest of the 18th and into the early 19th centuries no, or almost no, theological trends that 
could drew enough followers to constitute actual movements would present themselves as 
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“moving beyond” or replacing Christianity. Polemics of the time certainly made liberal use of 
“atheist” as a term of abuse, but it almost always applied to “someone who does not believe in 
God correctly” rather than someone who explicitly denied the existence of God.73  
The movement that did exercise considerable influence on Coleridge, and, in many ways, 
did so for his whole life, was the theological outlook that continued the spirit (if not temper) of 
Deism: Unitarianism. Specifically, the Unitarianism of the great English polymath Joseph 
Priestley, which wed the general theological outlook, themes, and disposition of the Unitarians 
with David Hartley’s physio-psychology philosophy, came to frame most of Coleridge’s 
religious development. Without providing a detailed survey of these thinkers, I will attempt to 
present enough about their goals, intellectual commitments, and general outlook to understand 
the religious and philosophical system that Coleridge so enthusiastically embraced in his early 
adulthood and then vehemently rejected during his middle and later years.74  
Some historical context will help with an understanding of the specifics of Priestley’s 
Unitarianism. At this point, I need to delve more deeply into how ecclesial history and 
identification were linked to the development of different theological, philosophical, and 
political affiliations. Some Anglicans certainly sympathized with Unitarian theology (although 
such sympathies would have had to have been held more or less secretly depending on how 
strongly one’s bishop or priest thought it necessary to enforce subscription to the 39 Articles), 
																																																						
73 See Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, 34-5. It would not be until the early Victorian era that atheism and 
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selection. While the dominance in the later 18th and early 19th century of a so-called “evidential” approach to 
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74 This rejection could be so strong at points that it appears that Hartley’s and Priestley’s thought still held sway over 
Coleridge, but now in the negative sense that he distanced himself from positions which were associated with this 
other system and in some cases one wonders if he intentionally adopted positions that this other system rejected. 
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but Unitarianism properly describes a theological and denominational tradition that emerged first 
among certain Nonconformists before becoming its own independent dissenting body.  
The established Church in England prior to, during, and after the Reformation had always 
contended with some groups that sought to establish themselves either as alternatives to or 
replacements for the state ecclesial body.75 However, with the exception of some few separatist 
groups such as the Brownists, from the beginning of the Henrician Reformation through the 
English Civil War, most theological and ecclesiological dissent came from those claiming 
fidelity to the state church and were truly internal disputes about how to properly structure the 
polity, liturgy, and theology of the Church of England. Only with the Restoration Settlement 
after the English Civil War and the push for a strict enforcement of the 1660 Act of Uniformity 
did most Dissent become a significant alternative to the established church. Some decided to 
leave the state church on their own. For others, who would have remained part of the established 
church but would not subscribe to every part of the new Act of Uniformity, it was the Church of 
England that rejected them.76 
Some Nonconformist bodies originated in traditions that sought to reform the state church 
prior to the Civil War, such as the Congregationalists and Presbyterians. Other groups, such as 
Quakers and Baptists, emerged from theological traditions that gained more prominence during 
the intense religious foment of the Civil War itself.77  The changes in the intellectual climate 
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76 Rupp, Religion, 105. Most notably in the Great Ejection of 1662. 
 
77 Polity, rather than doctrine, primarily divided the first two groups, with the Presbyterians calling for more 
interconnection, greater uniformity of liturgical practice, and less independence in governance of local 
congregations and the Independents calling for almost complete autonomy for local congregations. Both traditions, 
however, had similar theological outlooks, and by the beginning of the 18th century they tended to have the same 
range of theological distinctions. Both groups traced their origins to the English Reformed tradition, but out of this 
tradition there emerged those committed to strict or hyper-Calvinism, others who held to a more moderate Calvinism 
(such as Richard Baxter), and even some Arminians. The Baptists held to a polity that emphasized congregational 
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accompanying the transition into the 18th century had the effect of moving many Dissenters, 
often within the same ecclesial structures, along opposite ideological trajectories. On the one 
hand, a “vehement hyper-Calvinism” appeared in response to the feeling among some Calvinists 
that the Deism, Socinianism, and Arianism of the age could be “put down to the sinister 
influence of Arminian and Baxterian notions.”78 This hyper-Calvinism, which emphasized God’s 
sovereignty to the point of rejecting even evangelism as a presumptive invasion by humans of 
“the sphere of God’s sovereign grace,” found its greatest theological proponent in John Gill and 
its primary ecclesial outlet in the formation of the Strict Baptists.79 
At the same time, Dissent also created the conditions for the flourishing of the most 
liberal theological outlooks of the time. One can view this as the result of the political and social 
exclusion that accompanied membership in a dissenting body. Employment by the state and 
education at Britain’s ancient universities required both subscription to the 39 Articles and 
acknowledged membership in the Church of England, thus disqualifying Dissenters from 
military and other government positions as well as excluding them from education at Oxford and 
Cambridge. This led to Dissenters increasingly identifying with the Whigs, both because Whigs 
were the historic party of trade and industry (professions that did not exclude Dissenters) and 
because Whigs favored more expansive policies of religious toleration.80  
																																																						
autonomy, and could also count themselves part of the Reformed tradition, but they tended to disavow formal 
learning more than the Congregationalists and also held beliefs more in concert with the Anabaptists, such as a 
rejection of infant Baptism and greater propensity for a memorialist understanding of Baptism and Eucharist. On 
other doctrinal matters, Baptists also split along Arminian and Calvinist lines, and various Baptist organizations 
emerged in line with these distinctions. The Quakers represent the most distinct of the Nonconformist groups: they 
had a theology which emphasized the inner witness of the Spirit and some distinctive interpretations of traditional 
doctrines, even if they did not explicitly disavow most traditional Christian doctrine. They also were distinguished 
by their practice and ethics. They were firm pacifists, they eschewed any formal structure in liturgy and rejected any 
sacraments, and tended to be highly egalitarian (for the time) in their understanding of the social order. 
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Furthermore, exclusion from the universities led dissenting groups, particularly the 
Presbyterians and Congregationalists, to establish their own academies to ensure that they had 
access to higher education. These academies often provided far better educations than Oxford or 
Cambridge could offer. Because they lacked the institutional inertia that favored long entrenched 
educational methods, dissenting academies proved more accepting of contemporary scientific 
and philosophical approaches, resulting in “a ‘progressive’ outlook” pervading many of the 
academies early in the 18th century.81 While many who oversaw these academies remained 
orthodox in their own beliefs, they nevertheless “encouraged free inquiry” by students.82 For 
instance, John Jennings “did not restrict himself to a single theological position” in his 
instruction and “would defend in turn Calvinist, Baxterian, and Arminian views.”83 Explicitly 
heterodox teaching became more and more pervasive, particularly in the west and the north of 
England. At Daventry, some of the tutors explicitly confessed Arian beliefs by the time that 
Joseph Priestley became a student there, and while serving as a tutor at Warrington he claimed 
that all the tutors were at least Arians – if not “well on the road to Socinianism.”84 
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84 Cragg, Reason and Authority, 38. Socinianism was a general theological trend originating in the writings of the 
16th century Italian theologian Faustus Socinius (Fausto Paolo Sozzini), but it came to cover a wide range of thinkers 
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what may be called “theological Unitarianism,” but they were not necessarily confined to one ecclesial affiliation. 
Arians (and we may now term them more properly “neo-Arians”) or Subordinationists were those who still held to 
the divinity of Christ, and could consider themselves Trinitarian (often claiming to have the more authentic 
Trinitarian doctrine). However, like those in the early church who held views that would be deemed the “Arian 
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A divide opened and grew wider within Presbyterian and Congregationalist 
congregations between those adhering to orthodox Christian doctrine and those that moved by 
stages from moderate Calvinism to Arminianism to Arianism and finally to explicitly Socinian 
beliefs. By 1770 “barely half the Presbyterian congregations were Trinitarian in belief… and in 
due course became explicitly Unitarian.”85 While Presbyterians proved more accepting than any 
other dissenting group of heterodoxy and thus the turn toward Socinian belief and later 
association with the Unitarians, English Congregationalists also drifted in this direction: “At 
least half a dozen Congregational churches were to become Unitarian, when that communion 
was formally established,” and many congregations experienced bitter internal divisions between 
those sympathetic to the Unitarians and those who remained orthodox.86 
“Unitarianism” as an ecclesial designation and not only a common feature of “Socinian” 
theology describes the communion of congregations gathered together by Joseph Priestley and 
Theophilus Lindsey in 1774, and which generally held to the theological principles that will be 
elaborated in our discussion of Priestley. This communion consisted largely of congregations 
previously associated with Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and other communities that had 
come to hold beliefs that aligned with the Unitarians, but Unitarians also formed entirely new 
congregations with no ties to earlier Nonconformists communities.  
After 1774, one can distinguish an ecclesial body called “Unitarianism” from a tendency 
toward “Unitarian” thought in other religious groups, and Joseph Priestley significantly 
influenced the characteristic beliefs of this newly formed organized. Before expounding 
Priestley’s thought, I must make one last detour, this time through David Hartley’s intellectual 
																																																						
85 Cragg, Reason and Authority, 37.  
 
86 Rupp, Religion, 488.  
		45 
system. The degree of detail given to Hartley’s thought may appear unnecessarily extensive and 
is not strictly speaking necessary for an understanding of Unitarianism or Priestley. However, if 
Unitarianism was the religious movement that served as the main foil to Coleridge’s later 
development, Hartley is the thinker who Coleridge early on embraced most enthusiastically and 
who then came to represent the erroneous character of British thought that Coleridge sought to 
correct. Thus, for Coleridge’s religious milieu, Hartley proved significantly more influential than 
Hartley would have for many of Coleridge’s contemporaries. 
While Hume may have most accurately succeeded Locke methodologically by taking 
Locke’s empirical commitments to their limits, Hartley maintained the spirit of Locke’s original 
project. Locke wanted a clear description of human understanding that could undergird and 
facilitate continued advances in human knowledge through the Newtonian scientific method.87 
Hartley in turn sought a material, physiological foundation for Locke’s theory of human 
cognition that drew upon Newton’s mechanistic principles for explaining the structure of the 
natural world. Locke had provided a phenomenological account of the mind that did not require 
positing an immaterial soul and thus would not be incompatible with materialism;88 Hartley 
desired to show positively how mind could emerge from merely corporeal substance.  
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Locke’s account of association89 most inspired Hartley and determined his explanation of 
the human mind’s dependence upon and emergence from matter. Hartley believed that if he 
could show both the material process by which external stimuli give rise to simple sensations and 
a further material process by which these simple sensations became ideas, then he could explain 
individual flashes of consciousness. If he could explain individual instances of consciousness, he 
could explain consciousness in toto, and he would thus have a material basis for the mind as well 
as a natural scientific explanation of its functions. The upshot of providing such an account is 
that it would show that the principle laws governing the external world also govern the inner 
human mental world. In other words, Hartley could show that the principles of Newtonian 
science could really yield true knowledge in all areas of human inquiry. As Hartley affirmed “the 
proper method of philosophizing seems to be to discover and establish the general laws of action, 
affecting the subject under consideration, from certain select, well-defined, and well attested 
phenomena, and then explain and predict the other phenomena by these laws” – precisely “the 
method of analysis and synthesis recommended and followed by Sir Isaac Newton.”90 
 Hartley appealed to a theory of vibrations to solve the problem of how matter could give 
rise to seemingly immaterial ideas. Like Locke, he assumed that a mind remained blank (i.e., 
devoid of ideas) until sensations can make impressions on it. Complex ideas form from 
combinations of these simple sensations and the mind discerns general principles through a 
process of abstraction from these sensations and ideas.91 These impressions (purely physical 
interactions) can translate to sensations (mental states based on these interactions) because “such 
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impressions set up vibrations in the minute particles of the medullary substances of the nerves.”92 
Moderate vibrations produce sensations of pleasure, while violent vibrations, which disrupt the 
continuity of the nerves rather than merely setting them in motion, produce pain. The nerves, set 
in motion, communicate the impression to the brain, and there they gradually fade away. 
However, because they do not fade away instantaneously, they tend toward leaving behind 
fainter vibrations “of a similar kind,” which Hartley called “vibratiuncles.”93 Vibratiuncles 
correspond to Locke’s simple ideas of sensation, and Hartley used the power of association to 
account for how the mind organizes these simple ideas into complex ones. Whereas Locke 
accounted for the power of association agnostically through recourse to some constructive 
capacity in the mind, Hartley accounted for it physiologically: the patterns of association 
correspond to nerve functions.94 This explanation accounts for all facets of human mental life 
and action, including passive sense experience, desire, involuntary action, and even memory.95 
 With the basic principles in place for this theory of mind, Hartley attempted an 
explanation of the whole of human mental life. As simple sensations build on each other through 
further experiences, they open to the possibility of higher modes of mental life. Hartley thus 
proposed a theory of human psychological development through time. Babies come into the 
world without any ideas, but as they grow and experience more and more of the world, they 
develop through stages where increasingly complex (and noble) concepts determine our 
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pleasures and pains and thus our action. So, bare sensation eventually develops to imagination, 
and the combination of these two, sensation and imagination, leads to ambition. One moves in 
like fashion from ambition to self-interest, sympathy, theopathy, and finally the moral sense.96 
Each stage in human psychological development introduces a person to a broader range of 
possible pleasures, and this capacity for expanding the horizon of pleasures acts as the 
mechanism for moving from lower to higher stages. For instance, “imagination opens delights to 
which sensation alone cannot introduce us” by making us aware of the “beauties of the natural 
world, and of the charms of the world of art.”97 
 Hartley was not so naïve as to believe that humans do in fact move through all these 
stages, or that a person would necessarily act “properly” at any given stage of development. 
There are “degenerate,” in addition to “legitimate,” manifestations of pleasures and pains at each 
developmental stage. For instance, the love of God (the theopathic stage), “has its distinctive 
fears and pleasures” such that “when awe blends with love to create reverence, fear assumes a 
legitimate form.”98 Atheism and superstition, on the other hand, are corrupt (but more common) 
forms of theopathic fear. Likewise, gratitude, confidence, and resignation are the legitimate 
pleasures accompanying this stage, while enthusiasm represents its degenerate form.99 Hartley 
also freely admitted that any given action results from a motive at that moment, and that motive 
(a pleasure or pain) is determined by all past influences. Because this causal chain must always 
lead back to external causes, Hartley admitted that our larger environment and history does 
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determine any given action, and the totality of all the causes acting upon a person at any given 
time suffices to explain why a person acted how he or she did.100 Hartley admit that individual 
immoral actions, as well as the failure of people to develop to higher stages of motivation, 
ultimately redounds to a failure of one’s environment (or one’s given physical constitution) to 
produce a causal nexus that would create proper motives or physiological development. Hartley 
also admitted that his system lead to determinism or “necessitarianism,” but he would not 
concede that it required him to reject any notion of “free will.” His work possibly opposed a 
specialized concept of “free will” held by a minority of philosophers, but Hartley believed 
himself completely consistent with the commonly held sense of the term, i.e., the ability to do 
what one wants to do or to act on one’s strongest motive. Instances may arise in which one 
cannot act freely, but this system of necessitarianism did not in and of itself require this.101  
 However, critics of determinism at the time often feared not so much the abstract 
rejection of free will, but rather what they saw as a necessary inference from that rejection: the 
destruction of morality. Hartley regarded such objections as “frivolous”; far from destroying 
morality, his view would engender a reformist spirit. On an individual level people would strive 
to better their own circumstances, and on a broader scale his views would motivate initiatives for 
social reform. If the root cause of immoral desire or distorted motivation arose from larger 
environmental (social or material) conditions rather than individual choice, then modifying those 
larger environments held the key to broad scale moral reform. In this way, he maintained an 
Enlightenment optimism that humanity’s failings stemmed more from ignorance and social 
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conditioning than from a natural inclination toward evil, and could thus be rectified on a large 
scale through human effort and social engineering.   
 What many of Hartley’s contemporaries found so strange about his thought was that he 
sincerely considered his beliefs compatible with a  “theological superstructure” that was, if not 
entirely orthodox, perfectly mainstream for the 18th century.102 If we were looking at Hartley 
purely or primarily for his religious thought, it would probably be better to count him among the 
Latitudinarians rather than the radical rationalists, since he held to the need for a fully rationally 
defensible faith while maintaining a place for special revelation.  
 The perception that little in Hartley’s philosophy naturally gave rise to his theological 
commitments let Priestley enthusiastically embrace a Hartleyan philosophy and psychology as 
the foundation for his more radical theological project. While Priestley and Hartley shared a 
common optimism about their own era and the future before them, this optimism occupied a 
more axiomatic position in Priestley’s work. Priestley believed strongly that the continued 
increase in scientific knowledge would usher in a “kingdom of light” and overthrow “the reign of 
superstition and darkness” that had characterized so much of human history.103  
 To say that Priestley’s primary interest lay with Hartley’s philosophy does not mean he 
appropriated it unaltered. Priestly attempted to iron-out inconsistencies in Hartley’s though, often 
by drawing conclusions that Hartley stopped just shy of making. Notably, while Hartley wanted 
a fully material foundation for human consciousness, he did not reject an immaterial soul.104 
Priestley, however, strongly embraced the materialist possibility latent in Hartley’s thought. He 
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rejected the prevailing notion that matter was solid and inert and therefore incapable of the 
“powers of sensation and thought”; instead, matter was composed of “minute particles called 
atoms (akin to molecules in more modern terminology), whose essential quality was attraction 
and repulsion.”105 By positing matter as fundamentally active, Priestley could affirm that the 
“sentient principle in man is always associated with the material substance of the brain.”106 
 Priestley thought that this thorough-going materialism solved two problems. First, it 
allows for the resemblance between mental processes in animals and humans without having to 
postulate immaterial souls for animals. Thus, the differences between human and animal mental 
processes was one of degree rather than kind. Second, by “eliminating the usual concept of the 
soul, Priestley destroyed that element in man which had been regarded as akin to the divine.”107  
Priestley unquestionably accepted God’s existence and the demonstrability of God’s moral 
attributes, but he also believed that humans necessarily cannot know God’s essential nature.108 
By eliminating the need for something in humans analogous to this unknowable nature, Priestley 
could confine the whole of human nature to the physical universe and thus extended the scope of 
the natural sciences to include the whole of that nature.  
 Priestley’s optimistic worldview and his commitment to a necessitarian materialism, as 
well as the intimate connection between the two, provides a good entry into his religious thought. 
Priestley understood the existence of God to be an unquestioned fact. He did not believe we 
could in principle know God’s essential nature, but we can derive knowledge that God is the 
world’s intelligent first cause from the symmetry and goodness found in creation. Because the 
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principles of scientific observation could not determine the essential nature of God, one should 
not spend much time wondering about such things, to say nothing of enforcing them through 
dogma. Having said this, Priestley was resolute in his commitment to the complete oneness of 
God, meaning the rejection of any formulations of the doctrine of the Trinity. Furthermore, he 
rejected original sin, atonement for sin through Christ’s death, predestination (seeing it as 
arbitrary), and the plenary inspiration of Scripture. Based on God’s goodness, the unquestioned 
purpose for which God had created humanity was unlimited happiness. Necessitarianism ensured 
that this original purpose would inevitably come about; materialism assured that natural science 
could eliminate the ignorance and superstition that still impeded its realization. 
 Priestley attempted no self-conscious rejection of Christianity; to the contrary, he 
believed that he could and must preserve Christianity by stripping it of its “corruptions.” In his 
passionate desire to see Christianity reformed according to the principles of scientific rationality, 
i.e., in “enlightening” the gospel (although maybe Cragg is more correct to call his project a 
“gospel of enlightenment”), he pursued his task with “something akin to evangelical 
exaltation.”109 The desire to understand the whole of created reality according to the principles of 
scientific rationality provided the motivation that unified all his fields of inquiry. Here one must 
proceed cautiously when evaluating the centrality or superfluity of Priestley’s religious 
convictions. One may plausibly assume that were he alive 50 years later, he would not have felt 
any obligation to enlist this unified scientific inquiry in the service of a grand theological vision. 
However, for the Priestley who actually lived, neglecting this central religious motivation would 
fundamentally distort the shape of his intellectual work. As with Newton, Bacon, and other 
pioneers of modern experimental science, Priestley’s grounding concern and motive was 
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theological.110 Granted, the theology he arrived at involved a total conformity to human 
rationality, but it was a theological concern nonetheless. Priestley had, as he explains in his 
memoirs, grown up in a moderate home, and it seems one at least amenable to the teachings and 
practices of the evangelical revival.111 As was the case with many other Presbyterians at the time, 
he moved from the Calvinism of his youth to Arminianism, to Arianism, and finally to 
Socinianism. It was principally his Socinian theology that drew him to materialism and 
necessitarianism, and not the other way around.112  
Unlike the Deists, Priestly did not set out to discover pure natural religion independently 
of Scripture and only then accept whatever Scripture accorded with natural religion. Rather, he 
saw himself as completing the Reformation by returning to the original Christianity taught by 
Scripture. However, while Priestley might have felt he maintained the spirit of the Reformation, 
he certainly rejected many of its teachings. The Reformers, in his mind, remained inconsistent in 
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truly applying the principle of Sola Scriptura and thus developed systems of belief that retained 
far too many “corruptions.”  At the same time, Priestley attempted to consistently and rigorously 
apply scientific principles in distinguishing between true, original Christianity and its 
corruptions. Through the scientific study of history, Priestley believed he could discover when 
and from where these corruptions had been introduced. By demonstrating the un-Scriptural 
origin of these doctrines, Priestley believed it possible to then excise them from true Christianity. 
Priestley’s Unitarianism seems unquestionably to have continued the tradition of a 
radically rationalist form of Christianity and thus was a kind of successor to Deism. He shared 
the general Deist optimism that human reason could conquer ignorance and superstition. The 
acceptance of natural science as the principal model for proper rational inquiry meant that 
Priestley left slightly more room for “mystery” in the very weak sense that one cannot in 
principle know the nature of God, but his embrace of a complete materialism (excepting God) 
meant that in the universe the in-principle unknowable must give way to that which science had 
not yet discovered. However, this difference appears insignificant enough that it should not 
constitute an ideological shift from Deism in any significant way: God’s essential nature cannot 
be known by humans, but Priestley’s conclusion from this was that God’s essential nature 
therefore makes no difference on how we live or act. 
Nevertheless, one should not fail to see the real differences between Priestly and the 
Deists. While he may have ended up with a list of beliefs that could have satisfied a Deist, how 
he claimed to have arrived at them is a different matter. Scripture had to be amenable to 
scientific investigation, but Priestley still believed that it, or at least the original Christianity that 
Scripture points to, determined true Christianity.113 This contrasts with the Deist insistence on 
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deriving all the truths of religion from rational inquiry alone and only then, without any sense of 
compulsion to do so, demonstrating that Scripture conformed in some ways to these truths. 
Furthermore, whereas the Deists had lauded the Greeks and Romans and denigrated Judaism for 
its dedication to ritualism, ignorance, and devotion to a cruel God, Priestley’s esteem and 
corresponding contempt went in the opposite direction. Priestley still held Judaism had a certain 
“proneness to idolatry”, but it was Judaism that had the extraordinarily high purpose of 
“impressing the minds of many persons of other nations” of its fundamental truth, namely, the 
complete unity of God.114 It was Jewish Christianity that represented the earliest, un-corrupted 
form of the religion.115 In contrast, Greco-Roman philosophy fares very poorly. It was through 
the introduction of “maxims of pagan philosophy” that Christianity began to adhere to corrupt 
doctrines such as the divinity of Christ and the Trinity, and this “proceeded afterwards until 
Christianity was brought to a state little better than paganism.”116 Far from providing the model 
for opposition to superstition and ignorance as the Deists maintained, Greco-Roman philosophy 
was the chief corrupter of true Christianity and source of its superstitious doctrines.  
 Deists and Unitarians represent an extreme pole of rationalist Christianity/religion, but 
were not the only ones deserving of this title. There were also thinkers who acted as apologists 
for more traditional formulations of Christian doctrine but nonetheless still deployed a 
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fundamentally “rationalist” approach to Christianity. Bishop Butler at the beginning of the 
century and William Paley at the end prove fitting exemplars for this “apologetic” rationalism.117  
 Interestingly, this apologetic strand of thinking arose largely against the most extreme 
forms of rationalist religion, and it often acted as its most dedicated opponent. Butler may have 
done more than any other figure to repudiate Deism publicly; Paley used his evidential approach 
to both natural and revealed theology as a means of defending against the atheism and doubt 
occasioned by either the natural sciences or Humean rational skepticism. But, to use one of 
Coleridge’s favorite maxims, opposites meet. The apologists emphasized that a truly rational 
approach to Christianity embraced special revelation and the unknown, but this acceptance did 
not necessarily imply a qualitatively different understanding of the form of religious knowledge. 
Though their positions on the matter of individual doctrines would have placed Butler among 
conservatives and Paley on the liberal side of latitudinarianism, the apologists’s methodological 
disposition most resembled that of those whose thinking they most vociferously opposed.  
 Joseph Butler, the earlier of our two apologists, was probably the more theologically 
orthodox and was certainly the more circumscribed in his claims about the reach of human 
reason. Actually, much of Butler’s argument from analogy against the Deists was that they tried 
to give reason an unsustainable capacity to know the natural world; precisely this over-reaching 
led to the Deists’ over-confident dismissals of revealed religion.  
 Although born the son of a “Presbyterian linen draper” and taught at Samuel Jones’s 
dissenting Academy, Butler found himself drawn toward the established church and, after 
attending Oriel College, Oxford, he became famous as a preacher at Rolls Chapel.118 At Rolls he 
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wrote his famous 1736 defense of Christianity against Desim, The Analogy of Religion, Natural 
and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature. He first became Bishop of the See of 
Bristol and then again returned to an episcopal appointment in Durham in 1750. In terms of his 
character, Butler had a reputation for being prudent and yet still “almost prodigal in the 
generosity of his charities,” a man of great devotion, and a fine and well-respected preacher.119 
 Deism no longer represented a serious intellectual force in Britain by the middle of the 
18th century, and Butler’s Analogy of Religion was likely the most important single work for 
dismantling the Deist reputation in the public eye.120 This work proved so influential that most 
contemporary students only become familiar with his thought through it, and this it secured his 
enduring reputation as an apologist. As the title suggests, Butler used an analogical method to 
argue for the probability of Christianity’s revealed truths by moving analogically from human 
knowledge about the natural world gained through rational inquiry to deeper metaphysical 
questions such as the nature of God and the need for special divine revelation.  
 While Butler never explicitly singled-out Deism as his target, he also made no attempt to 
hide his intellectual opponents or the purpose of his arguments. He almost certainly took issue 
with the intellectual challenge to the truth claims that traditionally Christianity understood as 
coming through special revelation, but the attitude with which his unnamed opponents dismissed 
these claims appears to have troubled Butler much more. Butler could accept serious debate 
about these issues among the intelligentsia, but he felt instead that the Deists took the falsehood 
of Christianity’s claims for granted and made them therefore only the subject of “mirth and 
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ridicule.”121 This lack of due reverence in their treatment of Christianity’s claims contributed in 
no small part to Butler taking aim specifically at the Deists. As Terrence Penelhum summarizes, 
Butler meant to rectify both the arguments against Christianity as well as the glib dismissal with 
which the Deists made those arguments:  
 Butler’s arguments are intended as an antidote to the frivolity with which he thought his contemporaries 
 chose to approach the claims of Christianity. He intends to attack it by showing it to be unreasonable and 
 imprudent. To show it is imprudent, he does not have to prove that Christianity is true, or even prove that it 
 is likely Christianity is true; he has only to show that it is not so clear a case that there is nothing in it.122 
 
Butler understood rational demonstration in terms of probability, and it was in this spirit that he 
believed that his argument would show that it is more reasonable to believe in the truth of 
Christianity as a revealed religion than not to believe. But even if his arguments for the 
probability of Christianity failed, he still thought he could fall back on prudence to secure the 
rationality of belief. If there is even the slimmest chance it could be true (i.e., shy of Christian 
belief implying an unavoidable logical contradiction), one should believe in traditional 
Christianity because the stakes are so incommensurately high; one loses little by belief compared 
with what one stands to lose through unbelief if even this slim possibility proves true.123 
 Butler nevertheless thought that he made the case that our knowledge of the world makes 
the truth of Christianity as a revealed religion more probable than its falsehood. Beginning with 
the claim that if one truly accepted the idea that we should move by analogy from knowledge of 
nature to assertions about God, Butler concluded that no one should actually arrive at the Deists’ 
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proposed natural religion of simple truths fully transparent to human reason. The New Science 
indicated “a nature vast beyond all possible imagination,” and Butler believed that, far from 
being fully known or even knowable, nature in reality presents humans with a world at least as 
mysterious as it is comprehensible.124 If one could not arrive at clear and unambiguous 
knowledge of the immanent world, then should not humans assume that the transcendent source 
of that world would likewise exist beyond human comprehension, and likely all that much more? 
 Accepting that even natural knowledge requires room for mystery let Butler reintroduce 
what the Deists found truly unpalatable about Christianity: the potential for special revelation. If 
the natural world presents the observer with mystery and obscurity, of which some is likely an 
inherent part of that world, then one should reasonably expect “to find similar perplexities in 
religion – in natural as well as in revealed religion.”125 Butler always wanted to avoid any hubris 
regarding human rational capabilities. This arrogance he saw as his opponents’s undoing, and 
nowhere is that more evident than when he moves to a defense of revealed religion. Butler also 
wanted to ensure that his conception of revelation did not require acceptance of logical 
contradictions. While it could provide truths that were incomprehensible or even previously 
unknowable, “Revelation cannot contradict Natural Religion.”126 Butler also conceded that in an 
ideal state revealed religion would prove superfluous; Christianity was indeed merely a 
republication of “natural or essential religion.”127  
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 He always used caution in making his claims, but Butler did think that the natural order 
makes special revelation probable and not merely plausible. Additionally, he took up many of the 
challenges put forward by the Deists against Christianity to show that they relied on faulty 
conceptions of the natural world just as faulty assumptions led to the Deist understanding of 
natural religion. For instance, the Deists often attacked Christianity because of its perceived 
inequity: Christianity required assent to the non-egalitarian belief that revelation “had not been 
given equally to all men, in all places and at all times.”128 But how, Butler asked, could anyone 
derive an ideal of uniformity and equality from a truly objective assessment of the natural world? 
The diversity of human material conditions and natural endowments should, if anything, 
demonstrate that “diversity, not uniformity, is the rule of life.”129 By Deism’s own methods, this 
observation should lead one to expect – not rule out – an unequal distribution of religious truth. 
 Several important points should be noted for a fair assessment of Butler’s arguments. He 
assumed both the existence of God and the only probabilistic nature of human rationality that 
resulted from human finitude. He rejected a Cartesian view of rationality whereby a human being 
could deduce with apodictic certainty truths about God and the world; showing the probability of 
some truth was the most that could be hoped for. For him, to know the laws of the universe 
completely “would enable us to understand the past, present, and future with a systematic 
certainty that God already possesses,” but God has not endowed us with this capacity because it 
would be unnecessary for our conducting our lives in this finite existence.130 With this 
probabilistic approach to human knowledge, Butler showed himself, when compared to Browne 
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and Berkeley (the other great intellectual opponents of Deism), to be the most common-sense, 
the most skeptical, and the most scientifically oriented of the bunch.131 One need not chalk this 
up to any particularly pious motivation, though. In arguing for a probabilistic and circumscribed 
view of human rationality, as well as his focus on the need to move analogically from 
observation of the natural world to God, Butler was operating to a great degree in fidelity to the 
model of rationality popularized by Locke and the proponents of the New Science. 
 In terms of intellectual disposition, Butler has many characteristics that clearly 
differentiated him from the temperament and style of his Deist opponents. Whereas the Deists 
regularly resorted to ad hominem attacks and personal mockery, Butler did all that he could to 
refrain from invoking particular works, names, or even schools, and instead sought to meet 
particular arguments. In a similar vein, while part of the Deists’ undoing was a tendency toward 
arrogance and overstatement, Butler defended his positions with the most circumscribed 
solutions and with a style whereby “he never moved forward without fully consolidating his 
most recent advance and preparing carefully for the next.”132 Finally, if the Deists saw no 
problem in demolishing straw men, Butler’s very approach seems to belie a kind of intellectual 
charity and good-sportsmanship: Butler always tried to begin from commonly held positions and 
to argue toward what he saw as the natural consequences of those positions while pointing to 
what he saw as the illegitimate inferences that led to his opponents divergent conclusions.133 
 Despite positioning himself most strongly against the Deists, Butler still exhibits a 
significantly overlapping methodological outlook with them. Like the Deists, Butler asserted that 
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the court of human reason ultimately had jurisdiction over all religious conviction. He differed 
on what specific propositions one can rationally justify by making greater space for more 
orthodox Christian beliefs, but Butler still agreed with the Deists’ view that religious truth is 
primarily a matter of establishing and affirming correct propositions.  
 Butler (like Paley, as will we will see) nevertheless moved beyond the confines of a 
merely rationalist religious outlook. The main reason one might strongly resist classing Butler as 
a purely “rationalist” (if orthodox) religious thinker is that while he believed that Christianity 
does ultimately conform best to human reason, he would still argue for Christian belief on the 
grounds of prudence even if he could not actually defend its rational probability. However, from 
the perspective of locating Coleridge among the theological landscape of 18th century Britain, the 
point would be irrelevant because Coleridge distanced himself not only from those who made 
religious knowledge primarily a matter of rationally deducible propositions, but also those who 
argued for Christianity principally or wholly on the grounds of self-interest.  
 The cause of Christian apologetics found its most famous 18th century advocate in 
William Paley, born nearly a decade after Butler’s refutation of Deism. Paley’s thought displays 
a shift in outlook and tone among the defenders of mainstream (if not fully orthodox) theology 
that mirrored a similar shift in the transition from Deism to Unitarianism. Paley, who rigorously 
sought a rational demonstration of the existence of God and of the particular claims of 
Christianity based not only on the model of rationality asserted by the scientific method, but also 
on the specific knowledge of the natural world gained through advances in those disciplines, 
provided writings that remained required reading in British (and American) universities well into 
		63 
the 19th century.134 His thought most represented, if it did not fully codify, the emerging style of 
university theology that would predominate in early 19th century England, and it also sufficiently 
influenced the larger intellectual landscape to provide theological justification for the existence 
of medical faculties at universities. While Paley himself likely opposed neither mystery nor 
personal piety, he quickly came to represent both the “arid rationalism” of the Enlightenment and 
a mechanistic worldview made obsolete with Darwin’s 1859 Origin of Species.  
 William Paley, born the July of 1747 in Peterborough, came from a “thrifty and 
parsimonious” clerical household, and, potentially owing to sickliness and a lack of coordination 
in childhood, developed a sharp wit to accompany his enviable intellectual talent.135 Paley 
entered Christ’s College, Cambridge in 1759 where he proved himself a talented mathematician. 
Paley received a fellowship at Christ’s and became “one of Cambridge’s great teachers.”136 He 
also became a priest in the Church of England, leaving the university to serve the parish at 
Westmoreland in 1776.137 Here Paley wrote his three volumes in which he attempted to 
demonstrate empirically the truth of Christianity, the historical veracity of the Bible, and natural 
religion, as well as an influential work on ethics, The Principles of Moral and Political 
Philosophy. While his contemporaries respected his work, and those who worked with him held 
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him in high esteem, Paley, unlike Butler, did not rise to higher ecclesial office, in part because 
some authorities perceived him as a crypto-Arian or Socinian.138 
 Present familiarity with Paley comes mainly from his championing of the argument from 
design using evidence from the discoveries of the 18th century natural sciences, and specifically 
for his analogy of the watch and the watchmaker. This argument is contained in Paley’s Natural 
Theology, but this was the last of a kind of three-part defense of both natural religion and the 
particular claims of Christianity as a revealed religion. Prior to Natural Theology, he published 
his Evidences of Christianity, in which he wanted to claim not only that Christianity republished 
natural religion, but also that Christianity, through special revelation, confirmed and reinforced 
the claims of natural religion by adding an “assurance of a future state after death.”139 Paley 
believed he could demonstrate that Scripture was God’s Word because of “the miracles which 
accompanied it.”140 Accepting the existence of God, one must at least hold that this God could 
“vary the natural order” for particular purposes in ways that would be repeated and become part 
of universal or common human experience. Holding this supposition, Paley argued that Scripture 
reported the actual occurrence of such theoretically possible miracles and that other purported 
accounts of miraculous activity do not provide strong enough evidence to compel belief 
(affirming both the positive truth and uniqueness of the Christian revelation).141  
 Paley moved from the abstract possibility of divine miraculous activity to the reality of 
miracles by appealing to his understanding of the conditions under which the witnesses recorded 
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in the New Testament had given their accounts. Paley held that it if a number of people, 
independent of each other, should continue to testify to the same experience despite knowing that 
such testimony would likely result in death or torture and that acknowledging the falsehood of 
that testimony would prevent these outcomes, then “there exists not a sceptic in the world who 
would not believe [the witnesses].”142 The New Testament, he believed, provides a reliable and 
accurate account of people making testimonies under just these conditions.143 Paley could not, 
for the sake of his argument for the singular truth of Christian revelation and against Hume’s 
attack on miracles, stop at arguing for the truthfulness of the New Testament’s miracle stories. 
He also had to make case that other claims about miraculous activity, especially those that 
supported a divine revelation at odds with the claims of (Protestant) Christianity, did not meet 
the same criteria that established the truth of the New Testament accounts.144 
 Paley fully committed himself to arguing for the rationality of Christianity’s revealed 
truths, but most people know him from his work in natural theology.145 Natural theology dates to 
pre-Christian Greek and Roman philosophy and had many a Christian and Jewish proponent 
prior to the 18th century. A distinction that developed in some forms of 18th century British 
natural theology, with Paley acting as its most famous advocate, was an understanding of 
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“human reason” that followed the conception of rationality propounded by adherents to the New 
Science that merged Newtonian scientific method and Lockean empiricism.  
 The most famous part of Paley’s Natural Theology, and the part most familiar to 
contemporary readers, is Paley’s “Watchmaker” analogy. He argued that, should one find a 
watch while walking through a heath, the watch’s complexity and apparent intentionality of 
design should lead one to believe that some intelligent and intentional creator, rather than the 
confluence of random, unthinking natural causes, produced the watch. If the world also exhibits 
intentional complexity and design, then one should draw the conclusion that some purposive, 
intelligent designer more likely than not also produced the world itself. The reminder of the first 
half of the work drew widely from the then-differentiating natural sciences, specifically 
chemistry, astronomy, and, above all, anatomy, to point to well-ordered design in the natural 
world.146 Paley dedicated the second half of Natural Theology to working from the effects 
(design) in the world to the nature of the cause (designer). Paley stands broadly within the post-
Lockean British tradition of metaphysical skepticism, assuming it is “impossible to describe 
[God] with complete precision,” but still holding that “some things about [God’s] personality 
were clear” from the design exhibited in creation.147 Being a designer implied intelligence, which 
in turn implied mind. Paley would go on to enumerate a number of other attributes such as God’s 
self-sufficiency, self-sustenance, being the First Cause of the world, unity in the form of utter 
self-consistency, and complete goodness.148 
																																																						
146  Eddy and Knight, Introduction, xix. 
 
147 LeMahieu, Mind of Paley, 81.  
 
148 LeMahieu, Mind of Paley, 81-82. 
		67 
 Paley’s commitment to this kind of apologetic resembled, and at times went beyond, 
Butler’s approach. Both thinkers defended Christianity in its natural and revealed dimensions 
against challenges from skeptics and more radical religious thinkers. Both also tried to 
demonstrate that the rational defense of Christianity proved more intellectually tenable than the 
challenges leveled against it. However, while one should not underplay the diversity within late 
17th and early 18th century Deism, Paley faced a more diverse cadre of intellectual opponents 
than had Butler. Evidences of Christianity defended the authenticity and historical accuracy of 
the New Testament writings against attacks from early proponents of a “scientific” approach to 
history, and Paley took aim specifically at Edmund Gibbon and his Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire.149 In his defense of miracles and in his arguments for the human capacity to 
know God through empirical study of the natural world, Paley challenged David Hume’s 
skepticism. Finally, while Paley would not have viewed scientifically motivated religious doubt 
as a primary challenger, and he certainly saw the New Science as allied with the Christian search 
for truth, he did list the threat of atheism as one of the reasons for writing his natural theology. 
Even if he remained methodologically a man of the 18th century, Paley could sense the growing 
sentiment that the natural sciences could make discoveries that challenged traditional Christian 
claims as much as they could be marshalled in its support.150  
 Despite a contemporary trend that sees Paley’s rationalist apologetic as an attempt to 
convince unbelievers, he may not have actually deviated substantially from John Henry 
Newman’s sentiment regarding evidential theology, namely that “evidences” were only helpful 
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insofar as they alleviate the anxious doubts of those already possessing faith.151 However, what 
Paley actually believed or the shape of his work viewed in its totality concerns us less than how 
Coleridge perceived Paley’s theology. And here we find Coleridge explicitly identifying Paley as 
an arch-advocate of an arid rationalist and evidentialist approach to theology that might just as 
well “lead the inquirer out of religion rather than into it.”152 Part of Coleridge’s motivation for 
writing Aids to Reflection was to repudiate what he saw as this kind of disinterested, rationalist 
(with “reason” wrongly conceived as he saw it) theology that led to an equally non-Christian, 
self-interested moralism. Now, one should still have a firm grasp on the theological traditions 
that Coleridge rejected, but this rejection means that one can also safely assume that one should 
not locate Coleridge within this school of late 18th century British theology. 
 I now turn to the primary non-Evangelical, theological divisions in the Church of 
England.153 Particularly by the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th, three major 
divisions came to be described by contemporaries within the Church of England: the 
Latitudinarian (or liberal), the High Church (or non-Evangelical Orthodox), and the 
Evangelical.154 This division is in many ways an oversimplification, largely because 18th century 
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authors did not apply these terms consistently and their meanings and scopes could shift as the 
century unfolded. I nevertheless still find these terms a helpful heuristic, so I will make sure to 
distinguish the various ways in which they were used and to focus on how they help to 
differentiate specifically theological schools in 18th and early 19th century Anglicanism.  
 “Liberal” Anglicanism certainly included some full-blown Arians and Socinians; 
however, those with such beliefs could not have held them officially and would have had to have 
espoused them with some degree of obfuscation because membership in the Church, and 
particularly ordination, officially required subscription to the 39 Articles of Religion.155 By far 
the more pervasive strand of liberalism within the Church of England during this time would be 
that of Latitudinarianism, a theological temperament and tradition that (1) emphasized the 
fundamentally rational basis of religion; (2) strove for greater religious toleration, a more 
expansive interpretation of Christian orthodoxy, and a reduced emphasis on the mysterious and 
ceremonial; and (3) put an emphasis on the end of religion as morality.  
 Latitudinarianism is a broad category, but not so broad as to exclude it from describing a 
distinctive set of theological and political tendencies, and part of its breadth owes to the 
pervasive influence it exercised within the Church of England from the late 17th through to the 
end of the 18th centuries. Indeed, what began as a minority movement in the 1660s and 1670s 
became “the position linking the chief office holders in the church together” only 60 years 
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later.156 As early as the 1690s, Latitudinarians had become “the dominant, though not the 
majority, party in the Church of England.”157 
 The circumstances and figures surrounding the beginning of the movement help to clarify 
and disentangle the intertwined theological and political characteristics of the Latitudinarians. As 
stated above, the English Civil War, Interregnum, and Restoration greatly shaped the religious 
character and theological tenor of the 18th century. Latitudinarianism is no different, and indeed 
one may go so far as to say that it represented the characteristic theological response to these 
forces. The first references to “latitude-men,” the exonym158 from which we get “latitudinarian,” 
came from the mid-1650s and 1660s. This term described those thinkers who “in terms of 
doctrine wanted to reduce the Christian religion to a few plain essentially moral fundamentals, 
easily apprehended and put into practice by the ordinary rational man,” and who also “found no 
difficulty in both holding office during the Interregnum, when the Church of England was under 
attack, and conforming to the Church in 1662, when its position was secured and defined by Act 
of Parliament.”159 The theo-political vision of Latitudinarianism’s first two generations arose 
from an attempt at reconciling what could be seen as prima face dissonant desiderata. On the one 
hand, there was a strong impulse to blame the violence of the mid-17th century on the 
“enthusiasm” of the Puritans.160 On the other hand, though many of these thinkers saw a 
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potential for a socially and politically stabilizing effect in the reestablished Church and restored 
monarchy, they were often positively disposed to individual Nonconformists or to various 
moderate dissenting groups; thus, they resisted the Restoration Church’s seemingly vindictive 
disposition. Therefore, both the Cromwellian restrictions on episcopal and High Church elements 
in the Church of England as well as the ensuing counter-restrictions upon those who favored less 
episcopal or Erastian polities sat poorly with this group. 
 Scholars sometimes associate the first Latitudinarians with the Cambridge Platonists, 
particularly Whichcote, More, Smith, and Cudworth, such that the two groups seem identical, but 
influential early Latitudinarians also came from outside the bounds of “Cambridge Platonism.” 
For instance, John Wilkins, a highly influential first-generation member of the movement, was 
not at Cambridge.161 Cambridge did become vital for popularizing Latitudinarian ideas among 
the English clergy in the 1670s, 80s, and 90s, but individuals outside the “Platonist” circle shared 
in that responsibility.162 The “Cambridge Platonists,” exerted significant influence on some 
important second-generation Latitudinarians, including Simon Patrick and John Tillotson. 
However, other central figures in the development and perpetuation of this movement, such as 
John Locke and Samuel Clarke, were certainly not “Platonists.”163  
 Regardless of how one divides up the schools from which this movement developed, it 
would become the most powerful group in in the Church of England under William III. This 
ascendency was helped in large part by the Non-Juror’s refusal to submit to William’s authority, 
which weakened the High Church party and in turn left open a number of important ecclesial 
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appointments.164 Thus, “in 1691 Tillotson was appointed Archbishop of Canterbury, Patrick was 
appointed to Ely, Fowler to Gloucester, and like-minded men to other sees.”165 These positions 
of great influence, combined with the particular propensity for the Latitudinarians to disseminate 
their ideas widely, helped to make a Latitudinarian sensibility one of the most important, if not 
the dominant, Anglican intellectual mood in the first three-quarters of the 18th century.  
 The Latitudinarians held their theology and ecclesiology/political thought closely 
together, but one can distinguish the two for analysis and it will be helpful to look first to their 
intellectual commitments. A commitment to the thorough-going need for a rationally defensible 
Christianity united nearly all Latitudinarians. Unlike the radical rationalist theological traditions, 
Latitudinarians did not oppose special revelation and had far fewer problems with miracles, 
prophecy, the divinity of Christ, the human need for grace, special revelation, or faith in what 
goes beyond reason – so long as these things were properly understood. They did reject any 
interpretations of these orthodox convictions that appeared to contradict reason. However, rather 
than holding “that nothing is to be believed that cannot be apprehended by reason,” they 
accepted that “we must be convinced by our reason to believe what is beyond our reason.”166 The 
Latitudinarians attempted a conciliatory view of the relationship between reason and faith: They 
sought to “unite faith and reason, religion and philosophy, revealed and natural religion.”167 
However, an unforeseen consequence that emerged as the movement developed was a tendency 
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to “reduce the meaning of faith to an epistemological question and to restrict the role of reason in 
its association with faith to the task of proving the Scriptures true and worthy of assent.”168 
 Most Latitudinarians saw themselves as advancing orthodox Christianity, but the way in 
which traditional doctrines were emphasized, interpreted, or, in some case, both, distinguished 
their approach to orthodoxy. Latitudinarians wanted to differentiate between those doctrines that 
required a narrow interpretation and those that were adiaphora and need not have settled 
interpretations. Proper interpretations of the Trinity tended to fall into the latter category. One 
may rightly say that “all of the Latitudinarians were Trinitarians,” and some even wrote lengthy 
defenses of the doctrine of the Trinity.169 Such defenses proved exceptional, however, and some 
Latitudinarians likely had interpretations of the Trinity considered heterodox at the time (such as 
those of the Arians), with a few even going so far as to place the doctrine itself “among the 
adiaphora of non-essential truths.”170 The charge of Socinianism so often leveled against 
Latitudinarians by their opponent may be unfair, since Socinians regularly found themselves the 
targets of Latitudinarian polemic. However, this accusation reveals the degree to which 
Latitudinarians refrained from discussions of this doctrine relative to their orthodox peers.  
 Latitudinarians also frequently left the specifics of Christology and the atonement among 
the adiaphora. They had “little to say about the Incarnation” and “almost nothing about Christ as 
Mediator.”171 It is this point, particularly the nature of justification by faith, that most 
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significantly distinguished the Latitudinarians theologically from Evangelicals. Burnet’s views of 
the precise occurrence of justification can confidently be used to summarize the general 
Latitudinarian attitude on this point: so long as humans do not “imagine that the condition upon 
which justification is offered is the consideration that moves God,” and since “all are agreed that 
good works are necessary to salvation,” it follows that “it is a speculation of little consequence 
whether works are a condition of justification or the effect of justifying faith.”172 
 Since salvation depended in some way on good works, many Latitudinarians would have 
considered themselves part of an Arminianism consciously opposed to Calvinism. They affirmed 
“the importance of conditions for salvation” as well as “the pre-Augustinian, Erasmian, and 
Arminian view that man’s will is free, that God’s grace is given to all, and that man can work 
with or against it as he chooses.”173 Even allowing for those who did not commit to full scale 
Arminianism, Latitudinarians overwhelmingly opposed the “Calvinist doctrines of irresistible 
grace and imputed righteousness because they thought these attribute everything to God and 
nothing to man.”174 Opposition to the particular doctrines of Calvinism did not arise only from 
the perception that Calvinism tended to inculcate antinomianism and would lead to a lax morality 
and breakdown of civil order, all of which High Church and evangelical Arminians also 
believed. Latitudinarians believed that Calvinist morality rested on conceptions of God that 
contradicted a rational faith by presenting a moral code based on the “positive or arbitrary 
command of a mysterious God” rather than self-evident, rationally discerned principles.175 
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 As Latitudinarians were minimizing the “speculative” aspects of Christianity, they were 
elevating its moral dimension. Indeed, for many it appears that the goal and purpose of 
Christianity is perpetuating and perfecting human morality. Isabel Rivers provides a summary of 
the Latitudinarian view of morality and its relationship to religion in the following way:  
 Man is by nature sociable and disposed to act well; sin is an unnatural deviation from this disposition; man 
 naturally pursues happiness, though he often miscalculates the method of attaining it; happiness is achieved 
 through holiness, and understood properly is in fact the same thing; the religious life is the most 
 advantageous because religion enables man to act according to his true nature and in his own best interest 
 by choosing the path that will make him holy and therefore happy. It is the task of the religious moralist to 
 channel man’s innate desire for happiness by appealing to his prudence and self-interest in demonstrating 
 that the rewards of the religious life easily outweigh any others. The religious man is holy and happy, 
 prudent and wise, rewarded here as well as hereafter.176 
 
Some of this understanding of morality accords unproblematically with most Christian teaching, 
particularly in the claims of Christian morality leading to happiness. But there are many 
important, if at times subtle, distinctions between the Latitudinarians and other major theological 
trends in the 18th century – particularly the evangelicals, whether Arminian or Calvinist. While 
acceptance of sin’s distorting effects distinguished Latitudinarians from Deists or many 
Socinians, they still had an optimistic picture of human nature even after the Fall. All human 
beings retain a capacity to know the moral law through reason.177 There was greater diversity of 
opinion regarding sin’s effect on an innate human capacity to follow that moral law, although 
there was a marked tendency to regard “vice, sin, or human degeneracy as very much within 
human control.”178 While many might still consider the Latitudinarian view Pelagian, they 
differed from the more liberal theological positions (Deist, Socinian, Unitarian) by maintaining a 
need for divine grace in actually carrying out the commands of the moral law. Human co-
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operation and effort are necessary for and capable of returning “degenerate, abused, and vicious 
nature” to “its original ingenuity and goodness,” but these always require some co-operation with 
divine grace.179 Still, Latitudinarians maintained a much higher view of the innate human 
capacity for goodness, both epistemically and soteriologically, than did classical Reformers such 
as Calvin, Luther, or Cranmer. 
 The Latitudinarian understanding of salvation differed from its traditional Christian 
counterpart in other important ways. To begin with, the Latitudinarians emphasized the ease of 
following through with the moral expectations of Christianity. They vehemently rejected the idea 
that “suffering is a necessary part of the Christian life” and they maintained that Christianity not 
only should not oppose pleasure, but it in fact facilitated the greatest intra-mundane pleasure and 
happiness.180 The emphasis on the telos of human life as holiness and holiness being coterminous 
with happiness may push against this divergence with more traditional orthodox concepts of the 
relationship between morality and salvation. Some Latitudinarians even would go so far as to say 
that the goal of the Christian life was deiformity or “imitation or participation in the divine 
nature,” which is a view that strongly resembles the Wesleyan understanding of the plan of 
salvation.181 However, unlike the Wesleyan or other classical understandings of Sanctification, 
Latitudinarians saw this transformation of human nature as an increasing capacity to conform to 
the external, behavioral demands of the moral law. They hardly emphasized the need for the 
transformation of one’s relationship to or knowledge of God, if this was a concern at all. 
Similarly, heaven and hell became almost exclusively the necessary incentives for motivating 
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proper moral behavior. Thus, Latitudinarians reversed most traditional relationships between sin 
and salvation. Rather than having the afterlife as something like the beatific vision and generally 
emphasizing growth in perfection or knowledge and love of God as the goal of human life, 
Latitudinarians saw the promise of eternal reward or punishment as the means of impelling the 
believer to live the moral life. Finally, the Latitudinarian strongly emphasized what Cragg calls 
the “self-motive principle,” i.e., that prudent self-interest provided the primary motive for the 
Christian life. Even if this was primarily a rhetorical strategy, viz., that “most people can be 
persuaded to do what they should” only through appeals to self-interest, this still imparted the 
sense that the practice of Christianity need not aim at deepening one’s relationship with God.182 
 Latitudinarians were distinguished not only by their theological configuration, but also by 
certain commonly held rhetorical and stylistic features, polemical opponents, political 
affiliations, and tendencies in church practice. Isabel Rivers has done a marvelous job of 
explaining that Latitudinarianism (as well as many other 18th century movements) was defined 
not only by certain beliefs, but also by a certain communicative style. Like the Deists, the 
Latitudinarians favored a style of accessible, reasoned argument. However, whereas the Deists 
generally limited themselves to philosophical and theological disputations, Latitudinarians wrote 
three kinds of works: “controversial works and treatises; handbooks; and sermons.”183 Appeals to 
the reasonableness and practicality of Christian faith meant that these works contained rational 
argumentation to promote their position, and even – or particularly – the sermons emphasized a 
“rational and expository element” in a conscious departure from the emotional appeals in Puritan 
preaching.184 Nevertheless, far from the Deist goal of convincing people of the untenable nature 
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of orthodox Christianity through reason and ridicule, Latitudinarians had a strong sense of 
pastoral responsibility.  
 Moderation was for them a cardinal virtue and they saw in this the true nature of 
Anglicanism as a via media.185 Thus, they saw opponents on two sides. On the one hand, they 
fought against appeals to arbitrary authority, anti-rationalism, and enthusiasm found in 
Puritanism, Roman Catholicism, and later evangelicalism broadly conceived. On the other hand, 
they felt themselves defenders of orthodox Christian belief against Arianism, Socinianism, 
Deism, and atheism (which generally meant Hobbsean materialism).186 
  Flowing from the “modest and utilitarian” view of the role of the sacraments, their 
aversion to mystery, and their emphasis on rational exposition of thought, the Latitudinarians 
would be classed as “low church” according to contemporary designations of churchmanship.187 
They also made up the bulk of the “low church” party understood in the more political, pre-
Tractarian sense of the term. “Low church” in this sense meant supporting a Whig political 
program, greater church subordination to the state, and, for the more liberal Latitudinarians, a 
belief in the church as “essentially a voluntary society.”188 Latitudinarians shared a desire to 
expand the range of acceptable forms of religiosity within the nation. Some sought to accomplish 
this through comprehension, which is to say they sought to expand the acceptable range of 
discipline and ceremonial in the established church to entice more moderate (largely 
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Presbyterian) Dissenters to rejoin the Church of England.189 Others favored toleration, which 
would have extended religious liberties for dissenting groups without necessarily making the 
state church more accommodating for those who remained within its bounds.  
 The Latitudinarian dual impulse toward greater toleration in church governance and less 
restrictive doctrinal formulae came to a head during the Feather’s Tavern controversy of 1772, 
when several of the most liberal Anglicans sought Parliamentary relaxation of the requirement of 
subscription. While some undoubtedly sympathized with this cause yet remained relatively 
orthodox in their own beliefs, many others perceived this action, and probably not without some 
merit, as an attempt by private Arians and Socinians to go public without losing the protection 
and benefits provided by membership in the established church.190  
 Interestingly, while it was in many ways a logical conclusion of the theo-political alliance 
found in much liberal 18th century Anglicanism, the Feather’s Tavern controversy symbolized an 
important point in the shifting balance of power from the Latitudinarian to the more traditionally 
orthodox factions of the church. In addition to occasioning an uneasy temporary alliance between 
High Church and Evangelical factions against a liberalism that had transgressed its bounds, the 
political shifts in Great Britain following the American War for Independence and especially the 
French Revolution meant that Anglican liberalism became increasingly unfashionable.191 
Latitudinarianism would continue to make theological contributions, but from this point on, the 
real conflict over Anglican identity played out between High Churchmen and Evangelicals. 
Before looking at early British evangelicalism, with attention to what distinguished Anglican 
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Evangelicals from their dissenting peers, I will finish this chapter by describing the intellectual 
and cultural features of High Church Anglicanism in the long 18th century. 
 At this point I have used terms such as “Orthodox,” “High Church,” and “non-
Evangelical Orthodox” to describe a distinct configuration of theological, ecclesial, and political 
views that were neither Latitudinarian nor Evangelical. Peter Nockles points to two trends, going 
in contrary directions, that have made this group difficult to clearly distinguish. On the one hand 
is the tendency to see pre-Tractarian church affiliation as perfectly aligning with the firm 
categories of post-Tractarian churchmanship. On the other, there is the tendency to argue that the 
18th-century Church of England shared too great a sense of unity to recognize anything like 
Church parties prior to the 1830s. Nockles makes the compelling case that the answer lies 
somewhere in the middle, with the modern reader able to see clearly distinguishable tendencies 
toward forms of churchmanship, but always understanding that these categories usually proved 
more fluid and overlapping than in the post-Tractarian world. Some of these parties carried over 
even as they were transformed, while others represented substantial re-alignment.192 One need 
look no further than figures such as John Wesley and Bishop Beilby Porteus to see how 
“evangelical” and “high church” could overlap substantially.193 
 One significant problem for naming this group is that this tradition went through a greater 
evolution during the long 18th century than either the Evangelicals or Latitudinarians. Thus, I 
will present some of the movement’s background but focus on the tradition in its late 18th and 
early 19th century forms – the time most pertinent to the question of Coleridge’s affiliation.194  
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 The Restoration settlement provides a good starting point for a description of the High 
Church tradition in the long 18th century. The return of Stuart rule in 1660 when Charles II 
became king meant also the return of those royalists who had escaped to France, the release of 
imprisoned loyalists, and the reemergence of those forced to hide, obscure, or suppress their 
preferred pre-Interregnum worship according to the Book of Common Prayer.195 As the new 
Prayer Book that the king would authorize in 1662 was being created, defenders of the pre-Civil 
War Episcopal Church of England wanted something very similar to the more conservative 1549 
Book of Common Prayer, rather than the 1607 revision of the 1559 product of the Elizabethan 
Settlement.196 In setting the tenor for the Restoration Church by pushing for a strong adherence 
to the Divine Right of Kings, an emphasis on the spiritual authority of the Church, and the need 
for conformity, one could argue that the draconian and even vengeful approach of these ecclesial 
authorities helped precipitate the Glorious Revolution and the dethroning of James II.  
 With the ascent of William and Mary, the “High Church” movement experienced a 
schism significant enough to weaken its political influence and open the door for a Latitudinarian 
ascendency. While many of the High Churchmen were able – often with great reluctance – to see 
the legitimacy of the transition from James II to William and Mary, a strong adherence to 
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doctrines such as the Divine Right of Kings meant that others could not swear allegiance to the 
new monarchs. The failure of the “non-Juror” clergy, a group encompassing even the then 
Archbishop of Canterbury, to pledge fealty to the new rulers meant that “they were first 
suspended and then deprived of their offices, as were some 300-400 inferior clergy and an 
unknown number of laity who followed them.”197 
 This schism and the vacancies left by top non-Jurors decreased the ecclesial and political 
authority of High Churchmanship, with the balance shifting for the next 50-70 years toward 
Latitudinarians. This power imbalance continued in part because the High Churchmen remained 
tainted by an association with Jacobite politics, and the 1715 and 1745 Jacobite rebellions 
certainly did nothing to alleviate fears that High Churchmen had questionable loyalties.198 
However, while this tradition might have gone on the political defensive, historians generally 
reject a late Victorian view of a Latitudinarian monopoly on power and are fairly “confident that 
‘high’ Anglicanism existed as a potent force throughout the eighteenth century.”199  
 Particularly in the early part of the long 18th century, High Churchmanship described a 
nebulous class, identifying those conservative “Tory” (or even Jacobite) members of the 
establishment. The successors of the Oxford Movement might have come to favor 
disestablishment, but Toryism continued to permeate most of the High Churchmanship during 
the long 18th century. The High Church tradition tended to have a high view of the spiritual 
authority of the Church and its capacity to act as a force for social stability and order. This group 
acted as some of the fiercest opponents of Dissent and argued for greater uniformity within the 
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National Church. Following in the tradition of adherence to the Divine Right of Kings, High 
Churchmen emphasized the authority of the monarch over that of parliament. This should not be 
seen as Erastianism, though; High Churchmen would have understood a symbiotic relationship 
between church and state rather than a subordination of the church to the state.  
 Of course, some people held these political positions without having the accompanying 
theological and liturgical views associated with “High Churchmanship,” and others would have 
fallen into such a theological camp without the corresponding political views. Nevertheless, 
these political views, particularly the importance of a unified and authoritative church, did find 
support in some of the theological positions that distinguished “High Church” Anglicanism from 
other forms of orthodoxy. In principle, High Churchmen would not have differed substantially 
from other orthodox Anglicans on points of doctrine. Where they differed was in which points 
they emphasized and how they interpreted them. These points of divergence, particularly with 
the Evangelicals, occurred in relationship to Soteriology, Ecclesiology, and Pneumatology. 
Evangelicals and High Churchmen would split not over the Trinity or other issues related to the 
Doctrine of God, but rather on justification and the economy of salvation. The most defining 
feature of the High Church view would be the close relationship between justification and the 
mediating activity of the structures of the Church. There were certainly High Church thinkers 
who moved in the direction of a Latitudinarian focus on works antecedent to justification, but 
there were also those like Daubeney who would join Evangelicals in focusing on Christ’s 
sacrifice on the cross alone as that which secures the grace necessary for salvation.200 However 
they saw the relationship between moral acts and justification, High Churchmen agreed that the 
Church played a necessary role in mediating any divine grace necessary for salvation. 
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Specifically the High Church tradition advocated for the need for proper apostolic succession to 
ensure ecclesial legitimacy. In other words, many in this group believed that “though the grace of 
God and faith and belief in the Gospels were the foundation stones for salvation, the church 
remained the place wherein one came to a knowledge of such truth.”201 
 Because the post-Tracterian world equates Evangelicalism with “low” churchmanship 
and the High Church tradition with a very strong belief in the real presence, even bordering upon 
transubstantiation, in the Eucharist, one may assume that the primary sacrament dividing these 
two groups in a pre-Tractarian world was the Eucharist. However, while some High Church 
figures held to a very strong “virtualist” view of Christ’s real presence in the sacrament, most 
“were at one with the Evangelicals in taking the so-called ‘Receptionist’ view as expounded by 
Hooker and Daniel Waterland,” and it was the Latitudinarians who held to the “Zwinglian idea 
of the eucharist as a bare memorial of Our Lord’s passion.”202 Instead, it was the sacrament of 
Baptism that “notoriously divided Orthodox and Evangelicals in the pre-Tractarian era.”203 
Evangelicals allowed for a range of positions on the question of baptismal regeneration from a 
flat out rejection of this idea to some form of moderate acceptance that there were some spiritual 
effects of Baptism, but the High Church tradition almost universally held unwaveringly to a view 
of baptismal regeneration in which Baptism was the new birth and justifying grace “inseparably 
accompanied baptism.”204 If there were any aspects of theology that united the High Church 
tradition diachronically as well as synchronically through the long 18th century, it was these two: 
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the close associations between the apostolically legitimate Episcopal Church of England and 
salvation, and between justifying grace and baptismal regeneration. 
 One point on which the High Church tradition tended to be unified, and it only became 
more distinct as an identifying marker in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, was an adherence 
to Arminianism in opposition to Calvinism.205 By the end of the 18th century (important for our 
study because this period spans all of Coleridge’s adult life), the High Church party was 
exclusively made of up Arminians. Indicative of how much this had become an identifying factor 
for High Churchmen were the terms of internal debate on this issue. Whether one would possibly 
flirt with Calvinism seemed beyond the pale; the real debate was whether it was enough simply 
to be an Arminian or whether one had to take a more active stance by publicly resisting 
Calvinism. Some few Evangelicals considered themselves Arminians,206 but by the early 19th 
century Arminianism within the Church of England was closely associated with the High Church 
tradition while Calvinism was almost exclusively the domain of the Evangelical party.207 
 From the vantage point of the long 18th century as a whole, the High Church tradition did 
not present a single front on the question of interior spirituality. Contrary to a common 
perception – perpetuated in no small part by the Oxford Movement’s own attempts at reforming 
the tradition – about the nature of pre-Tractarian High Church piety as “high and dry,” i.e., 
lacking any concern for or having hostility toward the affective or inward dimensions of spiritual 
experience, this does not seem to be the case for a good portion of the latter part of the 18th 
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century proper. Probably the most distinctive High Church spirituality in the latter part of the 
18th century came from the Hutchinsonians, who took their primary influence from the writings 
of John Hutchinson. Hutchinson had developed a “school of philosophy and theology which held 
that God had revealed to mankind from the beginning of the world a means of understanding the 
created world, and this was embodied in the writings of Moses.”208 While the movement was not 
at first “conspicuously Anglican,” it eventually lost some of its more esoteric features as it 
sought a revival in the Church of England of a combined “Christian godliness and Christian 
order.”209 The movement took hold at Oxford as a kind of spiritual successor to the Oxford 
Methodists and, like the Methodists, contemporaries often accused them of “enthusiasm.”210 
 Nevertheless, dominant Georgian High Churchmanship remained suspicious of or hostile 
to what it saw as excessively “subjective emotionalism,” favoring a “practical spirituality based 
on good works nourished by sacramental grace and exemplified in acts of self-denial and 
charity.”211 Furthermore, for however much some groups may have emphasized inner spiritual 
intensity in parts of 18th century High Church Anglicanism, the identifier “high and dry” remains 
appropriate for the most significant strand of early 19th century High Church piety – the Hackney 
Phalanx.212 The Phalanx not only focused on the liturgy and sacraments while minimizing the 
role of preaching (all fully regulated by valid ecclesial oversight), but they were also “strongly 
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opposed to introspection, self-examination and the uninhibited expression of religious 
feelings.”213 Importantly, the Phalanx, and not the Hutchinsonians, would have determined the 
character of High Church piety for the entire period of Coleridge’s return to Anglicanism. 
Because they strongly opposed an introspective piety (and evangelicals strongly encouraged 
one), the role of introspection in Coleridge’s thought will prove significant in determining his 
relationship to early 19th century Anglican movements. 
 High Church Anglicans, no less than any other movement under consideration, 
distinguished themselves not only through their constellation of thought and practice, but also 
through the authorities by which they grounded that constellation. In line with Article 6, they 
maintained the primacy of Scripture, affirming that it “contained all things necessary unto 
salvation.” However, Scripture was authoritative only insofar as it was “understood in the light 
of antiquity,” meaning “the writings of the Fathers” and “those councils of the early church 
considered truly ecumenical.”214 Furthermore, the 18th century High Churchmen saw themselves 
as continuing the tradition of those Carolinian divines such as Laud and Hammond who saw the 
church as “transmitting to posterity an apostolic order and a static deposit of doctrine handed 
down from the Catholic antiquity of the ante-Nicene Fathers.”215  
 While they had a higher view of “Doctrine” (because of their view of ecclesial authority) 
than other 18th century Anglicans, High Churchmen often proved hesitant to see this doctrinal 
authority in the 39 Articles. Owing to their Arminianism, High Churchmen remained suspicious 
of Articles highlighting the Calvinist/Reformed convictions of Cranmer and other early English 
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reformers (notably Article 17 “On Predestination”) and they could only subscribe in good 
conscience by accepting questionable interpretations that introduced numerous caveats. With  
liberal claimants to orthodoxy, some High Church subscribers “reassured themselves with the 
argument of Bishop Burnett that, though the Articles demanded ‘assent,’ they were framed in 
such a way as to be taken in different and even contradictory senses.”216 Going into the 19th 
century, High Churchmen began to put out periodicals associated with their distinctive doctrinal 
and ecclesial views, the most important being The Orthodox Churchman’s Magazine (1801), The 
British Critic (1793), and The Christian Remembrancer (1818).217 
 The long 18th century saw a range of religious options which variously overlapped in 
terms of theological position, liturgical preference, and understanding of authority. Still one can 
discern recognizable matrices of distinguishable religious traditions. At the same time, there are 
certain elements in common between all these schools of thought. These traditions all 
emphasized the need to rein in “enthusiasm.”218 They focused on the imminent order in a way 
that simultaneously placed God at a distance from everyday human life. While highly rationalist 
traditions emphasized each individual’s capacity to use the light of reason to arrive at truths 
about God and the world, this rational inquiry was generally oriented toward the practical 
ordering of human life, with God being seen as largely uninvolved in the world. The 
Latitudinarian commitment to formal doctrinal orthodoxy occurred in concurrence with an 
overwhelming emphasis on the moral dimension of Christianity; they focused on the 
intramundane by shifting the focus from God as an object of worship and goal of human life to 
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guarantor of the moral order. Even the High Church tradition exhibited this by emphasizing the 
distance between humans and God that required the mediation of ecclesial structures.  
 The rather provocative nature of my thesis sets before me a greater burden of proof than 
would normally be expected for this kind of project. I have therefore provided substantial detail 
about trends in religious thought in Britain’s long 18th century to alleviate any doubts that may 
arise that I have compared Coleridge’s thought to an “evangelicalism” largely composed of 
elements common in many other 18th century religious movements. Beyond the attempt to make 
clear the defining features of the religious movements forming the background of Coleridge’s 
thought, this chapter serves the more particular purpose of pointing to a substantial and likely 
essential fault line between evangelicalism and most other movements of the time: the 
connection between the goal of human life and God’s relationship to the world. Evangelicals 
would reverse the relationship described above, placing the goal of human life in God and thus 
outside the world of everyday life while simultaneously lessening the mediating factors between 
God and humanity. Thus, while I believe that I can show Coleridge to exhibit nearly all the 
individual defining features of Evangelicalism that this chapter places into sharper relief, I also 
believe that his general theological temperament places him on the evangelical side of this fault 
line. However, before showing that Coleridge exhibited the defining features of an Anglican 
Evangelical, I first must explain what those features were. I take on this this task of describing 
the overall character of evangelicalism in Britain’s long 18th century in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 3:  
 
A WORLD ON FIRE OR A GLOWING HEARTH? 
BRITISH EVANGELICALISM’S ORIGINS, DEFINING FEATURES,  
AND INTERNAL DISTINCTIONS 
 
 
My assertion that Samuel Taylor Coleridge became some kind of Evangelical Anglican 
prior to his death likely arouses some degree of incredulity – and rightfully so – in part because it 
runs contrary to the long held scholarly consensus. At the same time, I have an intuition that this 
methodological suspicion may be heightened by suspicions about the specific movement in 
which I am placing Coleridge. “Evangelicalism” in the minds of many, both within and without 
the movement, can conjure a sense of anti-intellectualism, opposition to science, a cult of feeling, 
rigid, graceless exclusivism regarding other religious traditions, and reactionary politics.219 
Regardless of the nuances lost in these generalization, they do contain some degree of truth. At 
the same time, even recognizing that the various forms of contemporary evangelicalism 
developed from the forms the movement took in its first and second generations, one must take 
care to recognize the significant changes this movement underwent in the intervening two 
centuries. This need to differentiate between forms of evangelicalism applies all that much more 
when discussing early Anglican Evangelicalism. While it may not be true of worldwide 
Anglicanism, significant misunderstandings about the nature and significance of this movement 
occur even within the Episcopal Church, the standard bearer of the Anglican tradition in the 
United States. I hope therefore that this chapter can put a certain critical distance between the 
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“evangelicalism” of the long 18th century and of today so that one can discuss the degree to 
which Coleridge should be associated with this movement without bias from the term 
“evangelical.”  
 In this chapter I will describe the matrix of identifying features that would mark someone 
as a first or second generation evangelical as well as those that specifically applied to that subset 
within the Church of England.220 Many scholars who deal with early British evangelicalism tend 
to look at the movement’s ideational features and then see issues of evangelical rhetoric and 
culture through that lens. My approach, while drawing significantly on the work of these 
scholars, will look at the ideational features of early evangelicalism as part of a larger, 
interrelated web that includes the sources of authority evangelicals appealed to for their views, 
the figures that they tended to read and draw from, the ways in which they characterized (or 
mischaracterized) their opponents, and how those outside the movement saw them.  
 First, I will attempt to give an abbreviated account of the history of British 
evangelicalism in the long 18th century by providing the background conditions from which 
British evangelicalism emerged, its relationship to the larger Pietist and revival movements in the 
North Atlantic world, and the emergence and growth of the movement from the 1730s until the 
1830s. Second, drawing particularly upon the work of David Bebbington and Reginald Ward, I 
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will attempt to chart the explicit theological understandings and emphases of the broader 
evangelical movement. After this, I will analyze the ways in which the larger evangelical 
movement was perceived, and in many ways caricatured, by non-evangelicals.  
After giving this broader overview of British evangelicalism, which included Wesleyan 
and Calvinist Methodism, much of “New Dissent,” and the Anglican Evangelicals, focus will 
shift to the intricacies of Anglican Evangelicalism. Anglican Evangelicals retained the common 
features of the broader movement, but they did so in a way distinctive to them and had internal 
divisions and controversies equally distinct for them. For instance, Evangelicals legitimized 
themselves through appeals to the Reformers and claims of truly adhering to the 39 Articles; they 
were the only members of the Church of England during the late 18th and early 19th centuries not 
to find identification with Calvinism odious; and they distanced themselves from dissenting 
evangelicals through their commitment to the liturgy and order of the Establishment. I will also 
describe the conflict between moderate Evangelicals and radical Evangelicals that emerged in the 
late 18th century and intensified during the 1820s.   
 Of all the major theological traditions discussed in this and the preceding chapter, 
evangelicalism is the youngest, and did not really emerge on the British landscape until the late 
1730s and early 1740s.221 The relatively late emergence of evangelicalism owes much to the fact 
that it represented a new tradition with less claim to direct continuity with 16th and 17th century 
religious movements than the other traditions discussed in this work. The oft repeated charge of 
“enthusiasm” leveled against Methodism arose from a perceived “association of the Methodists 
with Cromwell’s Puritans and with other evangelical and religiously occult groups.”222 
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Evangelicals did draw inspiration from Puritan sources and shared certain theological features in 
common with them, but there is not nearly the same degree of continuity between the 18th 
century Revival and earlier Puritanism as there is between, for instance, 17th and 18th century 
High Churchmanship.223 The Restoration settlement had transformed Puritans into Dissent, 
which, as stated before, either started down the road of greater and greater theological 
rationalism or focused inward with increasingly dogmatic and rigid forms. The First Great 
Awakening in New England certainly kindled a hope among some early 18th century Dissenters 
such as Isaac Watts who believed a movement born in the dissenting churches would revitalize a 
tepid and lax British Christianity. However, such a dream was never realized and the British 
evangelical awakening emerged from what seemed a curious and unlikely intersection of forces: 
its early leaders were committed to the Church of England, formed by High Church 17th century 
piety and Arminian theology, and indebted to the early 18th century moralist crusade for the 
reformation of manners. As John Walsh observes, “When the revival arrived, it came, 
paradoxically, not among the Calvinist Dissenters who had corresponded about it, and prayed 
about it, but in an Arminian Church of England in which the old Puritan Calvinism was almost 
virtually extinct, and the prejudice against spirit-filled ‘enthusiasm’ almost an obsession.”224 
 When the evangelical revival emerged and its effects began to spread throughout Great 
Britain and beyond, many contemporaries saw it as though it came out of nowhere.225 However, 
the British revival was one of the last of a string of revival movements in America, Continental 
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Europe and Britain that occurred in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. A sophisticated 
communications network existed to link German Pietists, American Revivalists, and the 
emerging evangelicals in Britain, and those in Britain indeed saw themselves as part of a larger 
revival of Christian piety.226 Reginald Ward, pushing for a more global view of early 
evangelicalism, argues convincingly that one should not view national revivals as isolated 
occurrences, but as components in an interrelated Euro-American movement with origins in the 
German-speaking world.227 Beyond the North Atlantic exchange of evangelical religious 
literature and letters, Britain’s relative religious and political tolerance compared to continental 
Europe also primed the island for a religious awakening. Under George I and II, Great Britain 
welcomed waves of religious refugees seeking both protection from increasing Catholic hostility 
to Protestantism228 and an increasing attempt at religious uniformity in the modern bureaucratic 
state.229 This wave of religious immigration also included active missionary efforts, such as 
Zinzendorf’s Moravians who sought missionary opportunities in Great Britain and especially its 
American colonies.230  
 Undoubtedly the most significant development in the early Evangelical Revival was 
Methodism, and three figures proved indispensable to the emergence of this movement: John 
Wesley, Charles Wesley, and George Whitefield.231 Brothers John (1703) and Charles (1707) 
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were born in Epworth, England to Samuel and Susannah Wesley. Both came from families with 
deep roots in Puritanism and Dissent which had suffered under the Restoration and Great 
Ejection in the 1660s; nonetheless, Samuel and Susannah would return to the Church of England. 
Susannah, who significantly influenced her sons’s early education, imparted some of her Puritan 
heritage, but Samuel embraced a High Church approach both to theology and politics. Their 
father’s high churchmanship likely played an important role in the transmission of Non-Juror 
thought as well as that of Caroline Divines such as Jeremy Taylor to the Wesley brothers. 
Furthermore, Samuel became involved in the moral reform movement of the late 1690s and took 
an active part in the newly formed SPCK (Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge).232  
 After receiving his Bachelor of Arts from Christ Church, Oxford in 1724, John began 
studying for his M.A. in 1725 while moving toward ordination to the priesthood. John committed 
himself to a course of readings from the Pietist holy living tradition and a meticulous moral self-
examination. This study included authors such as Thomas à Kempis, Jeremy Taylor, Robert 
Nelson, and William Beveridge, and, inspired by Taylor, he began keeping a “diary as a record 
and measure of his progress in holy living.”233 In 1726 Charles arrived at Christ Church, and, 
after a year of what he considered an unfulfilling moral laxity, he, like his brother, “threw 
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himself into his studies and devotions.”234 Beginning with a group of two or three fellow 
students, Charles formed the “holy club,” the members of which would come also to be known 
as the “Oxford Methodists.” They dedicated themselves to frequent communing, “intense bible 
study and other serious reading,” strict adherence to church fast days, giving to the poor, and 
visitation of prisoners.235 Until the Wesley brothers left for Georgia in 1735, the Methodists saw 
the emergence of new societies at other Oxford Colleges while they grew in notoriety, and, to a 
substantial extent, infamy. John and Charles exercised direct supervision of this “core group” of 
Methodists, but the larger Oxford movement was more a loose affiliation of like-minded 
students. Nevertheless, John did become the Methodists’ chief spokesperson and apologist as he 
defended the movement from charges either of undue scrupulosity or enthusiasm. Through this 
work the term “Methodism,” originally a term of abuse leveled against the group, was adopted as 
a positive descriptor of the inchoate movement.236  
 In the early 1730s, George Whitfield, the third and youngest of these most important 
figures in the coming Revival, joined the Oxford Methodists. Whitfield was born in 1714 in 
Gloucester to a family of some means, but declining fortunes, providing him with an inferiority 
complex. Unlike the Wesleys, Whitfield grew up in a Church of England household without any 
meaningful ties to Dissent or Nonconformity. He was urged to seek a clerical profession, but it 
seems more from a sense of the opportunity this offered to regain social status than from a 
profound spiritual calling. In his home, “there was certainly no deep spiritual concern or biblical 
instruction comparable to that of a Susannah Wesley.”237 Arriving at Oxford, Whitfield intended 
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to study for a career in the theatre, but, owing to a sense of despondency and isolation, he 
involved himself in the Holy Club and thence resolved to enter ordained ministry. He became 
one of the most ardent practitioners of this spirituality, throwing himself headlong into his 
studies and spiritual disciplines in an apparent attempt to “out-methodize the methodists.”238  
 In the year before Whitfield graduated and was ordained, the Wesley brothers set out 
with the support of the SPCK and SPG (Society for the Propagation of the Gospel) for the new 
colony of Georgia. Charles went to serve as Governor Oglethorpe’s secretary and John was to be 
a missionary, hoping to spread the Gospel among Georgia’s native population and European 
immigrants. The journey to Georgia is often highlighted in histories of the movement for good 
reason: John encountered a group of Moravians who were part of an effort to start a Colony in 
Georgia and it was their calm devotion in the face of a violent storm in which John feared 
desperately for his life that occasioned one of many crises of faith for the elder Wesley. While 
Charles served adequately in his position as secretary,239 one would be hard pressed to argue for 
the success of John’s mission. Circumstances forced him to leave surreptitiously in December of 
1737 as he faced potential legal action brought forward by some prominent settlers. Both 
brothers returned to England deeply dismayed and spiritually unmoored, feelings that certainly 
made them receptive to the spirituality that led to their 1738 conversions. 
 During this same time, the Revival within the Church of England had already begun, but 
it happened with little influence from the Oxford Methodist, and in Wales rather than England. 
The Welsh Church of England retained a tradition of more emotive oratory such that “the 
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preaching of the Anglican Church in Wales can hardly be indicted for excessive and abstruse 
rationality.” In 1714 and 1718 a certain Rev. Griffin Jones even suffered the same kinds of 
accusations of undermining church order that the Wesleys would experience thirty years later.240 
Also, while it happened in the Church of England, the Welsh Revival, more so than the English, 
was not simply a clergy-initiated movement. Its beginnings are generally traced to Howell 
Harris’s 1735 conversion, and through the combined actions of Harris and his colleague Daniel 
Rowland, the curate of Llangeitho, a network of itinerant preaching and small group religious 
societies – both would characterize the larger evangelical movement – came into being.241 
 Between Whitfield’s ordination in the spring of 1736 and the field preaching in Bristol 
three years later that many mark as the true start of the English (or possibly better to say 
“Methodist”) Revival, several developments would set the stage for this coming event and 
contribute to the ideas, forms, styles, and conflicts that would inform the essential character of 
British evangelicalism for the rest of the century. Whitfield continued the work of the Oxford 
Methodists and regularly corresponded with the Wesleys during their time in Georgia. After 
returning to England, Charles visited Whitfield and convinced him of the need for missionary 
activity in North America. Whitfield resolved to embark on this missionary activity, but before 
leaving he ministered in London for a year, which afforded him the chance to develop his 
oratorical style. During this time he also experienced his conversion or “New Birth.”242 This 
emphasis on the “New Birth” and regeneration, seen by Whitfield as profoundly affective 
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experiences, fueled the revivalist fervor with which he preached throughout Georgia.243 
Returning to London after this missionary effort, he became for a few years the face of 
Methodism, acting as much as the target of accusations of “enthusiasm” as the movement’s 
celebrity icon.244 Whitfield then began his itinerant ministry, preaching in the “fields” around 
Bristol in early 1739. 
 When Charles returned to England he recommitted himself to the work of the now greatly 
enlarged Methodist societies. The revivalist foment he experienced and heard about in the work 
of Whitfield, other Oxford Methodists, and Harris also impressed him.245 John returned a year 
later much more spiritually defeated than his brother. Having encountered the Moravians in 
Georgia, he continued his spiritual “apprenticeship” with the London-based minister Peter 
Böhler who was soon to be ordained as a Moravian by Zinzendorf. Böhler convinced John of the 
need for instantaneous conversion and a commitment to Justification by faith alone, and that 
there were no degrees of faith, but only belief and unbelief. While John’s position on these three 
points would evolve, they nevertheless remained part of his thought for the rest of his ministry. 
His experience with the London Moravians set the stage for the now-famous “Aldersgate 
experience” in which John “felt his heart strangely warmed” on May 24, 1738, just three days 
after Charles’s self-proclaimed conversion.246  
But the peace accompanying instantaneous conversion did not last for John or Charles as 
they believed – and Böhler taught – it should. Ward goes as far as saying that one should not 
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locate Wesley’s true conversion in the Aldersgate experience.247 Instead, like his failure to 
become a precisionist that led to his failed Georgia mission, Aldersgate represents Wesley’s 
failed attempt to become a Moravian:  
 If Wesley is compared with his contemporaries among the Inspired in the Rhineland, who understood 
 Paul’s injunction to be fervent in prayer quite literally to be boiling hot, or even with the wilder shores of 
 enthusiasm at Herrnhaag on which the Moravians were shortly to fetch up, his confession of a warmed 
 heart is that of a rather cold fish whose pulse-rate (whether in religion or love) could not be got up to the 
 point of letting himself go.248 
 
After this less than satisfactory experience, John set out for Germany to meet with Zinzendorf 
and to sort out his theological experiences. The dissonance between what he felt as a real, if not 
entire, conversion and the Moravian hesitancy to accept its legitimacy led him to reevaluate his 
commitment to a strict Moravian theology.249 Back in England, John reluctantly accepted an 
offer to take over from Whitfield in his field preaching in Bristol as Whitfield began to move 
into Wales.250 This field preaching in Bristol on March 3, 1739 signaled the beginning of what 
would become the source of John Wesley’s stable faith and ultimate ministerial calling: that of 
itinerant Revivalist preacher and leader-organizer of the ever-growing Methodist societies.251 
 While the growth and development of Methodism during the Wesleys’ lifetime is 
interesting, a description of the most significant features of the movement for the larger 
evangelical revival will have to suffice for my argument. Throughout the Wesleys’ ministry a 
constant, if not frequently conflictual, tension remained between John and Charles regarding the 
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degree to which Church of England discipline and order could be stretched.252 Both brothers 
desired to remain within the bounds of Church of England order, but the movement, which acted 
more akin to a “para-church” organization to revive and support the Church of England, became 
increasingly independent of and a rival to the established church. Those Anglicans not directly 
involved in Methodism generally looked with suspicion or outright hostility on the movement, 
and from the middle of the 18th century a growing faction within Methodism itself desired that 
Wesley authorize lay ministers to administer the sacraments, if not to break from the Church of 
England entirely. Probably the critical moment in the drift away from the established church 
came when John Wesley ordained ministers and consecrated “superintendents” in 1784 for the 
Methodists in the newly independent United States, resulting in “Methodist independence [from 
Anglicanism] in the United States and de facto separation in Britain.”253 
 The other division within Methodism proper occurred much earlier and put a serious 
strain on the relationship between Whitfield and the Wesleys: the issue of predestination. The 
Wesleys were firmly committed to their own interpretation of Arminianism254, seeing the free 
offer of grace to all people and a corresponding capacity to receive that grace as part and parcel 
of true Christianity. They felt that the Calvinist doctrines of predestination and limited atonement 
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undercut the message of God’s love and led to antinomianism. This firm commitment would lead 
to a separation between the Wesleyan and Whitfieldian forms of Methodism.  
After his conversion and missionary journey to Georgia, Whitfield came to his particular, 
almost exclusive, emphasis on highly emotive or even ecstatic experiences that accompanied the 
“New Birth.”255 While John would eventually give greater tolerance to the more ecstatic 
experiences among the Methodists, Charles, always the more cautious and establishment brother, 
remained “much more skeptical” of these outbursts, even going so far as to keep a “bucket of 
water in plain view” when preaching.256 Even before the predestination or “Calvinist” 
controversy within Methodism, and even as John was accepting Whitfield’s invitation to take on 
field preaching, tension was building between the more reserved and pro-establishment Wesleys 
and the more charismatic and independent Whitfield.  
 However, the real wedge between the Wesleys and Whitfield came shortly after John had 
taken up Whitfield’s call to itineracy in 1739. While Whitfield had not been exposed to 
Calvinism early on (and likely read very little Jean Calvin in his life), he became open to a more 
thoroughgoing Calvinism in his Welsh preaching tour, as an aggressive commitment to 
predestination permeated the Welsh and east English revival, with those committed to this 
doctrine often hostile to Wesleyan Arminianism.257 In late 1739, Whitfield returned to the 
American Colonies for a preaching tour that took him from Pennsylvania to New York and again 
to Georgia. His experience of the Revival in America strengthened his preexisting openness both 
to “irregularity” and Calvinism: “If Whitfield’s ministry was ecumenical, it was an all-inclusive 
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ecumenicity that was explicitly ‘Calvinist’ in theology and opposed to all forms of 
‘Arminianism.’ In fact, Whitfield’s Calvinism and anti-Arminianism became more and more 
strident as he traveled through Calvinist America and Scotland.”258 While Whitfield was in 
America, John Wesley found that a growing number of members of his societies were 
increasingly hostile to his teaching God’s universal offer of salvation, and this prompted a harsh 
rebuttal against Calvinism.259 Whitfield responded with a letter in which he enjoined Wesley to 
avoid completely the topic of election in his preaching. This conflict culminated in a face to face 
meeting between John and Whitfield upon Whitfield’s return and ultimately a schism in the 
Kingswood society.260 The Wesleys and Whitfield from that time parted ways in their ministries, 
and, while always remaining courteous to each other, Whitfield would occasionally “upbraid 
John Wesley” during his distinct ministry.261 
 The various overlapping evangelical movements could often go in opposite institutional 
directions. If one looks at the Wesleys, one sees a constant conflict between a desire to reform 
the Church of England and to stay within what they saw as acceptable boundaries, with John 
more willing to push these boundaries than Charles. On the other hand, Whitfield, while also a 
clergyman in the Church of England, had a greater sympathy for dissent and fewer problems 
with ignoring proper church order. There is a certain irony in the fact that Wesleyan Methodism 
would become the largest dissenting movement, and Wesleyan Arminianism proved more 
influential on the emerging dissenting evangelical traditions not explicitly part of Wesley’s 
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Connexion. Likewise, while Whitfield explicitly encouraged the earliest departures from the 
Church of England, he exerted a greater theological influence on, or at least resonated 
theologically much more with, the non-Methodist evangelicals in the Church of England who 
would become increasingly identified with the Evangelical party. 
 Divisions along social and economic class lines partially explain these divergent 
ecclesiological trajectories. The Wesley’s inherited from their middle-class family a strong 
distaste for the wealthy and the aristocratic, and their movement focused on extensive work 
among the poor.262 Whitfield did not share this same distaste for the economic or social elite, and 
he saw great potential for extending his ministerial capacity by working with those of means.263 
 We now arrive at a personality who stood at the intersection of these opposing forces, 
and who helped lay the groundwork for the soon-to-emerge Evangelical party in the Church of 
England even as she formed one of the first independent evangelical communities: Selina, 
Countess of Huntingdon. Selina’s peerage allowed her to appoint chaplains and thus support 
several evangelical leaders such as Whitfield, Henry Venn, and William Romaine.264 Whitfield’s 
theological influence on Selina, who already inclined toward Calvinism, helped ensure the 
strength of Calvinism among Anglican Evangelicals. She also created an organizational network 
and college at Trevecca which gave greater cohesion to what was initially a group of like-
minded, but isolated and disparate, regular clergy whose “structure” could not match the 
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organizational prowess of the Wesleyan societies. Finally, her patronage and work with other 
elites helped to make evangelical thought acceptable among “respectable society.”265  
 “Parties,” in the post-Tractarian sense of well-defined ecclesial factions did not really exit 
in the 18th century, whose people saw them as breeding grounds for division and sectarianism. 
One can nevertheless still distinguish tendencies in the 18th-century Church that one could 
conceive of as “proto-parties.” Thus, while talk about the “Evangelical” party in the Church of 
England during the early revival would be idiosyncratic, I still feel comfortable talking about 
“early Anglican Evangelicals” in the sense of those Anglicans influenced by the evangelical 
revival who remained nevertheless only peripherally associated with the Methodist movements 
or even viewed them with suspicion. The early figures in what would become Anglican 
Evangelicalism sometimes experienced their conversion after contact with Oxford Methodism or 
revivalists such as Wesley and Whitefield, but they often occurred during the larger wave of 
conversions in the 1720s and 30s of which the early Methodists were only one part. Many 
prominent figures claimed by the Anglican Evangelicals were part of this group of independent 
conversions, including George Thompson, James Harvey, Vincent Perronet, William Romaine, 
and Henry Venn. Among these, Vincent Perronet was “ten years older than John Wesley, 
converted independently of him and did not meet him for the first time until 1744.”266 Similarly, 
“William Romaine (1714-95), though an undergraduate at Wesley’s former Oxford college, did 
not associate with the Holy Club and only converted subsequently.”267 An important transitional 
figure from the earliest forms of evangelical revival to the second generation of those like 
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Wilberforce and Hannah More was John Newton, the former slave captain turned Church of 
England Clergyman. He was established at Olney in 1764 – an insignificant parish at the time, 
but important in our history because the poet and hymn-writer William Cowper, who would 
importantly influence the young Coleridge, was from Olney.268  
 By the mid-18th century, “regular” evangelical clergy in the Church of England remained 
a relatively marginal group both in the Revival and the Church.269 Despite remaining within the 
bounds of Anglican parochial order, this group of evangelicals still “had a somewhat uncertain 
status in terms of legality” – or at least legitimacy in the eyes of those holding ecclesial  
power.270 “Evangelical parish clergymen in the Church of England, of course, were free to 
pursue their own style of preaching and pastoral work, although they were unlikely to receive 
promotion to the highest ecclesial rank.”271 The common assumption that evangelical thought 
and practice were “enthusiasm” played some role in marginalizing these clergy, but parochial 
Evangelicals also suffered from an association with the itinerant Methodists’ “irregularity” and 
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the perceived (or real) threat it posed to proper church order. However, with the aid of influential 
laity, like the Countess of Huntingdon, evangelical thought within the Church of England 
gradually became more respectable and acceptable. Evangelical clergy also worked to extend the 
influence of evangelicalism within the Church. John Newton, for instance, “became a trusted 
confidant to several distinguished Anglican leaders, both lay and clerical,” including Charles 
Simeon, the influential moralist Hannah More, and M.P. William Wilberforce.272 
 From the 1770s, pressure on pro-evangelical Anglican clergy to decide between 
remaining in the Church of England or associating with emerging dissenting movements quickly 
mounted. As many Wesleyan Methodists rapidly disconnected from the Church in the 1780s and 
90s, explicit shows of allegiance in one direction or the other became that much more necessary. 
The period of the French Revolution and then the early part of the Napoleonic Wars further 
challenged the ease of Evangelical growth in the Church of England. Both dissenting and 
Anglican evangelicals were suspected of Jacobin sympathies and involvement in political 
subversion.273 At the same time, despite the strong push for moral and social reform (including 
abolition of the slave trade), many prominent Tory politicians associated themselves with the 
Evangelicals, and Evangelical clergy after the French Revolution were “overwhelmingly 
Tory.”274 While Evangelicals were more apt than other conservatives to support toleration, their 
general adherence to orthodox theological positions allowed them to grow in influence and 
prominence as the liberal/Latitudinarian strain came under greater and greater scrutiny. 
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 One can fairly distinguish a second generation of British evangelicalism running from the 
1790s until the early 1830s.275 This is the same period in which Coleridge came of age and lived 
his adult life, so the character of the evangelicalism of this period is particularly important for 
this argument since this was the form with which Coleridge would have interacted. This period 
saw greater internal consolidation within individual forms of evangelicalism as increasing inter-
group competition led to greater differentiation between groups, a phenomenon mirrored in the 
consolidation within Anglican High Churchmanship as it competed with the Evangelicals. This 
meant on the one hand that Anglicans sought to secure the title to being (the) authentic 
evangelicalism: 
The alarming growth of Methodism and evangelical Nonconformity in the 1790s seemed to threaten the 
future of the Established Church: if Dissent continued to expand at this rate, would the Church not soon be 
a vulnerable minority institution like her offspring the Church of Ireland? Many Evangelicals now felt 
guilty at the way in which the irregularity of their own colleagues had encouraged s this upsurge in Dissent 
Too many of those who had been converted by irregular preaching had joined Dissent rather than the 
Church.276 
 
A lesser but still real challenge came from non-Evangelical (generally High Church but also 
some liberal) Anglicans, who claimed that any evangelicalism was inherently incompatible with 
Anglicanism and undermined the established Church.277 The growing power of evangelical 
Nonconformity certainly did little to help discount these views in the eyes of the Evangelical’s 
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detractors. These two forces helped bring about a moderated form of evangelicalism that 
simultaneously claimed it was the true (or truer) form of Christianity against the irregularities 
and doctrinal “particularities” imputed to the Nonconformists while it was also the true heir of 
the authentic, and Reformation, character of the Church of England. 
 Before this second generation of more moderate Evangelicalism came to an end, the 
pendulum swung in the other direction as an internal rift developed in the 1820s between those 
committed to this moderate form and those with features often associated with contemporary 
evangelicalism. This more radical movement emphasized prophetic utterances, millenarianism 
(as well as a pivot toward Premillennialism), a significantly narrower view of biblical 
inspiration, and an essential biblical literalism.278 I will explore the specifics of this doctrinal 
shift in greater detail in the following section, since some of Coleridge’s positions could be seen 
as attempts to shore up the more moderate Evangelical position against the radicalism emerging 
at the end of his life.  
 An explanation of evangelicalism’s influence on dissenting traditions is the last historical 
point I will consider before focusing on the characteristic features of the movement. We have 
already seen that despite the (Nonconformist) expectation that Nonconformity would serve as the 
fertile ground from which a revival would spring, revival instead largely originated within the 
Church of England. Second, the great exodus of Methodists at the end of the 18th century greatly 
increased the power of Nonconformity going into the 19th century. However, Methodism’s 
becoming a dissenting group and subsequent expansion was not the only significant change the 
revival brought to British nonconforming churches. As Noll explains, “With energy from 
Moravianism and the converts of Whitfield, a quickening of faith among Baptists and 
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Independents, a significant stimulus from America and a wholesale borrowing from the 
Methodists (especially itinerary), Nonconformity entered a period of dynamic evangelical 
expansion.”279 While the themes of the revival first influenced newly created Baptist bodies and  
other forms of so-called “New Dissent,”280 evangelicalism would eventually touch almost all 
dissenting groups in Britain, with the exception of rational Dissenters such as the Unitarians.281  
 I can now turn to identifying the matrix of theological thinking, communication style, and 
social and cultural markers, that together distinguished “evangelicalism” from other long 18th 
century religious traditions, as well as those differences that acted as boundary markers for the 
various forms of evangelicalism. Before proceeding, I need to clarify how my method of analysis 
departs from other approaches to 18th century British evangelicalism. For several reasons already 
identified in the first chapter, early evangelicalism has often been treated as more of a social and 
cultural phenomenon that is weak on theology or doctrinal formulation.282 However, W. 
Reginald Ward has brought attention to the characteristics of “top-drawer” evangelicalism and in 
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so doing has attempted to dispel conventional assumptions about evangelicalism as essentially a 
non- or anti-intellectual movement. He argues instead that evangelicalism, particularly in its 
early forms, had its own intellectual elite who contributed in consequential ways to the 
development of modernity, even if they have not received the same accolades as 
“Enlightenment” thinkers. It is the contention of this entire project that Coleridge would also 
need to be counted among this tier of thinkers, so this analysis of the distinguishing features of 
evangelicalism will focus on the forms put forward by the movement’s intellectual architects.283 
 Evangelicalism (both as a larger movement and as a specific party in the Church of 
England) represented the other half of the broadly “orthodox” approach discussed in the last 
chapter in the sense that they offered a more robust and “conservative” approach to Christian 
doctrine than the liberals/Latitudinarians. A list of the bare doctrines held by evangelicals and the 
High Churchmen in the long 18th century would be almost identical. However, this does not 
mean that these two groups thought exactly the same way about God and the world and differed 
merely on points of rhetoric/style/practice. Rather, evangelicals emphasized different doctrines 
than High Church Anglicans and frequently interpreted them differently as well: It was not 
doctrines such as justification by faith, original sin, or the need for repentance “per se but the 
Evangelical interpretation or gloss of them which the Orthodox tended to dispute.”284  
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 This observation does not mean that these two groups differed on their interpretation of 
every doctrine. A significant orthodox consensus existed for the interpretation of “speculative” 
doctrines, such as the Trinity or the incarnation (although not the atonement). However, while 
holding that these doctrines were important and should generally be accepted as true, 
evangelicals did not see intellectual assent to them as central to the life of faith. For evangelicals 
“faith” was less a matter of assent to doctrinal propositions (where doubt would be the contrary 
of faith) and more of the nature of one’s relationship and affective disposition toward God 
(where concern would be less with intellectual belief or unbelief and more about a 
“living/active/practical” faith vs. a “dead/cold/abstract” faith). Assenting to properly formulated 
understandings of, say, the divinity of Christ or the nature of the Trinity would be less important 
to the evangelical than a proper disposition of praise and thanksgiving toward that God.  
 John Wesley clearly indicates that for him “practical atheism” posed a much greater 
threat to Christianity than true intellectual doubt about the existence of God. In his sermon “On 
Living without God,” Wesley asserted that he “could not find twenty who seriously disbelieved 
the being of God; nay I have found only two of these (to the best of judgement) in the British 
Islands.”285 Rather, the threat comes from those who accept the proposition that God exists, but 
who nevertheless “have not God in all their thoughts; such as have not acquainted themselves 
with him, neither have any fellowship with him; such as have no more intercourse with God, or 
the invisible world, than the animal had with the visible.”286 From the point of view of what 
constitutes a true and living faith, stopping at assent to propositions about the existence of God 
proves no better than denying these beliefs.  
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 While Wesley did not consider them the same, he did see faith as intimately connected 
with love of God, which meant relationship with God. Wesley distinguishes between justification 
(forgiveness of sins) and sanctification (growth in inner holiness, meaning growth in love of God 
and neighbor), but he says that faith is the necessary and only condition for both justification and 
sanctification. One can infer then that “faith” which does not lead to growth in love of God and 
neighbor is not faith.287 Wesley clearly distinguishes between a kind of knowledge of God that 
even practical Atheists have and that kind that those who are truly saved by faith have in his 
sermon “On Original Sin”: “From the things that are seen we inferred the existence of an eternal, 
powerful Being, that is not seen. But still, although we acknowledged his being we had no 
acquaintance with him. As we know there is an Emperor of China, whom yet we do not know; 
so, we knew there was a King of all the earth, yet we knew him not.” That evangelicals wanted a 
stronger connection between faith and love or faith and relationship proves vitally important for 
our study of Coleridge, since he will go even further in conjoining them by making them only 
analytically distinct facets of one act or state of being.   
  Beyond this distinctive conception of faith, early evangelicals strongly emphasized the 
reality and fundamentally corrupting effects of original sin. Adherence to and emphasis of this 
doctrine would not necessarily have distinguished evangelicals from their High Church 
contemporaries, but it certainly distinguished them from Deists and other strong rationalists who 
saw Christ as nothing more than a teacher and moral exemplar. It would have also differentiated 
evangelicals from the many Latitudinarians who, despite generally affirming the doctrine, held 
that human nature remains fundamentally good. Instead, evangelicals saw original sin as utterly 
corrupting human nature, such that “there is nothing [humans] can do by themselves to win 
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salvation. All human actions, even good works, are tainted by sin, and so there is no possibility 
of gaining merit in the sight of God. Hence, salvation has to be received, not achieved.”288 
  Intimately connected with their view of original sin was the centrality of salvation by 
faith alone for evangelical belief. Evangelicals would never see salvation as something achieved 
through human activity, even if such an inherent capacity required God’s assistance, but only 
ever something given through God’s gracious activity and Christ’s death on the cross. This fully 
gratuitous offer of restored relationship also implied inner transformation, understood as  
regeneration or growth in holiness.289  
 Key to the evangelical conception of the ordo salutis is the subjective nature both of the 
acceptance of the offer of salvific grace and of regeneration. Conversion, often understood as 
repentance and a desire to receive full pardon for one’s sins followed by the “New Birth,” was 
essential. One can see that salvation by faith alone and the acceptance of saving grace in a 
conversion experience were cornerstones of evangelical thought in Wesley’s viewing “the ‘grand 
scriptural doctrines’ uniting the Evangelical clergy as original sin, justification, and the new 
birth.”290  The expectation of personal conversion, and particularly use of language of the “New 
Birth” proved almost exclusively the domain of the evangelicals in Britain during the 18th and 
early 19th centuries, but it was certainly not a new doctrine at the outbreak of the Revival. Earlier 
stages of the larger evangelical revival in the form of German pietism were already emphasizing 
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a conversion that included repenting of a life of sin and new birth in the Spirit. While opposed on 
certain theological points, both the Moravians and Halle Pietists influenced the developing 
theologies of the Wesleys. Philip Jacob Spener, whose Pia Desidera was an influential early 
treatise in German Pietism, urged “the need for repentance, the new birth, putting faith into 
action and close fellowship among true believers.”291 Nor was the doctrine without precedent in 
British thought. Nonconformists, and before them Puritans, made conversion central to faith.  
 The novelty in the evangelical292 understanding of conversion and New Birth compared 
with that of the Puritans was the nature of subjectively perceptible inner transformation that they 
understood conversion to entail. Prior to the revival, conversion was understood as 
the acknowledgement or recognition of regeneration as a new spiritual and ontological status. Where once  
sinners had stood alienated from God, after the New Birth they took on the mantle of Christ and became – 
in God’s eyes – new creatures. Left unspecified in Puritan sermons was whether and to what extent the new 
creatures became new in their own eyes. Personal experience was subordinated to considerations of the 
new status before God. It mattered less that individuals felt this new position before God than that they 
understood what had happened in the spiritual realm and responded appropriately to that new status with 
appropriate acts of praise and thanksgiving.293 
 
Evangelicals maintained the importance of the change in status in God’s eyes, but this form of 
change describes their understanding of justification. The New Birth became almost fully 
associated with an accompanying subjective change in the believer. For instance, for George 
Whitfield, “the new creation of which he spoke was not a ‘mere metaphor’; it was as self-evident 
and palpable as a ‘tasteless palate’ suddenly brought alive at a sumptuous feast.”294 This actual 
change affected not only the understanding, although one must also believe oneself forgiven, but 
also the affections as one experienced joy and gratitude at God’s saving work. 
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 That this shift occurred in nearly every form of evangelicalism does not mean that 
evangelicals had a monolithic understanding of the New Birth and its effects, but rather that 
debates now centered on precisely how to understand these subjective effects. An important 
question about the New Birth was the degree to which internal affective states required outward 
emotive displays. The role of these displays ran the gamut from being a necessary mark of true 
conversion, to being acceptable but often needing further scrutiny, to deserving suspicion. On the 
side of holding to the necessity or near necessity of strong outward displays stood someone like 
George Whitfield, who developed a highly theatrical (although this does not necessarily mean 
disingenuous) form of preaching that fused “tears, passions, and consolation,” and in which he 
made use of a voice that “was often likened to ‘the roar of a lion.’”295 On the other end of the 
spectrum stood those like Charles Wesley and many of the early 19th century Anglican 
Evangelicals who strongly resisted these external displays of affection.296  
 One should note the way in which these doctrinal emphases and interpretations gave 
evangelicalism a distinctive character against the backdrop of the dominant theological mood of 
the 18th century. Deists, Socinians, Arians, and Latitudinarians saw a close connection between 
justification and salvation, and one earned these by striving to do good works. They had a highly 
transactional view of salvation whereby either the joys and pleasures of heaven were the reward 
for living a properly moral life, or, in the case of many Latitudinarians, virtue produced a good 
life in this world that was its own reward. Human nature, weakened by sin, may still need the aid 
of God’s grace either to allow for a relaxed standard of moral rigor by offering forgiveness when 
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the strict standards of the law could not be fulfilled or to reveal/republish the fullness of the 
moral law (or both). Evangelicals, on the other hand, emphasized that holiness resulted from a 
restored human nature after justification/New Birth. Holiness was essential in the life of 
salvation rather than a prerequisite to it. Furthermore, evangelicals differed from Latitudinarians 
in seeing holiness as including the inner transformation of human will away from the inclination 
to sin and towards the love of God, and not as just a greater capacity for moral action. 
William Wilberforce wrote that “made at first in the likeness of God, and still boarding 
about some faint traces of our high original, we are offered by our blessed Redeemer the means 
of purification from our corruptions, and of once more regaining the image of our Heavenly 
Father.”297 Our inclinations become “love, the compendious expression for almost every virtue, 
in fortitude under all its forms, in justice, in humility, and in all the other graces of the Christian 
character, we are made capable of attaining to heights of real elevation.”298 John Wesley 
similarly held that the goal of Christian life, and the content of salvation, was transformation into 
the image of God as our wills turn from an inclination to sin to the love of God and, 
consequently, love of neighbor. Wesley stated that “full salvation from all our sins” is “perfect 
love” or “love filling the heart, taking up the whole capacity of the soul.”299 On the journey to 
entire sanctification, “we are more and more dead to sin” and “more and more alive to God.”300 
 Furthermore, the goal or reward of salvation is intrinsic in the means of accomplishing it, 
rather than an arbitrary addition inducing humans to moral behavior: the goal is the restored 
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relationship with God for which we were originally created. One can see this ultimate end of 
human life expressed in the hymns that communicated as much evangelical theology as did their 
sermons and doctrinal/polemical tracts. The theme of the joy of heaven repeatedly comes out, but 
rather than being a joy of continued earthly pleasure, it is the unrestrained praise and worship of 
God. Charles Wesley presented the hope for heaven as full communion with God:  
 2 Come, almighty, to deliver, 
  let us all thy grace receive; 
 Suddenly return, and never, 
  Never more thy temples leave. 
 Thee we would be always blessing, 
  Serve thee as thy hosts above, 
 Pray, and praise thee without ceasing, 
  Glory in thy perfect love. 
 
 3 Finish then, thy new creation, 
  Pure and spotless let us be; 
 Let us see thy great salvation 
  Perfectly restored in thee: 
 Changed from glory into glory, 
  Till in heaven we take our place, 
 Till we cast our crowns before thee, 
  Lost in wonder, love and praise.301 
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This understanding could be found in hymns from other branches of the evangelical revival. For 
instance, Cennick identifies Jesus as the way to and the destination of the Christian life: 
 Jesus, my all, to heaven is gone, 
 He whom I fix my hopes upon; 
 His track I see, and I’ll pursue 
 The narrow way, till Him I view. 
 The way the holy prophets went, 
 The road that leads from banishment, 
 The King’s highway of holiness, 
 I’ll go, for all His paths are peace.302 
Similarly, the final verse of “Amazing Grace” by John Newton emphasizes the goal of human 
existence as restored relationship with God: 
 The earth shall soon dissolve like snow, 
 The sun forbear to shine; 
 But God who called me here below, 
 will be forever mine. 
 It would be easy to try to distinguish the evangelical from the non-evangelical visions of 
salvation as something that begins in this life and is consummated in the next rather than seeing 
salvation as securing continued pleasure and avoiding pains in a future life. This characterization 
has some truth to it, but it fails to get to the heart of the difference between these visions. 
Latitudinarians could easily play down the future life and understand the pleasures of this mortal 
life as sufficient reward and as the goal of Christianity. Thus, the main distinguishing feature was 
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instead God’s role in the plan of salvation. For the non-evangelical, one’s standing before God 
generally serves an instrumental purpose. God provides the means for securing reward and 
avoiding punishment. For the evangelical, God both provides the means of salvation and its end. 
The emphases and anthropology prominent in non-evangelical thought focused on the end of 
human life as pleasure and avoidance of pain, and right relationship with God (understood 
primarily as obedience to God’s moral command) as the means of achieving that goal. The 
evangelical would have understood right relationship with God as the goal of human existence; 
joy/pleasure/happiness are a consequence of right relationship and pain/punishment are a 
consequence of disordered relationship.  
 By the late 18th century, the High Church tradition had also frequently come to view 
justification as requiring both faith and works. Even the Hutchinsonians, who among the High 
Churchmen appeared the most “evangelical” in their devotional piety,303 “remained identified 
with the later Caroline emphasis on ‘Justification by works’ as well as faith.”304 However, the 
nature of Baptism and its connection to regeneration served as a more reliable theological 
dividing line between evangelicals and the High Churchmen. Evangelicals could maintain a 
range of views regarding the relationship between Baptism and spiritual regeneration. More 
thorough-going Calvinists “denied baptismal regeneration outright as unscriptural” and 
“regarded baptism as little more than an initiation into the visible church,” although some could 
concede with Thomas Scott that “baptism was at least a sign of regeneration as laid down in 
Article 23.”305 There were, however, moderate Evangelicals who believed in the possibility of 
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some regenerative grace often accompanying Baptism, but they would also affirm that “the grace 
of spiritual regeneration could often be separated from the sacrament of baptism.”306  
 Separating regenerative grace from Baptism, either necessarily or potentially, constituted 
a line in the sand between evangelicals and High Churchmen. From the evangelical side, the 
problem with the High Church position was that it made the sacrament the “sole and exclusive 
instrument of the new birth.”307 For Evangelicals, the High Church position implied “two 
justifications, the first linked directly to baptism and the second to the final judgement,” despite 
any High Church objections to the contrary.308 From the High Church side, any separation of 
regenerative grace and Baptism meant both “a rejection of the spiritual prerogatives of 
priesthood” and the attempt to “deny or explain away and qualify a doctrine enshrined in the 
Prayer Book.”309 For a tradition that so closely linked salvation and proper church order, the 
explicit or implicit denial of a “proper” understanding of baptismal regeneration strongly 
supported the High Church accusation that the Evangelicals preached a “‘mutilated sketch’ of 
what they regarded as the whole Gospel.”310 
 The view of salvation sketched here primarily distinguished the evangelicals 
theologically from every other tradition in the long 18th century. These doctrines also dictated a 
particular evangelical method for interpreting and prioritizing other doctrines. The evangelical 
focus on the Holy Spirit’s role in the Christian life flowed naturally from an emphasis not only 
on salvation by grace through faith generally, but also specifically on the doctrine’s subjective 
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dimensions, i.e., the movement’s characteristic “conversionism.” Many in the larger trans-
Atlantic revival framed the entire movement as an outpouring of the Holy Spirit. Jonathan 
Edwards stated that “from the fall of man to this day wherein we live the Work of Redemption in 
its effects has mainly been carried on by remarkable pourings out of the Spirit of God.”311 
Similarly, the Anglican school master Joseph Milner indicated that the revival resulted from an 
“effusion” of the Holy Spirit.312  
 If the Holy Spirit’s work had a central place in evangelical thought, it was also something 
that those outside the movement looked at with the most suspicion. Fear for the implications of 
this doctrine was not limited to those outside the movement; evangelicals themselves could see 
this emphasis as highly susceptible to misunderstanding and misuse, thus needing the greatest 
scrutiny. Many 18th century thinkers saw evangelical pretensions to special outpourings or 
revelations from the Holy Spirit as one of the main signs that evangelicalism bred enthusiasm 
and fanaticism – and some fringe movements within the revival certainly did nothing to alleviate 
these fears.313 As a result, leaders of the evangelical movement constantly sought to put limits on 
the most extravagant and ecstatic claims to inspiration. For mainstream evangelicals, real 
manifestations of Spirit had to conform to the witness of Scripture; anything that did not 
rightfully deserved condemnation as “enthusiasm.” 
 An emphasis on the atonement also flowed from this evangelical understanding of 
salvation, and in particular a view of the atonement that entailed Christ’s full divinity. Few in the 
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movement would deny that Jesus serves as a moral exemplar, but this exemplary function could 
not be the primary aspect of his work.314 Human beings, fully estranged from God because of the 
all-encompassing effects of original sin, require far more than a reduplication of the moral law or 
gracious assistance to shore up defects in our moral capabilities; human beings need a mediator 
to remove the guilt of sin and to restore a human nature deformed by the effects of sin. Thus, 
Christ’s death on the cross as the completion or even totality of Christ's atoning work, usually 
understood in substitutionary terms, was inseparable from evangelical conceptions of true 
Christianity.315 Images of salvation through Christ’s blood shed on the cross and Christ as the 
sacrificial lamb filled evangelical hymns and sermons.316 John Wesley understood the atonement 
as the litmus test for true Christianity: “Indeed, nothing in the Christian system is of greater 
consequence than the doctrine of the Atonement. It is properly the distinguishing point between 
Deism and Christianity… Give up the Atonement, and the Deists are agreed with us.”317 
 The importance of the atonement provides an interesting insight into the theological 
character of the movement: It actually shared the larger 18th century’s hostility to “abstract” 
metaphysical speculation and a prejudice toward the “practical” dimensions of theory. Therefore, 
evangelicals attempted, sometimes vigorously, to demonstrate that their thought was conductive 
to good moral behavior and social orderliness. However, a distinctive dimension of evangelical 
“practicality” meant something more like a prejudice toward the “pastoral” importance of 
doctrine, i.e., a doctrine’s importance, as well as how it was interpreted, was judged according to 
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how well it aids people along the via salutis understood as conviction of sin, repentance, New 
Birth, and growth in holiness. Thus, most evangelicals had a strong commitment to the doctrine 
of the Trinity, but few and far between are treatises on the nature of the Trinity even as sermons 
and hymns about the working of the Spirit in believers’s lives abound. One may think of this 
emphasis on the practical (John Wesley was found of describing his approach as “practical 
divinity”) as part of the larger 18th century British turn toward practice, but “practical” did not 
mean an instrumental focus on ordering intramundane life so much as an instrumental focus on 
advancing believers into a restored relationship with God. 
 One now sees a resolution to a prima face paradox, viz., the atonement, particularly 
understood in its substitutionary form, was the central doctrinal line-in-the-sand between 
Christian and non-Christian belief, and the cross, sacrifice, and blood of Christ figure so 
prominently in evangelical piety and literature, yet a corresponding attempt to clearly and 
thoroughly define the mechanics of the atonement are conspicuously absent. For instance, if one 
looks at the various attempts to clarify John Wesley’s understanding of the nature of the 
atonement, rather than its effects (and remember that John Wesley saw the atonement as the 
defining feature of Christianity against Deism), one is at a loss. Ted Campbell summarizes the 
various analyses of how Wesley understood the atonement, and the result is that although 
“substitution is primary among these various theories in John Wesley’s thought on the 
atonement,” it is by no means the only theory put forward. One also finds allusions throughout 
his work to “many elements of Christ’s saving work, including substitution, sacrifice, suffering, 
Christ’s priestly intercession, and the notion of Christ’s victory over the powers of evil (Christus 
Victor) as elements of Christ’s work of salvation.”318 One sees an equal or greater disregard for 
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theoretical exactness in the second-generation Anglican Evangelical Charles Jerram. “Atonement 
meant reconciliation, breaching the gap between man’s sins and God’s holiness,” but the need 
for speculation on the mechanics of atonement was set aside as “unnecessary.”319 
 This pastoral theological method provides the solution to this apparent dissonance. The 
primary importance of the atonement comes in the fact that it provides the possibility of the 
forgiveness of the guilt of sin and restored relationship with God. Because evangelicals resisted 
any sense of the need for abstract intellectual assent to doctrines, how the atonement caused this 
effect would only be important insofar as some understanding of the mechanics of the atonement 
would be conducive to growth in holiness. This explains on the one hand how evangelicals could 
emphasize one theory (like substitutionary atonement) while making free use of other images (as 
Wesley did). One can see that this theory was promoted primarily for its devotional effects. In 
evangelical hymnody, gratitude for what Christ has accomplished is by far the more common 
framework for describing the cross and atonement rather than descriptions of the mechanics that 
explain the accomplishment.320 
 The discussion of this characteristically evangelical “pastoral” method make possible a 
discussion of what was likely the most significant intra-movement theological division: that 
between the Arminians and the Calvinists.321 Nevertheless, while sharing the same modifiers as 
their non-evangelical counterparts, evangelical Arminianism and some forms of evangelical 
Calvinism can be considered distinct from the Arminianism and Calvinism outside of 
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evangelicalism. Evangelical Arminianism found some adherents among Anglican Evangelicals 
and certain dissenting groups such as the New Connexion of General Baptists, but the vast 
majority of evangelical Arminians were Wesleyan Methodists.322 In describing his position as 
“Arminian,” Wesley wanted to consciously reject doctrines such as predestination or imputed 
righteousness that were common to most forms of Calvinism, but Wesley would not have 
considered his Arminianism as that claimed by Latitudinarians or non-evangelical High 
Churchmen, and it certainly was not the theology of Jacobus Arminius or the Dutch 
Remonstrants. Unlike non-evangelical forms which were, or came very close to, Pelagianism, 
Wesley rejected any belief that some part of the human being remained untouched by original sin 
or that humans can participate in the saving act through some innate capacity. Likewise, Wesley 
vehemently rejected the notion of any good works being necessary prior to justification.323 What 
Wesley held in common with other forms of Arminianism was that Christ’s atoning death was 
potentially for all people and that every human is given the opportunity to freely choose or deny 
the offer salvation. He also held, in his opposition to the doctrine of imputed righteousness, that 
in sanctification human beings are actually made righteous before God through the transforming 
power of the Holy Spirit. However, he wanted to develop a system that held that at every point 
the possibility of salvation was completely contingent upon God’s gracious activity and in no 
way because of any innate postlapsarian human capacity. Even the universal capacity to choose 
or reject the offer of saving grace came wholly through God’s grace and the power of the Holy 
Spirit restoring every human’s capacity to make such a choice.324 Whether one believes that 
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Wesley actually accomplishes the goal of affirming justification by faith alone, and many of his 
contemporaries thought he did not, his Arminianism consciously avoided any semblance of 
justification through both faith and works.325 
 Similarly, evangelical Calvinism, the majority position of most Anglican Evangelicals as 
well as those Methodists who traced their spiritual lineage to the Welsh revival and/or 
Whitfield’s teaching, generally had significant differences from non-evangelical Calvinism. 
Some evangelicals did adhere to “ultra-” or “hyper-” Calvinism, which strongly emphasized 
double predestination, the sovereignty of God to the point of almost no human agency, and very 
limited election, but it was generally strongest in the unreconstructed dissenting traditions such 
as the limited Baptists.326 By far most evangelical Calvinists adhered to what came to be known 
as “moderate Calvinism.” Moderate Calvinists accepted the imputed righteousness of Christ, and 
generally believed in predestination, although this later point was held with some delicacy. 
Unlike many Puritans, who tended to exalt the doctrine of election, moderate Calvinists thought 
that it should be “rarely mentioned, lest it stir up controversy, or excite unprofitable speculation.” 
While “they held [the doctrine] devoutly in private they did not often expound it in public.”327 
Furthermore, moderate Calvinists would have adhered primarily to what would be called “single 
predestination,” meaning that they accepted “predestination to salvation but not the positive 
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decree to damnation.”328 In accepting single predestination, moderate Calvinists attempted to 
retain a sense of God’s sovereignty and the complete gratuitousness of salvation while allowing 
room for human freedom and responsibility, a position argued for by Jonathan Edwards in his 
Freedom of the Will and echoed by the Anglican Evangelical John Scott.329 While much is often 
made of the division over predestination, the more critical difference between the Calvinists and 
Arminians, from their perspective, was probably the question of Christian Perfection or entire 
sanctification. Both groups held that growth in personal holiness necessarily occurred after the 
New Birth, but the Wesleyans accepted the possibility of entire sanctification (however rare) in 
this life, while Calvinists vehemently held that entire sanctification could only happen after 
death. “Calvinist objections to Christian perfection were probably more extensive than to any 
other aspect of distinctively Wesleyan spirituality.”330 
 As significant as the modifications of the respective Arminian and Calvinist positions 
were for evangelical identity, how evangelicals arrived at these positions was equally important. 
The Calvinism or Arminianism that divided evangelicals at the level of doctrine united them 
regarding how they arrived at these positions, viz., an overriding concern for a theology that 
simultaneously emphasized the need for justification through faith alone while also emphasizing 
the need for growth in holiness. Both Wesley and moderate Calvinists had positive and negative 
pastoral reasons for their respective positions. Wesley felt predestination contradicted God’s 
loving character; it undercut revivalist and conversionist preaching by taking the choice to accept 
God’s offer of forgiveness away from the hearer; and it led to antinomianism by making ultimate 
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salvation a forgone conclusion. Conversely, Calvinists believed that Wesley’s Arminianism 
compromised salvation by faith alone; undercut the necessary posture of gratitude and humility 
toward God; and imposed an inordinate and unyielding moral burden upon the believer that 
could led to despair and the loss of the necessary assurance of pardon. 
 This portrait of the theological character of first and second generation British 
evangelicals has already brought out features that may be considered part of a larger evangelical 
style or culture. An emphasis in preaching on conversion and the use of language of the “New 
Birth” was almost exclusively the domain of the evangelicals. Similarly, evangelicals made use 
of imagery emphasizing Christ’s atoning work such as the cross, Christ’s blood, and Christ’s 
sacrifice much more than their non-evangelical contemporaries. Evangelicals also frequently 
used language that distanced them from accusations of schismatic tendencies. John Wesley often 
claimed that his Methodism was not a particular form of Christianity, but rather that the defining 
features of Methodism were none other than “the common, fundamental principles of 
Christianity.”331 Wilberforce makes a similar claim in distinguishing between “practical 
Christianity” and “real Christianity” rather than evangelical and non-evangelical Christianity.332 
 Another feature common to all forms of evangelicalism was a strong emphasis on the 
centrality of the Bible as source of authority and means of ordering a believer’s life. In claiming 
that they were merely teaching real Christianity, it was most certainly a Protestant Christianity, 
and the language of sola scriptura abounds in evangelical literature. John Wesley desired to be 
seen as “homo unius libri” or a “man of one book” and opponents of “methodism” would at 
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times accuse them of making the bible their god.333 Mark Noll points out that the evangelical use 
and conception of the Bible meant their conception of authority overlapped with both rationalist 
and non-evangelical orthodox Christianity: “In the context of the eighteenth century, 
evangelicals stood with Arians, proto-liberals and anti-confessionalists in championing the Bible 
against tradition, but they stood with Christian traditionalists in affirming the Bible against 
reduced views of God, Christ and the Trinity.”334 The Bible was the ultimate source and referee 
on points of disputed doctrine, and Bible study was the focal point of small group gatherings.335 
  Based on how later Victorian and 20th century evangelicals came to view the Bible, one 
may assume that evangelicals always promoted or demanded a simplistic literalism and 
inerrancy, and so their “biblicism” would not significantly distinguish them from other 
inerrantist approaches, such as those put forward by modern fundamentalists. However, while 
evangelicals shared, in theory, the emphasis on the centrality of the Bible with most 
Protestantism336, they nonetheless represented a distinct approach to the Bible’s place in 
Christian life. While belief in the Bible’s divine inspiration was nearly universal among 
evangelicals and at least some evangelicals have always held to some form of inerrancy, first 
and, especially, second generation evangelicalism allowed a range of views about the degree of 
errancy and the nature of biblical inspiration.337  
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 More importantly, evangelicals differed considerably from most other forms of 18th and 
early 19th century Christianity by focusing on the Bible as a source of subjective direction and 
truth rather than as a repository of propositional facts. This latter view seems to have been held 
by both liberals and protestant scholastics alike, with the two groups differing on the factuality of 
these propositions. Evangelicals, on the other hand, attempted to be vigilant lest they make the 
Bible an end in and of itself. The use of the Bible was always meant to be a “means of grace, a 
means to conversion, sanctification, and unity, but above all a means of communion with Christ, 
the true end,” and it was always to be read with the Spirit’s guidance and as a means for the 
Spirit to communicate with the believer.338 That there was a devotional, and practically 
sacramental, emphasis for evangelical “biblicism,” appears in the contrast between other literalist 
visions of the “plain and simple” truth of Scripture and the early evangelical belief that the Bible 
was only ever a “potential means of grace” in which mere reading guaranteed nothing and the 
believer “had to wrestle with the text in the sure hope that the hidden spiritual treasures would be 
revealed.”339 Evangelicals placed great emphasis in this biblically centered piety on introspection 
as they constantly sought signs within themselves of continual growth in holiness and properly 
aligned affections.340 This self-examination as well as confession formed an integral part of the 
small-group spirituality of which Bible study formed the center.341 
 Evangelicals also had a distinctive constellation of literary forms that they both consumed 
and produced. Although they tended to deprecate theatrical performances “as tending to 
demoralize,” it was more often the culture of the theatre that they rejected and many evangelicals 
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had no problems “reading selected dramatic works in the privacy of their own homes.”342 The 
first generation of evangelicals sometimes suspected the novel, owing to its being a new art 
form. Nevertheless, evangelicalism always had an “elite devoted to literature.”343 In terms of 
devotional reading, evangelical habits can best be described as eclectic and extensive. The 
Wesleys undertook a vast educational campaign that emphasized spiritual literacy, with John 
Wesley designing, editing, and publishing a 50 volume Christian Library from 1749-55 meant to 
“convey practical divinity to his followers.”344 This and other evangelical devotional collections 
included Thomas à Kempis, William Law, and Jeremy Taylor. Early evangelicals held Baxter, 
Bunyan, and Milton in especially high esteem.345 Beyond reading devotional works, evangelicals 
also journaled extensively (part of their introspective, searching spirituality), and stood at the 
forefront of popularizing autobiography in the form of published “conversion narratives.”346 
Poetry was very highly valued for literary consumption, with classics such as Horace and 
Virgil serving as the foundation (in line with general 18th century “cultured” taste).347 Much of 
this emphasis on poetry was reinforced by and helped to reinforce one of the most important and 
distinctive evangelical literary forms: the hymn. For these first evangelicals, “hymn singing was 
almost sacramental.”348 Hymn singing and hymn writing were intimately linked to evangelical 
culture both in and out of the established Church. Late 18th and early 19th century Anglican 
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Evangelicals paved the way for hymn singing to become an acceptable part of regular liturgical 
worship in the broader Church of England. Noted hymn writers included both Wesley brothers 
(but especially Charles), Isaac Watts, John Newton, and William Cowper. The Wesleys349 led the 
way in publishing hymn books for their people, but most other groups in the revival followed 
suit and published their own collections emphasizing their own authors, although almost all 
evangelicals drew heavily from across the movement.350 Hymns could be didactic, teaching 
about doctrines such as the Trinity, incarnation, or Christian life, and often they served as one of 
the most potent means of communicating evangelical theology. Many hymns were also written 
equally or primarily to offer God praise and thanksgiving for God’s saving work. Importantly, 
evangelicals emphasized hymn singing because it functioned as a means of grace which re-
formed and healed the affections.351 While hymns were sung, they were also seen as a genre of 
poetry in the 18th century and were consumed for their literary as well as spiritual value (such is 
especially the case with William Cowper). 
Understanding evangelical literary taste proves particularly important for this argument 
because, of all the “cultural” (rather than specifically doctrinal) markers of evangelicalism, one 
could perceive engagement with popular entertainment culture as the most likely to set Coleridge 
apart from evangelicals. It is true that many contemporaries perceived evangelicals as overly 
“serious,” ascetical, and opposed to entertainment, and, especially when it came to things such as 
gambling, bear-baiting, or playing cards, this perception was not unfounded. However, the above 
description should show that while this tendency toward cultural asceticism could extend even to 
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what we would now call “high culture,” it was not at all uncommon for evangelicals to cultivate 
an appreciation for a broad range of literary forms. Furthermore, the form most associated with 
English Romantic literary production – poetry – also happens to have been the form most widely 
accepted in evangelical culture. 
Evangelical thought emphasized the need for growth in holiness to manifest in an 
impulse to preach Christianity to the unconverted, meaning either “nominal” or “almost” 
Christians as well as “heathens” who had not ever heard the Gospel. It is from this impulse to 
spread the “good news” that the movement gets its name.352 This desire to reform the “inner 
person” was matched by a zeal for bettering the material conditions of those suffering in society 
and of crusading against social evils.353 The first two generations of evangelicals saw economic 
and social inequality as Christian moral concerns and campaigned against illiteracy, poor laws, 
an emerging consumer culture, and, above all, slavery. Some late 18th century Wesleyan 
Methodists even involved themselves in revolutionary democratic movements and Methodist 
class meetings may have helped inform the structures of the emerging organized labor 
movement. Evangelicals were certainly not the only group in the 18th century with reformist 
tendencies, and often found themselves aligned with social radicals from rational dissenting or 
philosophical traditions. This reformist tendency created space for cooperation between the 
generally politically conservative evangelicals and political radicals. 
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The two last features distinguishing the whole evangelical movement from other religious 
traditions are in some ways two sides of the same coin, viz., how they characterized (or 
mischaracterized) their ideological opponents and how they were characterized (or 
mischaracterized) by those outside the movement. Evangelicals opposed most forms of radical 
rational religion such as Deism (in the early 18th century) and Arianism.354 Of all these groups, 
though, “the strongest evangelical hostility… was reserved for Socinianism.”355 Evangelicals of 
all forms so firmly opposed Socinianism that they could sometimes be moved, like the Anglican 
Henry Venn, to call Socinianism a “poison.”356 For as much as evangelicals opposed theoretical 
threats to vital Christianity, they also vehemently opposed what they saw as nominal, “practical,” 
or “almost” Christians, i.e., those who thought of Christianity as requiring no more than 
adherence to a bare minimum of belief and external moral behavior, often motivated by “mere” 
prudential morality. Both Wesley and Wilberforce often presented this later force as a far greater 
impediment to the propagation of true Christianity because these “almost” Christians existed in 
far greater numbers and already believed themselves to be practicing authentic Christianity.357 
If evangelicals tended to mischaracterize non-evangelicals as practicing a coldly 
rationalistic or ill-motivated inauthentic Christianity, their opponents often proved just as ready 
to caricature evangelical belief and practice. Especially after the 1750s, these opponents failed or 
refused to see distinctions within evangelicalism and would deridingly label anyone associated 
with the revival a “Methodist.”358 These attacks generally used the stock criticism that 
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“methodism” was nothing more than rank “enthusiasm,” although one can parse five more 
specific classes of argument leveled against evangelicals: “(1) the Methodists offered an easy but 
false way to salvation; (2) Methodists caused dissension and schism in the Church; (3) the 
Methodists were deliberate hypocrites; (4) the Methodists were reviving religious fanaticism; 
and (5) the Methodists were Papists and Jacobites.”359 Often the two distinctive evangelical 
claims open to the most suspicion were the centrality of the Holy Spirit, which led many to 
believe that evangelicals made claims to having direct inspiration unmoored from the rationally 
securing the social order, and justification by faith alone, which opponents argued led to moral 
laxity or even antinomianism since salvation was not contingent upon any works.360  
 Having given a general description of the distinguishing features commonly of the early 
Evangelical Revival, I can turn to describing the characteristics of late 18th and early 19th century 
moderate Anglican Evangelicalism that distinguished it as both an identifiable early evangelical 
sub-culture and form of Anglicanism. If two adjectives could best characterize this form of 
evangelicalism when compared to its first and second generation siblings, they would be 
“moderate” and “conciliatory.” This group had to fight a kind of apologetic campaign on two 
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360 One of the important points here is not that everyone who argued against enthusiasm or for morality was anti-
evangelical. There were indeed some on the fringes of the evangelical movement who found “enthusiasm” a positive 
or at least less negative accusation and there were some who made claims about being free from the demands of 
morality, but these remained relatively limited phenomena. Indeed, it was often leaders of the evangelical movement 
who remained just as interested in distinguishing between authentic forms of revived Christianity and counterfeit 
forms that truly deserved the name “enthusiasm.” Similarly, evangelical leaders were acutely aware of the always 
lingering danger of antinomianism that arose from teaching justification by faith alone with no corresponding 
emphasis on sanctification. Thus, the real distinction here between those within, or at least positively disposed 
towards, the evangelical movement and those hostile to it was that the latter believed that all forms of “methodism” 
necessarily were or were strongly inclined toward enthusiasm and antinomianism. 
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fronts, both maintaining their status as evangelicals while also arguing that they were an 
authentic manifestation of the Church of England.  
 Evangelical Anglicanism saw a shift in the pattern of coming to “authentic Christianity,” 
with key leaders such as “Simeon, Hannah Moore, Bickersteth, Budd, Richmond, Bexley, 
Jerram, Scott and Venn” turning away from an emphasis on sudden and ecstatic conversion 
experiences.361 Favoring the euphemistic “serious impressions” rather than “conversion,” this 
group distanced itself from the earlier “emotionalism and enthusiasm of sudden conversion” in 
favor of the “deeply moral and thoughtful, gradual progress to a fuller light.”362 Conversion was 
no longer “primarily an emotional experience nor a change of theological opinions, but a moral 
transformation, so that one no longer lived for self, but devoted all to God as a thank-offering for 
the redeeming love of Jesus.”363 Evangelicals became so acutely aware of the threat of 
accusations of “enthusiasm” and association with “disorderly” Methodists that they had stronger 
prejudices against “unusual experiences” than even John Wesley allowed. These clergy urged 
their people “to treat all unusual experiences – instantaneous conversions, ‘impressions,’ visions 
– with great caution, and never to publicise them” since, “however vivid and apparently self-
evidencing, these feelings were never to be treated as reliable proofs of the Sprit’s presence” and 
“might be genuine – but they were just as likely to be false, the work of an overheated 
imagination.”364 Furthermore, the individual “experiences” of conversion were deemphasized in 
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favor of a more formal and communal pattern of “experience,” seen as the “steady, cumulative 
experience of sanctification and the habitual love of God and man.”365  
 In terms of doctrinal identification, moderate Evangelicals tended to be moderate 
Calvinists as well.366 In fact, they tended to be the Revival’s most moderate and irenic Calvinists, 
especially when compared with the occasional bouts of hyper-Calvinism or the more 
confrontational forms in the conflict between 18th century Methodists. They accepted a form of 
Calvinism “inherited to some extent from the ‘middle-way’ Puritans and the Saumur School of 
Amyraut in France” and “held (though seldom taught) a ‘hypothetical universalism’ that 
ingeniously combined a belief in general Redemption with the doctrine of particular election.”367 
While often taking the acceptance of particular election on the basis of personal experience to the 
extreme and, unlike earlier moderate Calvinists such as Edwards, recognizing the inconsistency 
of free will and predestination, this group felt that both points needed to be held and appealed to 
God’s infinite mystery for their reconciliation.368 Some even went so far as to claim that pious 
Arminianism (it seems this means of the kind put forward by Wesley) was as good in practice as 
Calvinism, and there was a significant attempt to synthesize the two positions for the unity and 
strength of the Evangelical movement.369 
 This Evangelical emphasis on moderate Calvinism leads to the larger conversation about 
their other prominent distinguishing features. While not all Evangelicals were self-proclaimed 
Calvinists, and not all Arminians were non-Evangelicals, affiliating with Calvinism was almost 
																																																						
365 Walsh, “Anglican Evangelicals,” 97. 
 
366 Although not exclusively – some remained Arminians in the Wesleyan sense of the term. 
 
367 Walsh, “Anglican Evangelicals,” 93. 
 
368 Walsh, “Anglican Evangelicals,” 94. 
 
369 Ervine, “Doctrine and Discipline,” 35. 
		139 
exclusively an Evangelical phenomenon within the Church of England in the opening decades of 
the 19th century.370 Interestingly, this acceptance was generally modified such that what was 
meant by Calvinism was an acceptance of a belief in the “Reformed theology which they, the 
English Reformers, and the Continental Reformers held in common” rather than emphasizing 
appeals to the theology of Jean Calvin.371 These “moderate Calvinists” could easily roll back 
their claims to “Calvinism” and instead insist that they were really just expressing either a 
general “Augustinian” or “common Reformation” theology.372 Almost all Evangelicals assumed 
that they were the authentic theological representatives of the true Reformation vision of the 
Church of England, and they saw their theology fully contained within the 39 Articles – so much 
so that of all the theological traditions in the Church of England at the time, “perhaps only the 
Evangelicals accepted them joyfully in their literal sense, claiming that they alone held 
unequivocally to the title deeds of the English Reformation.”373 
 To demonstrate loyalty to the established church and distance themselves from the 
growing influence of the Methodists, now organized as a dissenting body, Evangelicals argued 
that they in fact embodied the authentic form of Anglicanism, the true via media charting a “path 
between the Scylla of high Calvinist fatalism and the Charybdis of Arminianism.”374 While they 
did not hold the Church’s liturgy in the same esteem as High Churchmen, seeing the Prayer 
Book as still an imperfect human creation, nonetheless their “approval of the liturgy was fervent, 
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though not without some qualifications which were often unexpressed, at least in public.”375 The 
only significant part of the liturgy that would actively trouble Evangelicals was the baptismal 
Rite, as its language supported a theology of baptismal regeneration. Based on the direction of 
later evangelical thought, the early 19th century Evangelicals would have held more in common 
with the High Church party when it came to Eucharistic theology than with Latitudinarians, and 
they often held to a strong view of the real presence.376 In line with their understanding of 
themselves as “true” Anglicanism, Evangelicals held in high esteem, and sought to ground their 
thought and practice in, a particular collection of early Anglican divines including “Richard 
Hooker, Bishops Jewel, Davenant (the conciliatory English delegate to the synod of Dort), 
Joseph Hall (whose works they reprinted), the post-Restoration prelates Reynolds and Hopkins, 
and, above all, the saintly Scots Episcopalian, Archbishop Leighton.”377 These early Anglican 
divines allowed them to “argue that their beliefs, which were now spurned as new-fangled heresy 
and ‘enthusiasm,’ had been held by thousands of clergymen in the century after the 
Reformation.”378 The appeal to these thinkers almost always belied an affiliation with or at least 
sympathy toward Evangelicalism – a point of no small importance since Coleridge built his most 
significant published work of theology around aphorisms drawn from Leighton. 
 While they claimed that the Church of England retained their full loyalty, Evangelicals 
always remained uneasy about confining true Christianity within the established Church. True, 
they wanted to differentiate themselves both from the earlier irregularities of (what could seem to 
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be) only nominally Anglican clergymen like Wesley and Whitfield. Thus, Evangelicals were 
often eager to demonstrate that they were committed to the good order of the Church, saw 
dissent as “unjustified,” and saw the “Church as immeasurably superior to Nonconformity.”379 
At the same time, they saw the episcopacy as part of the bene esse rather than the esse of the true 
Church and were more than willing to recognize many real Christians, deserving cooperation, in 
dissenting bodies, as well as the only nominal Christianity of many in the Church.380 
 Anglican Evangelicals could claim relatively few distinctive evangelical devotional 
practices, but they certainly emphasized some more than others. While still engaging in small 
group study and edification, the center of Evangelical piety shifted to the family, with “periods 
of prayer, Bible reading and meditation” becoming among the most important forms of 
devotional piety and means of grace.381 In fact, the Bible may have risen to an even greater place 
of prominence as a devotional tool and means of personal communion with the Holy Spirit since 
the fear of charges of enthusiasm led to the acceptance of the work of the Holy Spirit being 
largely confined to acceptable means of grace, viz., “private prayer, public worship, the 
sacraments, above all through the study of the Bible.”382 As noted above, Anglican Evangelicals, 
like other evangelicals, employed hymns and were the prime agents for making hymnody part of 
mainstream Anglican worship, but even here such additions had to be done in accordance with 
proper Prayer Book discipline and only cautiously. 
 British evangelicalism in its first two centuries is not discontinuous with the forms of 
evangelicalism that would develop, proliferate, and diversify over the next two centuries. Nor did 
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the Revival occur in isolation from the larger fabric of British religious culture in the 18th and 
early 19th centuries. However, I have argued in this chapter that while evangelicalism overlapped 
in different ways with various other distinct religious traditions on various points of doctrine or 
practice, one can nevertheless still point to a set of doctrinal commitments, emphases, and 
interpretations, theological method, forms of practice and life habits, and communicative style to 
see evangelicalism as a distinct movement of the time. Furthermore, the sub-movements 
spawned by the Revival show enough internal cohesion to distinguish them from each other, 
such that one can differentiate the early 19th century Anglican Evangelicals as part of identifiable 
movement over and against other contemporary evangelical and non-evangelical religious 
traditions. At the same time, I believe that this sketch has demonstrated that “evangelical” 
identity (even in its more specified forms) was not, for the most part, a matter of a long list of 
essential features and that missing any single one of them would automatically disqualify a 
person from inclusion in this movement. True, it would be difficult to conceive of an evangelical 
who did not believe in some special saving significance of Christ or who had a very low view of 
biblical authority, but a failure to vigorously defend substitutionary atonement or to maintain an 
aversion to theatre going would not in and of itself be enough to remove such a person from the 
evangelical rolls. The movement’s identifying markers still allowed for a great deal of diversity, 
and the idiosyncrasies of human biography, psychology, and agency certainly allow for deviation 
on individual points – sometimes significantly – from the ideal type of evangelical (or Anglican 
Evangelical) without the need to invoke sui generis status for that person’s form of Christianity.  
 I make these points because I now move from the general outline of the forms of 
religious life and practice in Britain’s long 18th century to the question of how an individual – 
and a particularly remarkable and creative individual – Samuel Taylor Coleridge, fit into that 
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religious milieu. In the next three chapters I will argue that Coleridge, despite having his own 
creative take on Christian doctrine and practice, and maintaining a critical stance toward some 
aspects of evangelicalism, was not only closest to Evangelical Anglicanism, but became in fact 
some kind of moderate Evangelical Anglican. Furthermore, with the background given in these 
last two chapters, I believe it possible to show that one need not invoke the allowance of 
individual deviation from the norm nearly as much as one may initially expect to see Coleridge 
as conforming to this standard. Coleridge’s thought, piety, forms of argument, sources of 
theological authority, and even theological method and personal relationships together paint the 
picture of a man who returned to Christian orthodoxy with evangelical ideas and gradually made 
the journey toward a more thoroughly Evangelical Anglican form of faith and life as he matured. 
Before turning to how Coleridge seems to have taken on the form of life of an Evangelical, I will 
take the next two chapters to show how Coleridge’s form of thinking appears to have come into 
significant conformity with evangelical theology.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
COLERIDGE’S PHILOSOPHICAL, EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY (PART I) 
 
  As stated in the introduction, interest in Coleridge as a religious thinker and theologian 
has recently come strongly into vogue, with influential and intellectually substantial figures such 
as Douglas Hedley and John Milbank mining Coleridge’s thought for its theological and 
philosophical significance. Likewise, while still presenting Coleridge as returning to an 
“orthodox” Anglicanism383 or adopting a kind of sui generis (for his time) 
“Augustinian/Platonic” philosophical and theological Protestantism undergirded by the 
conceptual vocabulary of German Idealism, the proliferation of scholarship on Coleridge’s 
ambivalent (rather than downright hostile) approach to (mainly Wesleyan) Methodism 
complicates these two categorizations. This larger scholarly conversation makes room for a 
further and deeper reevaluation of Coleridge’s relationship to his contemporary religious 
landscape. Moving beyond the (valid) observation about Coleridge’s ambivalence to dissenting 
evangelical traditions, I will spend the next three chapters building the case that Coleridge’s 
theological writing justified/exposited an Evangelical Anglican set of doctrinal and practical 
emphases grounded by a correct philosophical rigor. Seeing Coleridge as providing an 
intellectually “beefed-up” Anglican Evangelicalism, and therefore an Anglican Evangelical 
identity for Coleridge himself, will further make sense of Coleridge’s complicated relationship to 
Methodism and dissenting evangelicalism. I hope to maintain in this argument the idea put 
forward by a range of thinkers such as Hedley and Prickett that Coleridge did not simply re-hash 
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German philosophy, but instead expressed his own Christian Neoplatonism/Idealism best 
manifested through the creative appropriation of German philosophical writing.384  
 I will begin by looking at Coleridge’s explicit doctrinal commitments to show that he 
seems to have believed and emphasized those elements that one would expect of a late 18th 
century Evangelical (chapter 4). Additionally, this current chapter will include an extended 
discussion of the ways in which Coleridge self-consciously located himself closer to evangelical 
than non-evangelical thought, both through explicit statements and through his understanding of 
the psychological and historical dialectic between reason and will. Second, I will exposit 
Coleridge’s theological development of these doctrinal outlines (chapter 5). This exposition will 
show that Coleridge’s more developed theology committed him to even more distinctive 
evangelical positions and that he did so guided by a methodology that appears consistent with 
most evangelical intellectuals of the time.385 Finally, I will look at the larger religious culture that 
Coleridge inhabited during the second half of his life (chapter 6) to show that he not only shared 
theological emphases with the Evangelicals, but also a common set of rhetorical opponents, 
canon of authority, and certain stylistic conventions. These three next chapters will therefore 
																																																						
384 I do not mean this as an indictment of the very thorough scholarship of those like Hedley. These works do not 
share my purpose of locating Coleridge in the 18th/early 19th century religious landscape and, particularly with 
Hedley, thoroughly analyze Coleridge’s religious philosophy within the confines they set for themselves.  
 
385 Now, it is true that Coleridge sought a fully unified theory of all human life (including knowledge), meaning that 
his theology is supported by a much more robust intellectual scaffolding than would have been found with almost 
any other Evangelicals. Furthermore, his philosophical outlook is self-consciously quite different from the dominant 
Lockean-Newtonian empiricist tradition that undergirded nearly all other forms of British thought, including that of 
more philosophically inclined evangelicals. Ultimately, I will argue that Coleridge provides a theological synthesis 
of warmth and light, i.e., of the affective and rational, but this is not accomplished by synthesizing Moderate 
Anglicanism at the time with the rational theology current in Britain at that point. Rather, he takes what would have 
been a moderate stance regarding the “enthusiasm” of the evangelical movement conceived broadly and weds it to a 
completely different conception of rationality than either “rationalists” or “evangelicals” would have used. I would 
argue that Coleridge’s call for a synthesis actually made him more open to certain forms of “enthusiasm” than most 
other Anglican Evangelicals of his day. In other words, while I am not as prepared to defend it with the limited 
space I have in this work, my sense is that Coleridge, while he saw certain forms of Methodist popular piety as 
overly “enthusiastic” or “fanatical,” he would have allowed for still greater latitude when it came to “enthusiastic” 
displays than the much more cautious Anglican Evangelicals, thus actually placing him somewhere between the 
most ecstatic forms of piety and that prescribed by Evangelicals.  
		146 
work together to show that Coleridge developed a theological vision that emphasized most, if not 
all, of the distinguishing features of Anglican Evangelicals within the larger 18th and early 19th 
century British landscape, that he seems to make use of the same authorities and share many of 
the same markers of a larger Evangelical culture, and that finally he had both the occasions to 
have been shaped by the larger evangelical world and that a somewhat tenuous resting place in 
Anglican Evangelicalism actually makes sense for Coleridge given his distinctive spiritual 
journey through life.  
 It will help to briefly recall the theological features that were identified in the last chapter 
which distinguished evangelicals, and, specifically, moderate Anglican Evangelicals. These were 
an emphasis on the ordo salutis as the heart of Christian thought and practice, with this 
understood broadly in terms of the goal of human life as full communion with God, a robust 
belief in original sin such that this relationship is severed and is fully outside of human power to 
reestablish, the possibility of this restored relationship coming through Christ’s atoning death on 
the cross, and the need for repentance for the acceptance of this offer of forgiveness which is 
accompanied by the “New Birth” and followed by sanctification, all of which are intimately 
linked to the work of the Holy Spirit. This means an emphasis on Salvation or Justification by 
faith alone and a belief that good works are the consequence and/or proof, rather than in any way 
the cause, of this salvation. Anglican Evangelicals were further distinguished by frequently 
holding to some form of very moderate Calvinism, often expressed only with several caveats and 
flowing from pastoral, rather than strictly ideational/philosophical, motivations. 
 The Coleridge who I argue stands within the Anglican Evangelical tradition begins to 
emerge in a consistent form in the early years of the 19th century after he had begun his return to 
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an acknowledged Trinitarian Christianity.386 While his thought would develop and expand until 
his final years into a form that I will argue becomes more and more consistently Evangelical, if 
one looks at the doctrinal commitments Coleridge spelled out in late 1810, a full 17 years before 
he “emerged into the open as a revived member of the Anglican Church”,” he already accepted a 
set of emphases that would have been fully at home within the larger evangelical tradition.387  
 On November 3, 1810, Coleridge put forward in his Notebooks a “Confessio Fidei” 
(Confession of Faith) that outlined his religious convictions. Here he divides up his 
understanding of the principle truths of religion into two “tables,” the first of which includes 
belief that he is “a Free Agent” such that he “has a will which renders [him] justly responsible 
for [his] actions, omissive as well as commissive” (CN 4005). The second and third items on this 
first table are an “absolute Duty” to believe in God who is the supreme reason and “most holy 
Will” and that he is a spiritual being who should believe in the life to come – a belief wrapped up 
with a rejection that one should consider “the Pains and Pleasures of this Life, as the primary 
motive or ultimate end” of action (CN 4005). Importantly, Coleridge sees the division between 
the two tables as between “the Religion of all finite Rational Beings” and “Belief as a Christian.” 
Here he lists four elements that are unique to and constitutive of Christianity. The “fundamental 
article of Christianity” is the belief that he [Coleridge] is a fallen creature, “born a child of 
Wrath,” and of himself “capable of moral evil, but not capable of moral good” (CN 4005). 
Second, he believed that “the Word which is from all eternity with God and is God, assumed our 
human nature to redeem” humanity and that “no other mode of redemption is conceivable” (CN 
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4005). This second point is strongly linked with the third, which is that this incarnate Word is 
none other than Jesus Christ and that “his miraculous Birth, his agony, his Crucifixion, Death, 
Resurrection, and Ascension, were all Symbols of our Redemption… and necessary parts of the 
aweful [sic] process” (CN 4005). Finally, Coleridge believed “in the decent and sending of the 
Holy Spirit, by whose free grace alone obtained for [him] by the merits of [his] Redeemer [he] 
can alone be sanctified, and restored… to be a Child of God” (CN 4005).  
 Significantly Coleridge does not believe at this point that anyone who denies the Trinity 
(and therefore the divinity of Christ) can in any way be considered a Christian. More 
significantly may be why this is the case: he draws a distinction between the Trinity as a mere 
philosophical postulant and the Trinity as necessarily related to belief in the fullness of original 
sin and true “Christian” views on redemption, i.e., that Christ must be seen as “God incarnate 
taking upon himself the Sins of the World, and himself thereby redeeming us & giving us Life 
everlasting” rather than the Socinian view that Christ was “a mere man, even as Moses or Paul, 
dying in attestation of the Truth of his Preaching & in order by his resurrection to give a proof of 
his mission, & inclusivity of the resurrection to all men” (CN 4006). Thus, Coleridge does not 
make belief in the Trinity per se a defining Christian belief, but only Trinitarian belief firmly 
rooted in the distinctive Christian teaching about the incarnation, atonement, and the sanctifying 
work of the Spirit. Thus, as for Wesley, belief in the Trinity in the abstract does not properly 
distinguish the Christianity from the non-Christian, but the belief in the incarnate second person 
of the Trinity as the only means of our salvation through his atoning life and death does. 
 Here in this early exposition, Coleridge outlines an understanding of the distinctive marks 
of Christianity that concurs with the various formulations put forward by Wesley and other 
evangelicals. The first of the four points indicates a robust view of original sin and the utter 
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human need for divine Grace for salvation, and the fourth points to a belief in sanctification 
through the work of the Holy Spirit. Finally, Coleridge throughout explains that part and parcel 
of Christianity is a belief in the divinity of Christ by whose life and death (with an emphasis on 
the experience of crucifixion and death) the forgiveness of guilt and the restoration to being 
made “Children of God” are made possible, and this only because of the communication of 
divine grace through the Holy Spirit and not because of some cooperation with an innate human 
capacity (which is, being a “child of Wrath,” only capable of evil).  
 Coleridge clarifies that he accepted justification by faith alone as meaning that humans 
are utterly incapable of saving themselves through their own power in a series of notes that he 
made on an anti-Methodist pamphlet by the “Barrister” John Sedgwick in 1810.388 While not 
claiming to favor Methodism, the whole thrust of Coleridge’s commentary is a defense of the 
Methodists against the particular challenges levelled by Sedgwick. The problem with Sedgwick’s 
argument is that he argues against the Methodists on doctrinal grounds, which Coleridge 
believes to be both orthodox and nothing more or less than those of the Church of England, 
rather than their particularities, all of which appear to Coleridge to be matters of practice, 
organization, and general culture: “Never, never can the Methodists be successfully assailed, if 
not honestly! and never honestly or with any chance of success, except as Methodists—for their 
practices, their alarming Theocracy, their stupid, mad, and mad-driving Superstitions…their 
doctrines are those of the Established Church” (CM IV 657-8). While true that Coleridge does 
not come out and say that he in fact whole heartedly agrees with the Methodists and Church of 
England on these doctrinal points, it seems fair from the challenge he levels against Sedgwick 
that he at least has significant proclivities toward these doctrinal commitments. In other words, 
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Coleridge argues that there is indeed a fair way to critique Methodists – and that they should be 
thus critiqued – but Sedgwick has selected the one avenue for which they seem the least liable to 
criticism, viz., stated doctrine. In this light, one can fairly see Coleridge’s defense of the 
“Calvinist Methodist” understanding of Justification by faith as his defending a view that he 
shared. For Coleridge, it is only “the thickest Film of Bigot-slime” that “can prevent a man from 
seeing that this Tenet of Justification by faith alone is exclusively a matter between the 
Calvinist’s own Heart & his Maker who alone knows the true source of his words and actions” 
(CM IV 648). Nevertheless, “to his neighbours & fellow-creedsmen his spotless Life & good 
works are demanded, not indeed as the prime efficient cause of his salvation, but as the necessary 
& only possible Signs of that Faith, which is the means of that Salvation, of which Christ’s free 
Grace is the Cause, and the sanctifying Spirit the Perfecter” (CM IV 648).  
 What is important about this early orthodox (and at least germane to evangelicalism) 
“Confession of Faith” is that, while he may have elaborated the philosophical foundations for 
this set of beliefs as he matured, his actual stated beliefs remained remarkably constant for the 
rest of his life. In 1830 he drew up a statement called “On the Articles of Faith Necessary to 
Christians” in order to lay the boundary markers for what Christian groups were authentically 
Christian (and thus deserved toleration and protection by the state) and what groups as groups 
fell outside these acceptable boundaries (TT  455-6)389. He again distinguishes between properly 
Christian belief and what is known and affirmed through human reason alone, although the 
weight of the articles now rests on the side of the properly and distinctly Christian. There are two 
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articles related to a belief in “a Living God a Holy One” who is “himself the Ground of his own 
Being” and who is alone among all other beings “the rightful, the only permitted, Object of our 
religious Worship, direct or indirect” (SW&F 1484). The distinctively Christian articles are: that 
humans can only address themselves to God “through a mediator” who is necessarily “both God 
and man”; that humans need “a Redemption, which of [their] own power [they] are incapable of 
effecting” and that this redemption has been offered “by and thro’ the Mediator, along with all 
the means of finally effecting it”; and that “All the particulars, historic, declarative, or perceptive, 
necessarily to the rational acceptance of this Offer… are contained in that collection of Books, 
received as Canonical, by the Churches universally, which we call the Bible” (SW&F 1485).   
 A prayer390 that Coleridge wrote for his own nightly devotions makes clearer that 
Coleridge not only sought a politically or ecclesially expedient least-common-denominator 
Christianity at the end of his life, but that he truly felt the above stated exposition constituted the 
real heart of Christianity. In this prayer, he begins by invoking the purpose of human life as 
seeking God as “the only one Absolute Good, the Eternal I AM, as the Author of my Being” 
(SW&F 1486).  He then moves on to describing the grace given to him through Christ, the “only 
begotten Son, the Way & the Truth from Everlasting, & who took on himself Humanity,” who 
provides “condescending Mercy” and “an access & a return” to God despite Coleridge’s “own 
corrupted Will all Evil & the consequences of Evil” (SW&F 1487). The result of Christ’s 
“condescending” action is to remove the “taint of [his] mortal corruption”’ because of the “seed 
of Christ” placed “into the Body of this Death” (SW&F 1487). Through the aid of the Spirit 
Coleridge believed he could have a “more enkindled Love” and “deeper Faith” (SW&F 1487). 
The content of this prayer emphasizes the end of human life as union with God through love, the 
																																																						
390 Coleridge’s emphasis on a devotional life centered on individual and family prayer and Bible reading is, as a 
form of life, an indication of an Evangelical form of Christian piety. I explore this at greater length in chapter 6.  
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need for Christ’s atonement as the only means of overcoming our corrupted nature and inability 
to be in relationship with God, the transformation of the soul according to the growth of Christ 
therein, and the Spirit accomplishing this transformation.  
 Further helping my case that Coleridge became some sort of Anglican Evangelical is how 
he himself spoke about the Evangelicals in the Church of England. While he did not see them as 
a perfect group (a condition that is necessary for inclusion in almost no larger movement), his 
praise for them far outweighed his criticisms – a significant point distinguishing his view of 
Anglican Evangelicals from his opinions about the Methodists. In a letter to R. Brabant from 
May 1, 1815, Coleridge announced that he was far nearer Mr. T. Methuen's Creed than the 
“fashionable one of the sober in-the-way-of-preferment Churchmen” but that unfortunately “the 
Evangelical Clergy, who are really saving the Church, are too generally deficient in Learning, 
both historical and metaphysical — & in consequence take weak positions, and neglect the most 
impregnable” (CL III 567). His reference to Mr. T. Methuen seems by all accounts to be the Rev. 
Thomas A. Methuen, and this man was, according to Methuen’s son, an early 19th century 
clergyman “toned and ruled by the several points of doctrine brought into prominence, and 
deservedly so, at the time of the Evangelical revival.”391 These central doctrines were “Man’s fall 
in Adam, his recovery in Christ by faith in His merits, and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit,” and 
while “other omissions he would excuse,” these central emphases “must be present, and were 
present in all his discourses.”392  The emphasis on these themes, along with the absence of any 
stated “creed” in the autobiography, indicates that whatever “creed” Coleridge would have 
																																																						
391 Thomas Methuen, The Autobiography of Thomas Anthony Methuen with a memoir by T.P. Methuen, 227. This 
“autobiography,” to which is added the recollections of Methuen’s son, is in fact a thoroughly developed evangelical 
conversion narrative to the point where it appears almost an archetypical instance of the genre. 
 
392 Methuen, Autobiography, 227-8. 
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received from Methuen would have almost certainly focused on these points. That Coleridge 
then moves directly to a description of the “Evangelical clergy” shows that Coleridge had no 
misunderstandings about the school of thought with which Methuen affiliated.  
 Importantly, while Coleridge did critique the Evangelical clergy at this point, it was not 
on account either of their doctrinal emphases or conception of the Church and its heritage, but 
simply that they lacked the theological and philosophical depth to defend and develop their 
positions. As Coleridge continues in the letter, he “ventured to advise Mr T. Methuen to draw up 
a Professio Fidei of an Evangelical Clergyman — 1. What he does believe. 2. What he does not 
believe! 3. — and why? — 4. and by what authorities confirmed” (CL 566). Coleridge 
recognized both that the Evangelicals wanted to claim that their beliefs were “that which was 
common to all the Great Reformers” and that the tradition of the self-proclaimed Arminians in 
the Church was a “semi-Romanism” founded on the teachings of Grotius, who was himself 
“farther receded than Arminius” from the teaching of “all the first Reformers” (CL 566). 
Especially given that Coleridge had, five years earlier in the above-mentioned critique of 
Sedgwick, affirmed that the Methodists doctrinally affirmed everything that was taught in the 
Church of England, one can fairly assume that Coleridge had no problem accepting this 
understanding of the Evangelical party as holding the true Reformation doctrines of the Church 
of England against the Arminianism of the other Church parties, but that they were unfortunately 
insufficiently equipped to defend such a position intellectually.  
 Coleridge does not explicitly state that he counts himself among the Evangelicals in the 
Church of England, but he also never explicitly dissociates himself from them. He also at times 
provides implicit clues that he saw himself as somehow associated with this emerging party. This 
affiliation would only seem to grow stronger as Coleridge matured. The above quote shows that 
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Coleridge recognized divisions within the Church of England393 and saw the Evangelicals as the 
closest to defending the authentically pan-Reformation doctrine that he had expressed in his own 
1810 Confessio Fidei. Three things indicate that Coleridge at this point was at least growing less 
concerned with other people associating him with the Evangelical party, and he may even have 
had growing sense of actually affiliating with them. First, Coleridge remains constant in his 
doctrinal commitments from 1810 until the end of his life. Second, he saw these commitments as 
consistent with both the Wesleyan and Calvinist Methodists and the Church of England broadly 
in 1810 and in all likelihood specifically with the Evangelicals by 1815. This second point is 
confirmed by the analysis in the preceding chapter in which it was argued that some constellation 
of a specific emphasis on original sin, the need for the incarnation and an emphasis on Christ’s 
atoning work, belief in justification by faith, and acceptance of growth in sanctification through 
the power of the Holy Spirit subsequent to conversion were, in the Church of England, almost 
exclusively the domain of the Evangelicals and were put forward as Coleridge’s essential 
features of Christianity. Additionally, he did not bring forward any of the theological emphases 
that would have been expected by someone in the High Church party, such as the extreme 
importance or necessity of proper ecclesial mediation of saving grace, a firm commitment to a 
doctrine of baptismal regeneration, or a sense that the Liturgy, rather than the 39 Articles or 
Catechism, provided the Church of England its true doctrinal foundation. Third, from 1815 
																																																						
393 Because Coleridge makes the distinction between Evangelical and the Arminian/“sober” clergy, he may not have 
recognized sufficient enough differences between High Church and Latitudinarian traditions and essentially 
distinguished between Evangelicals and everyone else. While one may initially think that this could cut the other 
way (i.e., he put together the orthodox in contrast to the Latitudinarians), the larger picture of what we know about 
the divisions in the Church do not allow for this interpretation. The “High Church” orthodox of his time were almost 
universally united in their Arminianism, so that he makes this a central doctrinal dividing point would indicate that 
he is lumping together all Anglicans, regardless of their other differences, who professed this view in opposition to 
the vision put forward by Evangelicals. This lack of differentiation for non-Evangelicals strengthens my argument in 
another way since Coleridge demonstrates a familiarity in many places (including the notes on Sedgwick) between 
various evangelical factions, but does not believe that the differences in other groups warranted distinguishing them 
as such, suggesting in-group knowledge for Evangelicals that he lacked for other groups in the Church of England.  
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onward, Coleridge’s relationship to the Church of England only strengthened (although he never 
completely lost his ambivalence about his association with the national Church) until he literally 
returned to communion with the Church in 1827. As will be explored in the final chapters of this 
work, his return to the Church of England followed relatively closely upon his completion of 
Aids to Reflection. Because this work draws on the Evangelicals’ favorite divine (Robert 
Leighton), exposited a significantly Evangelical theology, and employs an Evangelical 
devotional style, one can infer that Coleridge was able to reconcile himself with the Church after 
he accepted a theological tradition within it with which he could align himself.  
 While Coleridge may have expressed the sentiment that he was closest to the 
Evangelicals, I still need to explore what he saw as the relationship between this affinity for the 
Evangelicals and his desire to “unite warmth and light” in the form of ensuring a more organic 
relationship between faith and reason or – one may say – religion and philosophy. In terms of 
bare doctrine, Coleridge provides statements of faith that most Evangelicals would have had no 
problem putting forward as their own. One must recognize, though, that Coleridge’s main 
critique of the Evangelical clergy was their “lack of learning” related to metaphysics and history, 
and an inability to clearly articulate the foundations of their belief or even a full account of those 
beliefs themselves.394 Furthermore, he does in fact go beyond confession of faith to provide a 
more robust account of these doctrines such that they are understood in terms of his deepening 
metaphysical views, most specifically in Aids to Reflection.  
 There are of course several complications in trying to locate Coleridge in relationship to 
Evangelicalism. For instance, if one takes anti-intellectualism as a necessary component of 
																																																						
394 A perception of a “lack of learning” that could have arisen from an inability to properly ground and articulate 
points of doctrine may not have indicated less education per se, but it is also not entirely reasonable that they would 
have appeared this way given that the Evangelicals, as they moderated and became more inclusive in the second 
generation, tended to do so by using ambiguous doctrinal exposition or quick appeals to mystery. 
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evangelical identity (a position that I would not take), then Coleridge’s attempt to more fully 
develop a philosophical foundation for Christian thought, even if that form of Christianity is 
Evangelicalism, would never be properly located as “evangelical” – no matter what Coleridge’s 
self-identification was. What appears most helpful from a schematization perspective is that one 
can take three broad approaches to answering this question. First, the unitive relationship 
between “warmth and light” is not of equal synthesis, but rather a subordination of the 
philosophical to the religious. The second would be one of an equal synthesis of the two 
principles. The third would be a subordination of the religious to the philosophical. 
 Evidence from his work suggests that Coleridge wanted a synthesis of the first type 
whereby the only sustainable system of thought is one in which the religious and philosophical 
are in proper relationship to each other, with the philosophical being subordinated to the 
religious, and that in its essence Christianity itself is the result of this proper relationship. A look 
at this relationship makes way for an analysis in the next chapter of Coleridge’s theological 
thought which will in turn show that Coleridge was very likely attempting to provide a 
philosophical underpinning for Evangelical Anglican theological emphases. Moreover, 
Coleridge’s theological works actually demonstrate even greater doctrinal agreement between 
Coleridge and the Evangelicals than his statements of faith alone. The following analysis of 
Coleridge’s conception of the relationship between philosophy and religion contextualizes his 
theological works such that they appear all that much more as attempts to ensure the long-term 
viability of the Evangelical religious vision by wedding what he saw as the closest thing to “true 
religion” to a sustaining philosophical foundation.  
 The controlling image of Coleridge’s attempt at uniting “warmth” and “light,” and his 
association of Methodism with the former and Socinianism the latter, seems helpful for 
		157 
describing the programmatic purpose of his life’s endeavor, but it must also be remembered that 
Coleridge made this claim in a 1799 notebook entry – rather early in his intellectual career. Both 
because of the early date of this observation, at a time prior to Coleridge’s in-depth metaphysical 
investigations, and because this statement was a passing notebook observation, one should not 
assume too literal or strict an attempt at a combination of Socinian rationalism and Methodist 
emotionalism, or that these were meant to be put in an equal relationship with each other. 
Instead, it seems better to see this sentiment as an inchoate understanding of the division between 
the will and the intellect in religious thought, and the need for a proper intellectual system that 
unifies them, since this will prove to be the overriding theme of Coleridge’s unfolding 
intellectual program and the foundation of his critiques of other intellectual trends of his day.395  
 Coleridge certainly has developmental conceptions both of the individual intellect and of 
intellectual movements within societies that seem driven by the same dynamics, such that an 
understanding of the intellectual trajectory of humanity provides insight into the intellectual 
development of individual human beings. Nevertheless, Coleridge believed that this essential 
connection either went unobserved or underdeveloped in most intellectual histories (at least in 
																																																						
395 There are several places where Coleridge seems to affirm the unequal nature of “warmth” and “light,” as well as 
his preference for the excesses of the evangelical’s unenlightened warmth over the Socinian’s cold light. In the Lay 
Sermons he stated that while there are those who will allow for a kind of hyper-rationalism (so-called) to hold “in 
check the more dangerous disease of Methodism,” Coleridge himself more than doubted “of both the positions” that 
the danger of Methodism was as severe as stated and the relative safety of Socinianism/hyper-rationalism: “I do not 
think Methodism, Calvinist or Wesleian [sic], the more dangerous disease; and even if it were, I should deny that it 
is at all likely to be counteracted by the rational Christianity of our modern Alogi λόγος πίστεως ἄλογος) who… 
entitle themselves UNITARIANS” (LS 99-100). Moreover, in a letter from 1822, Coleridge was even more explicit 
that he saw any threat posed by (Calvinist) Methodism to have been far outpaced and far more scrutinized than the 
real and deep danger of Socinian tendencies in the Church. In pointing out that in the then panic over the fear of 
Calvinism people had become suspicious of thinkers at all associated with Calvinism (Leighton in particular), 
Coleridge points out not only that the rejection of Leighton was unfounded, but also that the threat of Calvinism 
greatly exaggerated: “since the late alarm respecting Church Calvinism and Calvinistic Methodism,” there has been 
“a cry of Fire! Fire! in consequence of a red glare on one or two of the windows, from a bonfire of Straw and 
Stubble in the Church-yard, while the Dry Rot of virtual Socinianism is snugly at work in the Beams and Joists of 
the venerable Edifice” (CL V 199; the reference to ‘Church Calvinism’ likely indicates the Evangelical Anglicans). 
Additionally, Coleridge made an implicit reference in Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit to seeing the “warmth” in 
the light/warmth dichotomy as the better side. With “regard to Christianity itself, like certain plants, I [Coleridge] 
creep toward the Light, even tho’ it draws me away from the more nourishing Warmth” (SW&F 1118). 
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Britain), thus providing the impetus for his own lectures on the history of philosophy. One 
should “in the main 
 consider Philosophy historically, as an essential part of the history of man, and as if it were the striving of a 
 single mind, under very different circumstances indeed, and at different periods of its own growth and 
 developmental but so that each change and every new direction should have its cause and its explanation in 
 the errors, insufficiency, or prematurity of the proceeding, while all by reference to a common object is 
 reduced to harmony of impressions and total result (LP 5).  
 
Coleridge undertakes this exposition of the history of thought not only to understand the way in 
which human intellectual development occurs but also to accurately locate philosophy in the 
larger scheme of human knowledge. He also has a certain proscriptive agenda, desiring to show 
the negative intellectual and social consequences of disordered philosophy, either in the sense of 
other forms of thought eclipsing it or when it seeks to take the place of other forms, with religion 
as the most frequently usurped. Thus, the entire discussion aims at treating the historical 
relationship between philosophy and religion with the specific goal of demonstrating the correct 
relationship between them. Such a goal does not lie hidden, but was boldly advertised in the title 
of the lecture series, which claimed to provide “the Connection of Philosophy with General 
Civilization; and, More Especially, Its Relations to the History of Christianity” (LP 3).  
 Philosophy properly speaking begins with the ancient Greeks, and they remain the focus 
of the discussion of the development of philosophy until the coming of Christianity,396 but the 
initial discussion begins with both Greeks and Hebrews. These two groups establish the 
historical dialectic between pure religion and pure philosophy. The Hebrews represented “a 
nation purely historical and theocratical” whereby “all their institutions according to their own 
history were derived not from themselves or any genius arising in themselves but from a 
																																																						
396 Christianity provides both the proper synthesis of philosophy and the capacity for properly holding together 
religion and philosophy. 
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supernatural agency” (LP 49). Ancient Greek culture397 was unique in the ancient world for 
allowing individuals to critically analyze the nearly ubiquitous ancient belief in the divine origins 
of their own political institutions and theology. For non-Greeks, a sense of the divine ordering of 
the political and intellectual world arose because they “had received their constitutions and their 
opinions either by conquest or by imposture, that is by pretence to revelation” (LP 59).398 The 
Greeks stood alone by having “formed themselves at once simultaneously, as it were, into 
republics” such that governing power and political order derived not from divine origin or force 
of tradition, but from among the people (LP 59). As the attempt to extend rational human 
faculties to the limits of what they could accomplish under their own power, philosophy arose 
from an awareness that human reflection on its own could create political arrangements; 
therefore, “legislation was the first step towards philosophy, or rather it was the first dawning or 
appearance of it” (LP 59). Coleridge does not spend much time speculating on the precise causal 
order between this political arrangement and the Greeks’ sense of their history, but concomitant 
with these conditions for the emergence of a philosophically friendly culture was a profoundly 
weak and confused understanding of Greek origins among the Greeks themselves. The ancient 
Greeks “appear about as much perplexed concerning their origin as we at this present time do, 
and in the various criticisms concerning the planting of Greece each position has its own and 
almost equal authorities” (LP 49).  
																																																						
397 Coleridge here is likely describing something more like a theory of cultural conditioning than a biological 
conception of race since he does not at any point suggest a fatalism whereby inherent racial characteristics determine 
individuals in a group to naturally think in a specific way. 
 
398 The one exception is Israel, since Coleridge believed that Israel shared the same form of political and religious 
legitimization as other ancient cultures (divine revelation), but was itself unique in that it truly did receive these 
things through revelation (rather than pretense to revelation). Thus, the Greeks were still unique in their political and 
social organization, but Israel was unique in having a true divine source for its (non-unique) form of organization.  
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 The emergence of these two opposite poles, each representing an incomplete part of a 
whole, were providentially arranged such that they, “after a series of ages each maturing and 
perfecting,” would eventually come together and, like the two poles of a magnet, create a whole 
“comprising the excellencies of both” (LP 50). These two imperfect halves, that of Greek 
philosophical development, which represented “all that could be evolved out of corrupt nature by 
its own reason,” and that of Hebraic thought and culture, which represented “a nation bred up by 
inspiration in a childlike form, in obedience and in the exercise of the will,” would eventually 
come into contact to form the “unity of which all [our nature’s] excellency and all its hopes 
depend” (LP 83-4). Furthermore, this movement toward the uniting of opposites, and the need 
for a unity, represent not only the movement of human thought in history, but “the two great 
component parts of our nature,” viz., the reason and the will (LP 83). Despite seeing the need for 
the unification (but not the subsumption of one to the other) of the will and the reason, Coleridge 
does not believe that these powers (or cultural/intellectual trends) are equal in dignity. Instead, 
the will is that which is “the higher and more especially godlike” and the reason is the “compeer 
but yet second to that will” (LP 84). 
 Before turning to Coleridge’s analysis either of the emergence of Christianity as the 
union of these fundamental traditions or of his analysis of the religious and philosophical 
conditions at play in his contemporary Britain, it is necessary first to describe two impulses that 
seem to propel historical evolution of all human thought: first the human rational drive to 
understand the nature of the world, leading to a cycle of internal transformations in philosophy, 
and the drive to properly relate the will and intellect, and therefore religion and philosophy. To 
begin with, Coleridge believes that philosophy began fundamentally “in the distinction between 
the subject and the object” (LP 115). The result is that he sees there being “but three kind of 
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philosophers and more are not possible” (LP 115). There are first “those who give the whole to 
the subject and make the object a mere result involved in it”; those who “give the whole to the 
object, and make the subject, that is the reflecting and contemplating, feeling part, the mere 
result of that;” and finally those “who in very different ways have attempted to reconcile these 
two opposites” (LP 115). This distinction maps onto the internal philosophical developmental 
cycle that Coleridge believes continues to repeat itself whereby something like pantheism 
(associated with pure idealism) gives way to materialism, which in turn yields an attempted 
synthesis or overcoming of both. In the ancient world, this seems to be the move from the 
Eleatics to the response of the Atomists and then to the thought of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.  
 The second dynamic is that of the human drive to properly relate religion and philosophy 
(which again correspond in the social and larger intellectual world to the inner reality of the will 
and reason in humans) and the problems that happen when this drive yields a disordered 
relationship between them (either a reversal of priority or a subsuming of one into the other). In a 
proper relationship, “these two dearest names to human nature, religion and philosophy, can 
neither be confounded nor yet can they be separated” (LP 374). To try to cede all that properly 
belongs to philosophy to religion and thus convert philosophy into religion (or have a religion 
without philosophy), amounts to giving wholly over to the will ungrounded by the intellect. 
Without the mediation of the intellect, humans are “left to combine [their] senses with [their] 
better feelings” and the result is superstition, or “the confounding of the spiritual with the bodily” 
(LP 375-6). On the other hand, replacing religion with philosophy by attempting to make 
everything in the world transparent to the rational faculty has always produced “a dreary 
skepticism which has ended in a sensual delivery of our own being up to the wants and appetites 
of the present state” (LP 376). Philosophy alone always ends with either atheism or agnosticism, 
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but these also represent their own kind of superstition since they too mean confounding the 
spiritual with the bodily (particularly in the case of materialism). While neither religion nor 
philosophy alone suffices to sustain human development, with both becoming degraded forms 
when totalized, they still stand in an asymmetrical relationship in terms of deleterious 
consequences. Religion unmoored from or replacing philosophy tends toward superstition, while 
philosophy overtaking or replacing religion tends toward both superstition and atheism.  
 These two dynamics in place let one see how Coleridge understood the emergence of 
Christianity and its capacity to properly order philosophy and religion and the individual will and 
intellect. At its most basic, Christianity represented the proper integration of Jewish and Greek 
thought, with each interpenetrating and informing the deficiencies of the other. This occurred 
 just at that time when the traditions of history and the oracles of the Jews had combined with the 
 philosophy of the Grecians, and prepared the Jews themselves for understanding their scriptures in a more 
 spiritual light, and the Greeks to give their speculations, that were but the shadows of thought before, a 
 reality in that which alone is properly real (LP 84). 
 
Jewish thinking provided the lens for seeing Christ as the fulfillment of those human needs that 
Greek (and Roman) philosophy discovered but could not fulfill. The philosophers, but especially 
the moralists, discovered through reason both the fullness of human vice and the utter inability of 
humans to remove themselves from that vice. Likewise, philosophy arrived at a speculative view 
of God, but could not overcome “the pernicious distinction between truth and reality and that 
which was merely speculative” (LP 356). In response, Christianity provided the solution to those 
problems reached at the edge of human reason alone by offering a Savior who could extricate 
humans from their vices and a God who “differed from those of the old philosophers by being no 
abstraction, no blind truth, but a living God, so at all times truths appear as living truths” (LP 
357).  
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 Without detailing Coleridge’s conception of intellectual history up until his time, one can 
still see that he saw his contemporary problematic conditions related to philosophy and religion 
as the result of this unfolding of both the drive to properly understand the world intellectually 
and the drive to integrate the intellect and the will. The unfolding attempt to properly relate 
religion and philosophy within Christianity led to the Reformation and Renaissance and 
ultimately the “emancipation from the superstitions in at least the northern parts of Europe.” 
However, they also “left the mind open and almost impelled it to real silence” (LP 485). 
Nevertheless, from this vacuum emerged Lord Bacon, who “appeared not for any one purpose 
but to purify the whole of the mind from all its errors by having given first that complete analysis 
of the human soul without which we might have gone on forever weighing one thing after 
another in scales which we had never examined” (LP 486). Coleridge understood that Bacon, 
while later generations came to view him as only providing the system of empirical observation 
foundational for the emergence of the natural scientific method, actually presented the idea that 
“our perception can apprehend through the organs of sense only the phenomena evoked by the 
experiment, but that same power of mind, which out of its own laws has proposed the 
experiment, can judge whether in nature there is a law correspondent to the same” (LP 487). 
Coleridge thus saw Bacon as the “British Plato” who provided the true philosophical foundation 
for proper Christianity by delivering “a profound meditation on those laws which the pure reason 
in man reveals to him, with the confident anticipation and faith that to this will be found to 
correspond certain laws in nature” (PL 488). Bacon provided a vision for the relationship 
between the subjective and the objective that proved compatible with Christian revelation.  
 Several social and intellectual forces emerged that caused Britain to lose Bacon’s unitive 
philosophy. The Reformation and Renaissance ground clearing of error that allowed for a Bacon 
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to emerge also meant that human minds would attempt to acquire knowledge by only acting 
“upon its own stores, upon its own faculties.” Thereby “the mind was led to the revival of 
systems which the better feelings of mankind had exploded for many many centuries” (LP 494). 
This vacuum explained the reemergence of materialism in the thought of Gassendi and Hobbes. 
At the same time, the Baconian method of experimental scientific observation (which was to 
Coleridge only one half of his unitive thought) paved the way for the rapid development of 
knowledge of the natural world and consequently the sense that this whole world could be 
known through the natural sciences such that they became “synonymous with philosophy itself” 
(LP 510). The equation of philosophy with empirical science and the re-emergence of materialist 
atomism reinforced each other and led farther away from Bacon’s (so conceived by Coleridge) 
unitive thought. Finally, the material prosperity and economic advancement, coupled with the 
religious conflict of the 17th century, let Locke (for Coleridge not deserving his intellectual 
reputation) further move people away from Bacon’s correct thinking (as well as that of Milton 
and Shakespeare). Because Locke’s name was associated with “that of freedom and that of the 
Revolution,” Britain’s intelligentsia saw his thought as equally liberative from “old” ideas tied 
up with the old, repressive political order. Locke’s becoming a symbol for “good sense” and 
properly chastened British philosophy, as well as being a defender of a modest and sober 
Christianity against the infidelity arising among other philosophers, led to him becoming the 
model for proper British thought in the 18th century, with the effect that much better 
philosophical minds could not rise to prominence in Britain (LP 572-3).  
 With the entire national temperament in Britain so distorted, Coleridge believed that 
divine providence had arranged that “what had once been distinctions co-exiting in each country 
were now to be a distinction of countries as a whole” (LP 574). Whereas at one time 
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advancements in commerce and government occurred in one portion of the population and 
advancements in philosophy and theology in another, now Coleridge saw these partitions lifted 
to the level of whole nations within a larger world community. While Britain may have had some 
important intellectual advances with people like Hume showing the logical consequences of 
Locke’s thought, it remained for the Germans, and Kant specifically, to clear the intellectual fog 
of Lockean philosophy. Kant’s careful analysis of the mind as an object of reflection itself, led to 
the conclusion that the mind’s faculties working on sensations give us the “substance” of reality. 
More importantly, Coleridge took from Kant the demonstration that the will as the “practical 
reason” is the “higher and nobler” constituent of a person’s being which “does not announce 
itself by arguing but by direct command and precept” (LP 586). This allowed room for a “faith of 
reason” which disallowed positive proofs of religious truth but also ensured that one could not 
demonstrate their falsehood either. Kant thus clarified “the nature of religious truth and its 
connection with the understanding, and made it felt to the full that the reason itself, considered as 
merely intellectual, was but a subordinate part of our nature; that there was a higher part, the will 
and the conscience” (PL 587). The result is that “to be good is and ever will be not a mere 
consequence of being wise but a necessary condition of the process” (PL 587).  
 Several important conclusions for the argument at hand arise from Coleridge’s 
interpretation of the history of philosophy. First, he affirmed that, whatever his initial views of 
the need to unite “warmth” and “light,” his understanding of reason shifted enough for him to 
believe that while Methodism could still stand for “warmth,” post-Restoration English 
philosophy could not provide the “light,” insofar as light meant “true philosophy.” Instead, 
Coleridge believed that the German Enlightenment provided those minds that could clear a path 
out of the delusions of English materialism. This point would seem to track with the standard 
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interpretation that Coleridge merely sought to interpret German Idealism into an English idiom. 
However, a comparison of his understanding of Bacon and Kant mitigates against such an 
interpretation. Kant is important, and vitally so, but only in a propaedeutic manner by unsettling 
the secure foundation of materialism and exclusive empiricism, as well as for properly relating 
religion and philosophy to each other (similarly relating will and reason to each other in the 
individual human). However, Kant does not actually provide the true philosophy that should 
emerge once the ground is cleared. His “true understanding” of Bacon, on the other hand, points 
to the positive contributions of Bacon’s philosophy itself rather than simply the capacity to lead 
to a proper understanding of the nature and purpose of philosophy, as was the case with Kant. 
Coleridge therefore appears to see Kant’s greatness in his capacity to undo the philosophical 
errors that cloud a true reading of Bacon, but once this is done, one puts away Kant to return to 
Bacon’s true philosophy.399   
 The way in which Coleridge understands the proper relationship between religion and 
philosophy supports the idea that he did not want to supplant Evangelical Christianity, but to 
remain close to or within it and explicate its proper philosophical foundations. As was shown 
above, Coleridge thought that Christianity, the true religion, could only develop historically after 
the propaedeutic work of the development of philosophy. However, philosophy in this sense 
prior to (or after the fact divorced from) Christianity could only ever be corrupt philosophy. The 
emergence of Christianity alone allowed true philosophy to arise, and only if it was subordinated 
to true Christianity as its “willing servant and helpmate” (LP 325). It is true that Coleridge 
thought that Christianity would (and did) become simply “religion” and gave way to superstition 
when it precluded intellectual reflection (LP 375). However, Christianity, as true religion, carries 
																																																						
399 I am not trying to make any arguments about the debt Coleridge in reality owed to Bacon or Kant, or whether his 
view of Bacon in reality was Coleridge attributing to Bacon an alien philosophy drawn from German Idealism.  
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with it “true philosophy” – at least potentially or implicitly. Christianity came into existence as 
“the divine medium between all the opposite doctrines of the different philosophers” and 
comprehended “what was true in each” (LP 309). Additionally, “a true religion will necessarily 
lead to a just philosophy” (LP 360). Finally, Coleridge acknowledges that true knowledge can 
possibly emerge from “the illiterate and the simple,” such that they convey the truths they have 
discovered in forms that are difficult to distinguish from the fanatic’s “extravagant and grotesque 
phantasms” that are “for the most part poor copies and gross caricatures of genuine inspiration” 
(LP 482). While Coleridge here speaks about modern mysticism in philosophy, one may assume 
that such a situation could just as easily occur in the realm of religious truth; Coleridge does, 
after all, allow for superstition and fanaticism as categories in both religion and philosophy. 
Thus, even Coleridge’s statement that the Evangelicals generally lacked learning would not 
necessarily mean that they lacked a vision of real Christianity. While he certainly would not have 
ranked the Evangelicals with Luther, Coleridge’s description of Luther as having eschewed 
carrying on “a process of fine reasoning” in order to “overthrow the scholastic philosophy and to 
substitute for it the Word of God” (PL 449) shows at least that Coleridge saw it necessary in the 
unfolding of Christianity at points to elevate the proclamation of Scripture in language accessible 
to “the lowest of the low” above technical philosophical disputation. That Coleridge saw himself 
as providing a metaphysical underpinning for Christian doctrine, and the belief that this union of 
warmth and light could only be brought about with this underpinning, comes into sharper focus 
in a statement put forward by Coleridge in his marginal notes on The Pilgrim’s Progress: “this 
very controversy of t between the Arminians and Calvinists, in which both are partially right on 
in what they affirm, and both wholly wrong in what they deny, is a proof that without 
Metaphysics there can be no Light of Faith” (CM I 819-20). 
		168 
 Importantly, if one looks to Coleridge’s presentation of Bacon’s relationship to the 
Reformation, and also looks at his understanding of how the intellectual climate of the English 
Reformation differed from that of the German Reformation, one likely has even more evidence 
that Coleridge saw himself within Evangelical Anglicanism. Coleridge acknowledges that the 
emergence of a mind like Bacon only happened after superstition, both in philosophy and 
religion, had been cleared away. At the same time, he recognized that the English Reformation 
differed in its intellectual character from what Luther initiated in Germany. Coleridge interpreted 
Luther’s initial salvo against scholasticism through a singular focus on the Word of God as 
necessary for the removal of scholasticism’s excesses, but not so much the removal of 
scholasticism itself400 (LP 466-7). Despite these excesses, and the need for a genius like Luther 
to challenge them, Coleridge still regarded the scholastics very highly, stating that they were 
owed respect for their rightly placed “endeavors to reunite reason and religion by a due 
subordination of the former to the latter” and that the intellectual force of the Reformation owed 
much more to Scholasticism than “to the revival of classical literature” (LP 466-7). Additionally, 
the rejection of Scholasticism was confined to Luther’s specific time and place, and rightly “did 
not extend into England; on the contrary [England’s] great divines found in the writings of the 
Schoolmen the strongest testimonies in their favor” (LP 468).  Coleridge believed that a “just 
philosophy” would arise out of true religion. To repeat, Coleridge both acknowledged that Bacon 
emerged in Reformation England and that this was a Reformation that maintained a more 
positive relationship to Scholasticism than what was found in Germany. Because of how highly 
Coleridge regarded Bacon’s thought, he likely saw the English Reformation (in contrast to the 
German) as providing the grounds for Christianity’s movement beyond purification from 
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superstition to a positive vision of true Christianity.  In other words, Bacon, coming immediately 
after the English Reformation and during the age of the great Stuart and Caroline divines, would 
seem the best philosopher to point to as evidence of “true religion” yielding “just philosophy” if 
one wanted to point to the English Reformers as having established true religion, and Coleridge 
does indeed see Bacon in this way. Because it is precisely the vision of the English Reformers 
and Calvinist divines that the Anglican Evangelicals invoked as those who taught the pure and 
general spirit of the Reformation, it does not seem too far of a stretch to locate Coleridge among 
the principle group in his time that sought to reclaim the spirit of what he perceived as true, 
positively reformed (and not only purified) Christianity.   
 A look at Coleridge’s doctrinal summaries as well as the larger theoretical framework for 
the relationship between religion and philosophy already begins to paint a picture of a thinker 
with significant affinities with the Anglican Evangelicals. While it would be premature at this 
point to identify Coleridge as an Evangelical, some of the most significant obstacles to such an 
identification have at least been removed. While seeing “warmth” and “light” as incomplete parts 
of a necessary whole, he believed it better to imbue warmth with more light than to try to give 
light more warmth. He saw Evangelicals as closest to his own creed and as alone the group 
saving the Church of England (no less than from an inordinate rationalism). Moreover, with the 
close of this chapter, the stage has been set for understanding how Coleridge moved beyond 
doctrinal summaries to present a philosophically supported theological demonstration and 
exposition of these doctrines. I believe that this more developed theological vision only serves to 
demonstrate that Coleridge accepted doctrinal positions associated with the Evangelicals that he 
did not make explicit in his doctrinal summaries and that he frequently employed a method 
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consistent with how Evangelicals developed their theology. I thus turn in the next chapter to 
expositing that more developed theological vision and showing its connection to Evangelicalism. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
COLERIDGE’S PHILOSOPHICAL, EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY (PART II) 
 
 Chapter four concluded with Coleridge’s understanding of the history of philosophy, 
particularly as this development influenced and was influenced by the human attempt to arrive at 
the proper relationship between philosophy and religion. The way in which Coleridge sees the 
importance of certain figures and movements (most prominently Bacon, Kant, and the 
Reformation) itself provides evidence that Coleridge had Evangelical propensities, as did his 
sense that the consequences of a disjoined will (“warmth”) and intellect (“heat”) were not 
equally deleterious. This discussion also makes possible an analysis of Coleridge’s more detailed 
and thoroughly argued (if not always systematic) theological work, and an analysis of this work 
makes Coleridge’s affinities with Evangelical thought that much clearer. Coleridge’s history of 
philosophy provides a preliminary introduction to his theology and theological anthropology 
insofar as it points to his view of the relationship between the powers of the human mind. His 
conception of the nature of the human intellect provides a helpful entryway into his theology 
precisely because it is in the intellect as will and reason that Coleridge locates the image of God 
in humans, which in turn provides a logical entry point for a conversation about his Doctrine of 
God, the purpose of human life, the fall and original sin, incarnation, and atonement. 
 Before discussing the relationship between God and humanity – which presupposes the 
purpose of human life, the fall, and the proper means of restoration of fallen humanity – I need to 
give a cursory description of Coleridge’s understanding of human psychology, i.e., the 
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distinction between the reason, the understanding, and the will.401 Coleridge would come to see 
the most significant division between the powers of the human mind as that between the reason 
and the understanding, in large part because he saw some of the most egregious errors in 18th 
century philosophy as flowing from the conflation or misunderstanding of these two. At the most 
general level, the understanding is that power that organizes sense impressions into unitive 
experience and that abstracts therefrom. One can further draw a conceptual distinction in this 
power between two “forces.” The lower force is that which is held in common with “higher 
animals” and is a “further development of instinct.”402 The lower is not an act so much as the set 
of rules that passively organize individual sensations into unitive experience. This is 
“understanding” disconnected from reason (as Coleridge conceives reason; more on that to 
come). It is the second, higher, and active sense of understanding that can be considered properly 
(and possibly exclusively) “human” understanding. This is the ability for active judgement 
according to the senses, meaning an active capacity to abstract more general principles from 
sense information. This “active” understanding is higher, and properly human, because it only 
exists in conjunction with reason, and it is reason that makes possible active differentiation.403 
Importantly, “lower” and “higher” understanding are prominent in individuals in an inverse 
relationship with each other, and this is possible because they differ in degree rather than kind.404 
																																																						
401 It would be a distortion to call these distinct “somethings” in Coleridge’s psychology “faculties.” Owen Barfield 
points out that it would be more correct to distinguish between various “powers” of the mind, since Coleridge 
repeatedly refuted the claim that “perception, imagination, fancy, understanding, etc.” are faculties because the 
exertion of any of these powers requires the use of multiple human faculties, and different “powers” could make use 
of the same “faculties” (Barfield, 92).  
 
402 Barfield, What Coleridge Thought, 97. 
 
403 Barfield, What Coleridge Thought, 98-9.  
 
404 Thus, each lower state contains the higher in potentiality, such that “instinct cannot be explained without our 
seeing it as potential understanding,” and “understanding cannot be explained without our seeing it as developed 
instinct” (Barfield, 98-9). 
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 Reason, however, does differ from understanding in kind. As Coleridge explains in Aids 
to Reflection, reason is that “power of universal and necessary Convictions, the Source and 
Substance of Truths above Sense, and having there evidence in themselves” (AR 216). Reason 
likewise has a twofold differentiation, only now with a further internal twofold division. The first 
distinction occurs when one considers the object of reason as either necessary or conditional: 
when the object of reason is “contemplated distinctly in reference to formal (or abstract) truth, it 
is the speculative Reason; but in reference to actual (or moral) truth, as the fountain of Ideas and 
the Light of the conscience, we name it the practical Reason” (AR 217). The other distinction is 
between what Barfield refers to as the positive (lux intellectus) and negative (lumen a luce) 
reason. Reason positively conceived is conscious apprehension of the Ideas of Reason in an act 
of contemplation, whereas negatively it is the “irradiating” of the understanding, allowing 
passive understanding to ascend to properly active or human understanding.405 
 While one may loosely call reason a human power, one can only do so in a very qualified 
fashion. One can rightly speak of multiple distinct instances of “understanding,” with these being 
as numerous as the number of individual beings with understanding. There are similarly many 
Ideas contained within Reason. However, there is only one, universal Reason.406 Furthermore, 
Reason is present in all things and orders all of nature. It can be this universal precisely because 
Reason is the Divine Logos, the creative Word, which is both the basis of life and of light (in the 
sense of illumination) and the second person of the Trinity.407 At the same time, the 
																																																						
405 Barfield, What Coleridge Thought, 105-6. 
 
406 Barfield, What Coleridge Thought, 106. When not capitalized, “reason” refers to this universal considered as 
though it were a power of the human mind. When capitalized, “Reason” refers to Reason in itself as the universal. 
 
407 Barfield, What Coleridge Thought, 113.  
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understanding stands in a unique relationship to reason since it is the only thing in nature that 
Reason is present to (rather than present in) and thus uniquely constitutes individual humans. 
 In terms of this unique relationship to individual humans, Reason serves as that which 
creates the possibility of individual human subjectivities, but it can do this only by remaining 
distinct from any individual, i.e., by being superindividual. As mere negative reason, which acts 
on human understanding unconsciously, Reason becomes the principle of abstraction that allows 
the understanding to generalize and see objects in terms of “universals.”408 However, positive 
reason, i.e., Reason as the understanding is conscious of it, provides an awareness that Reason 
itself is transcendent and we are given access to, but do not create, universal Ideas. In other 
words, in its positive dimension, Reason becomes the awareness that Reason itself is one and 
therefore the ideas of Reason are not our “private property.”409 Without the development of a 
conception of positive reason, the growth of negative reason’s capacity only provides 
detachment, a purely mechanistic view of nature, and ultimately the end of the capacity for  true 
knowledge: When there is no sense that Reason transcends us, “it gives no assurance of an 
external world.”410 However, reflection on the concept of contradiction can make room for the 
understanding to come to an awareness of the positive function of Reason. When one gains an 
awareness that the same thing grounds our subjective understanding and the order of the 
																																																						
408 Barfield, What Coleridge Thought, 109. This occurs through an awareness of the principle of contradiction, 
which contains within itself both the concepts of “sameness” and “difference,” which are necessary to know whether 
two concepts in the mind contradict each other. In the Friend, Coleridge stated that negative reason “consists wholly 
in man’s power of seeing, whether any two conceptions, which happen to be in his mind, are, or are not, in 
contradiction with each other” (F I 159). 
 
409 Barfield, What Coleridge Thought, 108.  
 
410 Barfield, What Coleridge Thought, 110. 
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objective world, one should come to understand that this thing (Reason) must transcend and have 
a certain independence from both subjective consciousness and the objective world.411  
 Because of this superindividuality, and the fact that Reason is present both to and in the 
understanding, it differs in kind from all other human powers (and indeed all the powers in the 
rest of creation). The better way to describe Reason in relationship to the human psyche, then, is 
not “as a power, but rather as a gift – a gift which the human understanding enjoys, and by virtue 
of which it is human.”412 Furthermore, only in its negative function, conceived of as more akin to 
an energizing power, can the human (through the understanding) be said to “possess” Reason. In 
its positive dimension, humans can apprehend, through the power of understanding in an act of 
reflection, the Ideas of Reason. In this way, apprehension of the Ideas of Reason is more 
analogous to sensation than the process of “reasoning” as the term is commonly used, with the 
understanding functioning analogously to sense organs.413 
 The possibility of unpacking Coleridge’s doctrine of God and his understanding of the 
Image of God in humans requires a discussion of what Coleridge considers the even more 
fundamental distinguishing feature of humans in creation: the will. Coleridge says in a note on a 
copy of his work the Statesman’s Manual that as important as the distinction of the reason and 
understanding is for his thought, he still maintained “the Primacy of the Will, as deeper than and 
(in the order of thought) antecedent to Reason. See St. John’s Gospel 1.18” (SM 67n). One 
																																																						
411 This ground also provides the basis for understanding that subjectivity and objectivity are not completely 
heterogeneous and that some union between them is possible. 
 
412 Barfield, What Coleridge Thought, 95.  
 
413 Barfield, What Coleridge Thought, 97. Hence, when Coleridge describes the ascending and descending functions 
of the human psyche, he places “sense” as the lowest rung and “Reason” as the highest, but he also provides two 
lists, with one highest to lowest and one lowest to highest, such that the reader is meant to associate the highest and 
lowest as analogous to one another. This presentation and understanding of psychology fits with one of Coleridge’s 
favorite Maxims – “extremes meet” – and a belief in polarity penultimate to unity as a fundamental logical principle. 
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cannot talk about individual “wills” in humans without first describing the primal Will, which 
turns out to be God. The will is that which is “essentially causative of its own reality” and is 
therefore prior to all things, including intellection, in the order of existence (SW&F 777). At the 
same time, for this self-causative power to be truly Will, it must always and necessarily exist in 
conjunction with intellect. This is so because a “will” without intellect would be action directed 
by something external to itself, and therefore would not be causative of its own reality. The idea 
of self-causation implies the positing of something somehow “other” to direct this self-causation, 
but it cannot be absolutely other and in some important way must be the same as the Will. This 
seems to be what Coleridge means when he says that we must see that the Will posits both 
“alterity” and “the identity of these two” (SW&F 779). Thus, Will in the order of thought is prior 
to Intellect, but the two must always be joined: “the Will is neither abstracted from intelligence 
nor can Intelligence be conceived of as not grounded and involved in the Will” (SW&F 779).414  
 Now, only God is Will in the truest sense of that which is absolutely self-causative. 
Putting his conception of the causal relationship between God and creation into the mouth of 
God, Coleridge says: “The whole host of heaven and earth, from the mote in the sunbeam to the 
archangel before the throne of glory, owe their existence to a Will not their own, but my own 
Will is the ground and sufficient cause of my own existence” (OM 198). Nevertheless, Coleridge 
clearly indicates that there are individual wills in human beings, even if they are not initially 
self-causative. 415 Instead, there is in the created individual something analogous, at least 
potentially, to the primal unity of the Absolute Will and Reason. The analogue to uncreated unity 
																																																						
414 This is one of the points whereby Coleridge sees himself as moving beyond, for instance, Schelling. Rather than 
an absolute Will that produces intellect in a kind of Neoplatonic emanation, Coleridge sees Will and Intellect as 
relative terms like “Father” and “Son”; thus, one has the beginnings of Coleridge’s understanding of the Trinity.  
 
415 Here I bracket the question of a free will, since this concept is bound up with Coleridge’s conception of creation, 
Fall, and redemption. 
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in creation is the synthesis between the universal and individual by the “subordination of the 
former to the latter” (OP 81). Coleridge stands with most of the Christian tradition in holding to 
the incommunicability of the uncreated Will to what is created, so for this analogue to be 
possible, it must be something gifted by the Absolute Will to the individual will as a potential to 
be actualized: “as this likeness is not self-existent or necessary, but the product of the individual 
Will, then if it existed originally in man, it must have been given by some other Will as the 
incentive momentum or condition, in order to the commencement and continuance of the act by 
the individual Will” (OM 83).  
 Importantly, human will is a kind of causative power for action or thought, but not all 
causative power is will. Coleridge also allows for volition, or the power for action or thought 
within living organisms that arises from the various motive forces that are inherently part of the 
living organism but do not necessarily come about from distinct thought, and this seems to fall 
under the name of instinct (AR 247). Will properly speaking involves not only selection, but 
choice, meaning the power for activity or thinking themselves directed by thought416 (AR 247).  
 One must take a break from Coleridge’s religious psychology to talk about his doctrines 
of God and creation, since his conceptions of faith and conscience require more detailed 
descriptions of God and creation than do will and intellect. Any description of Coleridge’s 
doctrine of God during his return to orthodoxy must give due room to his understanding of God 
as Trinity. Coleridge himself placed the Trinity at the center of his understanding of the Christian 
																																																						
416 Because Coleridge believes that humans continue to have wills even if they are not free wills (which requires the 
will being fully directed by the ideas of Reason), thought here would be whatever arises from either the 
apprehension of the Ideas of Reason or of the understanding informed by the negative function of reason. 
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faith: his return to orthodoxy was also a movement from accepting the Trinity as a 
philosophically defensible postulate to its being an essential article of faith.417  
 The discussion of the Absolute Will provides the necessary starting point for 
understanding Coleridge’s conception of the Trinity. In a short work entitled “On the Trinity,” 
Coleridge begins with the description of the fundamental description of God as IDENTITY, and as 
such the “absolute subjectivity, whose only attribute is the GOOD; whose only definition is, that 
which is essentially causative of all possible true Being – Ground and Cause,” which is 
equivalent to “the Absolute WILL” (SW&F 1510-11).418 In this work, Coleridge develops then 
how each distinction or designation of God (with God as identity) has a certain name/names, a 
divine attribute associated with that distinction, and a definition. As was seen in the discussion of 
Absolute Will, being self-causative qua Will requires positing something that is at once distinct 
from and identified with Will. Thus, Coleridge believes that the affirmation of the Absolute 
Subject as Absolute Will and Cause entails a distinction (but not a division) within this 
fundamental unity. Coleridge introduces the relative subjectivity and objectivity within the 
absolute Subjectivity, which he refers to with the principles of Ipseïty and Alterity419. God as 
																																																						
417 In the Biographia Literaria, Coleridge affirmed that he first “considered the idea of the Trinity a fair scholastic 
inference from the being of God as creative intelligence,” but in such a way that “seeing in the same no practical or 
moral bearing, I confined it to the schools of philosophy” (BL 204). Coleridge later came to realize that “I cannot 
doubt, that the difference of my metaphysical notions from those of Unitarians in general contributed to my final re-
conversion to the whole truth in Christ” like how “the books of certain Platonic philosophers (libri quorundam 
Platonicorum) commenced the rescue of St. Augustine’s faith from the same error aggravated by the far darker 
accompaniment of the Manichæan heresy” (BL 205). This admission provides a biographical component to the point 
that Coleridge could see the doctrine of the Trinity on either side of the dividing line between natural religion and 
distinctive Christian belief, depending on whether the doctrine emerged as essential to an understanding of the 
Living God impacting the Christian life or as merely a necessary postulate in purely speculative philosophy. 
 
418 This is Coleridge’s affirmation of God considered in God’s unity. Robert Barth raises the issue of whether 
Coleridge assumes a Divine nature behind/independent of the Trinity, thus introducing a quadrinity or some form of 
modalism. While I could argue for why this is not the case (it appears that the distinctions in the Absolute Will and 
Subject are real and constitutive), answering this question is not necessary for the subject matter at hand. 
 
419 Acceptable translations may be “itself-ness”/“itself-ity” and “otherness.” 
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Ipseïty is the “eternally self-affirmant, self-affirmed: the I AM, in that I AM” (SW&F 1511). 
This is God as “the FATHER; the relatively subjective; whose attribute is, the HOLY ONE, whose 
definition is, the essential Finific420 in the form of the Infinite. It is under the form of the I AM, 
Father, and the Holy that the Absolute Subject, the Good, and Absolute Will “co-eternally begets 
the divine ALTERITY,” who is the “Supreme BEING” and “The Supreme REASON – The Jehovah. 
The Son. The Word” (SW&F 1511). This is intellect that must necessarily be identified with 
Absolute Will for it to be will while also being distinguished from it. The definition of Alterity, 
Son, Reason, and Word, is “the PLEROMENA of Being, whose essential poles are Unity and 
Distinctity; or the essential Infinite in the form of the Finite” and who is “relatively OBJECTIVE,” 
meaning the object in relationship to the subject that is the I AM (SW&F 1511). 
 A third is necessary as well, that which in relationship to the relatively subjective and 
relatively objective participates in both, i.e., “the great Idea needs only for its completion a co-
eternal which is both, i.e., relatively Objective to the Subjective, relatively Subjective to the 
Objective” (SW&F 1512). The reasoning here appears to be that to have a meaningful unity with 
differentiation, some principle must share in the two opposites which is not simply one or the 
other so that they are not subsumed into either the opposite or some deeper “true” unity on the 
one hand, or, on the other, to prevent complete heterogeneity of these opposites such that they 
could never form a union.421 Thus, that which partakes of and acts as the unifying force between 
both subjectivity and objectivity is the COMMUNITY, i.e., “the eternal LIFE, which is LOVE – the 
Spirit” (SW&F 1512). In Coleridge's attempt to regularize varying biblical language, the Spirit 
																																																						
420 I.e., that which limits or is limiting; possibly the principle of limitation that must therefore transcend limitation. 
 
421 Insofar as the Trinity is the pattern for the logic that permeates creation, this would inform Coleridge’s opposition 
to both absolute monism and absolute dualism. 
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is, “relative to the Father, the Spirit of Holiness, the Holy Spirit” (SW&F 1512). Relative to the 
Son, the Spirit is “the Spirit of Truth whose attribute is Wisdom. Sancta Sophia” (SW&F 1512). 
 Several distinctions should be made to avoid misunderstandings about Coleridge’s 
conception of God, all of which show that he desired to expound a fairly traditional conception 
of God’s transcendent existence. Coleridge sought a conception of God that can provide a 
foundation for something closer to the German Idealist conception of the world without a 
corresponding movement in the direction of a process doctrine of God422 found in Schelling or 
Hegel, or, in more contemporary theology, Moltmann. First, while Coleridge made Will prior in 
the order of knowing and in some sense in terms of “dignity,” he saw the “Calvinist’s God of 
supreme power” as a distortion of the ultimate, and necessary, connection between Will and 
Intellect because it substituted a false conception of an independent Will that is simple and 
unrestrained power.423 Additionally, Coleridge believed that as Absolute Will, “Deus est Ens 
super Ens [God is being above being], the Ground of all Being, but therein likewise absolute 
Being, in that he is the eternal self-affirming, the I Am in that I am; and that the key of this 
mystery is given to us in the pure idea of the will, as the alone Causa Sui [cause of itself]” (CM 
II 324). God is both absolute Being and the ground of created being. Finally, the divine attributes 
become the foundation and ground of the attributes of the finite world without either being 
identified with them or being wholly heterogeneous with them: “Reason does not necessarily 
																																																						
422 I believe that, while he never states this, process views of God (by making the realization of God’s own being, 
either necessarily or through some “self-limitation” on God’s part) make God necessarily part of the order of 
creation, which would for Coleridge subsume the world into God. 
 
423 I think this distinction helps to illuminate the main distinction between Karl Barth, whose more thorough-going 
Calvinism led him to wed a particular interpretation of total depravity and God’s sovereignty to a Neo-Kantian 
psychology, and Coleridge, who always sees will and intellect as intrinsically linked. Thus, Coleridge can keep a 
more traditional Augustinian and Thomistic sense that God’s omnipotence and sovereignty do not entail a complete 
voluntarism, but rather that the co-incidence of will and intellect allowing one to say that what is truly irrational is 
not a “something” that God cannot do, but rather is nothing at all and thus no constraint on God’s omnipotence. 
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exclude the Finite, whether in Time or in Space, in Figure or in Number, because it includes 
them eminenter – thus the Prime Mover of the Material Universe is affirmed to contain all 
Motion as its cause, but not to be or to suffer Motion in itself” (SW&F 839-40).  
 This overview of Coleridge’s doctrine of God allows for a consideration of creation and 
the Fall. In his discussion of the nature of creation, Coleridge devotes most of his energy to what 
makes the distinction between God and creation possible while also allowing for relationship 
between them, as well as what the duty of the creature is toward the creator. Divine Ideas 
provide the pattern for created reality as well as God’s knowledge of that reality. An Idea 
properly speaking is “not simply knowledge or perception as distinguished from the thing 
perceived: it is a realizing knowledge, a knowledge causative of its own reality; it is life, and the 
life is the light of men” (OM 223). The Divine or Eternal Ideas can be conceptually distinguished 
by us as “Distinctities in the pleromena” (SW&F 1511); however, they are not “parts” out of 
which the Reason/Eternal Word is composed. Any distinct Idea that we are given to perceive 
“in” the Reason is in some way a “refracting” of the one, unitive Divine Idea; a “divine Idea is 
the Omnipresence or Omniscience represented intelligentially in some one of the possible forms, 
which are the plentitude of the divine Intelligence” (OM 223). While they can be spoken of as in 
some way distinct, one should always keep in mind that they are “One with the <co->Eternal 
Act, by which the absolute Will self-realized begets its Idea as the Other self” (OM 223).424  
																																																						
424 One, if not the main, problem that Coleridge sought to avoid was running intellectually aground on “atheism on 
the one side, or a world without a God, and Pantheism, or a world that is itself God” (OM 221). The fundamental 
distinction in God, the Reason/Logos/Son, makes possible the further distinctions (but not divisions) within Reason, 
and these two “moments” of distinction provide for the possibility of differentiation between God and creation and 
then within the created order. It is these Divine Ideas as the refraction of the Logos in Godself that also constitute 
God’s knowledge, not only of Godself, but also of all that is not God. In this affirmation, Coleridge was rejecting 
either that one could conceive of “God without Ideas” or the theory that God “knows the universal only” and not 
particulars (OM 223). The first would be tantamount to rejecting the intellection necessary for the Absolute Will to 
be absolute, which would “destroy the very conception of God,” and the second would be “more absurd than to say 
of <attribute to> a man perfect insight into a genus with an entire ignorance of its species” (OM 223-4). 
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 The purpose of human beings and the possibility of falling away from that purpose are 
intimately linked. All that is not God came to exist because of God’s causative power working 
from the pattern of the Divine Ideas in the Divine Reason. Likewise, the constitutive identity of 
Will and Reason in God cannot be replicated in creation, but rather must be modeled analogously 
in the possible synthesis of the individual will and the Divine Reason by the individual will’s 
submitting to determination by universal Reason. “This possible synthesis is the only 
conceivable likeness, or image, of the necessary identity of the absolute and self-originating 
universal” (OM 81). Here lies the groundwork for an explanation of the possibility of the Fall 
from our created nature. The subordination of the individual will to the Divine Reason, and thus 
conformity to the Divine Will, can never be necessary and must remain always only an 
actualized or non-actualized (contingent) possibility; that this is the case arises from the inherent 
nature of individual or particular will. The essence of a created being endowed with will 
properly recognizing that its existence comes from God and not from itself lies precisely in its 
subordination of its individual will to Reason. This recognition itself requires an act of the will 
because it requires the choice to be subordinated to Reason. Since being a properly actualized 
created will presupposes an act of will, “there must be, if the actual Will be a Will, a potentiality 
of willing the universal under the predominance of the particular instead of willing the particular 
solely as the glory and presentation of the plentitude of the distinctions of the universal” (OM 
237). At least initially for every created being endowed with will there is the possibility of 
realizing the synthesis by willing the subordination of the will to reason, but “it must be eternally 
possible for all forms of being not absolute and universal to will itself for its Self,” i.e., to “will a 
Self that is not God” (OM 237-8). Thus, the purpose and proper character of humanity is union 
with the Divine Will through subordination of the individual will to Reason, as seen in 
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Coleridge’s affirmation that if this union is lost or not obtained, “the restoration of to this, his 
proper character, must be the proper duty, the moral destination, of man” (OM 83). 
 While consideration of how one acquires faith given human corruption must wait until 
after the discussion of the consequences and nature of the fall, as well as of redemption, the 
whole groundwork for Coleridge’s understanding of faith has been provided. Coleridge rejects 
any definition of faith that limits it to a form of mere belief in some body of propositions, for “if 
the mere acquiescence in Truth, uncomprehended and unfathomed, were sufficient, few indeed 
would be the vicious and the miserable, in this country at least, where speculative Infidelity is, 
Heaven be praised, confined to a small number” (LS 47).425 Rather than seeing faith as primarily 
a matter of belief or intellectual assent, it should be understood in the sense of “fidelity.” In his 
“Essay on Faith,” Coleridge defines faith in its fullest sense as “Fidelity to our own Being as far 
as such Being is not and cannot become an object of sense” (SW&F 834). Faith as fidelity is 
conceived of as an ascending series of more and more general ways in which one can be faithful, 
with the ultimate, most universal, and all-encompassing form being “fidelity, fëalty, allegiance of 
the moral Creature to God, in opposition to all usurpation, and in resistance to all temptations to 
the placing any other claim above, or equal with, the our fidelity to God” (SW&F 843). 
Faithfulness to our own being entails the true recognition that we are not the source of our own 
being and that our purpose is to willingly subordinate our will to God; faith is another way of 
describing “the Synthesis of the Reason and the Individual Will” (SW&F 844). As this synthesis 
of the will and Reason, faith has aspects of both. In relationship to the will, it is not one act of 
choosing among many, but rather “it relates to the Whole Moral Man, & is to be exerted in each 
																																																						
425 This sentiment closely mirrors Wesley’s observation that he had encountered very few intentional atheists and by 
far the much larger problem was the vast body of practical atheists, who, like Coleridge’s description of the vast 
multitude, merely acquiesce to uncomprehended truth without a corresponding living relationship. 
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and all of his constituent or incident faculties and tendencies” (SW&F 844). As it relates to the 
union with Reason, “it must be a Light, a form of Knowing, a beholding of Truth” (SW&F 844).  
 Coleridge further clarifies his understanding of faith as it relates to St. Paul’s use of the 
term. He distinguishes faith from the Beatific Vision, which is “that state of the Will and its 
affections, which considered in its own essence or substance, [is] uncorrupted from within and 
untroubled from withinout” (SW&F 845). Faith is the same substance, “i.e., the same in nature 
and personal identity,” as the Beatific Vision, but as it occurs in our earthly state, “as struggling 
with temptations from without and its own imperfections from within” (SW&F 844). In other 
words, Coleridge sees the Beatific Vision and faith as having the same object beheld and the 
same activity – both a spiritual apprehension of God and all else in God – but they differ in the 
clarity of that vision.426 Furthermore, Coleridge wants to distinguish between the act of spiritual 
apprehension, i.e., the actual vision, be it the Beatific Vision or Faith, and the description of the 
state in which the beholder exists while doing the beholding. In the Beatific Vision, it is 
improper to say that human beings are happy, which implies “pleasures out of our selves,” but 
rather that we are Holy and Blessed, which are two ways of describing that “Identity of Act and 
Being,” with Holiness being considered “as a habit of Action” and Blessedness being “the state 
of Being” (SW&F 846). Because Faith is the state of this vision considered insofar as the 
conditions of this world prevent full clarity in apprehension, the result is something analogous to 
the state of beatitude and holiness, viz., the Evidence of Faith, which is an “intuitive Assurance” 
of that which will be seen clearly in the Beatific Vision.  
 In his scriptural discussion of faith, Coleridge does slightly modify his understanding of 
this concept from how he explained it in the “Essay on Faith.” Faith does not merely describe the 
																																																						
426 This is likely an allusion to the Pauline sense of us only seeing in a mirror darkly in this body. 
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union of the Individual Will and Reason, although it can only exist in that union. Instead, just as 
Holiness and Beatitude describe the two ways of looking at the one unity of Act and Being in our 
final uncorrupted state, so too is there a similar relationship between Love and Faith:  
 From all this you may see how utterly impossible it is that Faith in the scripture sense should be seated in 
 the Understanding only – and how different it is from mere Belief, or acquiescence in the Truth of a thing. 
 Likewise, you will comprehend how what St Paul affirms exclusively of Faith, St John affirms exclusively 
 of Love; which would be a direct contradiction, if Faith and Love be not the same Thing contemplated from 
 two points of view. The self-same Position of the same Sun is vertical to the countries under the Line, and 
 central to the solar System. Call the Identity of the Will and the Reason, of the Spiritual Heart and the 
 spiritual Eye, xy: —when I think of xy chiefly in relation to the Will, to the Spiritual Heart, I call it Love; 
 when I think of it in relation to the Reason, to the Spiritual Eye, I call it Faith. But both are one, and each is 
 the other (SW&F 846-7). 
 
 Something that is intimately intertwined with the synthesis of the individual Will and the 
Reason, and thus of Faith and Love, but which is not to be conflated with any of these things, is 
Conscience. Conscience is “neither reason, religion, or will, but an experience (sui generis) of 
the coincidence of the human will with reason and religion” (LS 66-7). It is “a testifying state, 
best described in the words of our liturgy, as THE PEACE OF GOD THAT PASSETH ALL 
UNDERSTANDING” (LS 67).427 Through conscience “the Will of God, which is one with the 
Supreme Intelligence, is revealed” to individuals (SW&F 844). When the Individual Will and 
Reason are synthesized, conscience produces this testifying state that can be thought of as the 
Peace that Passeth All Understanding. Coleridge describes the conscience as functioning 
prescriptively, implying that this testifying state of peace accompanies the thoughts and actions 
of the person following the Will of God. However, it cannot be merely a testifying state, because 
he also acknowledges that it can function “as absolving or condemning,” and thus provides the 
“Consciousness of the subordination or insubordination, the harmony or the discord, of the 
Personal Will of Man with his reason, as the representative of the Will of God” (SW&F 844).   
																																																						
427 Coleridge at times speaks of conscience as akin to a spiritual organ and at other times as the resultant state. 
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 I now can and need to describe Coleridge’s conception of the Fall, sin, and corruption. 
Coleridge understands Sin, in line with the Augustinian tradition, as not fundamentally 
individual acts that go contrary to God’s divinely decreed law, but rather as “the finite will’s 
deliberate refusal to acknowledge its essential dependence on the Absolute Will” and thus the 
individual will’s attempt to found its self in something other than God.428 Coleridge believes that 
such a description of Sin also provides the means of describing the possibility of evil. Evil 
cannot be in or proceed from God, “since in God all Good is, and to will the contrary of God is 
to will Evil” (OM 238). Evil must exist, though, since without Evil there “is no Guilt, no rightful 
punishment, no other distinction than Pain and Pleasure,” and without this supposition the whole 
system of religion would be rendered purposeless (OM 238-9). Evil does exist, and cannot have 
come from God, so it must have come from something created. For something to originate, it 
must have been from an act of the will, for “in the Will alone causation inheres” (OM 238). If 
not from the Divine Will, then evil must have come from some created will. Thus, Coleridge 
concludes that evil came about in the created order because of the individual will not willing 
itself to be grounded in God.  
 I will speak about Coleridge’s conception of original sin shortly, but I think it helpful first 
to describe what Coleridge believes are the consequences of a sinful will, wherever and 
whenever it may arise. To begin with, Coleridge held that sin has ontological consequences. An 
individual will choosing to found itself in something other than God means realizing a kind of 
contradiction – “the result can be no otherwise expressed, as far as it can be expressed, than that 
																																																						
428 Barth, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine, 112. 
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self became, which was not God nor One with God. The potential was actualized, but <yet> not 
as actual, but by a strange yet appropriate contradiction as potential” (OM 247).429  
 Coleridge also affirmed a belief in Hell as a state after this life in which there is 
continued individual consciousness and positive pain for the unredeemed.430 Coleridge took no 
pleasure in this position, and he seems to have only come to it with great difficulty because it 
was unavoidably scriptural and because of the metaphysical consequences for rejecting it. He 
acknowledged that some “Arminian Divines have asserted that the penalty inflicted on Adam 
and continued to his posterity was simply the loss of immortality, Death as the utter extinction of 
personal Being” and that on this scheme “the Penalty resolves itself into the Consequence, and 
this the natural and (naturally) inevitable Consequence of Adam’s Crime” (AR 305-6). He sees 
good reason to hold this position and states that “immortality [is] seen by them (and not, I think, 
without good reason) as a supernatural attribute, and its loss therefore involved in the forfeiture 
of super-natural graces” (AR 306). This position has the advantage of emphasizing God’s mercy, 
and Coleridge believed that teaching this doctrine could prove more helpful for driving people 
toward repentance than a belief in positive eternal punishment: “The doctrine would be a far 
stronger motive than the present: for no man will believe eternal misery of himself – but millions 
would admit that if they did <not> amend, they would be undeserving of living forever” (CM V 
																																																						
429 Coleridge has the work of prevenient grace in mind here, or something like Rahner’s conception that the “no” to 
God cannot be commensurate with God’s “yes” to our existence, since Coleridge believes that even in the state of 
sin humans continue to have both a kind of existence and will. He indicates that one of the results of grounding the 
self in something other than God is subordination of the Reason to the understanding, or the assumption that the 
human powers of intellection are the highest arbiters of reality.429 At the same time, the human understanding, for it 
to be properly human, must have the Reason present to it (even if the individual is unconscious of this presence). 
However, Reason in humans is “the Presence of the Holy Spirit to a finite Understanding” and it is only given as a 
gift and not a right, meaning that God graciously continues to preserve humans not only in bare existence, but in 
what makes them distinctively human. 
 
430 Barth points out that there is at least one point where Coleridge may indicate that Hell may not involve the 
continuation of individual consciousness; this however seems to be a singular exception (Barth, 192).  
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601). However, Coleridge held that there were “so many [biblical] texts” that countered the idea 
of Hell as only a loss of immortality (CM V 601). Furthermore, this position gave him further 
pause because of “the countenance it seems to give to the doctrine of Materialism” (AR 306).431  
 Willing evil, which is to say sinning, rules out the possibility of freedom. Still following 
the Augustinian tradition, Coleridge believes that freedom properly conceived is not simply the 
capacity to decide, even willfully, between various options. Following Milton, Coleridge assigns 
the term “arbitrement” to this power of the will to choose between alternatives (OM 80). 
Freedom, a properly free will, only occurs in the realization of human purpose through the 
subordination of the individual will to the will of God (OM 144). On the other hand, “a will 
cannot be free to choose evil – for in the very act it forfeits it’s [sic] freedom, and so far becomes 
a corrupt Nature, self-enslaved” (CN 5555).432  
 Now, once the will chooses evil by subordinating itself to something other than God, is it 
within human power to reverse this decision and choose to properly submit the individual will to 
Reason? Coleridge’s answer is an unequivocally “No.” He clearly rejects the possibility of some 
inherent human capability to restore a will that has chosen evil. He professes “a deep conviction 
that Man was and is a fallen Creature, and not by accidents of bodily constitution, or any other 
																																																						
431 Coleridge, while believing the use of the fear of Hell acceptable as a motivator in the Christian life, challenged 
Wesley and others who overemphasized the idea of Hell as entailing physical pain. Wesley’s emphasis on “The 
Lake, the Brimstone &c are indeed much to be regretted; because they counter-act the very object in view – that of 
drawing the Soul inward on its own state & essence” (CM V 188). Instead, the pain and sorrow of Hell “in its 
unutterable intensity, though the language that describes it is all necessarily figurative, is there exhibited as resulting 
chiefly, if not wholly, from the withdrawal of the light of God’s countenance, and a banishment from his presence!” 
(CL III 482). 
 
432 It is unclear whether Coleridge would always consider the loss of freedom a consequence of Sin because of the 
seeming asymmetry between self that has subordinated itself to God’s will and a will that sought to constitute itself 
through something else. As was described above, a proper relationship with God requires the continual decision to 
be subordinated to the Will of God, so it makes sense to say that “a Will can choose evil; but in the moment of such 
choice ceases to be a free will” (CN 5555). At the same time, in a fundamental act of self-constitution, it is not so 
much possible for a will to lose its freedom in choosing evil, but rather it loses the possibility of freedom. In either 
case, Coleridge understands that Sin entails either the loss of a free will or the loss of the possibility of a free will. 
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cause, which human Wisdom in a course of ages might be supposed capable of removing, but 
diseased in his Will” (AR 139-40). This sentiment is reinforced by the way in which Coleridge 
conceives of the need for, and the nature of, redemption. Our alienation from God is such that, 
owing to the particular character of will, what is needed is “an Agent who can at once act on the 
Will as an exciting cause, quasi ab extra; and in the Will, as the condition of its potential, and the 
ground of its actual, Being” (AR 335). Alone through this redeemer is the potential for new life 
“impregnated and evolved” making possible the development of “a spiritual Life” (AR 322). 
Conversely, for all those who do not have this seed of new life actualized through redemption, 
physical death is but the seed of “another death, not the mere negation of Life, but its positive 
Opposite,” from which redemption is necessary (AR 322-3). At the same time, while there is 
nothing in human beings that allows them to extract themselves from Sin, Coleridge rejects 
extreme views of human depravity: 
I utterly disclaim the idea, that any human intelligence, with whatever power it might manifest itself, is 
alone adequate to the office of restoring health to the Will: but at the same time I deem it impious and 
absurd to hold, that the Creator should have given us the faculty of Reason, or that the Redeemer would in 
so many varied forms of Argument and Persuasion have applied to it, if it had been either totally useless or 
impotent (AR 141). 
 
 While Coleridge forcefully defends the fact of the human inability, of its own power, to 
restore its will from Sin and Evil, his explanation for why this is the case (and how a fallen 
human will can remain a will) is either much subtler or he does not actually see the need to make 
the argument. He does state that a will can lose its freedom (or possibility for freedom) and yet 
still be a will, with the caveat that it would now be an “evil Will” (AR 286). Seeming to 
contradict this statement, though, is Coleridge's claim that “the Will is ultimately self-
determined, or it is no longer a Will under the law of perfect Freedom, but a Nature under the 
mechanism of Cause and Effect” and furthermore that “if by an act, to which it has determined 
itself, it has subjected itself to the determination of Nature (in the language of St. Paul, to the 
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Law of the Flesh), it receives a nature into itself, and so far it becomes a Nature” (AR 285). The 
force of this claim could certainly indicate that a willful act of self-determination that rejects 
subordination to the “law of perfect Freedom” ceases to be a will. At the same time, Coleridge 
affirms not that this leads to an eradication of the will, but rather that “this is a corruption of the 
Will a corrupt Nature,” and it is in this that one can conceive of “a Fall of Man, inasmuch as his 
Will is the condition of his personality” (AR 285). Coleridge does not provide much further 
explanation, but it is possible that what he means here is something like his explanation in the 
Opus Maximum of the self that wills itself giving way not to utter dissolution but instead to the 
contradictory existence of the actual-possible. One could plausibly conclude then that the will, 
once it has self-constituted into something other than that for which it was created, has 
constituted itself as something that simply cannot reverse this direction; in the contradictory state 
of the actual-possible, this contradictory character would likely run through all individual acts of 
the will, meaning that any attempted decision to subordinate the will to universal Reason would 
in the same act be a decision that somehow undermines that attempt. However, these last few 
thoughts are highly speculative and it is just as likely, if not more so, that how it is possible for a 
human with an evil will to be simultaneously unable, of its own power, to be restored while also 
remaining responsible, is something that Coleridge believes must be left to mystery. “A life of 
Wickedness is a life of Lies; and an Evil Being or the Being of Evil, is the last and darkest 
mystery” (AR 248). And it is with this invocation of the ultimately mysterious nature of Sin that 
we can turn our attention to Coleridge’s conception of original sin. 
 Coleridge’s doctrinal commitments showed that he came to see original sin as a 
necessary and distinctive Christian doctrine. However, he also thought that any of the significant 
philosophies and religions of the world recognize with various degrees of clarity the same 
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phenomenon: “The doctrine (that is, the confession of a known fact) Christianity has only in 
common with every Religion, and with every Philosophy, in which the reality of a responsible 
Will and the essential difference between Good and Evil have been recognized” (AR 289). What 
is unique to Christianity, and what constitutes the doctrine as uniquely Christian, is that it 
recognizes not only the Sin, but also the “Remedy and (for all but the purposes of a merely 
speculative Curiosity) the Solution,” and this as an actual and not merely speculative solution 
(AR 289). So it would appear that Coleridge’s assertion in his confessions of faith that the 
doctrine of original sin was in some way unique to Christianity is not the recognition of the 
phenomenon, or even its severity, as much as the reciprocity between the problem and the 
solution. Hence, “the two great moments of the Christian Religion are, Original Sin and 
Redemption; that the Ground, this the Superstructure of our faith” (AR 305).   
 An exposition of original sin and attempt to place Coleridge’s conception within the 
larger context of the entire Christian tradition could rightfully fill volumes. For our present 
purposes, we need only consider three conceptions of original sin: that of Canons from the Synod 
of Dort (and Jeremy Taylor’s understanding of them), Jeremy Taylor’s rejection of this view, and 
the position put forward in Article 9 “Of Original or Birth Sin” from the Book of Common 
Prayer, since Coleridge believes the first two views defective interpretations of Article 9 and 
sought to offer his own position that represented a third, and correct, reading of the article. 
Showing that these are the three conceptions that he had in mind, Coleridge says that he provided 
an exhibition of original sin “according to the Scheme of the Westminster Divines and the Synod 
of Dorp433; then, according to the scheme of a contemporary Arminian Divine; and lastly, in 
																																																						
433 At least two occurrences in Aids to Reflection occur in which Coleridge replaces “Dort” with “Dorp,” and John 
Beer explained that this “may be a result of [Coleridge’s] reference to Dorpius” (AR CC 279n48). “Dorp” is a 
reference to Maarten Dorp, who was the addressee of Erasmus’s Epistola ad Dorpem, which was frequently 
included in editions of the Morae encomium (In Praise of Folly) (AR 244-5n32).  
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contrast with both schemes, I have placed what I firmly believe to be the Scriptural Sense of the 
Article, and vindicated its entire conformity with Reason and Experience” (AR 306-7).434 
 Coleridge begins his engagement with original sin in Aids to Reflection (his fullest 
treatment of the doctrine) with a quotation from Jeremy Taylor. This quote, modified only 
slightly to avoid Coleridge having to commit to whether Adam was originally mortal or 
immortal, was meant to present Taylor’s view of the effects of original sin. In sinning, Adam 
“brought evil into his Supernatural endowments, and lost the Sacrament and instrument of 
Immortality, the Tree of Life” (AR 265). The result of this loss was that “his sin left him to his 
Nature,” which meant that he became “sickly, his Sickness made him peevish: his Sin left him 
ignorant, his Ignorance made him foolish and unreasonable” (AR 265). Adam also lost access to 
these supernatural aids for all subsequent human beings, such that “by Nature, whoever was to 
be born at all, was to be born a child, and to do before he could understand, and to be bred under 
laws to which he was always bound, but which could not always be exacted, and he was to 
choose when he could not reason, and had passions most strong when he had his understanding 
most weak” (AR 265-6). Humanity became a kind of echo chamber for evil, such that all other 
people’s evils intensified and exacerbated each person’s individual evils: “Like ships in a storm, 
every one alone hath enough to do to outride it; but when they meet, besides the evils of the 
Storm, they find the intolerable calamity of their mutual concussion” (AR 266). 
 For Taylor, Adam’s first sin led to a state of universal human corruption, but in 
describing it this way it was the result of a loss of a supernatural gift and this state of corruption 
merely describes a state of nature unaided by grace. God allows this to happen, but Taylor does 
not believe that God actively distorts or disrupts human nature as a punishment. While humans 
																																																						
434 See the APPENDIX for the text of the relevant Canons and Article 9 from the Book of Common Prayer. 
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lost the supernatural grace that would have fortified them to follow God’s commands easily and 
to receive the reward of glorification, Taylor does not, in this aphorism, clearly indicate whether 
this corruption rendered humans in principle incapable of their duty to God, or whether it simply 
made it much more difficult. In the work from Taylor that Coleridge sites, Taylor goes on one 
page later to clarify his position and affirm something like the latter: 
 Yet this I believe to be certain, that we by his fall received evil enough to undo us, and ruine us all; but yet 
 the evil did so descend upon us, that we were left in powers and capacities to serve and glorifie God; Gods 
 service was made much harder, but not impossible; mankind was made miserable, but not desperate, we 
 contracted an actual mortality, but we were redeemable from the power of Death; sin was easie and ready at 
 the door, but it was resistable; our Will was abused, but yet not destroyed; our Understanding was cosened, 
 but yet still capable of the best instructions.435 
 
 Coleridge himself considered Taylor’s position Pelagnian, as indicated in a marginal note 
on Taylor’s work (CM V 610). Taylor, however, thought that he was preserving a correct view 
of original sin. In answering whether there is original sin, Taylor affirms that “it is a fact 
acknowledged on all hands almost” and he “cannot but confess that to be, which I feel and groan 
under, and by which all the world is miserable” (AR 365). What Taylor is responding to is his 
understanding of the exposition of original sin by the Synod of Dort. Taylor saw Dort as teaching 
not only that human beings are “totally dead” in sin, but that humans are wholly disposed to evil 
and incapable of any good action; that the corruption of humanity flowed from an imputation, 
i.e., God’s activity and not only passive allowance; and that the guilt of Adam’s Sin is imparted 
to all subsequent human beings simply by nature of their being born.436 Now, Taylor recognizes 
a distinction between certain Calvinists who proved “so fierce in their sentences of 
predestination and reprobation” that they saw humanity as “slaves, over whom he having 
absolute power, was very gracious that he was pleased to take some few, and save them 
																																																						
435 Jeremy Taylor, Σύµβολον Θεολογικόν; or, a collection of polemicall discourses… (London,1674), 870. 
 
436 Taylor, Σύµβολον Θεολογικόν, 872.  
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absolutely; and to the other greater part he did no wrong, though he was pleased to damn them 
eternally, only because he pleased.”437 This position he believes makes  “God to be powerful, but 
his power not to be good; it makes him more cruel to men, than good men can be to Dogs and 
Sheep; it makes him give the final sentence of Hell without any pretence or colour of justice.”438 
Taylor does see those who follow the Synod of Dort as attempting to soften the train of this 
thought, and he does not believe that they actually want to affirm such extreme positions, but he 
believes they end up with the same scheme only at one degree more removed. In other words, 
rather than damning the greater part of humanity for no reason other than God’s glory (so Taylor 
believes), God damns the majority of humanity for their own sins, but now the “Sin” of every 
other human being is the sin of one person transferred to everyone else.439 
 Coleridge’s position ultimately differed from both Taylor’s and that of the Synod of 
Dort,440 even though it maintained elements that resonated with both positions. Coleridge wanted 
to show that any careful analysis of the doctrine forces one to hold that human nature is 
corrupted, that humans become Sinful and utterly unable to extricate themselves from that Sinful 
nature from before (in an ontological sense) their existence in the world, and that they are 
rightfully responsible for that Sin. However, Coleridge also accepts that this cannot be something 
imputed and rather must result from each individual’s fundamental choice, such that even a full 
analysis of original sin cannot remove the fundamentally mysterious nature of Sin’s causal 
origin. He rejected Taylor’s position, but it does not seem that Coleridge merely puts Taylor’s 
position up in aphorism form to provide a foil for his own. He recognized that Taylor provided 
																																																						
437 Taylor, Σύµβολον Θεολογικόν, 871.  
 
438 Taylor, Σύµβολον Θεολογικόν, 871.  
 
439 Taylor, Σύµβολον Θεολογικόν, 872. 
 
440 It appears that Coleridge accepts Taylor’s interpretation of the Canons of Dort. 
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an account of the doctrine that accounts for fundamental flaws in the Calvinist (and one may say 
generally Augustinian) understanding of original and hereditary sin, corruption, and guilt. At the 
same time, Coleridge acknowledges that while Taylor’s instinct that the Dortian explanation 
makes God unjust, his solution still yields the same view of God but now with the added deficit 
of requiring the acceptance of the Pelagian heresy. 
 Coleridge held that any Sin, for it to be properly considered Sin, must have “its ground or 
origin in the Agent, and not in the compulsion of Circumstances” (AR 266). For Sin to be Sin, it 
must be the result of a decision of the will, meaning that it has no antecedent determination or 
causal explanation other than that decision of the will. Coleridge acknowledges that there can be 
evil either inflicted or suffered because of external causal circumstances, but “such evil is not sin; 
and the person who suffers it, or who is the compelled instrument of its infliction on others, may 
feel regret, but cannot feel remorse” (AR 267). He arrives at this position by analyzing how 
responsibility is attributed to human actions. If a human being does what seems to be a great evil, 
but proves to be a maniac441, then the results can be considered “calamity, deformity, disease, or 
mischief,” but the “Verdict follows of course — not guilty” (AR 271). 
 Two major points flow from this observation. First, Coleridge believes that the term 
“Original Sin” is “a pleonasm, the epithet not adding to the thought, but only enforcing it” (AR 
271). Every sin, both in terms of the fundamental self-constitution of the individual in opposition 
to its created purpose, and then every choice, or act of the will, that results from this now evil 
will, is “original” in that it has its grounding source in the agent and cannot be attributed to 
anything prior to or outside of the causative power of the will. The other point, though, is that 
external circumstances cannot adequately explain Sin. Therefore, any account that places the 
																																																						
441 I.e., a person whose actions are not ultimately the result of choice determined by sound understanding. 
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ground of Sin in something imposed from without ultimately defeats itself. Coleridge affirms 
that Taylor rightfully opposed the idea that God would actively corrupt human nature as a 
punishment and then find this distorted will and subsequent offenses flowing from it deserving of 
guilt and punishment: “That Jeremy Taylor, therefore, should have striven fervently against the 
Article so interpreted and vindicated is (for me, at least,) a subject neither of Surprise or 
Complaint” (AR 276). However, Coleridge believes Taylor errs in locating the injustice at the 
level of God’s activity instead of mere external determination. Taylor still advances a scheme in 
which God damns people for something that should not be considered sin and attributes guilt 
where guilt should not justly be attributed. While Taylor claims that “perfect Obedience became 
incomparably more difficult, it was not, however, impossible,” at the same time that “of the 
countless missions of Adam’s Posterity, not a single Individual ever realized, or approached to 
the realization of this possibility” (AR 276). Thus, while Taylor’s opposition to a particular 
interpretation (on Coleridge’s view) of the Article on Original Sin is correct, his substitution 
only makes matters worse. Taylor effectively makes the universal corruption of humanity after 
Adam not Sin, but disease, and then proposes that God will damn humanity for acting out of 
infirmity rather than Sin. Taylor “imposes another scheme, to which the same objections apply 
with even increased force, a scheme which seems to differ from the former only by adding fraud 
and mockery to injustice” (AR 276). 
 Coleridge thus sees value both in the formula of the Synod of Dort (and what may fairly 
be called a relatively classical Augustinian position) as well as elements of Taylor’s critiques. 
Coleridge accepted from the former that Sin is something attributable to every individual in some 
sense “before” birth. He likewise believed in a corruption of the will, and, in a way of speaking, 
of human nature, because of this Sin – although he would say that taking on a nature is the 
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corruption.442 At the same time, for this to be Sin and not some other evil, it must be chosen by 
an agent and cannot be imputed. This point leads Coleridge to the position of rejecting a sense of 
hereditary Sin such that Adam could be the responsible agent for the sins of all future humanity. 
The corruption of any individual human will after Adam, or whoever the first individual human 
being was,443 can be spoken of as “a Consequence of Adam’s fall, even as [one’s] Birth of 
Adam’s existence; as a consequence, a link in the historic Chain of Instances, whereof Adam is 
the first” (AR 289). However, the above is a kind of second level causal explanation for any 
subsequent individual’s Sin on par with saying that a particular crime is the consequence of the 
criminal’s parents’ being the cause of his or her coming into existence. Coleridge cannot accept 
that the establishment of a Sinful will is “on account of Adam, or that this evil principle was, a 
priori, inserted or infused in my Will by the Will of another” (AR 289).  
 At this point, Coleridge has established that original sin as it relates to the individual 
describes that fundamental act of the “Will’s own self-determination” to be grounded in 
something other than subordination to the Will and Reason of God (AR 286). The result of this 
malformed, contradictory Will is the establishment of “some private Maxim or By-law in the 
Will contrary to the universal Law of right Reason in the Conscience” and this proves to be then 
the ground from which all (metaphysically) subsequent evil acts flow (AR 289). Coleridge can 
explain how this is prior to birth for each individual in the sense that the Will’s fundamental act 
of self-determination “stands in no relation whatever to Time, can neither be called in time nor 
																																																						
442 Coleridge is ambivalent about whether the emergence of space and time are themselves the result of the Fall. 
There are points in the Opus Maximum that would point in this direction, although he never actually affirms this 
positively, and this seems like the force of saying that humans are now subject to a nature, i.e., the mechanistic order 
of cause and effect that only takes place in time and space. His Platonism would likely be a motive for this sort of 
understanding, and would put his understanding of creation and Fall in a place like Origen’s.  
 
443 Coleridge’s discussion of the Hebrew sense of “Adam” meaning the human genus and not an individual leads to 
a sense that he accepted the story in Genesis not as history but as allegory. At the same time, he does believe in an 
actual, historical first individual human being.  
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outside of time; but that all relations of Time are alien and heterogeneous in this question, as the 
relations and attributes of Space (nor or south, round or square, thick or thin) are to our 
Affections and Moral Feelings” (AR 287). Thus one can explain “the impossibility of an 
Individual’s referring to any particular time at which it might be conceived to have commenced, 
or to any period of his existence at which it was not existing” (AR 287).  
 The above description seems to solve the problems that Coleridge establishes as part of 
the doctrine when it is conceived of historically. No longer is Adam’s first Sin, the guilt of this 
Sin, or the subsequent corruption of the individual will imputed to subsequent humans; original 
sin is for each of them the atemporal, self-determining decision of the Will to seek its ground in 
something other than God. Coleridge believed that this placed the individual in a position from 
which he or she cannot extricate him- or herself. The question that arises, though, is how this 
could also represent a universal human existential reality. How is it that all human beings do 
come to actually make the fundamental self-determination for evil? That original sin is a 
universal phenomenon Coleridge thinks is not only something that must be affirmed by orthodox 
Christian believers, but indeed something almost universally recognized and affirmed by lived 
experience: “But the actual existence of moral evil we are bound in conscience to admit; and that 
there is an Evil common to all is a Fact” (AR 288). Almost every religious or philosophical 
system recognizes original sin, even if it is not so named or is only there implicitly. This 
recognition stems from the near universal recognition of moral evil in the world, and for it to 
truly be moral evil, it must be “an Evil that has its origin in a Will”; hence, sin (AR 288). 
Coleridge further posits that anything common to all must have a common ground and this 
ground cannot be found in the Divine Will. Therefore, “it must be referred to the Will of Man” 
(AR 288). In the final analysis, this is the most that can be explained about original sin as the 
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ground of universal human original sin. One cannot explain the thing itself and can only explain 
what cannot be said of it; one must ultimately accept that original sin as this universal ground “is 
a Mystery, that is, a Fact, which we can see, but cannot explain; and the doctrine a truth which 
we apprehend, but can neither comprehend nor communicate” (AR 288).  
 Coleridge recognized that his readers would likely prove unsatisfied with the ultimate 
appeal to mystery in his explanation of original sin. However, one should remembered that he 
did not posit that this universal ground is unknowable, only that it is incomprehensible and thus 
must be known through apprehension or spiritual “vision,” in common with all other 
metaphysical truths. Likewise, he does not deny that you can explain that there is original sin – 
only that you cannot explain the true nature of original sin. Nevertheless, in a move that has a 
certain affinity with Kierkegaard’s claim in the Concept of Anxiety that one should search for the 
ground of one’s own original sin instead of being concerned with its ground in others, Coleridge 
goes on in the paragraph following the description of mystery to assert that it is far more 
important to seek the removal of original sin than to seek to understand it.444 Using a medical 
analogy, Coleridge says that if one found oneself afflicted with a terrible disease and a physician 
came with the capacity to cure it, but could not communicate anything about the disease which 
the patient could understand, this in no way negates the need for treatment. Putting the words for 
the proper disposition of the patient into the mouth of this physician, Coleridge says, “Ask me 
not, how such a Disease can be conceived possible! Enough for the present that you know it to 
be real: and I am come to cure the Disease not to explain it” (AR 288).445  
																																																						
444 See pp 50-51 of Søren Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety, ed. and trans. by Reidar Thomte and Albert B. 
Anderson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980). Coleridge’s account of original sin shares many 
similarities with Kierkegaard’s, not least of which is the rejection of Adam as the cause of any individual’s original 
sin and the first sin being original sin for every individual. 
 
445 In fact the cure itself leads to a greater understanding of the disease. 
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 One cannot truly divorce Coleridge’s understanding of the human predicament from his 
conception of the solution, which, as stated above, belongs exclusively to the Christian religion. 
In a certain important way, original sin as a doctrine is not itself peculiar to Christianity except as 
it is the “antecedent ground and occasion of Christianity” (AR 291). Christianity itself, “as the 
Edifice raised on this ground,” is nothing more or less than “the great Constituent Article of the 
Faith in Christ, as the Remedy of the Disease — The Doctrine of Redemption” (AR 291). 
Coleridge even stated that “Christianity and REDEMPTION are equivalent terms” (AR 307).446 
 If one were to summarize Coleridge’s view of redemption, it would be that through the 
life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the incarnate second person of the Trinity who is at 
once wholly human and wholly divine, humans can be born again such that the power of the 
Holy Spirit can free them from the consequences of Sin; being so freed, they can grow in 
likeness to Christ such that they return to restored relationship with God through the 
subordination of the individual will to the Will of God. Ultimately, how this is accomplished is, 
like the universal ground of original sin, a transcendent mystery. In his own summary in Aids to 
Reflection, Coleridge sees four facets or questions that must be answered in a proper discussion 
of redemption: “Who (or What) is the 1. Agens Causator (causative agent)? 2. Actus Causativus 
(Causitive Act)? 3. Effectum Causatum (Effect that is Caused)? 4. Consequentia ab Effecto 
(Consequences from the Effect)?” (AR 332). In attending to these facets a fuller explanation of 
Coleridge’s conception of Redemption (and its subjective effects) can be brought to light. 
However, while Coleridge’s synopsis places the question of who causes redemption first, it will 
																																																						
446 In light of Coleridge’s somewhat more expansive definition of the doctrines peculiar to Christianity in his  
“Confessiones Fidei,” which include belief in original sin, the Atonement and Incarnation, the special revelation of 
the Bible, and the work of the Holy Spirit, one can construe his much more limiting statement in Aids to Reflection 
in one of three ways: First, he could mean here by “Redemption” everything which undergirds and flows from the 
redemptive act; second, he could be speaking hyperbolically, or; third, he may have been inconsistent. Regardless, 
this means that Coleridge gave pride of place to redemption even among specifically Christian doctrines.  
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be helpful to look at the nature of the redemptive act and the effect caused before turning to the 
fuller description of who accomplished it, since what he believes was brought about informs 
Coleridge’s own description of why the agent had to be who the agent was.447   
 Little can be said about the Actus Causativus (the Causative Act) beyond its being “a 
spiritual and transcendent Mystery, ‘that passeth all understanding’” (AR 332). How Christ’s 
incarnation, life, death, and resurrection made possible being born anew, restored relationship 
with God, and sanctification must, like all mysteries, be apprehended rather than comprehended. 
At the same time, Coleridge does think it possible to describe the effects that result from this 
mysterious cause. By talking about the effects of the redemptive act, Coleridge considers various 
“atonement theories.” He begins by saying that there are five different images used in New 
Testament to describe the effects of Christ’s redemptive act: “1. Sin-offerings, sacrificial 
expiation. 2. Reconciliation, Atonement, Καταλλαγή. 3. Ransom from slavery, Redemption, the 
buying back again, or being bought back, from re and emo. 4. Satisfaction of a Creditor’s claims 
by a payment of the debt” and finally, fifth, “a re-generation, a birth, a spiritual seed 
impregnated and evolved, the germinal principle of a higher and enduring Life” (AR 320-2).  
 Coleridge differentiates between two types of images related to redemption in the New 
Testament. The first, which comprise the first four categories above and are found largely in 
Paul’s writings, are meant to be metaphors that should not be taken as literal descriptions of the 
actual effects of the redemptive act (AR 320). The fifth image, which comes from John’s Gospel 
“enunciates the fact itself, to the full extent in which it is enunciable for the human mind, simply 
																																																						
447 Still, to avoid talking about the redemptive act and its consequences in the abstract, it is helpful to know that 
Coleridge does speak of these things as having been done by Jesus Christ, and so it may be of use to provide the 
synopsis of the Agens Causator: “The Agent and Personal Cause of Redemption of Mankind is — the co-eternal 
Word and only begotten Son of the Living God, incarnate, tempted, agonizing (Agonistes ἀγωνιζόµενος), crucified, 
submitting to Death, resurgent, communicant of his Spirit, ascendent, and obtaining for his Church the Descent, and 
Communion of the Holy Spirit, the Comforter” (AR 332). 
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and without any metaphor” (AR 322). How Coleridge understands talk of a spiritual birth to be 
literal language will be discussed below. For most of these metaphorical images, Coleridge does 
not explain at length why they should be considered metaphors, but he does describe why 
metaphors would be used. Paul sought to explain redemption by means of “whatever was 
eminently dear and precious to erring and afflicted Mortals” to “seek from similitude of effect to 
describe the superlative boon by successively transferring to it, as by a superior claim, the name 
of each several Act and Ordinance” (AR 324). In other words, Paul explained that redemption 
was the sort of act that should elicit the “feelings of joy, confidence, and gratitude,” just like the 
images he employs would do in human interactions, but to a much greater degree. 
 Coleridge does spend considerable time describing the error in understanding the 
Redemptive Act as an actual payment of an infinite debt. He does not state explicitly why he 
chooses this iteration of the doctrine to analyze, although he does acknowledge that some divines 
see “that our Lord’s Words, recorded by John, and which in all places repeat and assert the same 
Analogy, are to be regarded as metaphorical, and that it is the varied expressions of St. Paul that 
are to be literally interpreted” (AR 326). One may infer that he chooses the metaphor for debt 
because it would have been the one he had encountered most in his readings of the Reformers, 
and thus the one most likely to be held by “orthodox” believers.448  
 Coleridge lays out his understanding of substitutionary atonement in this way:  
 Sin is, or involves an infinite Debt, (in the proper and law-court sense of the word, debt)—a debt owing by 
 us to the vindictive Justice of God the Father, which can only be liquidated by the everlasting misery of 
 Adam and all his posterity, or by a sum of suffering equal to this. Likewise, that God the Father by his 
 absolute decree, or (as some Divines teach) through the necessity of his unchangeable Justice, had 
 determined to exact the full sum; which must, therefore, be paid either by ourselves or by some other in our 
 name and behalf. But besides the Debt which all Mankind contracted in and through Adam, as a Homo 
 Publicus, even as a Nation is bound by the Acts of its Head or its Plenipotentiary, every man (say these 
 Divines) is an insolent Debtor on his own score. In this fearful predicament the Son of God took 
																																																						
448 He intended to pass completely over the Alogi, i.e., those who denied the divinity of Christ, who “find nothing 
but metaphors in either Apostle,” which would indicate that he saw no merit in considering what amounts to an 
exclusively moral exemplar view of atonement as properly a theory of the atonement at all. 
		203 
 compassion on Mankind, and resolved to pay the debt for us, and to satisfy the divine Justice by a perfect 
 equivalent. Accordingly, by a strange yet strict consequence, it has been holden by more than one of the 
 Divines, that the agonies suffered by Christ were equal in amount to the sum total of the torments of all 
 mankind here and hereafter, or to the infinite debt, which in an endless secessions of instalments we should 
 have been paying to the divine Justice, had it not been paid in full by the Son of God incarnate! (AR 
 326-7) 
 
 One cannot take this view of redemption literally without also destroying a proper sense 
either of human beings as moral agents or of God as being properly just. The issue is that justice 
must be thought of as a moral attribute and as a moral attribute requires the “sacred distinction 
between Thing and Person” because “on this distinction all Law human and divine is grounded” 
(AR 327). Furthermore, if any meaning is to be given to the term “justice” when it is applied to 
God, it must retain the same meaning as it does for any other agent, with the exception that for 
God it is “as unmixed and perfect” (AR 328).  
 Because of this distinction between things and persons that is foundational for true 
morality, one can work from analogies drawn from our everyday life. Thus, it is possible to say 
that if a person were to owe someone else a certain sum of money (Coleridge uses the example 
of £1000), and another person were to pay off this sum, then it would be fully appropriate to say 
that full and perfect satisfaction had been made. This perfect satisfaction is possible because it 
requires only the substitution of things, which, since they are things, can function 
interchangeably (AR 328). However, using the analogy of a son who had grossly mistreated and 
acted with the highest ingratitude to “a most worthy and affectionate mother,” Coleridge believes 
it would be absurd to believe that, if someone other than the son were to step in and provide all 
the love and perform all the duties that were owed to this mother, this activity would somehow 
entitle the son thereby “to her Esteem, Approbation, and Blessing” (AR 329). The point here is 
that people, and the acts that flow thereby from their wills, are not interchangeable. What caused 
the broken or damaged relationship was not that evil acts had been done or certain duties 
neglected in the abstract, but that they had been done and neglected by a particular person.  
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 This is not to say that this third person could do nothing to rectify the relationship 
between the mother and the son. Indeed, possibly by example, “by persuasion or by additional 
and more mysterious influences, or by an inward co-agency, compatible with the existence of a 
personal will,” the son could be led to repent and then become a “grateful and dutiful child” (AR 
329). In this case, “doubtless the mother would be wholly satisfied,” although at this point “the 
case is no longer a question of Things, or a matter of a Debt payable by another” (AR 329). 
 One should note that while he saw these first four images as metaphors, Coleridge did not 
think they did not need to be taken seriously. While they cannot be taken as “the very nature of 
Redemption and its occasion,” these figures of speech are nevertheless provided “for the purpose 
of illustrating the nature and extent of the consequences and effects of the redemptive Act, and to 
excite in the receivers a due sense of the magnitude and manifold operation of the Boon, and of 
the Love and gratitude due to the Redeemer” (AR 327). They have a certain didactic function, 
but they above all seem to have a pastoral purpose insofar as they enable the hearer to have his or 
her affections properly disposed toward Christ.  
 If the Pauline imagery for the Redemptive act and consequences was meant to be taken 
metaphorically, the Johannine image of being born again in the Spirit must be taken analogically 
but literally. “Birth” functions as a metaphor if the only kind of birth that there is, is that of how 
we come to life and existence “in relation to our natural life and to the Organized Body, by 
which we belong to the present World” (AR 336). However, Coleridge asserts that the proper 
understanding of birth is that of entering into any state of life. The reason he holds this has to do 
with the way in which Jesus uses the term “birth” in John’s Gospel. Coleridge operates on the 
principle that “where two subjects, that stand to each other in the relation of antithesis (or 
contradistinction) are connected by a middle term common to both, the sense of this middle term 
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is indifferently determinable by either” (AR 335). In the case of Jesus’s words, “the two 
opposites here are Flesh and Spirit, this in relation to Christ, that in relation to the World, and 
these two Opposites are connected by the middle term, Birth” (AR 336). Because of “birth” as 
the middle term, its meaning must be “the same essentially (in kind though not dignity and 
value)” (AR 336). Thus, both bodily and spiritual birth are of the same kind, representing the 
emergence of a life, with the first representing the emergence of life in this world and in this 
corruptible body, and the second describing the emergence of a spiritual life, “that is, a Life, the 
actuality of which is not dependent on the material body, or limited by the circumstances and 
processes indispensable to its organization and subsistence” (AR 322).   
 Coleridge repeatedly affirmed that the agent of Redemption is Jesus Christ, the incarnate 
Second Person of the Trinity. He seems to have held this as a matter best established and 
affirmed by special revelation. The question can still be put forward as to why it would be that 
the agent of redemption would be the incarnate second person of the Trinity (that this incarnate 
Logos would be Jesus of Nazareth is something that can only be known a posteriori). On the one 
hand, Coleridge believed that the revelation of the agent of our redemption as both divine and 
human had been “assured to us by Revelation” (AR 335). 
At the same time, Coleridge believed that the original purpose of humanity and the 
results of the fall made it necessary that the Agent of Redemption be the Divine-Human. 
Coleridge held that the Fall was not a corruption of human nature, but a fall into a nature. 
However, this was what may be called a taking on of nature rather than a becoming nature, 
because had humanity become nature, it would mean becoming “an Animal wholly” (CN V 
5813). That humanity did not completely lose its distinguishing humanity was only through 
Divine mercy. However, God’s “preventing the submersion of Man in the Nature” was not the 
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same as the extraction and final detachment of humanity from this nature (CN V 5814). It is 
unclear whether Coleridge thought that this detachment yielded a humanity “restored to [its] first 
ground,” or if this detachment is a necessary condition in a larger act of re-formation (CN V 
5813).449 In either case, the capacity for this detachment implies the incarnation. The ultimate 
end of humanity, both in the sense of the result of redemption and of the purpose for which 
humanity was created, is “the union of humanity with it’s [sic] Divine Ground” (CN V 5814). 
Thus, it was necessary for the Son of God to take “Humanity into his Divinity, as the Mordaunt, 
or common medium, without which no affinity is possible” and likewise to humble himself “to 
the same Ground, and to have the Nature which Mankind had” (CN V 5816).450 This taking on of 
the nature into which humanity had fallen was for the purpose of destroying its hold on the truly 
or properly human in order to make a separation possible. Thus, the Divine Man took on a truly 
human nature insofar as this nature represents “consequences, penalties and incitements of Sin, 
the base of Sin,” but he did so while remaining sinless (CN V 6527).451 The union of the sinless 
Will with human nature occurred in such a way that it was “combined without pas spiritually 
appropriating it” and was thus able to neutralize any necessary connection between humanity and 
sinful nature (CN V 6527).  
																																																						
449 Given that the redemptive act is ultimately a mystery, it may not be possible to provide a definitive answer to this 
question. 
 
450 One of the interesting uncertainties that arises for later consideration is whether Coleridge thought that humanity 
would always have needed a mediator for union with God, and thus whether the incarnation would have occurred in 
some form even if there had not been a fall. In at least one place Coleridge answers affirmatively: In a note on a 
passage in Jeremy Taylor’s work, Coleridge asserted that “this is likewise my belief: and that man must have had a 
Christ, even if Adam had continued in Paradise” (CM V 603). 
 
451 Because the Divine Man takes on the nature into which humans fell, but did so without having sinned, Coleridge 
states that Jesus had a “likeness of sinful flesh,” which he contradistinguished from the Docetist claim that Christ 
had only the “οµοιωµα σαρκος” (likeness of flesh) (CN 6527). In other words, Christ truly took on human flesh (a 
human, material body) that bore all the results of Sin, but not having its origin in Sin.  
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Significantly, Coleridge locates this nature into which humans has fallen as the material 
(or perhaps better) phenomenal world which we now inhabit. For instance, in a note on one of 
Edward Irving’s Sermons, Coleridge stated that “time and τὰ µὴ θεός (things that are not God) 
were themselves the necessary result of the Fall” (CM III 22). As another example, Coleridge 
says in a letter to Dr. Green in 1820 that “there are phaenomena, which are phaenomena 
relatively to our present 5 senses — & these Christ forbids us to understand as his meaning, & 
collectively they are entitled the Flesh that perishes” (CL V 49). Nevertheless, Coleridge does 
not appear to be intentionally promoting any metaphysical dualism whereby the incorporeal is 
good and the corporeal is evil. One finds instead an attempt at a unitive view of reality whereby 
evil resides in corporeality only insofar as it opposes the spiritual. Indeed, attaining to our 
ultimate end of union with God cannot mean a “mystic annihilation of individuality, no breaking 
of the Bottle and blending it’s contained water with the Ocean in which it had been floating” 
because this means a “Spinozistic Deity” (CN V 5748). This ultimate state represents “an 
intension, a perfecting of our Personality,” and “where Persons are, and Community, and ever 
intercirculating Love, there must Bodies be — spiritual or as St. Paul says Celestial Bodies 
indeed, but yet Bodies” (CN V 5748). Hence it is nature – not body – that opposes spirit.452  
 Having described the act of Redemption as ultimately a mystery, the effect of this act as a 
second, spiritual birth, and the causative agent as Jesus Christ, the incarnate second Person of the 
Trinity, it is possible to move on to the Consequentia ab Effecto (the consequences from the 
Effect). These are “Sanctification from Sin, and Liberation from the inherent and penal 
																																																						
452 Coleridge does not even necessarily place the realm of the phenomenal in opposition to spirit. In the same letter 
to Dr. Green in which he states that Christ urges us to move beyond the immediate phenomena, Coleridge asks “But 
does it follow, that there are no other Phaenomena? or that these other media of manifestation might not stand to a 
spiritual world & to our enduring Life in the same relation as our visible Mass of Body stands to the World of the 
Senses & to the sensations correspondent to, & excited by, the stimulants of that World?” (CL V 49) 
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consequences of Sin in the World to Come, with all the means and processes of Sanctification by 
the Word and the Spirit” (AR 332). In describing sanctification, one should distinguish what 
happens in the being of those being sanctified and then how this transformation affects the 
subjective states and acts of the transformed person (this second element also proves a 
substantial part of sanctification epistemically conceived, i.e., how the individual may know that 
this transformation is occurring). It may be helpful to begin with a comment Coleridge made on 
Luther’s Table Talk: “But surely Justification, and Sanctification are one Act of God—& only 
different perspectives of Redemption by, in, thro’, and for Christ. They are one and the same 
Plant, Justification the Root, Sanctification the Flower—and (may I not venture to add?) 
Transubstantiation into Christ the celestial Fruit!” (CM III 748). The final goal of regenerate 
humanity is to be fully “transubstantiated” into Christ.  
 Coleridge uses different (but generally biblical) images to describe this process of being 
conformed to Christ. In some places, the regenerate person is “each twig or fibre that grows out 
of the Root” (CN V 6011). While images of being brought into or grafted onto Christ abound, 
there is also imagery of Christ present within the soul. In Aids to Reflection, Coleridge spoke 
about Life being born and growing in the Soul of the believer, and not only does Christ bring 
resurrection and new life, he is “THE WAY, the Life, the RESURRECTION” (CN V 5814). In 
1830 Coleridge writes explicitly of “the indwelling of Christ in the Soul” (CN V 6524). These 
spatial images, of being grafted onto, brought into, or of growth within the regenerate all attempt 
to convey that transformation into Christ, being made both righteous and holy, requires intimate 
union with Christ. Hence Coleridge’s use of the term “transubstantiation”: the regenerate do not 
only become like Christ – their essence actually becomes the being of Christ. This insight 
appears to lie at the core of a quote taken from Leighton, in which the Bishop says that “they [the 
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regenerate] shall rise by the communication and virtue of his Rising: not simply by his power — 
for so the wicked likewise to grief shall be raised — but they by his life as their life” (CN V 
5825). Christ is not only the mediator between God and humanity, but is “himself the Medium 
between the Creature and Himself” (CN V 5825). This “transfiguration” into Christ makes 
possible a believer’s participation in resurrected life where the consequences of Sin in the body 
are removed as well as of union with the Will of God through the transformation of our corrupt 
will into the Will of the Divine Humanity.453  
 The power of the Holy Spirit provides the means for the individual’s assimilation to 
Christ and Christ’s presence to the soul. Coleridge alludes to this in saying that “in regenerate 
souls [the Spirit] may act in the will; that uniting and becoming one with our will and spirit, it 
may ‘make intercession for us,’ nay, in this intimate union taking upon itself the form of our 
infirmities, may intercede for us” (AR 78). In a notebook entry, Coleridge makes this even more 
explicit, saying that the Spirit is “the ingenerated Christ, the new Nature,” which could “alone 
cast off, & or resist Sin” (CN V 6012). 
 Faith describes in some way the union of the individual will with Reason considered 
under the form of the intellect in this world. Thus, Coleridge could describe “the necessity of 
																																																						
453 In this sense of union, though, Coleridge still wants the regenerate individual to remain distinct. In his repeated 
rejection of pantheism and the description of the continuation of individual consciousness in the resurrected life, 
Coleridge made plain that he would not want an absolute and complete subsuming of the individual into Christ. 
Such seems to be the other side of the importance of the term “transubstantiation.” While becoming one in essence 
with Christ, the individual still retains one’s outward “accidents.” This need for an assimilation of the soul to Christ 
while retaining individuality reasserts itself in other places. In his parable about the proper understanding of 
redemption, Coleridge says that what is needed for restored relationship between the mother and son is for the son to 
“in his own person become a grateful and dutiful child” through “gradually assimilating his mind to the mind of his 
benefactor” (AR 329). That there is both an assimilation of the mind to that of the benefactor and the retention of the 
son’s own personhood indicates this need for an individual’s mind to become the mind of Christ while still being 
one’s own. Coleridge does not dwell on how this is possible, but it may relate to the nature of the Divine Human. 
Because it is the second person of the Trinity, the Divine Idea that is the “pleromena” of all “distinctities,” that 
becomes human, the divine humanity in Christ may already contains within itself the perfected union of each 
individual qua induvial and God. Thus, the “mind of Christ” that the individual is transfigured into is a mind that 
includes the distinction between that person and Christ in the unity between them. 
		210 
Faith in each individual in order to his appropriation of this redemption” (OM 53). Because 
“Faith must be a Life originating in the Logos” and the indwelling of Christ in the soul that is the 
spiritual birth communicates this life to fallen humanity, Coleridge must believe that faith is not 
something temporally prior to redemption, but rather the subjective state of the redeemed 
(SW&F 844). Just as faith is the union of will and Reason under the form of the intellect, so if 
there is this union, there is also Love, since Love is this union as it relates to the will. In this way, 
Coleridge could affirm that “from God’s Love through his Son, crucified for us from the 
beginning of the world, Religion begins: and in Love towards God and the creatures of God it 
hath its end and completion” (LS 92). Furthermore, union with the divine will not only produces 
a reciprocal fullness of love returned to God, but also an overflowing of Love toward creation. 
Thus, love of God gives rise to proper love of neighbor (LS 91).454  
 Prior to death and the resurrection necessary for the full removal of this body which is the 
result of our sinful fall into a nature, humanity remains confined to the knowledge that comes 
through the understanding and has no capacity for making spiritual realities objects of our own 
“direct and immediate Consciousness,” specifically “all Truths, and all modes of Being that can 
neither be counted, colored, or delineated” – including the workings of the Spirit on and in us 
(AR 79). Instead, so long as we remain in a state of hope for a final and complete regeneration, 
the activity of the Spirit must be inferred “from its workings; it cannot be perceived in them” 
(AR  79). Whether something actually is an effect or working of the Spirit can be “assuredly 
known,” but only insofar as these effects are subjected to reflection under the guidance of the 
Scriptures, which “furnish the clear and unfailing Rules for directing the inquiry, and for drawing 
																																																						
454 In good Augustinian fashion, the proper love of neighbor and creation must always flow from and be subordinate 
to the love of God, otherwise it represents an opposition between the individual and divine will and cannot be real 
love (or at least is a lesser and disordered love) (SW&F 844). 
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the conclusion” (AR 79). Accountability to the rule of Scripture prevents a person from 
succumbing to the “danger of Fanaticism or Enthusiasm” (AR 78).  
As the spiritual testament of the union of the individual will with Reason, or the “peace 
that passeth all understanding,” the presence of this testament through Conscience, or the 
presence of its negative condemning function, serves to provide assurance of whether we are at 
peace with God. However, as a spiritual testimony, there would be need of reflecting on some 
effects for us to have an inference of this spiritual state. Hence, Coleridge says that “our own 
inward Peace, a calm and quiet temper of mind,” when arrived at in “a soul watchful, and under 
the discipline of the Gospel” may be considered “the medium or organ through which the 
assurance of his Peace with God is conveyed” (AR 88). 
Love of God, properly speaking, does not describe a “feeling” or “affection,” but rather a 
spiritual state of union between the individual and Divine Will. Thus, it cannot, in this current 
state, be an immediate object of consciousness. Works become important now because they can 
serve as a kind of “effect” from which one can infer the love of God and receive “evidence of 
faith.” While humans are called to follow God’s moral commands, obedience is not in and of 
itself what makes acts good. Instead, following the moral law when these acts flow from proper 
affections makes the works good. If one follows the moral commands qua imposed law, i.e., if 
one follows them only out of self-interested hope for rewards and fear of punishments and a 
belief in the capacity of the law-giver to enforce these rewards and punishments, then these are 
dead works because rewards and punishments are only “lifeless and unsubstantial Shapes of the 
actual Forms” of motivations for good works (CM III 741). On the other hand, if the affections 
are first formed by an initiating act of God’s love, viz., redemption, then the believer will 
experience affections of “Faith, Gratitude, Love, and affectionate Contemplation of the 
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exceeding Goodness and loveliness of the Saviour, Redeemer, and Benefactor.” From these 
affections “will flow the deeds, or rather the Affections overflow in the Deeds” (CM III 741). 
There is a reciprocity between affections and deeds as they provide evidence for one’s love of 
God that yields love of neighbor. True acceptance of redemption should yield proper feelings of 
joy and gratitude, but these are in and of themselves not enough to prove that one has the love of 
God. Because love of God is not only a fullness but an overflowing, if joy and gratitude do not 
overflow into a desire to follow the moral law out of a love both of God and the well-being of 
God’s creation, it is unlikely that these feelings are truly effects of a love of God. At the same 
time, works can only be good when they flow from the proper posture of response to God’s 
redemptive act, and thus serve as effects of salvation rather than conditions for it.  
One last consequence of Christ’s redemptive act is the removal of guilt incurred by 
human sin. This effect is one that could be easily overlooked because Coleridge does not 
emphasize this element in his work nearly as much as the other consequences of redemption, but 
it seems unavoidable that Coleridge did believe that humans had incurred guilt through sin that 
needed removal. First, Coleridge believed in the suffering of Hell as not merely a punishment 
that was the natural consequence of a human action. He goes further in describing punishment 
for evil as not only a corrective, but as flowing from the incompatibility of evil and holiness: 
That all punishments work for the good of the whole, and that the good of the whole is included in God’s 
design, I admit: but that this is the sole cause, and the sole justification of divine punishment, I cannot, I 
dare not, concede; —because I should thus deny the essential evil of guilt, and its inherent incompatibility 
with the presence of a Being of infinite holiness. Now, exclusion from God implies the sum and utmost of 
punishment; and this would follow from the very essence of guilt and holiness, independently of example, 
consequence, or circumstance (CM II 800). 
 
Furthermore, Coleridge affirmed in Aids to Reflection in summarizing his view of Redemption 
that one of its consequences was the removal of the penal consequences of Sin, which would 
seem to indicate a removal of the guilt of Sin. That Coleridge saw the removal of guilt, at least in 
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a metaphysical and objective sense of guilt, appears obvious from his claims that guilt leads to 
the need for positive punishment, and in the redeemed there is no longer such a punishment. That 
he did not go into greater detail about how this happened is likely because this falls under the 
same mystery of how the sinless will of the divine humanity could assume the consequences of a 
sinful nature and then communicate restored humanity to other individuals. 
Coleridge also believed it possible, and in many cases necessary, to admit that 
sanctification after being “born anew” was a matter of continual growth in holiness. To begin 
with, Coleridge held that full sanctification and the complete removal of Sin in this life was an 
impossibility. It is death and resurrection into a new and uncorrupt (and incorruptible) body by 
which God’s mercy “precipitates the Alien & Adverse” so that we can “hope to be fit for 
heaven” (CN V 6459). Thus, the death that Christ conquered was not the “dissolution of our 
earthly tabernacle which we call death,” but instead the complete “assimilation to the Principle 
of Evil” which is the continuation of consciousness in the separation from God that is Hell (AR 
322). For the Christian, death as the dissolution of this body is not an evil but an act of grace 
since it becomes the occasion for the growth to maturity of the “spiritual seed impregnated and 
evolved, the germinal principle of a higher and enduring life, of a spiritual Life” (AR 322).  
 Furthermore, in several places, Coleridge describes the life of faith as one of growth and 
progression. First, in his notebook entry summarizing the process of redemption Coleridge 
asserted that there is a process of “gradual extraction” before a “final detachment from Nature” 
(CN V 5814). In the Opus Maximum he asserted that there are fruits of faith which are the “tests 
and criterion of [faith’s] existence, and which are at the same time a necessary part of the 
appointed means of its growth and progress” (OM 53). In critiquing Wesley’s (early)455 
																																																						
455 Coleridge (and Southey) was using one of Wesley’s early, more radical, definitions of Christian Perfection, since 
Southey here supplied a definition of Christian Perfection as the “free, full, and present salvation from all the guilt, 
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understanding of Christian Perfection, he held that the concept of “perfection” in the gospel of 
Matthew would be better conceived of as “Full Growth, Adult” which nevertheless does not 
imply a “point, at which you can arrive in this life, in which the Command — ‘Soar upwards 
still’ ceases in validity or occasion” (CM V 169-70).  
 Having described the various effects of redemption, one may ask how a person may 
receive this spiritual birth. This point allows for a consideration of Coleridge’s thoughts on 
election. Coleridge begins his discussion in Aids to Reflection on the question of divine election 
by saying that it should prove innocuous and therefore a possibility for true Christian belief, even 
if some have misused the doctrine to support fanaticism. Properly understood, election is one 
link on a three-linked chain where “Two Links of the Chain (viz. Election and Salvation) are up 
in heaven in God’s own hand; but this middle one (i.e. Effectual Calling) is let down to earth into 
the hearts of his children” (AR 71). Because these links are connected inseparably, clarity about 
effectual calling (the only one of the three that is available to human beings) provides the means 
by which an individual can have assurance about his or her election and salvation. However, the 
way that one becomes clear of an effectual calling is not otherwise than by seeking the signs of 
election in growing in love (and the acts that flow from love) as a result of having been loved 
first (AR 72). In pointing out that this doctrine does not lead to the “perversions of the Fanatic,” 
Coleridge is referring to the linking of the doctrine of election with pretensions to immediate 
Spiritual revelations of this election that can lead to antinomianism (AR 72). That Coleridge saw 
this danger in the linking of these things is reinforced by his statement in his notes on Southey’s 
Life of Wesley that Whitefield’s acceptance of the doctrine of election became dangerous in 
																																																						
all the power, and all the in-being of sin.” Wesley later tempered this view, although Coleridge likely still would not 
have accepted Wesley’s belief that all inner propensity toward sin could be rooted out while we are in this life, since 
Coleridge in many ways located the propensity toward individual sins in this corporeal body. 
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Methodism “only by being mixed with the new ingredient, the juice of the Plant ex Horto 
Wesleyano [from the Wesleyan garden], videlicet, the doctrine of individual assurance, and a 
sensation of Election” (CM V 155). By combining these, the believer no longer must seek signs 
of election in “the moral Result” that is the only “sure pledge and token” of the Spirit’s work and 
presence (AR 73). However, if effectual calling can only be discerned through inference from 
good works flowing from gratitude for what God has done in redemption, then the doctrine of 
election not only need not but should not lead to antinomianism.  
 Coleridge further believes not only that the doctrine of election is acceptable for 
Christians, but that he himself holds it and trusts that most other Christians who reflect on their 
experience of salvation would come to accept it as well. Importantly, though, he takes a very 
circumscribed approach to the doctrine of election. First, he does not believe that it should be 
arrived at through mere speculative theology, but should come about from the reflection by the 
individual believer that the “first movements and preparations” of the will and understanding on 
which his or her hope is founded should not be discovered in one’s “own comparative 
excellence” (AR 171). However, if it is not possible to ground this initial movement of the will 
and understanding in oneself, then “to whom shall [the believer] assign it, if not to that Being in 
whom the Promise originate, and on whom its Fulfillment depends” (AR 171). Thus, Coleridge 
believes the Doctrine of Election will be “in itself a necessary inference from an undeniable fact 
– necessary at least for all who hold that the best of men are what they are through the grace of 
God” (AR 173). At the same time, while Coleridge held this doctrine, understood with due 
circumscription, to be “rational, safe, and of essential importance,” there are “many reasons 
resulting from the peculiar circumstances…why a discreet Minister of the Gospel should avoid 
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the frequent use of the term, and express the meaning in other words perfect equivalent and 
equally scriptural: lest in saying truth he might convey error” (AR 173-4).  
 Importantly, Coleridge believed that the doctrine of election should be understood in “its 
relation to Man” and that one should avoid “metaphysical views of Election, relatively to God” 
(AR 166). Election, as it corresponds to God’s universal decrees, would be an Idea and thus a 
mystery. Once it is confined to its relation to humanity, “we are determined by a practical 
interest exclusively” and we “may not, like theoretical or speculative Positions, be pressed 
onward into all their possible logical consequences” (AR 166-7). Thus, how one judges the 
doctrine must be confined to how it conforms to the dictates of practical reason and morality. 
After one has established that the doctrine does not necessarily contradict practical reason, and 
then pressing onward to determine that it is necessary, it is still possible to gain greater clarity 
according to the dictates of moral reasoning. Hence, however one holds the doctrine of Election, 
one should rule out “the doctrine of modern Calvinism as laid down by Jonathan Edwards and 
the late Dr. Williams, which represents a Will absolutely passive, clay in the hands of a Potter,” 
because it “destroys all Will, takes away is essence and definition” (AR 158). This is because by 
taking away any sense of active will, one destroys the responsible will and thus the basis of 
morality. Therefore, in holding the doctrine of election, one cannot allow it to turn into a doctrine 
of divine determinism; the believer must maintain that salvation is effected “not by Will of man 
alone; but neither without the Will” (AR 158).   
With this sketch of Coleridge’s theological thought, it is possible to show that Coleridge 
did provide a more thoroughly systematic and explicit philosophical superstructure to the 
doctrinal emphases explained in his “Confessiones Fidei.”456 This philosophical scaffolding for 
																																																						
456 I say explicit and systematic because, as scholars such as Bebbington and Hempton have pointed out, the 
Evangelical Revival in Britain, especially as it was understood and developed theologically by the intellectual 
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his doctrinal convictions does not, however, move Coleridge farther away from the Anglican 
Evangelicals, even if it does reinforce one’s awareness of his belief that their exposition was 
incomplete. If anything, Coleridge’s larger theo-philosophical project strikes one as that more 
thorough-going doctrinal exposition of the Evangelical position that he wished he had received 
from Thomas Methuen. Coleridge sought to provide an intellectual defense of a Christianity that 
emphasized precisely those points that the Evangelicals emphasized, and he did so while often 
preserving or expanding upon what could be a more or less realized “method” that directed 
Anglican Evangelical thinking.  
There are several elements of Coleridge’s thought that demonstrate a close affinity with 
that of the broader evangelical movement. To begin with, Coleridge held to a view that 
emphasized proper relationship with God rather than or going beyond intellectual assent to 
certain propositions. Even though Coleridge does not use the terminology of dead and lively or 
true faith, he does say that while “all effective Faith presupposes Knowledge and individual 
Conviction,” it must rise beyond “mere acquiescence in Truth, uncomprehended and 
unfathomed” to include being “rooted and grounded in love” (LS 48). Furthermore, in 
Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit, Coleridge makes explicit that faith and belief must be 
distinguished, and that faith goes well beyond mere lack of doubt in certain propositional truths.  
He can say that although he is free of doubt about certain core claims of Christianity, Coleridge 
wishes that his “Faith, that faith which works on the whole man, confirming and conforming, 
were in proportion to [his] Belief, to the full acquiescence of [his] Mind Intellect and the deep 
Consent of [his] Conscience” (SW&F 1119-20).  
																																																						
leaders of the movement, remained indebted to and made use of philosophical categories from the Enlightenment. 
What distinguishes this from Coleridge’s thought was that this appropriation was much more ad hoc and never 
achieved the same degree of integration that Coleridge offered.  
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Similarly, Coleridge understands “conscience” as the “spiritual testimony” or at times 
“spiritual sensation” that, as the “peace that passeth all understanding,” looks very much like the 
doctrine of assurance that proved a distinguishing mark of so much general evangelical thought. 
As Bebbington points out, one of the shifts that occurred from earlier Puritan thinking to the later 
Evangelicals was a transition from a sense that “a persistent phase of gloom was a sign of true 
religion” where “assurance was by no means the norm” to the expectation that “assurance is the 
normal possession of the believer.”457 For Coleridge, “the proper and natural Effect, and in the 
absence of all disturbing or intercepting forces, the certain and sensible accompaniment of Peace 
(or Reconcilement) with God, is our own inward Peace, a calm and quiet temper of mind” (AR 
88). Moreover, he further affirms that “a holy heart that gladly entertains grace, shall find that it 
and peace cannot dwell asunder; while an ungodly man may sleep to death in the lethargy of 
carnal presumption and impenitency; but a true lively, solid peace he cannot have” (AR 89). 
It is true that Coleridge did not present nearly the same sense of the intensity of assurance 
as some others in the evangelical movement, such as Whitefield, who held that this assurance 
would be “joy unspeakable – even joy that was full of and big with glory.”458 At the same time, it 
was not unusual for other evangelicals to speak of this assurance in terms of being at peace. John 
Wesley not only spoke of the assurance of salvation as “a steady peace,” but also went to far as 
to use the same language as Coleridge in describing this “Spirit of Adoption” as “that ‘peace 
which passes all understanding.’”459 Furthermore, evangelicals often believed that this assurance, 
or at least the perception of assurance, could decrease in intensity for periods of time. This view 
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458 Whitefield, quoted in Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Britain, 46.  
 
459 Wesley, “Witness of Spirit, Discourse II,” V.4, in Works, 1. 
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was particularly common among Anglican Evangelicals. For instance, Bean stated that “the 
comforts of Religion may, for wise reasons, be suspended by him who gave them, or that the 
great enemy of mankind may sometimes be permitted to harrass [sic] a pious mind.”460 Henry 
Venn understood that while the evidence of faith is permanent, the “sensible comforts of a 
Christian, it is true, are in their nature fluctuating.”461 Even Wesley would admit that “joy in the 
Holy Ghost may be withdrawn during the hour of trial, yea the soul may be ‘exceeding 
sorrowful’ [cf. Mt. 26:38].”462 In like manner, Coleridge affirms (via a quotation from Leighton) 
that “this Peace which we have with God in Christ, is inviolable; but because the sense and 
persuasion of it may be interrupted, the soul that is truly at peace with God may for a time be 
disquieted in itself, through weakness of faith, or the strength of temptation, or the darkness of 
desertion, losing sight of that grace, that love and light of God’s countenance, on which its 
tranquility and joy depend” (AR 89). However, “when these eclipses are over, the soul is revived 
with new consolation” (AR 89) This sentiment echoes Wesley’s understanding that when the 
“hour of darkness” is over, joy and peace are “generally restored with increase, till we rejoice 
‘with joy unspeakable and full of glory’ [cf. I Pet. I:8].”463 
 One could conceivably challenge this point since Wesley’s conception of assurance 
required the acceptance of direct testimony of the Spirit to an individual believer’s 
consciousness, a point that Coleridge explicitly rejected. However, this only serves to underscore 
Coleridge’s location within the realm of Anglican Evangelicalism. Bebbington points out that 
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Wesley “propagated a strong view of the certainty instilled in the believer by the Spirit” that 
“often seemed the greatest novelty about Methodism.”464 Conversely, it was the norm, not the 
exception, for Anglican Evangelicals to reject pretenses to direct consciousness of the workings 
of the Spirit. While Venn held that it was the height of impiety to reject the idea that the power 
of the Spirit could work on the soul, he also asserted that “this influence of the Holy Ghost is 
secret, and discernible only by its fruits.”465 Walsh points out that this movement away from 
“sensible perceptions” of the Holy Spirit came out of the Evangelical Anglican desire to subdue 
the overt “enthusiasm” associated with Methodism and other irregular evangelical groups.466 
 Coleridge’s rejection of direct consciousness of the Spirit’s workings effectively locates 
him among the Anglican Evangelicals on another point. He did not reject the notion that the 
Spirit’s activity produced no discernable effects, even if that activity itself was not an object of 
consciousness. A certain amount of discernment through reflection guided by Scripture was 
necessary to ascertain whether potential effects of the Spirit were indeed truly from the Spirit. It 
was shown in chapter three that definitive for Anglican Evangelicals was an attempt to distance 
themselves from the “extravagant” pretensions of showings of the Spirit found in dissenting 
evangelical groups by locating most of the Spirit’s work within the confines of devotional 
practices, such as prayer and personal reflection, directed by meditation on Scripture. For 
instance, Venn again says that “the influence of the Holy Spirit is always correspondent to the 
written word, and preserved and increased in the use and the means of grace. He makes no new 
revelations, but gives success and efficacy to what is already revealed.”467 Coleridge does not 
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make any substantial modifications to this conviction, but instead provides a defensible ground 
for holding this position by explaining why claims about direct revelations and impressions from 
the Spirit run contrary to a properly conceived philosophical psychology.  
 This sense of the effects of the Spirit’s work brings into focus another element of 
Coleridge’s thought that associates him with the larger evangelical movement. For Coleridge, 
redemption should produce in the believer affections of joy and gratitude toward God that then 
produce the fruit of good works, and that the love of God that these affections spring from should 
likewise engender a love of neighbor. This has strong affinities with a constellation of Wesley’s 
statements. Wesley held that the Christian should stand in a relationship to God describable in 
this way: “he acquiesces in whatsoever appears to be [God’s] will, not only with patience, but 
with thankfulness… the ruling temper of his heart is the most absolute submission and the 
tenderest gratitude to his sovereign benefactor.”468 Furthermore, “remembering that God is love, 
[the Christian] is conformed to the same likeness” and is thereby “full of love to his 
neighbour.”469 It is this love of God that is “productive of all right affections” and good works 
spring as the “daughter, not the parent, of [the Christian’s] affection.”470 Wilberforce provides a 
similar description of the way in which true belief in and acceptance of God’s working for our 
redemption should excite the affections toward deep gratitude and joy. Here he explicitly links a 
coldness of affection with the probability that a person does not have a real, living faith:  
The Unitarian and Socinian indeed, who deny, or explain away the peculiar doctrines of the Gospel, may be 
allowed to feel, and talk of these grand truths with little emotion. But in those who profess a sincere belief 
in them, this coldness is insupportable. The greatest possible services of a man to man must appear 
contemptible, when compared with “the unspeakable mercies of Christ:” mercies so dearly bought, so 
freely bestowed – A deliverance from eternal misery – The gift of “a crown of glory, that fadeth not away.” 
Yet what judgement should we form of such conduct, as is here [in the case of affection toward God] 
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censured, in the case of any one who had received some signal services from a fellow creature? True love is 
an ardent, and an active principle — a cold, a dormant, a phlegmatic gratitude, are contradictions in terms. 
When these generous affections really exist in vigour, are we not ever fond of dwelling on the value, and 
enumerating the merits of our benefactor? How are we moved when any thing is asserted to his 
disparagement! How do we delight to tell of his kindness!471 
 
 The final doctrinal point that Coleridge expounded aligning him with the Anglican 
Evangelicals was his acceptance of a particular modulation of the doctrine of election. Even if all 
Anglican Evangelicals did not subscribe to the doctrine of election or moderate Calvinism472, 
moderate Calvinism and acceptance of some form of the doctrine of election was, by the early 
19th century in the Church of England, almost exclusively the domain of the Evangelicals. And 
here Coleridge advances precisely the kind of circumscribed doctrine of election predominant in 
the moderate Calvinism of Anglican Evangelicals. He accepted the doctrine, but focused on 
election as it related to individual believers’ lives and avoided delving into its possible 
speculative consequences. This doctrine was held because it conformed with a believer’s 
individual experience of redemption, and Coleridge even echoed the idea of many Evangelicals 
that it could prove a stumbling block (so should not be preached about too frequently), and that it 
certainly should not be emphasized and reveled in. 
  The one point on which Coleridge may seem to have been at odds with evangelicals, 
including Anglican Evangelicals, was his understanding of redemption, but I believe that his 
understanding of redemption still places him squarely in the spirit of the Evangelical tradition, 
even if it put him in a somewhat more marginal place regarding how he drew doctrinal lines. It is 
important to emphasize that Coleridge’s understanding of the doctrine did not actually align him 
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472 One must distinguish “moderate” Calvinism from Coleridge’s “modern” Calvinism. When Coleridge refers to 
“Modern Calvinism,” he describes what we would call Hyper-Calvinism rather than the moderate Calvinism held by 
Evangelicals, especially since his view of “modern” Calvinism includes thinkers he believed delved too far into 
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more with some other theological tradition from the period. If one looks at the options that were 
prevalent in Britain at the time, one could follow some kind of moral exemplar view of Christ’s 
work or some kind of substitutionary atonement. A recapitulationist/healing view, which is 
probably the closest to what Coleridge embraced, seems relatively unique in that time and place.  
 Furthermore, the position Coleridge puts forward still stood much closer to the logic 
behind substitutionary atonement than the theories of redemption advanced by more liberal 
strands of Christianity in Britain at the time. He does not reject the notion that humans have 
incurred guilt with penal consequences, and he has a robust doctrine of original sin and the 
human inability to extricate themselves from that sin. The point on which he really disagrees 
with substitutionary positions was his insistence that describing this guilt as “debt” in any but a 
metaphorical sense confused the relationship between things and people.  
 However, Coleridge may in fact have put forward a theory of redemption that simply 
codified and extended the logic of the Evangelicals of his time. As described in the previous 
chapter, nearly all evangelicals stressed the New Birth as something central to true Christianity, 
and this stress generally relegated the metaphysical mechanics making this New Birth possible to 
a secondary position. Additionally, Anglican Evangelicals in the 19th century may have generally 
ascribed to substitutionary atonement nominally, but they avoided speculative descriptions of 
this doctrine. When one combines these elements, viz., a nominal acceptance of the doctrine and 
avoidance of undue speculation about it, one sees in Coleridge simply what may have been a 
theoretical explanation for how one could hold these two elements together. He ultimately left 
the actual mechanism of redemption in the realm of mystery and focused instead on what could 
be said about spiritual rebirth. It should also be noted that Coleridge does not reject 
substitutionary atonement in toto, and focused on how using substitionary language served as an 
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important devotional and pastoral tool for engendering an appropriate gratitude toward God – a 
necessary sign of the Love of God – within believers. The emphasis on substitutionary 
atonement already had this strong devotional quality for evangelicals: focus on the blood of 
Christ, on Christ’s cross, on the suffering of Christ, etc. were often linked with how God’s work 
in Christ should elicit the appropriate posture of love and gratitude in the believer. Evangelicals 
embraced substitutionary atonement due to its subjective importance, but almost never because 
they felt a need to make salvation contingent on holding to a set of “right” doctrines.473 Even 
while talking about how common substitutionary atonement was among evangelical thinkers, 
Bebbington states that “there was a bond between the atonement and the quest for sanctification” 
such that “the motive for spiritual growth was Calvary.”474 Robert E. L. Strider, in his summary 
of Anglican Evangelical thought on the redemption also points to the fundamentally practical 
and devotional acceptance of some form of substitutionary atonement – an acceptance that 
allowed a certain elasticity in doctrinal formulation. True – many early Evangelicals expressed a 
view of redemption in “legalistic and substitutionary terms.”475 At the same time,  
																																																						
473 And likely often because they wanted to remain true to the spirit of the Reformers (Calvin and Luther certainly 
held to forms of Substitutionary Atonement). In other words, with a high view of human sinfulness and guilt, the 
importance of the cross for salvation, and the sense of returning to the purer Reformation view of Christianity, many 
evangelicals likely held to substitutionary atonement not dogmatically but because they thought it an adequate 
enough theory. The same impulse that would have led evangelicals to avoid excessive (or any) speculation on 
doctrines and thus to really emphasize the need for precisely formulated statements of belief that required assent 
could also have the effect of preventing evangelicals from considering whether a doctrine really fit with their larger 
vision of the Christian life and love of God.  
 
474 Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Britain, 16. 
 
475 Robert E.L. Strider, “Jesus Christ the Redeemer,” in Anglican Evangelicalism, ed. Alexander Zabriskie 
(Philadelphia, PA: The Church Historical Society, 1943), 151. Maddox, summarizing the work of J.R. Renshaw on 
Wesley’s views on atonement, comes to a similar position about Wesley’s views. While Wesley may have focused 
on some form of substitutionary atonement, he was generally careful to see this as expressing first and foremost 
God’s mercy and love and only at some of his most careless moments as a means of emphasizing God’s wrath. The 
real concern of the Wesleys was (1) “to stress that the integrity of God’s character was not abrogated in the atoning 
work of Christ; and (2) their overriding emphasis was not on God’s wrath, but on the love of God in initiating and 
effecting our salvation. For the Wesleys, to preach the life, death, resurrection, and intercession of Christ was most 
fundamentally to preach ‘the love of God’” (Maddox, 106). 
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the evangelical is not primarily interested in formulating a dogmatic statement of the atonement which shall 
hold for all men and for all time. His chief interest is that, however explained and intellectually justified, 
the atonement shall be the most vivid and powerful fact in men’s experience of Christianity. Evangelicals 
believe that the Lord Jesus died upon the Cross for the sins of men; that there is no other means of 
forgiveness; and that the cross was in consequence a necessity from the standpoint both of God and of man. 
They believe — yea, more, they know of a certainty—that through the cross man actually and personally 
has received remission of sin, and that the fruits of such remission are perceived in the lives of those who 
have received it.476 
 
 Furthermore, evangelicals like Wesley willingly used descriptions of redemption that 
recalled multiple atonement theories, including those of Christus victor and moral exemplar, 
further illustrating that they were less concerned with adhering to a particular doctrinal 
formulation than they were with which formulations preserved certain theological truths and 
were conducive to devotional desiderata. Substitutionary atonement was advanced not because it 
was seen as a necessary development from speculative theology, but because it explained 
Christ’s redemptive work in a way that recognized the gravity of original sin, the full human 
reliance on God’s work in Christ for salvation, and because it elicited appropriate dispositions 
toward growth in holiness in the believer. Thus, Coleridge may actually provide a fully 
consistent evangelical doctrine of the atonement in 1) making the New Birth central to salvation; 
2) maintaining a strong tie between original sin and redemption; and 3) recognizing the 
subjective importance of various images of redemption for eliciting the proper disposition in 
believers. 
 What's more, a strand of early 19th century Evangelical thinking existed that did advance 
almost exactly the same approach to Christology and the redemption as Coleridge, moving 
beyond the cross alone as the location of Christ’s reconciling work. Evangelicals such as Budd, 
Mandell, and Daniel Wilson emphasized “the whole of Christ’s incarnate life” and looked to a 
“restorative dimension or ‘new creation’” in Christ’s redemptive work.477 These thinkers did not 
																																																						
476 Strider, “Jesus Christ the Redeemer,” 151-2. 
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disregard the importance of the cross, but, as Budd stated it, “Though God’s reconciling attitude 
had reached a climax at the cross, reconciliation had been demonstrated in the whole of Christ’s 
incarnate life.”478 Likewise, “those whose theological interests extended beyond the customary 
emphasis on justification by faith” tended to look also “to the doctrine of adoption or union with 
Christ.”479 While Ervine does point out that these thinkers formed “a minority of the Evangelical 
clergy,” he gives no indication that they were marginal or borderline in the Anglican Evangelical 
tradition.480 They may have been a minority, but they were a minority of firmly Evangelical 
thinkers, indicating that Coleridge’s theological positions, though on the surface seeming to be 
out of line with the mainstream of Evangelical thought, actually echoed the positions of thinkers 
whose Evangelical credentials remain largely beyond questioning.481 
 Lastly, Coleridge, despite providing a deeper intellectual foundation for evangelical 
emphases, retains a certain methodological affinity with evangelicalism. While Coleridge sought 
to provide more philosophically defensible foundations for these positions, he still ultimately 
avoids deep metaphysical speculation on those elements of these doctrines that he does not 
believe bear significantly on the practice of the Christian life — only now the Christian life is 
meant to include growth in insight into the mysteries of God. Nevertheless, while he sought to 
provide philosophical explanations of doctrines such as original sin, the Trinity, and redemption, 
																																																						
477 Ervine, “Doctrine and Diplomacy,” 239.  
 
478 Ervine, “Doctrine and Diplomacy,” 239.  
 
479 Ervine, “Doctrine and Diplomacy,” 240. 
 
480 Ervine, “Doctrine and Diplomacy,” 239. 
 
481 This association as it applies to the atonement with this strand of more “holistic” Anglican Evangelicalism is 
important, because, as seen in the next chapter, Coleridge seems to have taken up some of their positions within 
Evangelical “culture” as well. For instance, this same group included many of those most willing to put forward 
non-inerrantist visions of Scripture, which Coleridge also sought to do. This would indicate not only that he shared 
similar concerns and came to similar theological conclusions, but that he may have consciously aligned himself to 
some degree in the Anglican theological milieu with this internal subset of Anglican Evangelicals. 
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he did not do this except insofar as these explanations were necessary for removing any 
objections that holding to them required descent into irrationality.  
 After approaching Coleridge’s more detailed theological work, one is likely struck not 
only by its consistency with a general Reformation-Augustinian theological tradition (even if his 
rationale for this position shows remarkable ingenuity), but also how he does not give significant 
attention to doctrinal points that he did not address in his short Confessions of Faith. Insofar as 
those doctrinal convictions represented statements of belief like what one would find among 
early 19th century Evangelicals, Coleridge’s more detailed theological expositions indeed leave 
his readers with a sense that he wanted to ensure the intellectual sustainability of an authentically 
Evangelical outlook on Christianity. Looking to those points where Coleridge entered into topics 
outside the scope of the more circumscribed doctrinal summaries, one still sees him directing his 
thought with the kind of pastoral logic employed by evangelicals or that he introduced and 
explained doctrines particular to the Evangelicals of his day not included in those summaries (as 
with his discussion of the doctrine of election). When one combines these features with the sense 
that Coleridge, despite a reputation for being hopelessly lost in a fog of impractical metaphysical 
speculation, avoids such speculation unless it must be marshalled to make defensible a position 
popularly held by Evangelicals (for instance, original sin or the Trinity), Coleridge appears all 
that much more to have been making explicit and defending a pervasive but largely implicit and 
non-systematic Evangelical theological outlook. In other words, one does not come away from 
Coleridge’s more explicit theological work with the sense that his observation about the 
Evangelicals’ lack of learning led him to abandon their approach; rather, one senses all the more 
that he wanted to rectify this deficiency for the sake of the movement that he thought was saving 
the Church. It remains to be seen whether Coleridge indeed exhibited the marks of belonging to 
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Evangelical culture (which I contend throughout this work are truly necessary to fully identify 
him as an Evangelical), but a combined look at his doctrinal commitments and deeper 
theological and philosophical explications of those commitments in these last two chapters show 
a man who very much shared a commitment to Evangelical thought.  
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CHAPTER 6  
 
AN IMPERFECT SUN 
COLERIDGE AND THE ANGLICAN EVANGELICAL CULTURAL IMAGINARY 
 
 
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge produced a theology that exposited Christian doctrine with 
greater philosophical intentionality, consistency, and depth than not only nearly all other late 18th 
and early 19th century evangelical thinkers, but indeed most theologians, regardless of 
ideological commitment, of the time. At the same time, when one looks at both the core 
convictions and even method guiding his theology, Coleridge remained remarkably consistent 
with the views held by certain of his contemporary, un-controversially Evangelical, Anglicans. 
This discovery provides considerable evidence for an affinity between Coleridge and the 
Evangelicals and even for likely relationships of causation. Had I set out to describe the 
movement purely in terms of its thought-patterns, one could at this point claim with a high 
degree of confidence that Coleridge was some kind of Anglican Evangelical. However, I have 
contended throughout this work that religious identity involves not only a constellation of ideas, 
but also of other “cultural” markers such as sets of practices, forms of communication, and 
rhetorical styles. I now turn to arguing that Coleridge not only shared similar doctrinal and 
methodological commitments with Anglican Evangelicals, but that he also gradually adopted 
many of these marks of a distinctive Evangelical “culture.” Beyond providing a more 
comprehensive and precise description of Evangelicalism, I believe that this approach 
strengthens my case that Coleridge belongs within that identity nexus. Showing that Coleridge 
developed his philosophical theology in a way that preserved the theological emphases of 
moderate Anglican Evangelicalism while also using its rhetoric and larger cultural markers 
		230 
moves one significantly from a position of seeing an interesting coincidence of ideas to 
positively identifying Coleridge as an Evangelical Anglican.482 
 This chapter begins by exploring how Coleridge expressed the ideas he held in common 
with Evangelicals in language that was likewise similar to how Evangelicals expressed these 
ideas themselves. This section moves beyond specific vocabulary and phrases to look at 
Coleridge’s (admittedly modified at times) use of literary genres popular among evangelicals. 
Second I show that the authorities that Coleridge drew upon to ground his thinking and how he 
described his Christian identity mirror the constellation distinctive to Anglican Evangelicals. 
Third, Coleridge focused on the same polemical targets as evangelicals, viz., Unitarianism, 
Socinianism, and those forms of thought perceived to encourage or lead to them. Fourth, I will 
evaluate Coleridge’s individual and corporate piety to show that his practices of prayer and 
regular self-examination and reflection were what one would expect from a self-avowed 
Anglican Evangelical. Fifth will be an exploration of Coleridge’s sacramental and liturgical 
theology, and in particular his understanding of Baptism and conversion.483 Finally, I look at 
Coleridge’s position on the Church of England itself and how his view of ecclesial authority, its 
relationship to other Christian groups, and the nature of the Book of Common Prayer all could 
have come from moderate Anglican Evangelicals.   
																																																						
482 While I believe that the short biographical sketch in the conclusion will only strengthen this observation by 
placing the trajectory of Coleridge’s thought in such focus that he begins to look more and more like an Evangelical 
Anglican the more that he self-consciously saw himself as returning to good standing in the Established Church, I 
believe that the current chapter will provide sufficient evidence to evaluate my central thesis. In other words, my 
attempt is to show that he did end up looking like a moderate Anglican Evangelical; how he ended up thinking, 
speaking, and acting that way is illuminating but a fuller treatment of the question can be postponed. 
 
483 These last four points will serve not only to demonstrate a larger cultural affinity with Evangelicals, but, 
particularly regarding the role of introspective piety, his baptismal thought, and his view of Anglican history, 
disassociate him even more from the forms of High Churchmanship available in the 18th and early 19th centuries. 
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 I obviously cannot go through all of Coleridge’s word choices and analyze their 
relationship to the particularities of evangelical speech, but I can point to a few examples that 
show Coleridge’s use of locutions that one would not expect to find outside of evangelicalism. 
First, I look at two repeated phrases that relate to distinctive evangelical doctrinal emphases – 
one in relation to original sin and one in relation to redemption. Coleridge repeatedly used the 
term “Child of Wrath” or the plural “Children of Wrath” to describe the human condition 
resulting from Original Sin.484 By the late 18th century, almost no one without ties to the 
evangelical revival used the term approvingly (i.e., as an appropriate term to describe humans in 
a state of sin). John Wesley frequently used “children of wrath” in his exposition of original 
sin.485 In publications from 1790-1799, “child of wrath” or “children of wrath” appeared as 
appropriate designations for the sinful condition of humanity (and about the doctrine of original 
sin) in a variety of works associated with the larger evangelical revival. For instance, Wesley’s 
use of the term from his sermon on this topic resurfaced in Methodism vindicated, from the 
charge of ignorance and enthusiasm486, which, as the title suggests, sought to defend Methodist 
ideas and practices. The line “Savior can’st thou love a traitor? Can’st thou love a child of 
wrath?” appeared in the hymn “The Believer’s Resolution” which itself was published in A 
collection of hymns universally sung in chapels of the late Countess of Huntingdon. Furthermore, 
those few instances where someone hostile to the movement used the phrase, or some variation 
of it, appear to have encountered it first in evangelical sources. For instance, Thomas Belsham’s 
																																																						
484 One can look to Coleridge’s short note “On Redemption” (SW&F 1500) or his “Confessio Fidei” (CN III 4005). 
While this phrase did not originate with the evangelicals – one sees it first in the English translation of Ephesians 2:3 
(KJV) and it made its way more immediately into the Catechism in the Prayer Book – it is important to point out 
that evangelicals rarely invented their language. Often what was particular to their language was the emphasis on 
certain biblical words or phrases that others did not use with the same frequency or in the same way. 
 
485 In Wesley’s “Original Sin,” this wording occurs at the beginning and in the fourth paragraph of the introduction.  
 
486 Methodism vindicated, from the charge of ignorance and enthusiasm (London, 1795), 30. 
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1798 review of William Wilberforce’s Real Christianity uses this phrase four times. However, 
two of these are quotations from Wilberforce himself and two are from the verse in Ephesians 
that the phrase recalls; in any case, Belsham meant to demonstrate that Wilberforce propagated a 
deformed Christianity.487 
 The second image under consideration is the titular image of warmth and light. After his 
initial claim of Socinianism as a moon, Methodism as a stove, and his desire to have warmth and 
light united in some sun, Coleridge repeatedly returned to these images, particularly referencing 
the cold light of the moon and the unenlightening heat of a stove. In his Lectures on Philosophy, 
Coleridge states: 
Will you find any pretence [sic] to light in that which has really no warmth? There is nothing in it that can 
be called tangible, nothing which presents motives or shapes itself to human imperfections. Allow the light, 
it is moonlight and moths float about in it. Again, those who reject all knowledge, who have wonderful 
incommunicable we know not what in the recesses of we know not where, and who scorn all knowledge 
and all the means of attaining it, we will say here again you have warmth, this may be a stove of life and 
crickets and other insects sing their inarticulate songs in it, but you must be as the lark, and rise and enjoy 
the warmth, and therein your own being will be made fit for its apportioned happiness and the extension of 
power which will come when the spring has been given. Then only will true philosophy be existing, when 
from philosophy it is passed into that wisdom which no man has but by the earnest aspirations to be united 
with the Only Wise in that moment when the Father shall be all in all (LP I 287).  
 
Coleridge also employs this image in his Lay Sermons when describing the nature of faith, 
saying that “the light of religion is not that of the moon, light without heat; but neither is its 
warmth that of the stove, warmth without light” (LS 48). 
 What is interesting about this characterization is that it corresponds almost exactly to the 
language and sentiment of a quote by John Newton, who said:  
A moonlight head knowledge however true is a poor thing, nor am I an admirer of those rapturous sallies, 
which are more owing to a warm imagination than to a just perception of gospel truth. The gospel addresses 
both head and heart; and where it is received as the word of God and is clothed with energy and authority 
of the Holy Spirit, the understanding is enlightened, the affections awakened and engaged, the will brought 
into subjection, and the whole soul delivered to its impress as wax to the seal.488 
																																																						
487 Thomas Belsham, A Review of Mr. Wilberforce’s treatise, entitled A practical view of the prevailing religious 
system of professed Christians (London, 1798), pp. 5, 44, 100, and 101.  
 
488 John Newton, Works of Newton, II, 18, quoted in James M. Gordon, Evangelical Spirituality (London: SPCK, 
1990), 86. 
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Importantly, Newton’s quote comes from a letter that would have been published in 1780 as part 
of his Cardiphonia – a full 23 years before Coleridge’s first notebook entry would echo this 
sentiment.489 It is widely accepted that Newton’s spiritual autobiography, the Authentic 
Narrative, partially inspired Wordsworth’s The Excursion and Coleridge’s Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner. Given Newton’s influence on William Cowper and the high esteem in which Coleridge 
held Cowper, it would make sense that Coleridge would have been led to Newton.490 Coleridge’s 
use of language so reminiscent of Newton’s letter from around the same time that he would have 
been composing the Ancient Mariner indicates either a great coincidence or that Coleridge was 
reading and engaging with Newton’s religious writings and appropriating his language.  
Another element that Coleridge shared with evangelicals, and specifically Anglican 
Evangelicals, was the nature of “true” religion. One may distinguish this evangelical approach to 
“religion” from that of their contemporaries by pointing to a certain holism that permeated their 
conception of it. True forms of religiosity were not merely systems of belief requiring 
intellectual assent (through faith or reason), a set of moral laws, or some combination of the two. 
I have already partially alluded to this holism in describing the evangelical conception of faith as 
intimately related to growth in proper relationship with God, moving from a mode of language of 
belief to language of a “way of being.” Coleridge elaborated on this idea in his description of 
religion. In the Lay Sermons, Coleridge affirmed that 
The elements (as it were) of Religion are Reason and Understanding. If the composition stopped in itself, 
an understanding thus rationalized would lead to the admission of the general doctrines of natural religion, 
the belief of a God, and of immortality; and probably to an acquiescence in the history and ethics of the 
Gospel. But still it would be a speculative faith, and in the nature of a THEORY; as if the main object of 
religion were to solve the difficulties for the satisfaction of the intellect. Now this state of mind, which alas 
is a state of too many among our self-entitled rational religionists, is a mere balance or compromise of the 
																																																						
489 For confirmation that Newton’s letters were published in 1780 in the Cardiphonia, see L. E. Elliott-Binns, The 
Early Evangelicals (London: The Lutterworth Press, 1953), 409. 
 
490 Cf. Bernard Martin, The Authentic Narrative and the Ancient Mariner (London: W. Heinemann, 1949).  
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two powers, not that living and generative interpretation of both which would give being to essential 
Religion – to the RELIGION, at the birth of which “we receive the Spirit itself bearing witness with our 
spirit, that we are the children of God” (Rom. viii. 15, 16.)491 In RELIGION there is no abstractions. (LS 
89-90). 
 
Coleridge reiterates a similar sentiment in Aids to Reflection. Speaking to those who have now 
been exposed to the tenets particular to Christianity, Coleridge goes on to say that “I should 
expect to overhear a troubled Murmur: How can I comprehend this? How is this to be proved? 
To the first question, I should answer: Christianity is not a Theory, or a Speculation; but a Life. 
Not a Philosophy of Life, but a Life and a living Principle” (AR 202).  
One of the of the most important ways that this holism manifested itself was a feeling that 
faith required transformation and renewal in all aspects of a person’s existence. As a result, a 
distinctive aspect of evangelicalism, especially in Wesleyan Methodism, was a belief that 
Christian faith could and should transform the affections no less than any other part of the human 
person. Several thinkers have pointed that out a defining feature, and possibly an innovation, of 
evangelicalism was its understanding that the Christian life does not seek to subordinate or 
eliminate the passions/affections, but rather to properly order them – thus affirming them as a 
good within the totality of a human identity.492 Phyllis Mack points to the preoccupation 
Methodists had with managing the emotions in her analysis of the movement: “By developing 
better habits of eating and exercise, sleeping and dreaming, reading and thinking, the individual 
[Methodist] tried to master ‘bad’ feelings like anger or envy while nurturing ‘good’ feelings like 
compassion or tenderness.”493 The necessity of properly ordered affections for the Christian life 
																																																						
491 John Wesley uses these same verses from Romans in several of his sermons, including his discussions of the 
assurance and witness of the Spirit (Sermon 9, “The Spirit of Bondage and Adoption”; Sermon 10, “The witness of 
the Spirit, I”; and Sermon 11, “The Witness of the Spirit, II,” all in Works, 1:248-298), 
 
492 For instance, Theodore Runyon makes the argument that one of the greatest contributions to theological thinking 
that came from the Wesleyan movement was a conception not only of orthodoxy (correct thinking) and orthopraxy 
(correct thought), but also orthopathy, or correct feeling (Theodore Runyon, The New Creation: John Wesley’s 
Theology Today [Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1998]). 
 
		235 
was not confined to Wesleyan Methodism, though – prominent Anglican Evangelicals also 
expressed similar positions. William Wilberforce cautioned against rejecting a proper intensity of 
religious affection, even saying that humans have been “duped” into accepting that the “species 
of Religion which is opposite to the warm and affectionate kind” alone deserves the title of 
“rational religion.”494 Real Christianity should excite “a zeal tempered with prudence, softened 
with meekness, soberly aiming at great ends by the gradual operation of well adapted means, 
supported by a courage which no danger can intimidate, and a quiet constancy, which no 
hardships can exhaust.”495 
Coleridge likewise believed that true Christianity produced proper gratitude and joy at 
God’s work, and from these affections good works – properly conceived – could flow. Likewise, 
Coleridge’s persistent desire to “unite warmth and light” implied that proper religion could not 
be pure emotivism, but neither could it be an intellectualism with no regard for due emotional 
fervor. In Aids to Reflection he expressed that Christianity should not be indifferent to emotional 
states, but should instead properly order those states, particularly in relation to doing one’s 
Christian duty. In the aphorism “The Christian no Stoic,” Coleridge modifies one of Leighton’s 
statements to say that Stoicism of all the ancient philosophies came closest to Christianity, but 
was still opposed to it because Stoicism “attaches the highest honor (or rather, attaches honor 
solely) to the person that acts virtuously in spite of his feelings or who has raised himself above 
the conflict by their extinction” (AR 96). Christianity, on the other hand, “instructs us to place 
small reliance on a Virtue that does not begin by bringing the Feelings to a conformity with the 
																																																						
493 Mack, Heart Religion, 15.  
 
494 Wilberforce, Real Christianity, III.2. 
 
495 Wilberforce, Real Christianity, III.1. 
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Commands of the Conscience,” and one should actually see Christianity such that “its especial 
aim, characteristic operation, is to moralize the affections” (AR 96).   
Moving from distinctive language to broader literary forms, one sees in two of the 
significant prose works relating specifically to religion that Coleridge published496 in the period 
under consideration a developing concern for Evangelical themes.497 Specifically, one can see 
the Biographia Literaria as Coleridge (partially) employing an evangelical literary genre, namely 
the evangelical conversion narrative. In a different way, the publication of Confessions of an 
Inquiring Spirit, even if it did not follow specifically an evangelical literary genre, demonstrates 
the centrality of the Bible for Coleridge’s Christianity and that his mode of interpretation 
maintains many of the features of biblical interpretation distinctive to evangelicals.498 
																																																						
496 Or, in the case of Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit, intended to publish. 
 
497 One of the most important, and specific, genres of evangelical literature – and one of the primary means of 
catechizing and developing piety – was the hymn. A version of this argument could see Coleridge as also doing 
“hymn writing,” insofar as hymns would have been seen in the 18th century not only as a song form, but also as 
poems, and Coleridge was early in his poetic career strongly influenced by William Cowper’s Olney Hymns. 
However, while Coleridge did continue writing poetry after his return to orthodoxy, and there is a way of seeing his 
self-conception as a poet as influenced by evangelicalism, these connections are more indirect and would warrant a 
stand-alone work. Hopefully it will suffice to speak to Coleridge’s recognition of the importance of hymnody when 
we arrive at the section on his personal piety.  
 
498 Coleridge does not present anything like a boilerplate Evangelical publication. Coleridge’s own idiosyncrasies 
come out and the reader is clearly dealing with a thinker who always sought to work creatively with genre 
conventions. However, this idiosyncratic nature was idiosyncratic within a particular tradition, and needs not point 
toward his belonging to a kind of sui generis religious tradition. If I am correct and Coleridge adopted a form of 
moderate Anglican Evangelicalism, it would seem right to think of this in some ways as the idealized version of this 
form –not its most common manifestation. Coleridge never ceased being one of Britain’s premier Romantic poets 
and thinkers, but even this further underscores his uniqueness. It was not uncommon for Romantic thinkers across 
Europe to follow a life trajectory in which they went from an early political and religious radicalism to a late life 
return to conservative and even reactionary views. However, whereas “the Romantics were often inclined to employ 
religious terms and idioms in an aesthetic mode without any deep commitment to traditional religious tenets,” 
Coleridge, on the other hand, gave “reflections on culture, church, and state” that “are perfectly genuinely; it is not 
an ironic mask” (Hedley, 265). A return to a truly living understanding of traditional Christianity made Coleridge 
unique among British Romantics; one cannot but expect that he would likewise be unique in his religious tradition 
as well. Indeed, if one can come to see Coleridge as the luminary mind for second generation British evangelical 
thought, one can expect him to stand apart from more unreflective or popular forms of the movement; certainly, if 
one were to compare popular Methodist beliefs from the late 18th century with those of John and Charles Wesley, 
one would perhaps find it difficult to locate the movement’s founders within the Methodist “mainstream.” 
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It may seem strange to present the Biographia as a kind of evangelical conversion 
narrative. Even those with a cursory understanding of Coleridge’s prose would respond that the 
Biographia Literaria presented Coleridge’s mature theory of the imagination and literary 
criticism. Indeed, for many years after Coleridge’s death, readers saw the Biographia principally 
as a work of literary criticism.499 However, as could be seen as the work unfolds, Coleridge’s 
thinking, particularly in his mature period, was highly unitive and generally oriented toward the 
ultimate goal of a theo-philosophical vision. While it is true that the length of the explicitly 
philosophical chapters resulted from Coleridge’s desire to “enlarge the scope” of the work, I 
think that one of the advantages of seeing this as either a kind of evangelical conversion narrative 
or at the very least a proto-conversion narrative (more on what this may mean will come soon) 
helps to explain some of the work’s seeming discontinuity.500 
Bruce Hindmarsh’s now authoritative study, The Evangelical Conversion Narrative, 
surveys and gives insight into one of the most important literary genres and forms of piety for the 
evangelical revival. Any discussion of spiritual autobiography must begin with Augustine. While 
St. Augustine’s Confessions stands as an archetype of spiritual autobiography, it was not only 
“unlike any of the models provided by ancient biographers,” but it also stood alone within the 
genre of “spiritual autobiography” (the evangelical form can be seen as a sub-genre) until after 
the Renaissance.501 Much of the reason for this was that a particular constellation of ideational 
and material forces not present until modernity had to come together to make “contemporary” 
autobiography a viable popular genre. For instance, as autobiography and therefore an 
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“apologetic of the individual” and “one of the ways to answer the question of what life means,” a 
large scale acceptance of this genre required “an individualist self-identity.”502 It is this 
individualist understanding of self-identity that provides a societal framework in which 
“displaying myself as the unique product of my own choices” will be taken seriously.503 Thus the 
modern autobiography not only bears many narratival similarities to the novel, but many of the 
same social and intellectual forces led to the development and promulgation of both genres.504 
As to the spiritual dimension, conversion as seen in Augustine’s and evangelical 
narratives did not become a significant part of spiritual autobiography until the early modern 
period because of medieval European Christianity’s particular conditions: “If early medieval 
converts were, so to speak, not Christian enough to write a conversion narrative like Augustine’s, 
later spiritual autobiographers, as they appeared beginning in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, 
were, on the contrary, too Christian.”505 Conversion for later medieval thinkers meant entrance 
into monastic life, with the Latin conversio denoting “not principally the transition from pagan to 
Christian, but the passage of a Christian into the life of a religious.”506 Before the evangelical 
narrative could become possible, a form that understood conversion more like Augustine’s 
movement from paganism or non-Christianity to true Christianity, a culture had to emerge in 
which it was conceivable to see individuals within that culture as not truly Christian. The broader 
answer to how this was initially possible was the Reformation, but specifically it was the 
development of pietistic movements. In England, it was the movement (or conflagration of 
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movements) that would come to be labeled “Puritanism,” and which saw the English church as 
only “halfly reformed,” that made it possible to call into question the assumption that being born 
in a “Christian” country proved sufficient for “real” Christianity.507 Puritanism made space in the 
British religious social imaginary for this distinction, and it was a distinction in many ways 
central to evangelical self-identity as well. Together these two forces, the rise of an individualist 
self-identity and the emergence of a sense of difference between “real” and “nominal” 
Christianity508, laid a foundation for the emergence of evangelical conversion narrative as a 
possible literary genre and didactic and devotional tool.  
In 18th century England, despite similarities uniting them into a single “genre,” the forms 
and purposes of conversion narratives differed depending on what branch and stage of the revival 
they were associated with. I will limit my discussion to the features of the Anglican evangelical 
conversion narrative and bring the two main Methodist forms into discussion to highlight how 
the Anglican form stood apart. For developing a conception of the commonalities and range of 
possible differences within Anglican Evangelical narratives, Hindmarsh focused on 
autobiographies produced by three important figures in late 18th century Anglican 
Evangelicalism: John Newton, William Cowper, and Thomas Scott. Hindmarsh describes the 
common structure of each of these narratives in the following way:  
The subject progressed from childhood religious impressions to adolescent anxiety about sin and 
damnation, and then there followed a degeneration into worldliness and a state of hardness of heart. Each 
author went on to relate the spiritually corrosive influence of Deist ideas and his ignorance of the leading 
themes of the gospel. As so often in all these narratives, conscience was painfully awakened as each was 
made aware of the unattainable ideal represented in God’s moral law, but at first it was only a ‘legal 
repentance’ that followed—an attempt at personal reformation in one’s own strength. Then followed a 
crisis of moral and spiritual insufficiency, the pivot upon which each conversion narrative turned. Each 
author came to learn that the gospel held forth a promise of God’s gracious and complete forgiveness, but 
the personal hope awakened thereby was deferred. After a period of waiting, in which each one’s 
helplessness was made plain, each made an ‘evangelical repentance,’ renouncing self-sufficiency and 
casting himself on the mercy of God in Christ’s atonement. Psychological relief accompanied this 
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experience, and the subject bore witness to a transformed perspective on all of life, credited to having been 
inwardly regenerated by the Spirit of God.509 
 
 The other two prominent forms of evangelical conversion narrative in 18th century 
England developed out of Methodism, and while each shares certain overlapping features with 
the Anglican form,510 they provide a helpful foil to highlight its distinctive features. The first 
narratives to emerge in the Revival were lay accounts of conversions resulting from exposure to 
Revival preaching. Sometimes these were prompted by the published journals of early leaders, 
but more often than not these lay Methodist conversion accounts formed an oral genre, either 
presented during class and band meetings or transcribed in letters for the pastors who had 
provided the homiletic occasion for their conversion. Beyond being a largely oral form, these 
accounts shared a number of themes in common: a focus on novelty in terms of the Christian 
ideas being expressed, the sense of awakening as an individual in one’s experience before God, a 
simultaneous experience of being part of a larger Methodist movement and sharing in a common 
pattern of life, and an intense, almost unmediated, emotionalism or “white hot piety,” especially 
when compared with the published accounts of the clergy and lay preachers in the movement.511 
 The published lives of Wesley’s Lay Preachers represent the other dominant Methodist 
form of conversion narrative. These accounts were originally published in Wesley’s Arminian 
Magazine to combat the “poison” of Calvinism at work in other branches of the evangelical 
Revival, and, importantly for the genre in England, represented “a progression of conversion 
from the oral and manuscript culture of Lay autobiography to the public culture of the printed 
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page.”512 In addition to belonging to a more codified literary format, these accounts have a more 
explicitly didactic purpose.513 These were conscious attempts to use conversion as a principle 
hermeneutical key for retrospectively looking over the entire course of these ministers’s lives, 
attempting to read their subsequent life of sanctification (and possibly entire sanctification), 
ministry, and holy death as a continuation of initial conversion or as repetitions of the originary 
conversion experience. These narratives show a remarkable degree of coherence, particularly in 
communicating the Arminian Methodist vision of the Christian life, in large part because of John 
Wesley’s almost obsessive need to regulate his preachers and their narratives. As with almost 
everything Wesley allowed to be published for the edification of those in his spiritual care, he 
exercised a significant degree of editorial oversight prior to publication.514 Additionally, there 
was the uniformity of experience that came from the “unique literary subculture deriving from 
Methodist organization and discipline.”515 Wesley’s preachers were formed through contact with 
Wesley in his Connexion and their “entire literary environment—what they read and what they 
wrote—was under Wesley’s strict supervision.”516 Self-formation and self-interpretation were 
central features of all autobiographical endeavors, with authors almost always putting the 
individual facts of their lives within some larger pattern. In the case of Wesley’s preachers, it 
was not a general pattern that allowed for significant personalization and autonomous 
appropriation by individual autobiographers, but instead was the very immediate and specific 
																																																						
512 Hindmarsh, Conversion Narrative, 233. 
 
513 Hindmarsh, Conversion Narrative, 260. 
 
514 Hindmarsh, Conversion Narrative, 240. 
 
515 Hindmarsh, Conversion Narrative, 241. 
 
516 Hindmarsh, Conversion Narrative, 241. 
		242 
direction of John Wesley himself and the culture he engendered, leading to a much narrower 
pattern to which these narratives were made to conform.  
 The Anglican Evangelical sub-genre shares important features with both forms of 
Methodist spiritual autobiography. Like the lives of the lay preachers, they were more 
consciously exercises in self-formation and interpretation and were intentionally a written 
exercise: “Newton and Scott were well educated, and Cowper was a distinguished man of letters. 
Accordingly, their autobiographies are characterized not only by an act of retrospection, but also 
by a degree of literary creativity that turned life into art.”517 Similarly, while the primary purpose 
of these Anglican Evangelicals was self-interpretation and not necessarily providing spiritual 
guidance for future pilgrims, that does not mean that such a goal was unimportant. As Thomas 
Scott said in the preface to The Force of Truth, he hoped that it could be employed by God “as 
an instrument for advancing his glory, and the salvation of souls.”518 
Unlike the Lives, and in common with the lay versions, the Anglican accounts exhibited a 
much higher degree of individuation. In line with the generally staider Anglican Evangelical 
approach to outward emotional displays, these accounts are less likely to convey the kind of raw 
emotionalism of the lay Methodist accounts, but they also are not attempts at creating consistent 
spiritual templates for others. There was a shared sense of understanding conversion according to 
a broadly Calvinist typology, and they shared a general narrative structure, but these biographers 
still “stand out from the page as vivid individuals.” Unlike many other spiritual autobiographers 
where “there is very little sense of the unique personality of the writer,” a strong distinguishing 
feature of Anglican Evangelical conversion narrative was the capacity of the authors to 
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distinguish “themselves as unique” and to develop “the tradition of spiritual autobiography in 
novel ways.”519 Thus, a main distinguishing characteristic of the Anglican Evangelical 
conversion narratives was a capacity to accommodate a broader range of literary styles and 
narrative developments within a still discernible common framework. 
It is possible to see the significant similarities between Coleridge’s Biographia and the 
Anglican sub-genre, as well as have a framework for explaining deviations from the standard 
pattern. In the autobiographical portions of the Biographia, Coleridge expresses something that 
shares the contours of the Anglican narrative. He begins by saying that as a youth he had 
bewildered himself “in metaphysicks, and in theological controversy”; however, he came to seek 
“a refuge from bodily pain and mismanaged sensibility in abstruse researches, which exercised 
the strength and subtlety of the understanding without awakening the feelings of the heart” (CL 
15, 17). At Cambridge and immediately after he became a “zealous Unitarian in Religion; more 
accurately, [he] was a psilanthropist, one of those who believe our Lord to have been the real son 
of Joseph, and who lay the main stress on the resurrection rather than on the crucifixion” (BL 
180). Furthermore, he recognized that his “opinions were indeed in many and most points 
erroneous” (BL 180). He became zealous for the cause of Unitarian “enlightened religion” and 
even named his child after David Hartley. However, Coleridge arrived at a crisis point after the 
failure of the French Revolution and its connection to the kind of thorough-going Enlightenment 
philosophy to which he had attached himself (BL 199). This led him to a period of solitude and 
reflection in which he explored other philosophical opinions, as well as the “books of 
Revelation,” finally culminating in his awareness through Kant of “a certain guiding truth” 
whereby there was no “legitimate argument” that could be brought against reconciling 
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“personality with infinity” (BL 201). This led to him to being philosophically capable of holding 
“the idea of the Trinity a fair scholastic inference” despite remaining “in respect of revealed 
religion a zealous Unitarian” (BL 204). While this metaphysical difference that developed in 
Coleridge’s thought between the Unitarianism (and mechanism) of Hartley and others may have 
proved a kind of preparation for returning to orthodox Christianity, it still took a “more thorough 
revolution in [his] philosophic principles, and a deeper insight into [his] own heart” before he 
could have a “final re-conversion” from Unitarianism to Christianity (BL 205).  
Some significant parallels certainly exist between the overarching structure of the 
Anglican Evangelical conversion narrative and that of Coleridge’s movement to Unitarianism 
and back to orthodox, Trinitarian Christian belief. With the Olney autobiographies, Coleridge 
begins with initial metaphysical inclinations (like the inchoate childhood religious impressions) 
that he deadens himself to through a turn to ease and bodily comfort (like the turn toward 
worldliness). Thence Coleridge gives himself over to Unitarianism religiously and a mechanistic 
materialism philosophically. Coleridge experiences a crisis of faith in his Enlightenment 
optimism in the sufficiency of human reason for religion, leading to a period of preliminary 
philosophical conversion from materialism to a hybrid Platonic and German Idealism, and finally 
issuing in a full conversion from Unitarian to orthodox Christianity. If one sees the broad 
contours of the Olney autobiographies as exhibiting an exitus-reditus structure where the crisis 
point leading to repentance (broadly conceived) yields a two-stage partial and then complete 
conversion, then Coleridge’s autobiographical material in the Biographia certainly fits this 
structure. This pattern of partial/complete conversion is particularly significant in the Anglican 
Evangelical conversion tradition; even in the lives of the Methodist preachers, where important 
events after an initial conversion to Christianity are read as echoes or recapitulations of the 
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primary conversion, there is not the same sense of this principle conversion’s insufficiency. 
Furthermore, Coleridge’s introductory quote from Goethe states that “Er wünscht der Jungend 
die Umwege zu ersparen, auf denen er sich selbst verirrte” (“He wishes to spare the young those 
circuitous paths, on which he himself had lost his way”), signaling that he saw a certain didactic 
purpose in the presentation of his autobiography (BL 3). 
While Coleridge follows the same broad outline of the Olney autobiographies, there are 
also many significant points where this comparison could be called into question. To begin with, 
Coleridge frames so much of his personal, intellectual, and spiritual development in terms of 
philosophical movements and he spends a considerable part of the work on explicit philosophical 
critique and exposition that are not autobiographical in nature (cf. chapters 5-9). Additionally, 
Coleridge states that his autobiographical material exists as a kind of structure to give continuity 
to the work so he can present “an introduction to the statement of [his] principles in Politics, 
Religion, and Philosophy, and the application of the rules, deduced from philosophical 
principles, to poetry and criticism” (BL 5). Hence, when one combines the philosophical 
chapters with those that deal with the practical application to poetry and criticism, one gets the 
sense that this other work takes nearly as much room as the autobiographical material.  
However, this principle objection can be addressed in several ways, all of which 
reconcile this apparent dissonance between Coleridge’s stated purpose and written material and 
the claim that this work broadly belongs to the genre of Anglican Evangelical conversion 
narrative. First, because Anglican Evangelicals presented narratives that brought the 
idiosyncrasies and distinguishing features of the authors to the fore, it would make sense that 
Coleridge, who identified himself as a philosophical poet, would, if he were to craft a conversion 
narrative, do so with the categories of his literary and philosophical development. Second, there 
		246 
is precedent for interpreting one’s spiritual development and conversion as having come from a 
series of philosophical investigations. No less than St. Augustine’s Confessions shares this 
feature with Coleridge’s Biographia. That Coleridge likely had Augustine in mind in interpreting 
the shape of his life comes through in the explicit comparison Coleridge draws between the way 
in which his developing metaphysical views acted as a kind of preparatio evangelii just as 
Augustine’s exposure to Platonism helped to free him from Manichaeism (BL 205). While not 
explicitly invoked by Coleridge, Thomas Scott provides a more contextually proximate 
precedent for an Anglican Evangelical’s conversion narrative being presented as a series of 
spiritual changes consequent upon philosophical investigation. As Hindmarsh points out, for 
“Scott there were to be no providential deliverances or near-death turning points, no demons or 
psychomachy, no signs of mental instability,” but instead an “intensely dialectical” narrative of 
the “progressive demolition of his arguments for unbelief and his reluctant capitulation to 
evangelical views as he was propelled by the ‘force of truth.’”520 
One may see the sheer amount of non-autobiographical material in the Biographia as a 
critique against understanding it as an instance of conversion narrative, but multiple responses at 
least temper this. If one looks at the explicitly philosophical chapters (5-9 and 12-13), one sees 
Coleridge providing arguments against the positions he had rejected and in favor of the positions 
he eventually accepted. Thus, while the organization of the work can at times appear erratic 
(more on this below), the philosophical exposition is not part of an intellectual potpourri 
unrelated to the autobiographical material. Second, whereas others generally wrote conversion 
narratives with the express purpose of interpreting their lives through the experience of 
conversion, Coleridge had pressure from prior publishing commitments while putting together 
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his autobiography. The origins of what would become the Biographia Literaria originated with 
differences between him and William Wordsworth, particularly as they manifested themselves in 
the views of poetry Wordsworth included in the Preface to the 1800 edition of the Lyrical 
Ballads. This morphed into a full intent to write a preface to his poetry by 1811, and 
Wordsworth’s own preface to his poetry published in 1815 (the year the Biographia was 
composed) remained constantly in Coleridge’s view as he wrote his own work.521 So both in his 
proposal to his publisher and at least part of his internal motivation for writing, Coleridge 
intended to write an apology for his own literary career and work. Furthermore, one can partially 
conceive of the Biographia as two separate works. Coleridge had largely finished chapters 1-3 
and 14-22 (which comprise his “literary life” and his literary criticism) by August 10, 1815, 
having seen what would become the philosophical and more extended autobiographical chapters 
(5-13) as “of minor significance.”522 He wrote the “philosophical chapters” in about a month and 
then inserted them into the middle of the Biographia manuscript. Their expansion indicates that 
Coleridge, as he wrote his literary life and criticism, came to see deeper exposition of his 
metaphysical views either as essential to the understanding of the literary criticism or as of 
greater significance in the order of his thinking; indeed these chapters would come to represent 
almost 45 percent of the entire finished work.523 One may more accurately say then that rather 
than interpreting the Biographia as a whole as a conversion narrative, it is a sui generis work 
composed of many genres that includes within it a partial conversion narrative.  
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One cannot avoid Coleridge’s omission of certain elements that seem essential to the 
evangelical conversion narrative. For instance, Coleridge does not indicate a feeling of an entire 
dependence on God’s saving grace as he returned to orthodox Christianity. However, Coleridge 
composed most of the Biographia in 1815, which was the same year that he underwent one of his 
most extreme spiritual crises relating to laudanum usage. That he does not provide a work of the 
same coherence or polish as other conversion narratives (or even his own other prose works), and 
that he does not include all the common elements of other such narratives could be because of 
the tremendous stress he was under while composing the work; because his conversion may have 
been, so to speak, in media res while he was writing; or some combination of both. 
 At the same time, one should not under-emphasize the similarities between Coleridge’s 
autobiographical work and that of Anglican Evangelicals. His first Confessio Fidei, which 
pointed to a Christianity amenable to Evangelicals, was written in 1810, so Coleridge may have 
already had encounters with Evangelicals that would lead to increasing acceptance of the 
movement in the years before his composition of the Biographia. In 1814, Hannah More wrote 
to William Wilberforce that, in meeting Coleridge, she found him “very eloquent, entertaining, 
and brimfull of knowledge. Added to this he seemed to have great reverence for Evangelical 
religion and considerable acquaintance with it.”524 This personal familiarity with Evangelicalism 
only grew in the following year; in early 1815 Coleridge had become acquainted with Thomas 
Methuen’s beliefs to a point of being able to say that he was “far nearer to Mr. T. Methuen’s 
Creed” than to that of others in the Church of England and maintained a relationship with 
Methuen enough to be able to speak of their shared beliefs on Baptism in a letter from August 2, 
1815. It is unlikely, given that Methuen’s only substantial (and potentially only) published work 
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was his autobiography,525 that Methuen would not have presented his beliefs within the context 
of his personal narrative. Finally, September 17, 1815, Coleridge wrote to John M. Gutch that he 
had come to see his autobiography (the Biographia) as his “main work” and as the “Pioneer to 
the great Work on the Logos, Divine and Human, on which I have set my Heart and hope to 
ground my ultimate reputation” (CL 586). Thus, while Coleridge was writing the Biographia, he 
was explicitly acknowledging that affinity with Evangelical thought that Hannah More the year 
before had sensed and conveyed to William Wilberforce; then, as he was expanding the 
philosophical and autobiographical chapters of the Biographia, he shifted his focus from the 
literary to the philosophical and theological. 
 Interpreting the Biographia Literaria in its entirety as an evangelical conversion narrative 
may be overzealous; the work is multi-faceted both in its origins and purposes. Nevertheless, one 
thread of Coleridge’s spiritual autobiography follows a similar interpretative pattern as the 
distinctively Anglican Evangelical conversion narrative. This occurred while Coleridge was 
explicitly expressing affinity with Evangelical thought and had spent considerable time with an 
Anglican Evangelical. Whether he intentionally appropriated this format is not clear. Even if it 
were, we do not know if his exposure to this genre was primarily informal via conversation with 
Methuen and his reading of Newton’s autobiography in the 1790s, or if he had read more 
extensively in Evangelical narratives.526 In the end, what is important is that Coleridge had been 
formed theologically to such an extent at the time of writing the Biographia that he was at least 
inchoately interpreting the shape of his life according to a broadly Anglican Evangelical pattern. 
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 The other work to be considered in relation to Coleridge’s potential Evangelicalism is 
Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit, a work presenting Coleridge’s understanding of the nature 
and role of Scripture in the believer’s life. The ultimate purpose of this work is to ask the 
question of whether it is necessary to believe that the Bible was not “alone inspired by, i.e., 
composed by men under the actuating influence of, the Holy Spirit; but likewise—dictated by an 
Infallible Intelligence—that the Writers each & all were divinely informed as well as inspired” 
(SW&F 1123). Coleridge gives several reasons for his denying this position. If the Bible were 
the infallible, dictated Truth from Absolute Intelligence, then this would necessarily be an 
Article of Faith. However, while he believes that there are many instances of words and events 
recorded in the Scriptures that came directly from God, claims to the recording of these events of 
divine origin themselves being directly from God are incredibly rare and, even when they do 
occur, have obscure meanings. Coleridge believes that this rarity and obscurity provide strong 
evidence against Scripture’s divine dictation. If true, this claim would be “a most important & (if 
not fundamental yet) essential Article,” which cannot be squared with how “obscurely” and 
“obstinately” this concept had actually been “declared and enjoined” in Scripture (SW&F 1126).  
 Coleridge argues further that the very possibility of holding to divine dictation and 
infallibility implies a certain contradiction. Accepting direct divine communication of the “letters 
and articulate sounds by which the word is conveyed to our human apprehensions” ultimately 
requires that one hold the contradictory claim that “absolute Infallibility” is “blended with 
fallibility,” since it would require that “infallible truth be infallibly conveyed in defective and 
fallible expressions” (SW&F 1127). However, that Coleridge rejected this doctrine because it 
entails a contradiction does was not really about the contradiction per se, but because collapsing 
perfect and infallible Truth into fallible and limited human utterances leads to fanaticism and 
		251 
superstition. Coleridge believed that superstition was essentially the same as idolatry, i.e., 
mistaking something inferior (and generally material) for something higher (and generally 
spiritual). In other words, Coleridge rejected this doctrine in large part because it leads to 
“Bibliolatry,” or the “literal Rendering of Scripture in passages, which the number and variety of 
images employed in different places to express one and the same verity plainly mark out for 
figurative” (SW&F 1142).  
Finally, and most damning in his eyes, Coleridge believed that a doctrine of verbal 
inspiration destroyed the Bible’s living and spiritually efficacious nature; it “petrifies at once the 
whole Body of Holy Writ” (SW&F 1134). This language of the destruction of the “living” nature 
of Scripture is only partially metaphorical: Coleridge thought that the doctrine destroys the real, 
spiritually struggling individuals presented through Scripture. Throughout history, the Bible has 
provided a model, through the authors’s own acts of composition, of humanity “actuated by a 
pure and Holy Spirit” (SW&F 1134). But if these various authors were influenced in ways that 
eliminated their own acts of will, then the Bible in its existence as a literary creation can no 
longer guide and direct actual human existence, and can only be an object of awe and worship527:  
But let me once be persuaded that all these heart awakening Utterances of human Hearts, of Men of like 
faculties and passions with my own, mourning, rejoicing, suffering, triumphing, are but a “Comedia 
Divina” of a superhuman – O bear with me, if I say–Ventriloquist–that the Royal Psalmist Harper, to whom 
I <have so often> submit<ed> myself as a many as a “many-stringed Instrument” for his fire-tipt fingers to 
travers, while every several nerve of emotion, passion, thought that thrids [sic] the flesh-and-blood of my 
our common Humanity, responds to the Touch–that this sweet Psalmist of Israel was <himself> as mere an 
instrument as his Harp, an automaton Poet, Mourner, & Supplicant–all is gone! all sympathy, at least, all 
example! I listen in awe and fear, but likewise in perplexity and confusion of Spirit (SW&F 1136). 
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 While Coleridge rejected its plenary form, he still maintained a remarkably high view of 
inspiration and had no desire to lessen the authority or importance of the Bible. He held to its full 
inspiration, believing that it was “composed by men under the actuating influence of, the Holy 
Spirit” (SW&F 1123). He accepted not only the historical veracity of numerous events and 
speeches recorded in Scripture, but also divine and miraculous origins for many of them. 
Coleridge stated that “with my full persuasion of Soul respecting all the articles of the Christian 
Faith as contained in the four first Classes, I receive willingly the truth of the History, namely 
that the Word of the Lord did come to Samuel, to Isaiah, &c., & that the which gave utterance to 
the same, are faithfully recorded” (SW&F 1124). Later he asserted this claim with greater force, 
stating that “whatever is referred by the sacred Penman to a direct communication from God, and 
wherever it is recorded, that the Subject of the History had asserted himself to have received this 
or that command, this or that information or assurance from a supernatuhuman Intelligence… I 
receive the same with full belief, and admit its unappealable authority” (SW&F 1130-1). He 
rejected that the “faithful Recording of such [words and actions] does not of itself imply or seem 
to require any supernatural Working—other than as all Truth and Goodness is such” (SW&F 
1124). Coleridge never denied that the Bible is “the appointed Conservatory, an indispensable 
Criterion” for judging Articles of Faith and contains the whole of Christian religion, but only the 
notion that it is a “Creed, consisting wholly of Articles of Faith” (SW&F 1144).528  
 While preempting potential challenges posed by modern critical scholarship may have 
partially motivated the writing of this work, the more important reason appears to have been the 
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but seek help as I may, and whence be thankful for what I have, and wait, quietly” (SW&F 1121). 
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actual stated problems he had with the doctrine of plenary inspiration.529 Looking at the 
arguments put forward against this doctrine in conjunction with Coleridge’s own stated high 
regard for biblical authority, one sees a pattern developing where he believes that plenary 
inspiration actually denigrates biblical truth by stripping it of its capacity to act as a living and 
significant guide to the Christian life. A main purpose of Scripture is to provide a model for 
spiritual growth and maturity, and Coleridge repeatedly references the incredibly subjective, 
formative importance of Scripture. In one instance, he stated that compared with all other books, 
“the words of the Bible find me at greater depths of my Being; and that whatever finds me brings 
with it an irresistible evidence of its having proceeded from the Holy Spirit” (SW&F 1123). 
Moreover, in proposing his purpose for writing Confessions, Coleridge, in two rhetorical 
questions, asks whether it is not better that “due appreciation of the Scriptures collectively be 
more safely relied on as the result and consequence of such the Belief in Christ” rather than 
insisting on “the Belief of the divine Origin and Authority of all and every part of the Canonical 
Books as the Condition, and or first principle, of Christian Faith” (SW&F 1116). Consequently, 
is it not better that the Bible, properly approached, offers “the gradual increase of in our spiritual 
discernment of their truth and authority” and “supplies a test and measure of our own growth and 
progress as individual Believers, under without the servile fear that prevents or overclouds the 
free honor that cometh from Love? (1 John. iv. 18)” (SW&F 1116).  
 If one looks at Coleridge’s understanding of the function of Scripture in the Christian life, 
one sees a strong resemblance to the distinctive features of evangelical approaches to Scripture. 
As stated before, evangelicals saw Scripture as a, if not the, essential element in ordering their 
																																																						
529 In the introductory essay for Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit in the Collected Works of Coleridge, the editors 
point out that Coleridge likely, because he had a familiarity with critical German biblical scholarship to a much 
greater degree than most of his British contemporaries, wanted to develop an understanding of scriptural inspiration 
that preempted potential challenges posed by this scholarship. 
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lives. While many did hold to some form of inerrancy, including plenary inspiration, what 
distinguished evangelical readings and use of Scripture was not that they held to forms of 
biblical inerrancy.530 Unlike other groups who held to plenary inspiration or the entire inerrancy 
of the Bible such as in Reformed Scholasticism531, evangelicals focused on the Bible’s 
devotional function as a subjective means of grace. Scripture was not simply, or primarily, a 
repository of objectively true propositions, but a mirror, lens, and rule by which one could 
interpret one’s growth in sanctification and judge the work of God when read under the Holy 
Spirit’s guidance. Coleridge thus retains the distinctive features of evangelical readings of 
Scripture; what he did not retain was the undistinguishing understanding of the inspiration of 
Scripture held in common between many evangelicals and many non-evangelicals. Furthermore, 
in emphasizing the role of Scripture in guiding the believer after coming to faith and as a means 
of growing in faith, he was modeling a view of Scripture consonant with the lived experience of 
many evangelical Christians who had come to conviction of sin, repentance, and salvation 
through preaching or testimony rather than arguments relying upon the inerrancy of the Bible.   
Furthermore, Coleridge did not simply have a view of biblical inspiration consistent with 
the distinctive features of the early evangelicals generally, but he actually had a view that 
specifically resembles that of the prominent Anglican Evangelical Charles Simeon.532 As W.J.C. 
Ervine notes, Simeon held that without the enlightening power of the Holy Spirit, the Scriptures 
																																																						
530 A more widely held evangelical acceptance that some form of inerrancy was essential to the Christian life did not 
come until later in the 19th century. 
 
531 The Protestant Scholastic approach saw inerrancy as a means of establishing certain inferences through 
syllogistic logic applied to sure factual propositions. Even if Coleridge shared with some liberal Christians a sense 
that every statement in Scripture did not have to be historically or scientifically true, he disagreed profoundly with 
the approach that used the Bible primarily as a repository of factual evidence for the truth or falsehood of 
Christianity. While differing on the nature of inspiration, liberals and Protestant Scholastics shared a common 
disposition toward scripture that contrasted with both Coleridge’s and that of many evangelicals. 
 
532 Interestingly, Simeon also had a view of truth that strongly resembled Coleridge’s polar logic.  
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“in themselves are like a sword sheathed and lying upon the ground: they are a dead letter: they 
convey no spiritual light: they impart no spiritual energy: they carry with them neither 
conviction, nor consolation: whether read or preached they are equally without effect.”533 In 
understanding the nature of truth as conveyed in Scripture, Simeon believed that “no error in 
doctrine or other important matter is allowed; yet there are inexactness in reference to 
philosophical and scientific matters, because of its popular style.”534 As to the purpose of 
interpreting scripture, Simeon held that everything in Scripture had to be read with a view to its 
“practical improvement,” or as to how it impacted Christian practice.535 
One principle feature distinguishing Evangelicals from other Anglicans were the 
authorities that they appealed to for grounding their understanding of true Christianity and the 
real character of the Church of England. While Evangelicals were not unwilling to claim some 
form of moderate Calvinism, they were more likely to understand the Church of England’s 
theological identity as expressing a common Protestantism, i.e., those theological convictions 
commonly held by all the Reformers. Furthermore, they frequently considered their theological 
outlook broadly “Augustinian” as much, if not more, than they admitted to being “Calvinist.” 
Evangelicals tended to draw on early Elizabethan and Caroline divines such as Cranmer, Hooker, 
and Field as their theological exemplars, to view Puritan and early dissenting thinkers positively, 
and, as John Walsh pointed out, to see Archbishop Robert Leighton as especially authoritative. 
On both of these points, Coleridge was of one mind with this Evangelical outlook. In his 
criticism of Sedgwick’s attack on Methodism, Coleridge likely during 1810 had already accepted 
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534 Simeon, quoted in Ervine, “Doctrine and Diplomacy,” 119.  
 
535 Ervine, “Doctrine and Diplomacy,” 118. 
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for himself that the Church of England’s “Church Liturgy + Articles + Homilies, Calvinism & 
Lutheranism are joined like the two Hands of the Union Fire Office” (CM IV 658). Furthermore, 
he grounded the thought of Luther and Calvin in “their great Guide, St Augustine” (CM IV 644). 
Even at this time before Coleridge was acknowledging full conformity with the Church of 
England, he was still describing the Church in terms of a common Reformation, Augustinian 
heritage. As time went on, Coleridge came to accept this common Reformation heritage for 
himself. In Aids to Reflection, in describing his view of Divine Election, rather than positioning 
himself as holding a specifically Calvinist doctrine, he appeals to the broader Reformation 
consensus, stating that “the Doctrines of Calvin on Redemption and the natural state of fallen 
Man, fare in all essential points the same as those of Luther, Zuinglius, and the first Reformers 
collectively” and that this belief was also common to the “Protestant Divines at home [i.e., 
England]” (AR 162). In a note in this section, Coleridge again associates Augustinianism with 
this common Reformed theology, distinguishing between the “Augustinians, or Luthero-
Calvinistic Divines and the Grotians [i.e., Arminians]” (AR 163n). In a note on Leighton’s 
commentary on 1 Peter referring to the same doctrine, Coleridge reiterates that it was “most 
unfairly entitled Calvinism” since it was held commonly by “Luther, Zuinglus, Calvin, Knox, 
Cranmer, and the other Fathers of the Reformation in England” (CM III 515). More thoroughly, 
in Confessions, Coleridge stated that he accepted “the whole Creed or System of Credenda 
received and asserted common to all the Fathers of the Reformation unanimously before me, 
(overlooking the differences between the several reformed Churches overlooked, as indifferent 
or at least non-essential)” (SW&F 1118).  
 Beyond his sentiments regarding the broader temper of his, and the Church of England’s, 
theology, Coleridge highly regarded and drew upon the thinkers that one would expect from 
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evangelicals. Writing about his understanding of John Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress, Coleridge 
stated on June 14, 1830 that  
I know of no Book – the Bible excepted as above all comparison – which I according to my judgement and 
experience could so safely recommend as teaching and enforcing the whole saving Truth according to the 
mind that was in Christ Jesus, as the Pilgrim’s Progress. It is, in my conviction, incomparably the best 
SUMMA THEOLOGIÆ Evangelicæ ever produced by Writer not miraculously inspired (CM I 802). 
 
Furthermore, Coleridge greatly respected John Milton as a theologian as well as a poet. While he 
saw more needing correction in the thought of Richard Baxter, Coleridge still included him 
among “such excellent men as Baxter, Callamy, and the so-called Presbyterian or Puritan 
Divines” (CM II 651). Coleridge read and commented widely in Baxter’s collected works even if 
he sometimes offered significant critiques of Baxter’s theology and ecclesiology.536 Baxter was 
also one of only two thinkers – the other being Luther – whom Coleridge continued to give equal 
emphasis as proposed figures for a spiritual autobiography in 1802 and again in 1803.537 
Coleridge also held Puritanism as a broader movement in high esteem. In the Lectures on 
Philosophy while explaining that the propensity to believe in ghosts and other spectral 
apparitions was due to an inadequate understanding of human psychology in the period before 
the Restoration, Coleridge uses the Puritans to show the universality of such beliefs and that they 
were in no way confined to the superstitious, ignorant, or fanatical. Such stories could be found 
not only in “Luther and the divines of the English Church, but especially among the Puritans,” 
and that these accounts were “combined with so much political wisdom, so much ecclesiastical 
research, and so much genuine piety, that a man must be thoughtless indeed who could find a 
recurrence of such facts and not seek for their explanation” (PL 469).  
																																																						
536 For the extent of Coleridge’s engagement with Baxter, see Coleridge’s Marginalia I, 230-361. In addition to a 
copy of Baxter’s Catholick Theologie, Coleridge owned and annotated two copies of the Reliquiae Baxterianae.  
 
537 John Beer, Editor’s Introduction (AR xlii-xliii). 
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 Coleridge also looked to the kinds of Church of England divines commonly esteemed by 
Anglican Evangelicals. He frequently compared the general Reformation outlook of Church of 
England thinkers prior to the English Civil War and Restoration with an Arminian and Grotian 
system of thought, which Coleridge saw as a “half-way between Popery and Socinianism,” that 
replaced it (CM III 652). Coleridge, in a title page-inscription to his son Derwent, recommended 
the work of Richard Field, a contemporary of Richard Hooker who worked with him to defend 
the legitimacy of the Anglican Church as Protestant. In this inscription, Coleridge proposed that 
“this one Volume [Field’s Of the Church] thoroughly understood and appropriated will place you 
in the highest rank of doctrinal Church of England Divines” and that in this work “here (more 
than in any of the Prelatical and Arminian Divines, from Laud to the death of Charles the 
Second) you will see the strength, and the beauty of the Church of England, i.e. its Liturgy, 
Homilies, and Articles” (CM II 651).  
 Coleridge’s engagement with and appropriation of the work of Robert Leighton deserves 
special treatment. To begin with, Coleridge praises Leighton even more than Bunyan, stating in 
his marginal notes on Leighton’s work that “surely if ever Work not in the sacred Canon might 
suggest a belief of Inspiration, of something more than human, this is it” (CM III 508). Leighton 
proved so significant for Coleridge that the most extensive published work expounding his 
theological views, the Aids to Reflection, grew out of his originally intended collection of 
excerpts from Leighton for a certain “Beauties of Leighton.”538 While transforming into Aids to 
Reflection, which included substantial commentary from Coleridge and aphorisms from a few 
other thinkers such as Jeremy Taylor, this work ultimately retained its original aphoristic 
structure and was still composed around a core body of quotations from Leighton. Coleridge was 
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certainly not simply parroting the Archbishop, but it would also be a mistake not to see Leighton 
as a, if not the, centrally significant theological influence on Coleridge.  
 Robert Leighton provides evidence that Coleridge was within the orbit of Anglican 
Evangelicalism for reasons beyond Coleridge’s having used him to express his theology and the 
esteem in which he held him. Coleridge’s first exposure to Leighton came to him when he was 
loaned a copy of Leighton’s works by a certain William Brame Elwyn during the profound 
spiritual crisis Coleridge experienced from late 1813 until early 1814.539 Coleridge found that 
reading Leighton gave him hope and helped him persevere through his physical and spiritual 
pain.540 Coleridge engaged in regular and extended conversations about Leighton, some of which 
occurred between Coleridge and acknowledged Evangelicals. Coleridge’s interactions with both 
Thomas Methuen and Hannah More have already been pointed out, but it is important to indicate 
that part of what lead these thinkers to appreciate Coleridge’s religious outlook was his 
extensive, and in their estimation correct, familiarity with Leighton. Thomas Methuen recalled 
from 1814-16 the way in which Coleridge exhibited “… familiarity with Leighton and kindred 
religious authors” and that “from the rich, and spiritually speaking, jeweled pages of Leighton, 
he would repeat ample passages.”541 Hannah More stated that in addition to Coleridge having 
shown “considerable acquaintance” with Evangelicalism, it pleased her to learn that Coleridge 
“had stayed up till 4 that morning reading ArchBp Leighton which Mr. Elwin [sic] whose 
favorite Author he is become, lent him!” (CM III 507). Coleridge was not only acquainting 
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himself with a luminary author for Anglican Evangelicals; he was forming his opinions about 
Leighton in conversation with Evangelicals.  
 Coleridge shared with the larger evangelical movement the same (religious) opponents. 
Evangelicals squared off against the explicitly “rationalist” religious movements such as Deism, 
Socinianism, and Unitarianism. It hardly seems necessary to point out here that Coleridge 
opposed Unitarianism and Socinianism; numerous passages already quoted have pointed to this 
fact. Coleridge did not even see these movements as rising to the status of deformed versions of 
Christianity, saying in the Biographia Literaria that “if the Doctrines, the sum of which I believe 
to constitute the Truth in Christ, be Christianity, then Unitarianism is not, and vice versâ” (BL 
246). Speaking to Socinianism as a theological system, Coleridge told his brother-in-law George 
Fricker in 1806 that “I read the New Testament again [after increasing misgivings about 
Unitarianism], and I became fully convinced, that Socinianism was not only not the doctrine of 
the New Testament, but that it scarcely deserved the name of a religion in any sense” (CL II 
1189). 
However, Coleridge spent much more space arguing against those claims to Christian 
belief and practice that emphasized an external scheme of rules without requiring the practitioner 
to move beyond self-interested motives. In this opposition Coleridge stands with the evangelical 
challenge to what they saw as the predominant claimant to “Christianity” in the 18th century. 
Namely, they challenged the dominant theological system, whether put forward by academic 
theologians (such as Paley) or preached and believed, that proposed a kind of utilitarian ethics 
whereby Christianity ensured the following of the moral law by holding out the reward of heaven 
and the punishment of hell. 18th century thinkers generally had a sense that Christianity added 
something that would not be possible without revealed religion, whether that was the revelation 
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of further moral laws or the possibility of the grace of forgiveness to address the weakness of our 
nature preventing perfect obedience to this law. In any case, even with the more orthodox 
Latitudinarians who held to all human actions requiring divine assistance, this belief in 
Christianity as support for following the moral law almost universally involved the sense that 
salvation (or justification) was contingent upon moral behavior accomplished in some way 
through inherent human capacities. In challenging this scheme, there were really two separate 
critiques that evangelicals leveled, viz., the critique of reducing Christianity to mere self-
interested morality and the challenge to salvation through works.  
Looking again to Wesley and Wilberforce, one sees a strong rejection of this “self-
interested” Christianity. John Wesley asserted that there is not only the division between the 
“almost Christian” and the “Christian altogether,” but between both of these and those with the 
outward signs of Christianity but who work wholly from self-interest. In all three of these cases 
there is no significant difference in outward behavior: All three classes of people speak honestly, 
seek to follow the dictates of justice, avoid excess, actively do good, and pray, worship, and 
make use of the means of grace regularly.542 The motivation from which these actions flow 
distinguishes these three categories. Wesley importantly sees those who do these things in such a 
way as to never rise above self-interest as not only not even almost Christian, but not even rising 
to the level of heathen morality. To this class of people, Wesley applies the quote, “Oderunt 
peccare boni, virtutis amore;/ Oderunt peccare mali, formidine ponae [Good people hate sinning 
(doing bad) out of a love of virtue; evil people hate sinning (doing bad) from dread of 
punishment].”543 You do not even rise to being almost Christian (and thus not thoroughly wicked 
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in intention) unless you also do all these things from a sincere and “real design to serve God.”544 
Being a “Christian altogether” involves doing all of these things out of a true love of God “as 
engrosses the whole heart, as rakes up all the affections, as fills the entire capacity of the soul 
and employs the utmost extent of all its faculties.”545 Similarly, William Wilberforce, in 
describing the way in which real Christianity has been replaced with a system whereby “a man 
admit in general terms the truth of Christianity, though he know not or consider much the 
particulars of the system; and if he be not habitually guilty of any of the grosser vices against his 
fellow creatures, we have no great reason to be dissatisfied with him, or to question the validity 
of the name and consequent privileges of a Christian.”546 This false system of Christianity 
removes “the generous wakeful spirit of Christian benevolence” and instead “a system of decent 
selfishness is avowedly established in its stead.”547  
 In a way that echoes this evangelical sentiment, Coleridge fully rejects the notion of 
“schemes of conduct, grounded on calculation of Self-interest; or on the average Consequences 
of Actions” being used as a system of “Moral Science” (AR 293). While such systems may be 
important and justified as a “branch of Political Economy,” when they are referred to the higher 
sphere of morality “they are in all cases foreign, and when substituted for it, hostile” (AR 293). 
True morality, that is, a system that secures truly moral (good) action, “springs out of the ‘perfect 
Law of Freedom,’ which exists only by its unity with the Will of God, its inherence in the Word 
of God, and its communion with the Spirit of God” (AR 294). The goodness or badness of 
actions do not originate, with regard to the individual agent, in whether the effects of the actions 
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are “constructive, destructive or neutral,” but in the originating will. Any act that truly comes 
from a will subordinated to the Will of God is good, while any that “proceeds from a false centre 
in the Agent’s particular Will, is EVIL,” and it seems here that actions that arise from self-
interest are just such actions (AR 294). One can see that Coleridge has Paley’s system of self-
interested morality squarely in his sights from the title of the aphorism from which this argument 
is taken, viz., “APHORISM XII: PALEY NOT A MORALIST” (AR 293).548 
 While Coleridge, Wesley, and Wilberforce reject moral schema that fail to transcend self-
interest as the source of activity, none of them believed that Christianity should fully exclude 
self-interest. John Wesley understood that in the true Christian all actions and affections would 
flow from love of God, but this was not meant to exclude regard for one’s wellbeing. Even 
though love of neighbor or “social love” was to be distinguished as “absolutely, essentially 
different from self-love,” there is still a self-love “of the most allowable kind.”549 Additionally, 
Wesley allowed for there to be a special regard for “relations, friend and benefactors” and “a 
fervent love of [the Christian’s] country” even within the love of neighbor “not confined to one 
sect or party, not restrained to those who agree with him in opinions, or in outward modes of 
worship, or to those who are allied to him by blood or recommended by nearness of place.”550 
Using more Augustinian language about the proper subordination of various intramundane 
concerns, Wilberforce also puts forward a view of proper Christian love that does not eliminate 
self-regard even as it does not let it be the motivating (or primary motivating) force:  
																																																						
548 Coleridge also challenges eudemonistic systems that move the reward or punishment for good and bad behavior 
from heaven and hell to the happiness that is the natural result of good behavior. Coleridge affirms that it is true and 
indeed a good that the life of virtue will bring with it many inner and outer advantages, but it is impossible to turn 
these consequences of virtue into “our proper and primary motives for such acts and determinations, without 
destroying or entirely altering the distinct nature and character of the latter” (AR 52-3). 
 
549 Wesley, A Plain Account, I.6. 
 
550 Wesley, A Plain Account, I.5. 
		264 
It is not merely however the fear of misery, and the desire of happiness, by which [real Christians] are 
actuated in their endeavors to excel in all holiness; they love it for its own sake, nor is it solely by the sense 
of self-interest (this though often unreasonably condemned, is but it must be confessed of a principle of an 
inferior order) that they are influenced in their determination to obey the will, and to cultivate the favour of 
God.551 
 
It is not that the proper love of God eliminates other concerns, but rather affections should be so 
ordered that they are “supremely fixed on God,” and that this fixation be “the leading and 
governing desire and primary pursuit” of everything else that we do and desire.552 
 Coleridge shares this sense of the way in which this higher principle should control the 
lower without eliminating self-interest; he is likewise not opposed to self-interest per se, but only 
to self-interest that does not lead to its self-transcendence. There is a prudence “that stands in 
opposition to a higher moral life, and tends to preclude it,” and this is an “EVIL PRUDENCE.” 
However, there is also a neutral kind of prudence, “not incompatible with spiritual growth,” and 
finally a prudence that “co-exits with morality, as morality co-exits with the spiritual life: a 
prudence that is the organ of both, as the understanding is to the reason and the will, or as the 
lungs are to the heart and the brain” (AR 38-9). Here is Coleridge’s description of his more 
Augustinian understanding of the love of God as that which should properly order the will. This 
seems to be the principle behind Coleridge’s affirmation that the ascending scale of the various 
forms of faith, leading to the truest sense of faith as fidelity to God, do not at higher levels 
necessarily completely subsume or replace the lower. Instead, each lower level is only harmful 
and in need of correction when it attempts to supersede the demands of the higher (SW&F 844).  
 However, Coleridge not only puts forward this as it were synchronic view of proper 
prudence or self-interest, but also a means whereby self-interest can serve a diachronic or 
developmental purpose for the Christian. While this is of an inferior order to the prudence that 
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coexists with a proper Love of God as its analogous organ, it is still of a high value for growth 
into spiritual maturity. Coleridge refers to this as a “faithful, a WISE PRUDENCE, having, 
indeed its birth-place in the world, and the wisdom of this world for its father; but naturalized in a 
better land, and having the wisdom from above for its Sponsor and Spiritual Parent” (AR 38-9). 
Coleridge provides in a September 1829 notebook entry an abbreviated way in which this 
development progresses according to what are the practical means for fostering each level of 
spiritual development. It will be more helpful to simply list the entry in its totality: 
1. To <gross> Sinners.—by the plain light of Common Sense & of natural Conscience, supposing only the 
belief of a Holy God & a Spirit Soul that survives the dissolution of the Body to show the terrific lot that 
cannot but await the Persons who are in habits of committing crimes—specifying the crimes, & proving by 
the effects in this life what their consequences must be, in a state where there is no Hope — —To such men 
the Law must be sheen in its terrors—& Faith in Christ offered as a rescue from Perdition.  
2. When the mind is awakened, and turns toward Christ, then to prevent the fearful mistake that a forsaking 
of these gross vices so produced will suffice, to preach the Law in it’s [sic] Holiness—to show what is 
demanded of us, and it is does demand all this of us.—“I hope, I am pretty tolerably good for a man”—as a 
Pers Horse is as good as can be expected of a Horse of this Sort.—This is the delusion which must be 
rooted out God knows that we are poor and imperfect & erring creatures—Yes! God does know this, and to 
a far more fearful extent than we know it of ourselves; but God likewise knows, that this imperfection, i.e. 
these Sins and sinful weaknesses, are the effects and consequences of our own Guilt—But what wonder if 
the doctrine of Faith Gospel should be resisted by those, who either deny or explain away the foundation of 
our need of his Gospel, the Article of original Sin—of a Sin, not arising out of our circumstances, but 
having it’s origin in ourselves, and of which these circumstances, are far rather the result.—When the 
demands of the Law on the spiritual Man are set forth, then to compare our best works, as done without 
Faith, with these demands—and then to preach Faith as the ground of Hope, the hope of everlasting Life in 
and thro’ the righteousness of Christ. 
3. Lastly, & to such minds to preach Faith a unto Sanctification—(as in the 2nd page of the third lead, 
counting backwards—)—Faith alone can save us, because Faith never is nor can be alone. —And this 
presence is communicated to an individual Soul must needs appear & act as a Seed. This manifestation of 
Infinites in the Finite is a most fertile & ferocious Truth — Think only of the infinite power of Vegetable 
Life in the first Acorn —the formative power must be conceived in that, as all in one—(So the infinitude of 
the Son of God in Christ/ = the fullness of the Godhead bodily)—But now the same powers must be 
conceived as one in all. But the manifestation of both must be a Seed (CN V 6086). 
 
Coleridge conceives of a movement whereby self-interest, by means of fear of one’s eternal 
punishment and the hope of reward and salvation from punishment can give way to the life of 
what can become good deeds if they come to flow from an inner principle of true Faith.  
 The other half of the evangelical critique of popular Christianity was the vigorous 
rejection of any Christianity that made salvation, justification, or repentance contingent upon 
some good works. Wesley stated that while “the Deists, Arians, or Socinians” are certainly to be 
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considered enemies of true Christianity, he saw them as too obviously opposed to true 
Christianity to be worthy of comment. Those “who are accounted the pillars of our Church, and 
champions of our faith” but who “betray the Church, and sap the very foundation of the faith we 
are taught thereby” were the greater threats to true Christianity.553 Referring specifically to 
Tillotson, but speaking about a broader sentiment put forward by “men of renown,” Wesley 
pointed to their attempt to demonstrate that “not faith alone, but good works also, are necessary 
in order to justification,” which has the effect of sapping “the very foundation of our Church, by 
attacking its fundamental d[octrine], and, indeed, the fundamental [doctrine] of all Reformed 
Churches, viz., the doctrine of justification by faith alone.”554  
Wilberforce provided as much, if not more, of a challenge to this loss of the 
“fundamental doctrine of all Reformed Churches.” Wilberforce does not give a single summary 
like Wesley of the challenge to the doctrine of justification by faith alone, but that is only 
because he instead critiques at length the component parts that constitute such a rejection. First, 
he challenges the “bulk of professed Christians” who are “used to speaking of man as a being, 
who naturally pure, and inclined to all virtue, is sometimes, almost involuntarily, drawn out of 
the right course, or is overpowered by the violence of temptation.”555 Wilberforce directly 
contrasts this conception of humanity to the properly Christian understanding that “man is an 
apostate creature, fallen from high from his original, degraded in his nature, and depraved in his 
faculties, indisposed to good, and disposed to evil.”556 Rather than seeing Christ’s death as the 
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only means of effecting the forgiveness of sins and occasioning the restoring power of the Holy 
Spirit, these nominal Christians “really rest their eternal hopes on a vague, general persuasion of 
the unqualified mercy of the Supreme Being” or, “still more erroneously, they rely, in the main, 
on their own negative or positive merits.”557 Nominal Christians do not recognize there are 
“many shades of difference between those who flatly renounce, and those who cordially embrace 
the doctrine of Redemption by Christ.”558 Because nominal Christians do not explicitly reject 
Christ’s redemptive work by believing that Christ’s death effected a “new dispensation, wherein 
[these Christians] will be tried by a more lenient rule than to that by which they would otherwise 
have been subject,” they mistakenly believe that they are accepting an appropriately Reformation 
doctrine of justification by faith.559 
Coleridge also spends considerable space arguing against what he saw as variously 
“Arminian,” “Grotian,” or “Paleo-Grotian”560 systems of thought within Christianity, almost 
always putting these systems of thought in a kind of middle position between orthodox 
Protestantism and Socinianism. In an exposition of the Arminianism of Jeremy Taylor (which he 
does tie to that of Laud and one may assume to 18th century Arminians), Coleridge explicitly 
claims that the problem of this way of thinking is that in it “man is to do every thing” and that it 
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human depravity rather than on the traditional reformed understanding of the doctrine.  
 
557 Wilberforce, Real Christianity, III.4. 
 
558 Wilberforce, Real Christianity, III.4. 
 
559 Wilberforce, Real Christianity, III.4. 
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is “bonâ fide Pelagianism” that “reduces the cross of Christ to nothing” (CM V 589, 596). That 
he saw this as descriptive not only of Taylor, but in his day of all (or the majority) of Church of 
England clergy who were not Evangelicals, is indicated in his letter regarding the creed of 
Methuen, where the “sober” non-Evangelical clergy were of the “Religio Grotiana [Grotian 
Religion],” which went farther toward a semi-Roman Catholicism and semi-Socinianism than 
even the thought of Arminius, who himself deviated from the common teachings of all other 
Reformers (CL IV 567-8). With Arminianism and its victory over Calvinism in the “higher 
orders of Christians” came “a finer form of the old doctrine of meritorious works” (CN IV 5385). 
It is now appropriate to turn to Coleridge’s understanding and practice of piety, both 
personal and corporate. It is in the practice of piety that Anglican Evangelicals (particularly 
moderates) most represented a distinct modulation of the larger evangelical movement. If one 
can speak of 18th and early 19th century evangelical piety as consisting of an emphasis on 
preaching and hymn singing in worship, intense devotional study of the Bible, and the 
importance of prayer and introspection, then Evangelicals, especially moderates, were 
characterized by a more reserved approach to these things and a greater regard for formal 
liturgical and ecclesial structures.  
Returning to Walsh’s contrast between the Anglican Evangelicals and their dissenting 
(primarily Wesleyan Methodist) counterparts, one sees an overriding attempt to temper or 
moderate the excesses (perceived and, in certain cases, real) of “irregular” or “enthusiastic” 
evangelical practices. In opposition to any expectation of extraordinary manifestations and 
revelations of the Spirit, Evangelicals largely confined the work of the Spirit to the “regular, 
constituted ‘means of grace;’ private prayer, public worship, the sacraments, above all the study 
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of the Bible.”561 Evangelical clergy avoided the “unruly immediatism of popular piety,” 
particularly the “fraternal, egalitarian pietism of Methodists” which “stood for a simple 
receptivity to divine influence, an expectant openness which anticipated personal encounters 
with God not only within the prescribed ‘means of grace,’ but outside them as well; at any hour, 
in any place, however incongruous.”562 In some instances this increased emphasis on regularity 
and proper institutional mediation only affected the venue and not the form of piety. While 
Anglican Evangelicals could be averse to the itinerancy, field-preaching, and use of lay 
preachers of the Methodist Revival, they remained committed to the importance of a particular 
form of preaching. “All the Evangelicals were convinced of the primacy of preaching,” says 
Horton Davies in his study of worship in modern and contemporary England.563 Like the strong 
emotionalism and even theatricality of Whitfield, Evangelicals came to be known for 
“passionately sincere preaching that evinced a true love for souls,” even if they returned to 
manuscript preaching rather than extemporaneity when “preaching without notes came to be 
identified with Methodism.”564 Similarly, Evangelicals emphasized theological themes – above 
all the cross of Christ – “in contrast to the moral preaching of Tillotson.”565 
As early as 1810, Coleridge was rejecting moralistic preaching in favor of doctrinal 
sermons, specifically those sermons labeled “Methodist.” Coleridge stated that “never were 
either Ministers or Congregations so strict in all morality as at the hour when nothing but fine 
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moral discourses (i.e. calculations on Self-love) would have driven a Preacher from the Pulpit—
& when the Clergy thought it their duty, to preach Christ & him crucified” (CN III 3790). More 
telling, however, than Coleridge’s individual statements or reflections regarding his attitude 
toward Evangelical preaching was his relationship with Edward Irving, an extremely charismatic 
minister in the Church of Scotland whose own exceptionally theatrical and emotional preaching 
style came about in part from his relationship with Coleridge. Irving reported that Coleridge 
proved “more profitable to my faith in orthodox doctrine, to my spiritual understanding of the 
Word of God…than any or all of the men with whom I have entertained friendship and 
conversation…”.566 Bebbington places Irving not only as one of evangelicalism’s most important 
early 19th century orators, but also one of the main figures propagating the ideas that shifted the 
movement away from moderate Evangelicalism, including millenarianism, an emphasis on 
prophecy and “supernaturalism,” and a stricter biblical literalism.567  
Coleridge certainly respected Irving’s gifts as a speaker, calling him “the greatest 
Orator” he had ever heard (CL V 286). Indeed, Coleridge took a special interest in seeking out 
opportunities to hear Irving preach while he was living at Highgate. While Coleridge was 
thinking extensively about Christian theology in the early 1820s (but before making his return to 
full communion with the Church of England), he still did not attend services regularly. Even then 
Coleridge made an exception for Irving, whom “Gillman drove him to hear preach at the Scotch 
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Chapel in Hatton Garden in 1823.”568 However, Coleridge’s respect for Irving did not stop with 
his oratorical skill. He commented extensively on Irving’s published works569 and gave Irving 
“unfeigned and earnest respect” (CM III 26). This respect extended to a description of Irving in 
Aids to Reflection as “a mighty Wrestler in the cause of Spiritual Religion and Gospel morality, 
in whom more than in any other Contemporary I have seen the spirit of LUTHER revived” (AR 
378n). Coleridge’s respect for the religious content of his preaching may indicate that he 
appreciated preaching that was more emotionally vivid than even moderate Evangelicals 
normally provided. At the very least, it shows that Coleridge was not averse to Evangelical 
modes of preaching and gave the hearing of sermons an important place in his life even when he 
was not regularly attending other services. Such an inference is strengthened by Coleridge’s 
understanding of Irving as a gifted speaker and as a great spiritual example. It would seem 
strange that Coleridge would approve both of Irving’s method of delivery and (for the most part) 
the content of his preaching and yet disapprove of such preaching more generally.  
 In other ways, the appreciation for a more “orderly” evangelicalism meant that distinctive 
(for the 18th and early 19th century) evangelical practices of piety were tempered by the desire to 
conform to proper forms of worship as prescribed by the Book of Common Prayer. Unlike early 
Methodist services of extemporaneous prayer, preaching, testimony, and hymn singing, which 
formed the basis of Methodist public worship when they became their own church, Anglican 
Evangelicals did not seek separate forms of public worship; rather they sought ways to 
incorporate these distinctive emphases into proper public Prayer Book worship or into parallel 
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private devotion. Evangelicals did follow the Wesleyan and Calvinist Methodists in publishing 
their own hymn books, and they had their own hymn writers, but their distinctive contribution 
was on emphasizing the “introduction of hymnody into Anglican services,” and in so doing they 
“enabled the people to take a larger part in worship than had hitherto been their right.”570 This 
was in contrast to the standard (non-Evangelical) Anglican practice, in part sustained by 
association between Methodist “Enthusiasm” and hymn-singing, of avoiding congregational 
singing. As recorded in The Early Evangelicals, there were certainly many in the 18th-century 
Church of England who opposed hymn singing on the grounds that “all ancient hymns were 
Popish and all modern hymns are Puritan.”571 Davies states, “In the first three decades of the 
nineteenth century the standard of congregational praise was deplorable,” with some 
congregations not even standing for it.572 Emblematic of this larger attitude, Davies points to 
Berridge’s Preface to the Collection of Divine Songs, where he states that “Psalm-singing is 
become a vulgar business in our churches. The tax of praise is collected from a solitary clerk of 
some bawling voices in a singing loft: the congregation may listen if they please or talk in 
whispers or take a gentle nap.”573 
 On the point of the use not only of music, but of hymnody, Coleridge advanced a view of 
congregational song that saw the importance both of hymnody and of fuller congregational 
participation through music in worship. In an entry from his Table Talk from May 30, 1830, 
Coleridge stated: 
Is it not most extraordinary that the Church of England should so utterly disregard congregational singing! 
that in that particular part of the public worship in which, more than in all the rest, the common people 
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might and ought to join-which by its association with music is meant to give a fitting vent and expression to 
the Emotions-that in this part, I say-we should all sing as Jews! In Germany, the hymns are known by heart 
by every peasant; they advise, they argue from the hymns, and every soul in the church praises God like a 
Christian with words which are natural and yet sacred to his mind! (TT I 150). 
 
That Coleridge was not simply speaking about singing metrical Psalms can be gathered first from 
the original sentence that was prefaced to the 1835 edition of this entry in the Table Talk, where 
Coleridge states that “Luther did as much for the Reformation by his hymns as by his translation 
of the Bible” (TT I 150n6). Coleridge expressed that hymns were specifically important for 
Christian worship when he stated that “you know my veneration for the Book of Psalms, or most 
of it; but with some half dozen exceptions, the Psalms are surely not adequate vehicles of 
Christian thanksgiving and joy! Upon this deficiency in our service, Wesley and Whitfield 
seized; and you know it is the hearty congregational singing of Christian hymns which keeps the 
humbler Methodists together” (TT II 103-4).  
The desire to preserve the orderliness of Prayer Book worship led to one of the main 
distinguishing features of Anglican Evangelicalism: the importance of different approaches to 
public and private prayer, as well as an emphasis on family prayer and devotion. “The Anglican 
Evangelicals may be said to have hit on the happy notion of requiring the Liturgy in public 
prayers and extemporary devotions in informal gatherings, such as family prayers.”574 Family 
devotions took a distinctive form among Anglican Evangelicals; its form and depth as it arose in 
the thought and practice of “such men as Wilberforce and Shaftesbury is revealed by their 
diaries: they show how highly they regarded periods of prayer, Bible-reading and meditation.”575 
While this family and individual prayer was often extemporaneous or not directly taken from the 
Book of Common Prayer, one can still see the influence of the general structure of Anglican 
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devotion in Evangelical practices. Echoing the structure of morning and evening prayer in the 
Prayer Book, family prayer occurred “most frequently at breakfast or in the evening, or both, 
often with the servants present.”576 Evangelicals rejected any mere formalism or unthinking (or 
better unfeeling) ritualistic recitation of the liturgy or prayers, but their use of extemporaneous 
prayers in the home did not come out of a sense of the inadequacy of the structured liturgy. 
Evangelicals may have thought that one needed to truly pray and not only say the words of the 
Prayer Book in the liturgy and at home, but they did not share the Presbyterian feeling at the 
Savoy Conference that using only established forms of prayer in public worship “is not enough 
to warm the heart aright; and cold prayers are likely to have a cold return.”577 Instead, 
Evangelicals held the Prayer Book in the highest regard as the formula for public worship and 
the plan for private devotion. The leading members of the first generation of Anglican 
Evangelicals “were assiduous in their reading of the Book of Common Prayer,” and the second 
generation was “even more enthusiastic in its admiration for the Prayer Book.”578  
 Evangelicals linked this emphasis on individual and family prayer to a larger conception 
of personal, prayerful devotion. Periods of prayer and meditation occurred in conjunction with 
serious and attentive Bible study and devotional reading. While the Anglican Evangelicals may 
not have insisted on the same need for extemporaneity in all forms of worship to cultivate proper 
religious dispositions, they held in common with the larger evangelical movement the need for 
searching introspection in the life of prayer. Just as Wesley encouraged rigorous self-
examination and prescribed various methods for engaging in this activity, such as journaling, 
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meditating on scripture, etc., John Newton also developed regularly appointed spiritual exercises 
and devotions “used chiefly as a means of disciplined self-examination and a way of focusing his 
religious affections.”579 Evangelicals generally used this time to seek out the marks of growth in 
sanctification; in it evangelicals acted “with a view to discovering the marks of a real change 
made by the Spirit of God.”580 
 Anglican Evangelical piety emphasized public and private prayer, the study of and 
meditation on scripture as a vital part of personal devotion, and an expectation of self-
examination and introspection, all of which Coleridge explicitly prescribed, engaged in, or both. 
Robert Barth has shown Coleridge’s general sense of the importance of prayer to the Christian 
life, and his summary shows a view consonant with that of Evangelicals. Coleridge gave prayer 
great prominence within the Christian life, seeing it, along with the sacraments, as one of the 
“means of sanctification.”581 For Coleridge, prayer was “an act of both God and of man” 
whereby the person is given clarity as to whether appropriate means for accomplishing union 
with God have been chosen.582 In line with the Evangelical sense that prayer required true feeling 
and could never be equated with mere words, Coleridge stated that “Prayer is Faith passing into 
act – a union of the will and the Intellect realizing in an intellectual act. It is the whole man that 
prays; less than this is wishing, or lip work, a Cham, or a mummery” (CM I 702). An anecdote 
reported by his son between Coleridge and his nephew indicates that Coleridge personally 
became highly emotional in his prayers. Coleridge, in speaking to his nephew, said, “Believe me, 
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to pray with all your heart and strength, with the reason and the will, to believe vividly that God 
will listen to your voice through Christ, and verily do the thing he pleaseth thereupon – this is the 
last, the greatest achievement of the Christian’s warfare upon earth. Teach us to pray, Lord!” 
After saying this, Coleridge “burst into a flood of tears, and begged me [Henry] to pray for him” 
(TT II 103n). 
 Coleridge drew distinctions between public and private prayer in much the same way that 
Evangelicals did. In 1810, Coleridge was saying that the problem with the Methodists was that 
by collapsing both forms into each other, they lose “the most heart-elevating part of a Christian’s 
Duty,” which is “that in which he loses for a while his individual and dividuous Self, and 
partakes of the Joys, Sorrows, Hopes, and Exultations of Christ’s ma espoused Church.” The 
Church of England’s advantage is that “the Language of our noble Liturgy is such as applies to 
all men, which all men alike may & ought to utter from their inmost hearts” (CN III 4021). One 
thus sees Coleridge already distinguishing between public and private forms of prayer and 
extolling the virtues of the liturgy as found in the Book of Common Prayer. He would continue 
to hold to the excellency of the Book of Common Prayer for public forms of worship till the end 
of his life. Among his statements in Table Talk, Coleridge said on October 5, 1830 that “I never 
felt the heavenly superiority of the prayers of the English Liturgy, till I had attended some Kirks 
in the country parts of Scotland” (TT I 210). Interestingly, this statement echoes almost exactly 
not only the sentiment but also the circumstances of one by Charles Simeon, who said after a 
visit to Scotland that “I have on my return to the use of our Liturgy… felt it an inestimable 
privilege that we possess a form of sound words, so adapted in every respect to the wants and 
desires of all who would worship God in spirit and truth.”583 
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 For all his respect for the form of public worship, Coleridge did not lack an appreciation 
of the importance of family and private prayers. Again looking to his Table Talk, Coleridge 
indicated on May 30, 1830 that “there are three sorts of Prayer – Public – Domestic –Solitary. 
Each has its peculiar uses and character” (TT I 152). That Coleridge was deeply invested in his 
personal prayer life is made clear by his composition of his own forms of morning and evening 
prayers, as well as at least one “Prayer to Be Said Before a Man Begins his Work.”584 
Furthermore, whatever forms of prayer Coleridge may have read or composed, he also used 
extemporaneity in his personal devotional life. In a letter to Edward Coleridge, he stated that 
“my Prayers had been too little formal, too exclusively meditative, too much of thought and 
feeling, and too little of Will and Striving after furtherance in grace” (CL VI 555-556). This 
statement indicates that Coleridge employed not only various forms, but also attitudes and 
methods in his prayer, all of which would indicate that he was not simply repeating words from 
the Daily Office. An even clearer indication comes from another letter in which Coleridge both 
strongly alludes to extemporaneous elements as part of his daily prayer and also indicates three 
other elements frequently found in Evangelical personal prayer habits, viz., morning and evening 
times of prayer, the use of Scripture585, and introspection:  
Before I pass to worldly concerns of all the supplemental means of comfort and of growth that it has been 
given me to employ, the most fruitful has been the habit of making some one chapter of the Psalms or the 
Prophets, or St John's Gospel, or of St Paul's Epistles a regular part of my morning and my last prayers. 
This interposition of meditation, together with the act of self-examination in determining the 
appropriability of the several verses that either might form or suggest prayer or thanksgiving and previous 
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to the appropriation, I have found most favorable to a devotional state — and among other advantages 
prevents those transient wanderings of the mind and transfers of the conscious attention from the Great 
Being addressed to the words and thoughts themselves & which the sound of one's own voice will at times 
occasion (CL V 725-6).  
 
 Finally, one cannot describe Coleridge’s personal piety without giving due space to 
introspection. This could hardly be more obvious than that Coleridge’s only published work 
expositing his theology at length, Aids to Reflection, was by Coleridge’s own admission written 
for “as many in all classes as wish for aid in disciplining their minds to habits of reflection” (AR 
6). Reflection requires people to fix their attention “on the world within them, to induce them to 
study the processes and superintend the works which they are themselves carrying on in their 
own minds,” and it is a habit built up only with great difficulty (AR 14). This reflective activity 
was not exclusively for what may be considered “purely intellectual matters,” but also involved 
examining one’s behavior and Christian life, since “an hour of solitude passed in sincere silence 
and earnest prayer, or the conflict with, and conquest over, a single passion, or ‘subtle blossom 
sin,’ will teach us more of thought, will more effectually awaken the faculty, and form the habit, 
of reflection, than a year’s study in the schools without them” (AR 16). The result of developing 
this habit of introspection or reflecting is a “full faith in the Divine Word” that will “expand the 
intellect, while it purifie[s] the heart” (AR 18). The growth of the intellect and of proper 
affections are not two independent results of growth in the Christian faith, but “the exercise of 
the reasoning and reflecting powers, increasing insight, and enlarging views, are required to keep 
alive the substantial faith in the heart” (AR 20).  
 A discussion of Coleridge’s devotional life flows naturally into his understanding of the 
sacraments, or, specifically for locating him in the landscape of late 18th and early 19th century 
theological and ecclesial traditions – particularly on his conception of Baptism. A brief 
discussion of Coleridge’s view of the Eucharist is in order as a way of showing that Coleridge 
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played fully within the boundaries of orthodox early 19th century Anglicanism (both Evangelical 
and High Church) and not that he held views that would have been more at home in liberal 
Anglicanism (i.e., Latitudinarian or crypto-Unitarian) or that he may have pre-figured later 
Tracterian views. High Churchmen and Evangelicals were largely of one mind on their 
understanding of the Eucharist. While some mid-18th century High Churchmen maintained the 
Nonjuror position of “Virtualism,” a position whereby the bread and wine, “once set apart by 
consecration, while not changed physically into the body and blood of Our Lord, became so in 
virtue, power and effect.”586 The doctrine of the “Real Presence was taught, but that presence 
was not located in the elements of bread and wine.”587 However, the position that came to 
dominate all forms of orthodox thinking in the early 19th century was “Receptionism,” or the 
teaching of a Real Presence but in a conditional way, such that “the Real Presence was subject to 
the worthiness of the recipient of the eucharist.”588 This position would have been natural for the 
Evangelicals since it was put forward by the early framers of Anglican theology, namely Hooker 
and Daniel Waterland.589 Some of the Hackney Phalanx came under the influence of Virtualism, 
but most even within this group came to “prefer the rival doctrine of receptionism.”590  
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  Coleridge’s most concise view of the Eucharist can probably be found in a Notebook 
entry from October 1819 in which he said, “If we may trust the Table Talk, Luther himself 
taught at last the true christian doctrine of the Sacrament – Christus est spiritualiter in 
Sacramento – quo modo, non nobis est perscrutari. Rem credimus: modum nescimus [Christ is 
spiritually in the sacrament, it is not for us to study carefully how. We believe the 
occurrence/fact: we do not know the manner]” (CN IV 4599; translation mine). This he saw as 
not only Luther’s doctrine, but of the Church of England itself. Coleridge noted in his copy of 
Jeremy Taylor’s works that “I say, again and again, that I myself greatly prefer the general 
doctrine of our own Church, respecting the Eucharist.—Rem credimus, modum nescimus, to 
either the Trans-(or Con-)subt.n on the one hand, or to the mere signum or memoriæ causâ of the 
Sacrementaries591 <on the other>” (CM V 554). That Coleridge held that the bread and wine in 
the Eucharist only become the Eucharist through being received in faith is seen in yet another 
statement on Taylor’s work in which he uses the Eucharist as an example to argue against 
Baptism being Baptism merely by nature of the ritual itself. He states that “Surely the wafer & 
the tea-spoonful of wine might be swallowed by an Infant, as well as water sprinkled upon him. 
But if the Former is not the Eucharist because without Faith & Repentance, so cannot the latter 
be Baptism. For they are declared equal Adjuncts of both Sacraments” (CM V 652). Here 
Coleridge clearly believes that faith and repentance were necessary for a reception of the 
Eucharist as Eucharist (and indeed of Baptism as Baptism).  
 In terms of locating Coleridge within either a High Church or Evangelical understanding 
of Baptism, it seems quite clear that Coleridge stood firmly within the range of Evangelical 
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positions. It will be remembered that views of Baptism were the primary distinguishing 
sacramental point between Evangelicals and High Churchmen in the early 19th century. High 
Churchmen held to a strict and all-encompassing view of baptismal regeneration, following the 
language of the liturgy of Baptism. Looking forward to the later Tracterian understanding of 
baptismal regeneration, which can fairly be asserted of earlier High Church positions, the belief 
was that in Baptism “a child or adult lost the stain of original sin… by the power of the Holy 
Spirit.”592 Here the appeal was made to the baptismal liturgy in the Prayer Book and the 
catechism, in which “an infant is declared regenerate at the end of the ceremony” and that 
“baptism is the occasion of our new birth,” with the liturgy applying to the former and the 
catechism to the latter.593 The dividing line was drawn by the absolute position taken by most in 
the High Church camp: Any separation between regenerative grace and the rite of Baptism belied 
an “anti-sacramental animus and a rejection of the spiritual prerogatives of priesthood.”594 The 
High Church view of baptismal regeneration intimately linked the regenerative grace to the rite 
itself. Evangelicals, on the other hand, held to a range of positions. Some believed that some sort 
of regenerative grace was conferred through the Rite, but that this grace was not necessarily and 
always linked to it, while others saw Baptism as only “proleptic and anticipatory in meaning, a 
kind of charter of Gospel privileges to be appropriated fully on attaining maturity.”595  
 That Coleridge rejected the hard line of the High Church position is almost undeniable. 
The quote about faith and repentance in relation to the Eucharist in the preceding paragraphs 
																																																						
592 Davies, Theology and Worship, II, I.270. 
 
593 Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Britain, 9.  
 
594 Nockles, Oxford Movement, 230.  
 
595 Davies, Worship and Theology, II, I.226. Davies here seems to be speaking about infant Baptism specifically; one 
can assume that in those instances of adult Baptism, the Baptism serves as an outward sign and recognition of the 
inward regeneration brought about through repentance and faith.  
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clearly demonstrates that Coleridge saw no necessary relationship between the Rite performed by 
the priest and grace bestowed by God. At other points, Coleridge affirmed that any belief that 
“the mystic water would cleanse the baptized person from all sin and (if he died immediately 
after the performance of the ceremony,) would send him pure and spotless into the other world” 
is to be rejected vigorously as “Superstition” (AR 369). In commenting on Taylor, he said that 
any implication that the Holy Spirit “is said to operate simply & without the co-operation of the 
Subject” is “rank Enthusiasm” (CM V 652). Moreover, Coleridge indicates that no grace that can 
be conveyed through Baptism is in any way necessary in and of itself for Christian salvation. “In 
the strictest sense of essential,” it is “such a faith in Christ as tends to produce a conformity to his 
holy doctrines and example in heart and life, and which faith is itself a declared mean and 
condition of our partaking of his spiritual body” that is “alone the essential in Christianity” (AR 
366-7). It is “neither the outward ceremony of Baptism, under any form or circumstance, nor any 
other ceremony” that “properly makes us Christians” (AR 366). The only time when a failure to 
be baptized would indicate that one is not saved is when this “omission should arise from a spirit 
of disobedience,” rather than the lack of opportunity or knowledge of the fittingness of 
undergoing the Rite, and “in this case it is the cause, not the effect, the wilful and un baptized 
Heart, not the unbaptizing hand, that perils it” (AR 367).  
 The question at hand, then, is not whether he should be positioned in the Evangelical or 
High Church camp; rather, it is whether Coleridge should be located nearer the Evangelical 
position that allowed some room for Baptismal regeneration or the position that almost wholly 
rejected it. It seems fair to locate Coleridge much closer to the latter than the former. Coleridge 
believed that the external Rite and ceremony was, for the one being baptized at least, only a 
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sprinkling of water without an interior faith and repentance, and it is faith and repentance alone 
that properly speaking were the conditions for saving grace.  
 Coleridge’s most extensive argument about the nature of Baptism occurs in Aids to 
Reflection, and it is from this argument that one can gain a greater sense that he actually should 
be placed in the non-Regenerationist camp. Coleridge writes for a hypothetical interlocutor who 
is “a born and bred Baptist, and paternally descended from the old orthodox non-Conformists” 
who had come to Coleridge seeking his opinions on infant baptism when his wife, a member of 
the Church of England, desired that their first child be baptized (AR 361). This set-up already 
frames the issue such that Coleridge’s understanding of the relationship between faith, 
repentance, and Baptism shifts the argumentative burden to the person wanting to maintain infant 
Baptism. He concedes that from a scriptural point of view or from the witness of the “Apostolic 
age,” he cannot marshal firm and definitive proof for infant Baptism, and even if one supposes it 
to have been used during this early period of Christianity, it was “of comparatively rare 
occurrence”; the most that Scripture and the Apostolic witness can definitively provide is that 
they provide no express condemnation of infant baptism (AR 364-5). At the same time, 
Coleridge believed that there are good reasons for keeping the practice. Appealing to the 
authority of the Reformers, Coleridge believed that infant Baptism could not have contained 
anything “fatal or imminently perilous to Salvation,” because otherwise they would have shared 
with the Radical Reformers a rejection of the practice (AR 376). Additionally, Infant Baptism 
has positive aspects, viz., it indicated to the world that the Church considers an individual a 
member of the Church; and it marked out this individual for the special “Dearness, that watchful 
and disciplinary Love and Loving-kindness, which over and above the affections and duties of 
Philanthropy and Universal Charity, Christ himself had enjoined” (AR 370).  
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 What Coleridge thinks happens in Infant Baptism is highly reminiscent of the “lower” 
Evangelical view that “the ordinance was proleptic and anticipatory in meaning, a kind of charter 
of Gospel privileges to be appropriated fully on attaining maturity.”596 Coleridge made 
statements in various places about his understanding of (infant) Baptism that conform to this 
description. In a letter to Thomas Methuen, Coleridge states that “the [Baptismal] prayer 
evidently implies that the actual operation of the Spirit is future and conditional. The whole 
prayer is prospective — ‘Grant that this child may receive the fulness of grace;’ and therefore all 
that follows may rationally, and in my opinion ought to be, likewise understood as prospective” 
(CL IV 582).597 Furthermore, in his notes on Jeremy Taylor, he stated that, referring to baptized 
infants, “the Spirit is promised to them, first as Protection & Providence, and as internal 
Operation when those faculties are developed, in & by which the Spirit co-operates” (CM V 
652). Coleridge partially rejected the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration because he saw it as 
not only superstition, but needless superstition. Because children until a certain age had not fully 
developed rationality, they were not yet co-operant subjects (CM V 653).598  
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597 There are two aspects of this letter that point even more favorably toward Coleridge’s not only having rejected a 
necessary link between Baptism and regeneration, but having rejected baptismal regeneration all together. Coleridge 
speaks of attempting to refute “our opponents” on the question of Baptism, which indicates that he held to a 
substantially similar view of Baptism as Methuen. One of the points that Methuen’s son makes about his father’s 
theological position was that, despite his not having been a strict Calvinist, he nevertheless “looked also upon the 
doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration as the food of self-righteousness, and it is perhaps not too strong to say that he 
abhorred it” (Methuen, 222). Furthermore, in this letter Coleridge speaks of arguing against the positions of Bishop 
Mant and his understanding of the liturgy. Mant was a High Church controversialist who held that anyone who did 
not accept the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration was a heretic, and he explicitly targeted the Evangelicals, whom 
he saw as “reducing the Sacrament to a bare sign” (Ervine, 64).  
 
598 Coleridge held this view strongly, going so far as to say that instances of a young child who received the Spirit, 
such as was recorded about Daniel, had to have resulted from God having “miraculously hastened the development 
of his understanding” (CM V 653). Thus, while Coleridge did not believe that the infant could have the gracious 
working of the Spirit on his or her consciousness because there was not properly speaking a consciousness to work 
upon, this also meant that one need not fear for children who died prior to Baptism being damned. Infants are “free 
from and incapable of crime” and in whom original sin “was present only as potential being”; it only became actual 
with the emergence of a cooperative subject and true human consciousness (AR 372). 
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  One of the main points that has to be reconciled with Coleridge’s holding to the 
Evangelical view of Baptism that was farthest from the High Church position was that those 
Evangelicals who held to this view almost always placed an extremely high value on the 
conversion experience. What, then, should one do with Coleridge’s PRECAUTIONARY 
REMARK towards the beginning of Aids to Reflection in which he stated that “we meddle not 
with the dispute respecting conversion, whether, and in what sense, necessary in all Christians” 
(AR 33). Nevertheless, he goes on to say that “it is sufficient for our purpose, that a very large 
number of men even in Christian countries need to be converted, and that not a few, we trust, 
have been” (AR 33). On the surface, Coleridge would seem to be leaving some room for 
conversion not to be necessary for all people. However, what is likely going on is not a rejection 
of conversion per se as an individual’s personal repentance leading to faith in the redeeming 
power of Christ and being born anew in the Spirit. This Coleridge certainly thought was 
necessary for the beginning of true Christianity. Instead, Coleridge appears to use “conversion” 
in a stricter sense of meaning “instantaneous conversion” whereby someone is convicted of their 
sin, repents, and receives faith in an extremely short period of time. Speaking of the examples of 
most of the Apostles other than Paul, Coleridge understood them to have been made apostles by 
being “carved out…by degrees and in the course of time” (AR 33n). Furthermore, Coleridge 
speaks about the expectation of conversion becoming “fanatical and dangerous, only when rare 
and extraordinary exceptions are made to be the general rule,” namely when “a conversion begun 
and completed in the same moment is demanded and expected of all men” (AR 33). Coleridge 
suggests that just as “under many circumstances the magnetic needle, even after the disturbing 
influence has been removed, will keep wavering, and require many days before it points aright, 
and remains steady to the pole,” it is also the case “ordinarily with the soul, after it has begun to 
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free itself from the disturbing forces of the flesh and the world, and to convert itself towards 
God” (AR 33). Because he compares these two scenarios, with one being the exceptional case 
and the other being the usual course of events, it seems Coleridge did actually believe conversion 
necessary for all Christians, so long as one lets the concept of conversion include a “period” of 
repenting – rather than only a moment of repentance – between initial awakening and New Birth.  
 In this way, Coleridge shows himself to have been well within the mainstream of 
moderate second generation Anglican Evangelicalism. In 1803 the Christian Observer “ran a 
series of fictional articles depicting three characters, Amanda, Theodosia, and Euboea.”599 Each 
character represented a different strand of religious thought in England, with Amanda 
representing a non-evangelical Anglican with suspicions about Evangelicals, Theodosia as a 
sectarian evangelical, and Euboea as a model Anglican Evangelical. Euboea had no “sudden 
conversion,” but instead a gradual growth in her awareness of an awakened conscience, and she 
was rooted in classical Anglican writers such as “Cranmer, Ridley, Jewel, Andrewes, Hooker, 
Usher, and Hall.”600 While Euboea was clearly meant to be the model for Anglicans, the 
Observer treated Amanda better than Theodosia, showing the Anglican Evangelical respect for 
formal Anglican religiosity. Theodosia received the harshest treatment, and she was represented 
as habitually judging the spiritual state of others and showing no regard for civil and ecclesial 
authority or order. “Her conversion had of course been sudden and dramatic and anyone not able 
to relate the time and the place of theirs was a suspect Christian.”601 Furthermore, the strand of 
Evangelicalism that looked beyond the cross alone for understanding Christ and Redemption, as 
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seen in thinkers such as Budd or Hoare and which would seem to most characterize Coleridge's 
approach, emphasized the “motif of order or continuity,” making it “appreciate the idea of a 
gradual conversion or a gradual working out of baptismal grace.”602  
 The last element in Coleridge’s thinking that helps to locate him within the confines of 
moderate Evangelicalism was his understanding of the Established Church, his relationship to its 
liturgy and theology in the Book of Common Prayer, and his ambiguous understanding and 
connection to other Christian bodies. It is in this discussion that Coleridge not only can have his 
connection to Evangelical Anglicanism finalized, but it also demonstrates that his understanding 
of the National Church, like that of many other Evangelicals, was more ambivalent than the 
ecclesiology of High Church thinkers.  
 One of the elements that distinguished the 18th century predecessors to the 19th century 
Evangelical party from those clergy more closely aligned with the Methodist movement was a 
conflict about church order. Whereas the Wesleyan and Whitfieldian Methodists would engage 
in “irregular” practices such as itinerant preaching and the use of lay preachers, and Wesley’s 
ultimate willingness as a presbyter to ordain clergy, proto-Evangelicals were much more hesitant 
or outright hostile to this seeming disregard for proper Church order. These clergymen (and they 
were at first almost all clergy) were certainly open to the theological emphases and piety 
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High Churchmen, viz., baptismal regeneration, Coleridge not only rejected the necessity of baptismal regeneration, 
he took the more stringent Evangelical position in rejecting baptismal regeneration almost altogether. 
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practiced by Methodists, but they felt that these should be done within the confines of established 
parochial boundaries and following the pre- and proscriptions of Anglican polity. At the same 
time, they worked with and had many colleagues who practiced this greater irregularity or who 
became members of dissenting groups. This distinction became more pronounced after the 
formation of the various Wesleyan Methodist denominations after the 1790s, and it led to many 
Evangelicals who chose to stay within the Church of England more vigorously defending both 
their claim to being properly evangelical and to their attachment to the order and structure of the 
Established Church. At the same time, relationships with dissenting evangelicals continued to 
exist and Evangelicals often had a sense of greater spiritual and theological solidarity with 
evangelicals outside of their church than with non-evangelical Anglicans. This all led to a 
situation where, “by 1800, among Evangelicals at large the regulars were overwhelmingly in the 
ascendant. Irregularity was frowned on and its few remaining practitioners were soon to be 
strongly criticized in the pages of the Christian Observer” (as seen in the example of the greater 
grace extended to the Anglican Amanda than to the dissenting Theodosia above).603 
 However, a conflict remained for the Evangelical that did not exist for the High 
Churchman. Evangelicals saw the church as part of the bene esse bordering on esse of the 
Christian faith, but they saw the fallibility of the specific structures of the English Church and its 
Liturgy, however highly they regarded them. Thus, Evangelicals believed in the superiority of 
the Established Church, but this was born more out of a sense of practical concerns, such as the 
ability of the Established Church to comprehend a more Universal Christianity or the proneness 
of dissenters toward schism. The boundary between Established and Dissenting Christians was 
more one of degree of error admitted (and not necessarily of error that imperiled salvation) than 
																																																						
603 Carter, Anglican Evangelicals, 41. 
		289 
the hard boundary pre-Tractereian High Church thinkers put between the real Christianity 
necessarily connected to the Church of England and the false, heretical, and schismatic 
“Christianity” of dissenting groups. Grayson Carter provides a succinct and clear summary of the 
normal Evangelical attitude toward the Established Church in the early 19th century:  
 Despite the presence of minor imperfections in the Church and its formularies, most evangelicals 
remained adamant that secession to Protestant Dissent was unjustified. Although their catholic spirit could 
readily countenance fellowship with evangelical Dissenters, they regarded the Church as immeasurably 
superior to Nonconformity. Dissent was seen as unbalanced and prone to schism. In its chapels, Simeon 
and others alleged, the congregation held a dangerous whip hand over its minister, whose salary it 
provided, and so prevented him from preaching the Gospel fearlessly in the way possible for the clergy in a 
State Church whose incomes came from endowments and tithes.  
 The Dissent of evangelical Christians was seen as essentially unnecessary. It was not to be 
compared to the separations of the Church of England from the Church of Rome which had apostatized 
from the faith, for the foundations of the English Church were pure and reformed. Those who went over to 
Dissent were schismatics who divided the body of Christ. None the less, the Evangelical clergy urged their 
people to treat Dissenters with charity and kindness and not to anathematize them in the style of some High 
Churchmen. Since much Dissent stemmed from the lack of ‘real’ religion in the Church, the best way to 
prevent its further progress was for the Established clergy to out-preach their rivals by a fervent exposition 
of the Gospel.604 
 
 So, if Coleridge is to be located among Anglican Evangelicals in an ecclesiological sense, 
it would seem necessary to demonstrate these features: a sense of the superiority, but not 
absolute superiority, of the Established Church; a sense that this superiority was born more often 
from contingent and practical concerns; and a sense of charity toward Dissent. I believe it is 
possible to demonstrate all of these points, along with a common understanding of the 
imperfections of the Church that nonetheless did not negate its superiority over Dissent.  
 I will begin this argument by looking at Barth’s general description of how Coleridge 
came to regard the Established Church by the end of his life, particularly as described in 
Coleridge’s work On the Constitution of the Church and State. For Coleridge, the established 
Church, by being bound up with England, was a good to be preserved because “the Established 
Church is part of the nation” and the idea of a national church offered “not only spiritual unity 
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but also intellectual coherence and continuity to the nation.”605 However, Coleridge clearly 
indicated that one should and could not identify the National Church with the Christian Church, 
and it was this distinction that actually made the continued existence of the National Church a 
grounds for an expansive toleration. The National Church not only could coexist with Dissenting 
Christian bodies, but should provide the means for securing toleration. Coleridge held that the 
“visible Established Church does not fully embody the reality of the spiritual Church of Christ, 
and that other churches may express aspects of that reality. The Established Church is to protect 
not only its own rights but those of all churches.”606 One sees this larger concern for an inclusive 
view of Christianity in his formulation of “Articles of Faith Necessary to Christians” in 1830, in 
which he stated beliefs that he thought could be expansive enough to comprehend “the Ministers 
of all other Churches, Lutheran or Calvinistic, Arminian or [? Zwinglian], Presbyterian or 
Independent,” but not so expansive as to allow what he saw as politically subversive (but not 
generally theologically incorrect) Roman Catholicism or the heretical and non-Christian “modern 
Unitarians” (SW&F 1486). He even clearly identifies his understanding that these other groups, 
as Christians, should be permitted to coexist in England and may play an important and 
necessary function for English Religious life: Regarding these different groups, “you neither 
need nor can all of you be Ministers of the National Church of England, any more than all 
Country Gentlemen can or need be Justices of the <Peace; but I receive you all, as Members of 
the Christian Church in England—& to with any of you, whom I hold competent, I would 
interchange [? in <the> Pulpit]” (SW&F 1486).607  
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 Coleridge held both to the goodness and necessity of the National Church as well as the 
spiritual legitimacy of most other (Protestant) Christians.608 That he saw the Church of England 
as not only deserving special status by being the National Church, but that it was superior to 
other fellowships is seen in his affirmation that “I believe (as I do) the Church of England to be 
the most Apostolic Church” (AR 381). He even went so far as to affirm that a person with 
difficulties with the Church of England who sought “the Escape through the Channel of Dissent 
is from the Frying-Pan to the Fire” (AR 381).609 
 Furthermore, if one looks to the ways in which Coleridge viewed the fallibility of the 
Church and the Liturgy, while still holding them in high regard, one sees that Coleridge had no 
problem recognizing imperfections in the Established Church’s prayer and polity. Coleridge, 
despite his high regard for the National Church, would not hold to the “perfect Truth of each and 
every word in the Prayer-book” (AR 381). Moreover, in his letter to Methuen, Coleridge 
admitted that “the framers of that Liturgy were eminently pious, learned, and wise men. But they 
were not inspired men. Nor does the Church of England pretend to supersede the study of the 
Scripture by the pretences [sic] of infallible interpretation” (CL IV 582). Coleridge noted on 
Article VII of the Articles of Religion that he could give his “amen” to the confession that “The 
Book of Common Prayer, and Administration of the Holy Sacraments, set forth by the Authority 
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of Parliament, is agreeable to the Scriptures, and that it is Catholick, Apostolick, and most for the 
advancing of God’s Glory” so long as his assent was not contradicted by “the knowledge of its 
[the Prayer book’s] fallible origin” (CM I 838). 
 While the Evangelicals likely had certain qualms about the liturgy (and especially on the 
point that Coleridge seems also to have had problems, viz., the Baptismal Liturgy), they were 
among all other Anglicans at the time the most likely to embrace the Reformation origins and 
teaching of the Articles of Religion as a true representation of Christian faith. Coleridge not only 
saw himself as believing whatever was commonly held by all the Reformers, but had a regular 
habit of associating the Articles of Religion and the common teaching of the Reformation. 
Coleridge states that Arminianism in its particular Laudian, Anglican High Church form was “a 
habit of Belief opposed not to Calvinism or the Works of Calvin, but to the Articles of our own 
Church, and to the Doctrine in which all the first Reformers agreed” (CM I 358).610 While it was 
not universal among Evangelicals, if there was one element in the teaching of the Church of 
England that was disliked, it was the Athanasian Creed.611 The only article that received any 
substantial pushback from Coleridge was that which dealt with the Creeds, and specifically the 
Athanasian Creed: Coleridge here stated that  
I hold the (so called) Athanasian Creed to be not false but imperfect, but yet unfit to be a public Creed 
because the whole Truth in a Doctrine setting forth a one Idea is necessary to the perfection of each and 
every of the Truths therin contained, or of the distinct Verities contemplated in the untroubled Unity of the 
Idea. Now the Creed truly expressed the quality of Attributers and the Identity of the Godhead; but does not 
confess the subordination of the Persons (CM I 836-7). 
 
 A final point showing Coleridge working within an Evangelical outlook was his 
relationship to the Bible Society. “The British and Foreign Bible Society, which was started in 
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1804, was the first pan-evangelical institution to win patronage of most evangelicals in the 
various denominations. Evangelicals were encouraged to participate because of its one, 
uncomplicated objective, to distribute the Bible.”612 What is significant about the Bible Society 
was that while its mission was not complicated, association with it became highly polarizing. 
Association with the Bible Society could bring strong critiques from certain High Church 
figures, and even those who did not fit neatly into an Evangelical mold were subject to criticism 
because of their association with this group. For instance, the High Churchman Thomas Sikes, 
who was “obsessed with the bogey of a ‘Puritan’ conspiracy,” “sharply criticized Porteus for his 
patronage the Bible Society.”613 Thus, association with the Bible Society was not something that 
failed to differentiate Evangelicals from non-Evangelicals in the Church of England, but to the 
contrary was a quite clear indicator that one was at least sympathetic to Evangelicalism. It is not 
an insignificant indicator of Coleridge’s Evangelical leanings that he stated in Confessions that 
he had “frequently attended the <great> meetings of the <B. & F.> Bible Society” (SW&F 
1148). Also, in the same letter in which Coleridge puts forward his Evangelical sounding 
position on Baptism to Methuen, he begins by saying that “I have more than once told you, that I 
am most friendly to the Bible Society and every thing connected with it, excepting enthusiastic 
anticipations of immediate effects” (CL IV 581). 
 One, two, or even three commonalities between Coleridge and the larger style of 
Evangelical Anglicanism could possibly be explained as a matter of cultural convergence. 
However, I hope I have presented a convincing case that Coleridge exhibited almost every one of 
the defining elements of this identity, including not only features that served to distinguish 
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Evangelicals from their early 19th century High Church counterparts, but also those that formed a 
positive identity matrix for Anglican Evangelicals. Coleridge made use of distinctively 
Evangelical language; he attempted a systematized exposition of the distinctive elements of 
evangelical Biblical interpretation; he put forward a view of vital Christianity consonant with the 
distinctive view of evangelicals; his personal and corporate piety was almost exactly what one 
would expect of an Evangelical; he embraced the more stringent Evangelical position on 
Baptismal regeneration; he found authority for his theological positions in a distinctively 
Reformation view of the Church of England and a general Augustinian understanding of 
Christianity, including the utmost reverence for the darling of the Evangelicals, Robert Leighton; 
and he had a view of the Established Church that would have found no opposition among 
Evangelicals. While I am sure that it is possible to find different Liberal/Latitudinarian or High 
Church thinkers who differed from their “ideal types” and could be shown to embrace any one of 
these “distinctive” Evangelical emphases, I can say with the utmost confidence that there would 
be no figure from either of these camps who would satisfy all of these distinguishing features 
(and if one did find such a person, one could be pushed to ask why they were not included as an 
Evangelical). The same would seem to go for any attempt to claim a completely sui generis 
status for Coleridge’s theological position; there can be no doubt that he was, while remaining an 
Evangelical, a sui generis form of Anglican Evangelical, but, as said in the introduction, his 
idiosyncratic position within Evangelicalism is possible precisely because he can be located 
within its bounds.  
 A fitting conclusion to this discussion of how Coleridge should be thought of within the 
Church of England seems to come from one of the final statements he makes in Aids to 
Reflection, and one that I have already quoted in part. Coleridge says:  
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Enough for me, if in my Heart of Hearts, free from all fear of man and all lust of preferment, I believe (as I 
do) the Church of England to be the most Apostolic Church; that its doctrines and ceremonies contain 
nothing dangerous to Righteousness or Salvation; and that the imperfections in its Liturgy are spots indeed, 
but spots on the sun, which impede neither it Light nor its Heat, so as to prevent the good seed from 
growing in a good soil and producing fruits of Redemption (AR 381).  
 
Coleridge had been seeking a union of Methodist warmth and Socinian light since 1797; nearly 
30 years later he finally found his sun, and he found it in an imperfect Church of England with an 
imperfect Liturgy, in an imperfection conductive to the fruits of Redemption that could have 
characterized the conception of the Church of any number of Anglican Evangelicals. 
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CHAPTER 7  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 For those familiar with Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s thought, a positive association 
between his religious thought and Evangelicalism probably came as something of a surprise, to 
say nothing of the claim that Coleridge ultimately became some kind of Anglican Evangelical. 
Most interpreters have understood his religious affiliation in the second half of his life as some 
sort of generic conservative Anglicanism. Those who have entertained some connection between 
Coleridge and evangelicalism have focused on how the movement made room for the emergence 
of Romanticism generically by elevating the importance of the affections in late 18th century 
British society. Even then, though, the general perception about Britain’s most influential 
Romantics is that they began their careers with ambivalence or hostility to traditional 
Christianity only to return to a façade of orthodoxy later in life as part of an increasingly 
reactionary political, social, and aesthetic vision. Coleridge has until now largely been studied by 
literary scholars who feel out of their depth in his theological and philosophical thinking, by 
philosophers interested in locating Coleridge’s philosophical thought, or by religious scholars 
interested in giving synopses of Coleridge’s Christian belief itself. Whether from lack of interest, 
expertise, or opportunity, attempts to contextualize Coleridge’s religious thought have focused 
on his earlier Unitarian thinking while neglecting how his 19th century theology fit into to the 
larger landscape of British religious thought.  
 I have attempted in this work to provide a thorough evaluation of the larger British 
religious landscape in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, expanded from a consideration of 
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formal theology to include style and culture, and in doing this mapped Coleridge’s later religious 
thought onto this landscape. Having done this work, I think I can argue confidently that 
Coleridge returned to the Church of England not as a “generic” orthodox Anglican, but as a 
moderate Evangelical. All that remains for the argument itself is to bring these lines of analysis 
together. Once this is done, I believe that the burden of proof will be on those who remain 
skeptical of Coleridge’s Evangelical status.  
  I began by showing the range of theological thought in Britain’s long 18th religious 
century, from the formation of Dissent during the Restoration until the first Tracts of the Oxford 
Movement in 1833614. A tradition of high Enlightenment theology (high in the sense of holding a 
high view of human reason) emerged most prominently as Deism in the late 17th and early 18th 
centuries and then was picked up by theological Socinians in the various church bodies and 
institutionally enshrined in Unitarianism. While the tone of these movements shifted from the 
rhetorically harsher Deists to the more optimistic Unitarians, and the underlying understanding 
of “rationality” evolved to follow its scientific and philosophical corollaries, this larger tradition 
shared a high view of an innate human capacity to know the world, a belief “reason” would 
liberate people from an oppressive and capricious social order, and a general disregard for 
mystery and “supernaturalism.” This movement provoked a reaction from those committed to 
greater doctrinal orthodoxy such as Joseph Butler and William Paley. Regardless of the final 
doctrinal and ecclesial tenor coming from these thinkers, they still shared a central commitment 
to religious rationalism seen in the more radical thinkers. “Latitudinarianism” represented a more 
chastened wing of “liberal” Christianity in the 18th century. This movement shared a 
commitment to toleration of a more limited set of doctrinal essentials with a wider range of 
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interpretations, the rationality of Christian belief, and the moral life as a conditional part of 
salvation. Latitudinarianism was, by design, a big tent, and one can think of it as a tendency 
within the Church of England applying to anyone wanting a more limited sense of “necessary” 
Christian doctrine, suspicious of or seeing little need for mystery, and desiring a functional 
Christianity to secure a this-world morality and social order.  
 “Orthodoxy” in the Church of England, particularly at the outset of the 19th century, 
generally meant Evangelicalism or High Churchmanship. By the beginning of the 19th century, 
the High Church tradition largely accepted the same formal theological beliefs as most 
Evangelicals, but with significant differences in emphasis and interpretation. The High Church 
tradition emphasized the ecclesial mediation of God’s grace for salvation, and thus the Church of 
England alone as the “true” Church. The greatest theological difference was avoidance if not 
active hostility toward “Calvinism.” They found authority in the patristic Church, ecumenical 
councils, and the Laudian Churchmanship of the 17th century. High Church and Evangelical 
Christians viewed the Eucharist similarly, but they drew a line in the sand on the issue of 
baptismal regeneration; anything short of full equation of New Birth and Baptism, with Baptism 
as the only means of removing the guilt of original sin, constituted heresy. Particularly with the 
Hackney Phalanx, late 18th and early 19th century High Church figures differed significantly 
from the Tracterians by a general suspicion of inwardness and reflection.  
 Early evangelicals shared most of the formal doctrinal commitments with orthodox High 
Church figures, but emphasized original sin, justification by faith alone, Christ’s redemptive 
death on the cross, the need for conversion and “New Birth,” and the sanctifying work of the 
Holy Spirit. Evangelicals had a sense of true faith as going beyond intellectual assent to 
propositions (i.e., belief) to include a living, restored relationship with a personal God. 
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Evangelicals of all types felt a strong need for assurance from the Holy Spirit and emphasized 
introspection and self-examination as means of confirming this assurance and seeing signs of 
growing sanctification. Evangelicals almost exclusively among pre-Tracterian British religious 
traditions sang hymns in public and private worship, used journal and diary keeping as a spiritual 
exercise, and made use of Conversion Narratives as a distinctive evangelical literary genre. 
There was a theological divide between Arminian and Calvinist evangelicals, although the 
Arminians were generally of a Wesleyan type that still emphasized justification by faith alone 
and rejected the semi-Pelagian Arminianism of non-Evangelicals. While some were so-called 
“hyper-Calvinists,” most evangelical Calvinists were of a much more moderate variety, 
emphasizing a private, pastoral, and non-speculative view of election. Anglican Evangelicals in 
the early 19th century for the most part remained within the bounds of early evangelicalism as its 
most moderated form, even if a faction emerged in the 1820s that prefigured more conservative 
contemporary charismatic/evangelical movements. Rather than dramatic conversion experiences 
with highly public emotional displays, Evangelicals emphasized a personal development from 
self-concern to love of Christ and a subsequent progressive moral transformation. They were 
generally moderate Calvinists, although they sought to bridge gaps with evangelical Arminians. 
Evangelical Anglicans both highly regarded the liturgy and structure of the Church of England 
and developed a way of integrating more extemporaneous forms of evangelical piety into a 
culture of individual and family prayer. Evangelical Anglicans tended to rein in excessive claims 
of Spiritual inspiration and emphasized the traditional means of grace of prayer, Bible reading, 
and regular worship founded on an internal, perceptible love of God. One of the defining features 
for Anglican Evangelicalism was an ambivalence toward other evangelical groups. They usually 
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saw the superiority of the Established Church, but did not go nearly as far as many High Church 
thinkers by excluding dissenting groups a priori from true Christianity. 
 When one looks at Coleridge’s thought and religious style/cultural markers by the time of 
his death in 1834, there are significant indicators that one should locate him as some kind of 
moderate Anglican Evangelical. Coleridge’s stated doctrinal commitments from around the time 
of his renunciation of Unitarianism and re-adoption of Trinitarian orthodoxy sometime around 
1805-7 already began echoing the general emphases of the evangelical revival. Coleridge placed 
belief in original sin and corruption, the need for redemption through Christ, the primacy of 
scriptural revelation, and the sanctifying power of the Holy Spirit as beliefs that are the “peculiar 
doctrines” of Christianity. The only thing that changed in his doctrinal summary by 1830 was 
that he had come to emphasize the need to believe in a personal God to whom one could pray, a 
shift which only strengthens a connection with an Evangelical prayer piety. Indeed, in the time 
between his doctrinal summaries, Coleridge expressed that his beliefs were closer to the 
Evangelicals than to non-Evangelicals in the Church of England. Looking to Coleridge’s 
philosophical theology, one sees greater metaphysical concern than was usual among English 
thinkers of any affiliation from this period, as well as gaining a deeper appreciation for the 
Evangelical character of his theology. He emphasized the need for not only external moral 
behavior, but for the subordination of one’s will to the Will of God through a union with the 
Logos, which, as a result of original sin is only possible through Christ’s redemptive death 
leading to our spiritual rebirth and our inner transformation into Christ through the sanctifying 
power of the Holy Spirit. While Coleridge’s emphasis on a more restorative rather than atoning 
work of Christ would put him in the minority among Anglican Evangelicals, some important 
moderate Evangelicals also wanted a view of atonement that included but extended beyond the 
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cross. Also significant for this discussion is how Coleridge approached his philosophical 
theology. He certainly used categories drawn from Kantian and post-Kantian German Idealism, 
but he seems to have found in them a way to order a general pastoral pragmatism characteristic 
of evangelicalism. More than seeking ways to delve deeper into metaphysical explanations of 
points left unexplored for Evangelicals, Coleridge provided metaphysical explanations for why 
these mysteries could not be explained.  
 Following the lead of intellectual historians like Isabel Rivers, I have contended 
throughout this argument that religious identity should not be thought of as merely a set of 
beliefs or even beliefs and practices, but also flows from a larger “style” or “culture” that also 
encompasses distinctive vocabulary, genres of communication, and perceived opponents. In this 
way, Coleridge showed an affinity with Evangelicals beyond doctrinal commitments and 
theological method. He employed language common to Evangelicals, such that even the thematic 
image for his intellectual project may have been directly modeled on John Newton’s own words. 
Coleridge shared the Evangelicals’s sense that religion should move beyond “cold” belief to 
involve the whole person, and that one’s good works should spring from gracious and sincere 
affection for God and God’s saving work. He may have been influenced by Anglican 
Evangelical conversion narratives and included a kind of inchoate version of one in his 
Biographia Literaria. He put forward a treatise on biblical interpretation which retained a high 
place for biblical inspiration, but rejected a doctrine of plenary inspiration in favor of one that 
preserved the Spirit’s capacity to meet the believer through the text – possibly the distinguishing 
feature of evangelical and Pietist approaches to Scripture at the time. He opposed Socinianism, 
Unitarianism, and other crypto-Socinian (in his mind) forms of “rational Christianity,” as well as 
an Arminianism that seemed Pelagian to him. Coleridge grounded his theology and vision of 
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Anglicanism on the authority of a common Reformation and broadly Augustinian heritage. He 
read and approved of authors who were not only generally the purview of evangelicals, but also 
held in highest regard Robert Leighton, the theological luminary of the Evangelicals, as well as 
figures who were almost universally avoided by non-Evangelicals, such as Bunyan and Baxter. 
Sacramentally, Coleridge held to a receptionist view of the Eucharist, which was to be expected 
of both Evangelicals and High Churchmen, but he maintained the more extreme and definitively 
Evangelical rejection (not tempering) of baptismal regeneration. His piety demonstrated a high 
regard for the study of Scripture and individual prayer and meditation while also holding the 
Prayer Book liturgy as an imperfect but still exemplary form of conducting communal worship. 
Finally, he saw the Church of England as the most excellent Church in England, but he did not 
see it as exclusively the Church. While ambivalent about other Protestants, even evangelical 
Protestants such as Methodists, he still believed they deserved toleration, protection, and could 
contribute certain things to national religious life that the Established Church possibly could not. 
 Before he even returned to Trinitarian orthodoxy, at least confessionally, Coleridge 
sought a sun that would unite the dim warmth of Methodism and the cool moonlight of 
Socinianism, poles that corresponded to extremes of purely affective or intellectual religiosity, 
rooted in blind will or fully unaffected intellect, both of which would lead – if left disjointed – to 
superstition, fanaticism, and atheism. Still, he did not see equal value, or at least equal danger, in 
these two disjoints and thought the Methodist pole the much lesser of the two evils. Insofar as 
one allows for a more philosophically systematized evangelicalism, Coleridge appears to have 
provided a more robust philosophical and more explicated theological foundation for the 
Anglicanism, of a moderate Evangelical form, that he came to accept as his own. It actually 
makes substantial sense that this would be the location from which Coleridge would extend his 
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theological and philosophical vision; nearly all leading figures in the larger evangelical revival 
and particularly Evangelical Anglicanism sought to accommodate some degree of enlightenment 
rationalism. While Coleridge could not accept the forms that this rationalism took, and the 
movement could lose this synthetic character in its popular forms, evangelicalism in the 18th 
century was already a tradition “primed” for synthesis. That Coleridge would arrive in the form 
of evangelicalism that self-consciously appropriated language of Anglican order and moderation, 
and had to defend itself as the true via media between a more conservative Lutheran 
Protestantism and that of the Radical Reformation appears quite appropriate.615  
 I maintain that this argument helps to explain Coleridge’s whole intellectual development 
better than the traditional interpretation. However, this is not to say that there are no valid 
objections to it. For instance, if Coleridge indeed slots into every defining feature of Evangelical 
Anglicanism, why has no one come to this conclusion before? To this, I would say first that there 
has been at least one attempt: a dissertation called “Coleridge’s Statement and Defence of the 
Evangelical Faith as Ultimate Metaphysics,” which I believe deficient, but in a way that actually 
helps my position.616 The deficiency lies in a lack of substantial engagement (through lack of 
available sources not negligence) with much of Coleridge’s at that time unpublished material. 
Thus, even without the evidence I drew from letters, notebooks, and Marginalia, it is possible to 
construct a defensible argument that Coleridge defended some sort of metaphysically robust 
evangelicalism. The second reason I would say that it has not been observed is because people 
do not seem to have known that they should have been looking for this connection or would not 
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have cared to do so if they had. Because both Coleridge and evangelicalism have recently only 
become of significant interest for overlapping groups of scholars, there has not been the 
opportunity to bring the depth of good research from both areas to bear on each other. The inertia 
of having interpreted Coleridge as not an Evangelical, or the received position that Coleridge 
became a generic, orthodox Anglican (or as Cragwell states, a descent into an “uncompromising 
Calvinism”617) – even if such a category did not really exist – provides a significant explanatory 
power for why this question has not been raised in a meaningful way.  
 Additionally, while I believe Coleridge’s Evangelicalism is more obvious than most 
would have until now admitted, this does not mean my argument has no ambiguities or 
idiosyncrasies that will eventually need to be addressed at greater length. Early evangelicalism 
was not inherently anti-intellectual, but it is also not without reason that it developed such a 
reputation. True, important scholars were associated with this movement, and Ward has done a 
good job of showing that the intellectual leaders were sophisticated and competent scholars if not 
always their generations’ greatest minds. Nevertheless, evangelicalism developed cultures often 
more prone to anti-intellectualism than other contemporary religious movements. One could use 
this to see Coleridge as even more marginal in evangelicalism than has been explained here; 
however, it does not ipso facto preclude Coleridge from being part of this group. Indeed, his 
association with evangelicalism gives the movement’s second generation an intellectual figure 
that Ward did not believe existed. It also helps explain why greater nuance is needed to 
understand the “evangelical” features of some of Coleridge’s thought (for instance, his 
atonement theory). A stronger criticism would be that Coleridge did not maintain the asceticism 
associated with Evangelicals, particularly when it came to the kinds of art and entertainment that 
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Evangelicals avoided. I do not think this is an insurmountable challenge; Coleridge had 
developed relationships with these artistic communities that pre-dated his serious, but extended, 
conversion. Just as Newman, who was himself influenced by Coleridge, deserves to be 
considered a great Roman Catholic (as well as Anglican) thinker despite his not having adopted a 
stock Catholicism upon his entry into the Catholic Church, neither should it be expected that 
Coleridge would have adopted a stock Evangelicalism.  
 No matter how idiosyncratic Coleridge may have been as an Evangelical, it seems that 
there is one point that must remain always in mind – one drawn from Ward’s work on the 
intellectual history of early Evangelicalism. He starts his first chapter by saying that 
“Evangelicals, in the Anglo-Saxon sense of the word, seem generally to have found it easier to 
recognise each other than others have found it to categorize them.”618 Evangelicals seemed to 
have had a capacity to recognize kindred spirits, whatever their idiosyncrasies may have been. 
Thus, one of the greatest clues to Coleridge’s Evangelical identity may be as simple as Hannah 
More’s observation to Wilberforce of the depth of Coleridge’s understanding of Evangelical 
religion and his penetrating insight into Robert Leighton. 
 The final point that could be raised is that this argument draws upon work that Coleridge 
wrote over an almost twenty-year period, or nearly one third of his life. If I am making the more 
tempered claim that Coleridge by his death became an Evangelical, why should one accept that 
his earlier work was equally applicable to the later thinker? First, I believe that there is more than 
enough to still demonstrate that Coleridge was embracing some form of Evangelicalism in his 
writings from 1820 onward. Coleridge’s relationship with Ervine, his Aids to Reflection, 
Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit, his engagement with Southey’s Wesley, many of his relevant 
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notebook entries, and the Opus Maximum all form a significant body of my evidence and all 
come from the 1820s and after. Second, though, I think that this claim points to the eventual need 
to more fully reconstruct Coleridge’s spiritual and intellectual biography. This current work does 
not provide the room for this full treatment, but I will try now to give the broad outlines of what 
it would probably look like.619  
 Beyond attempting to show the lines of causality in terms of Coleridge’s intellectual and 
spiritual development, this outline will also bring into question three explicit and one implicit 
sets of interpretations/assumptions that often inform Coleridge scholarship. The explicit are that 
one can think of a clear “return” to the Church of England that coincides with Coleridge’s 
avowed return to Trinitarian orthodoxy; that what Coleridge returned to was a generic 
Anglicanism imparted to him by his father; and that one can conceive of distinct and almost 
discontinuous phases in Coleridge’s thought. The implicit idea, and one that is oriented more 
toward those who have begun to engage with Romanticism and Methodism/evangelicalism, is 
that among the first major British Romantics (Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Blake), Coleridge did 
not have any strong childhood family association with Methodism or the larger Evangelical 
Revival.  
 One is almost certainly struck with the sense that my argument rings hollow if Coleridge 
never actually had any contact with Evangelicals. Now, clearly, as his letters from the mid-1810s 
indicate, he encountered Anglican Evangelical ideas and by at least the mid-1790s he had 
become familiar with popular Methodism. But the standard interpretation of Coleridge’s 
childhood Anglicanism would mean that he would have had limited exposure to evangelicalism 
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in his early life. Barth only says about Samuel Taylor’s father John that he was “a sound if 
unimaginative Church of England clergyman,” assuring that Samuel Taylor received “early and 
thorough exposure to orthodoxy.”620 Beyond noting that Samuel Taylor spoke relatively little 
about his father other than saying that he was “no first-rate Genius” but still a “first-rate 
Christian,” Richard Holmes states that John Coleridge was an accomplished scholar, well 
received in his community, and “no Anglican Radical.”621  
 Granted, even if one accepts this standard reading of Coleridge’s childhood religious 
background, it is likely that he still had an indirect childhood exposure to Methodism. 
Devonshire saw a jump from eight to seventeen parishes mentioning Methodist circles from 
1764 to 1779 and by 1789 the Wesleyan Methodists had three circuits in the county.622 However, 
a new monograph, Coleridge’s Father, which seeks to give a much more thorough, independent, 
and scholarly examination of John Coleridge, develops a picture of a man who, if not himself a 
Methodist or early Evangelical clergyman, at least sympathized with the movement. In the 
1750s, John Coleridge’s essays in the Gentleman’s Magazine “publicly attack rationalists and 
generally avoid enthusiasts,” and it is unlikely that he would have been unfamiliar with 
associations between Methodism and enthusiasm.623 This is not only because he would have 
known the literature of the time, but also because he was ordained by Bishop George Lavington, 
one of Methodism’s most vociferous opponents.624  Unlike his predecessor at St. Mary’s, Ottery, 
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John Coleridge did not attempt to break up Methodist itinerant preaching, and “held his peace” 
when John Wesley preached in the market house September 4, 1776 (when Samuel Taylor would 
have been four years old).625 John Coleridge did not report in his 1779 visitation returns the 
twelve parish members who had joined the Methodist societies, an action which may indicate a 
positive disposition toward the movement at a time when such reporting formed part of episcopal 
attempts to monitor or stamp out Methodism. At the same time, John Coleridge made arguments 
“on behalf of settled forms of worship, in chapels and groves if not in temples (that is, certainly 
not in fields),” he preferred “argument which appeals to analysis and comparison (not to feeling), 
to traditional belief (not ‘enthusiasm’),” and found many supporters for his circulated 
publications among those in the larger evangelical movement who did not directly associate with 
the Wesleys.626 While the degree to which John Coleridge positively presented Methodist or 
evangelical ideas as his own is uncertain, he maintained an openness to Methodism and his ideas 
were well received by clergy who would be considered the predecessors to the later moderate 
Anglican Evangelicals. 
 Coleridge very likely had multiple opportunities to encounter evangelical ideas while at 
Christ’s Hospital from 1781-91 before going to Jesus College, Cambridge. While the school was 
part of the Anglican establishment and not a hotbed for early evangelical or Methodist activity, 
from 1787 onward, Beilby Porteus, a bishop already described as having Evangelical sympathies 
without himself being an Evangelical, became the bishop of London. This likely meant that the 
church hierarchy would not have promoted active hostility toward Methodism at Christ’s 
Hospital and would not have dissuaded sermons with evangelical themes while Coleridge 
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attended. Moreover, Coleridge points to an incident in the Biographia that may indicate direct 
exposure to the Wesleys’ works. In a tale told to Gillman about his extracurricular activities at 
Christ’s Hospital, Coleridge describes inadvertently bumping into a gentlemen while lost in an 
adventure of his imagination; after convincing the man that he was not a pickpocket, the 
gentleman purchased him a subscription to the lending library near King street.627 If Coleridge 
truly read through the entire library’s holdings (as he claimed), then he would have read Charles 
Wesley’s two volume Hymns on Select Passages of Scripture, John Wesley’s Collection of 
moral and sacred poems, some of John Wesley’s polemical works, and William Cowper’s 
poems.628 
 Coleridge’s public Unitarian beliefs began in 1794, having gone up to Jesus College, 
Cambridge in 1791, and having finished a stint in the army under the pseudonym Silas Tomkyn 
Comberbache.629 He wrote to his brother George to say that he had come to be in a “kind of 
religious Twilight” with a faith made up of “the Evangelists and the Deistic philosophy” (CL I 
79). His radicalism seems to have its roots, as it does for many students even today, in exposure 
to radical Enlightenment philosophy, and this religious twilight grew into a more explicit 
Unitarianism after his return to Cambridge. However, Coleridge’s views between this time and 
his 1805 repudiation of Unitarianism were not static. Coleridge began struggling with his 
Unitarian theology well before 1805 and it seems that in this period he not only encountered 
Methodist and evangelical thinking, but that it likely played a role in shaping his intellectual and 
spiritual life.  
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 Coleridge’s dissatisfaction with Unitarian thought seems to have yielded some 
appreciation, if ambivalently, for Methodism between September and November of 1799. This is 
when he noted “Socinian Moonlight – Methodism &c A Stove! O for some Sun that shall unite 
Light & Warmth” (CN I 467). However, Coleridge’s exposure to and wrestling with the 
Revival’s theology go back several years before this statement. Coleridge wrote in a letter to 
Thomas Poole on February 6, 1797 that “I never yet read even a Methodist’s ‘Experience’ in the 
Gospel Magazine without receiving instruction & amusement” (CL I 303). What is important 
about this statement is not only that Methodist conversion narratives seem to have played some 
role in providing a model for his own autobiographical work630, but also that Coleridge was 
reading the Gospel Magazine with some degree of frequency. The Gospel Magazine, founded by 
Augustus Toplady, was the principle vehicle for the promotion of Calvinist Methodism and the 
refutation of Arminian Methodism, and included articles from early Anglican Evangelicals such 
as John Newton. Coleridge used Newton’s Authentic Narrative as one of his source inspirations 
for “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” and his language of Socinian Moonlight and the 
Methodist Stove points out that he may have been reading more deeply in Newton’s letters. The 
“Rime” was composed between 1797-8, indicating that he was reading Newton as he was taking 
inspiration from the Gospel Magazine. He also spoke of the “divine Chit chat” of William 
Cowper’s poetry in a letter to William Thelwall from December 17th, 1796 (CL I 279). All these 
elements point to Coleridge having been invested in various Calvinist Methodist forms of 
thought around late 1796 and early 1797.  
 This link between the “Rime” and some interest in Calvinist evangelical thought 
strengthens Robert Penn Warren’s interpretation of the poem, namely that it has as a theme 
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wrestling with an origin of moral evil going beyond the explanations of social conditioning, 
redemption, and an ultimate return to God.631 Being based on an evangelical conversion narrative 
only strengthens this theme of fall and redemption. Charles Lamb’s letter to Coleridge from 
January 5, 1797, in which he recalled that Coleridge was “talking of the Origin of Evil as a most 
prolific subject of a long poem,” adds further evidence for this interpretation.632 Coleridge went 
on to confess a year later (March 10, 1798) that  
I believe most stedfastly in original Sin; that from our mothers’ wombs our understandings are darkened; 
and even where our understandings are in the Light, that our organization is depraved, & our volitions 
imperfect; and we sometimes see the good without wishing to attain it, and oftener wish it without the 
energy that wills & performs — And for this inherent depravity, I believe, that the Spirit of the Gospel is 
the sole cure (CL I 396). 
 
What is important is that, after having shown an interest in and engagement with various vehicles 
for evangelical thought, by 1798 Coleridge was describing his views on original sin in a way that 
would have resonated most with evangelicals and looks very unlike Unitarian optimism.  
 Some engagement with evangelical thought very likely occurred while Coleridge was 
reformulating his thinking about evil and sin, and this can probably stand on its own to show that 
Coleridge was influenced by evangelical ways of understanding his experience. If one asks 
whence comes this break with Unitarian thinking, it seems correct that “the obdurate fact of his 
own experience” stood in the way of Coleridge’s ability to continue uncritically accepting 
Priestly and Hartley as guides.633 In early 1796, Coleridge experienced a string of economic and 
personal hardships. Moreover, amid severe anxiety over a publisher’s deadline, he caught a 
terrible eye infection for which he was prescribed laudanum, which he found “soothed both 
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physical pain and mental worry.”634 While there was not yet a medical conception of addiction, 
Coleridge had in fact become addicted to opium, and even at this early stage Coleridge seems to 
have had some sense this fact.635  
 Personal life experience may explain the cause of his troubling of the Unitarian waters, 
but one could still ask why Coleridge came to interpret his experience in evangelical terms. One 
possibility is that he reached back either to possible evangelical influences brought into his home 
from his father or based on his having encountered this sort of language in his personal reading 
at Christ’s Hospital. It is also possible that he was pointed in this direction by William 
Wordsworth while collaborating on the Lyric Ballads, given that Wordsworth came from an 
evangelical family.636 While all of these are possible, and some are likely, partial explanations, I 
believe there is another, more immediate link in the causal chain. In early January of 1796, 
Coleridge set out on a “hectic five week subscription-gathering tour of the larger Midland towns 
and cities” in order to distribute subscriptions to the Watchman, a periodical meant to help 
finance the Pantisocratic enterprise.637 Among the groups in which Coleridge sought 
subscriptions were the Dissenting communities, including Unitarians, Quakers, and 
Methodists.638 This trip did not make him hostile toward Methodists; he spoke favorably about 
them in the “Introductory Essay” to the first issue of the Watchman published on March 1, 1796, 
describing Methodism as one of the best means of cultivating a sense of compassion for the poor, 
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indignation against their oppressors, and a love of liberty (CW 12-13). There is little doubt that 
Coleridge attended some worship services with those who were at least friendly toward 
evangelicalism, since he describes at least one instance where “after church, in the evening, they 
sat round and sang hymns so sweetly that they overwhelmed me” (CL I 178). The “they” who 
were singing were a certain Mr. Martin Barr and his children, and, while Barr was part of a 
mixed Congregationalist/Baptist congregation, he appears to have been evangelical in outlook 
since he was a founding member of the Worcester Evangelical Society.639 This Evangelical 
Society was founded to “encourage evangelical preaching in destitute towns and villages, to 
promote the instruction of the poor and ignorant, especially children, by the establishment and 
assistance of schools and good books.”640 It is likely that Coleridge encountered evangelical 
preaching and teaching in hymns sung, sermons preached, and conversations with members of 
Methodist and other evangelical dissenting groups. 
 The real importance of this discussion, though, is not that Coleridge did not return to 
orthodox theology first through the adoption of Trinitarian thought, but from a conviction of 
original sin and salvation by grace. A letter from 1802 clearly indicates that this was the 
progression of his re-conversion to orthodox Christianity. He stated that “on the subjects of the 
original corruption of our Nature, the doctrines of Redemption, Regeneration, Grace, & 
Justification by Faith my convictions are altogether different from those of Drs Priestley, 
Lindsey, & Disney — neither do I conceive Christianity to be tenable on the Priestleyan 
Hypothesis” (CL I 821). At the same time, Coleridge was still affirming that his thought “as far 
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as regards the Doctrine of the Trinity is negative Unitarianism — a non liquet concerning the 
nature & being of Christ — but a condemnation of the Trinitarians as being wise beyond what is 
written” (CL I 821). Thus, he was moving away from Unitarianism at this point as regarded the 
question of the nature of Christ, and he had not yet come to be able to accept the Trinity, but he 
was firmly opposed to the Unitarian understanding of salvation.  
 There does not appear a good reason to doubt Coleridge’s description in the Biographia 
of a return to belief in the doctrine of the Trinity via first being convinced of its metaphysical 
validity and only then of its religious importance. It also seems that the despair he felt during his 
time in Malta over his continued opium use, his unrequited love for Sara Hutchinson, and the 
coldness in his marriage with Sarah Coleridge (Fricker) drove him to seek an even firmer 
foundation of grace as he continued to see in himself even less of a capacity to extricate himself 
from his situation. As Barth points out, there was an increasing number of insistent entries in 
Coleridge’s Notebooks in late 1804 and 1805 in which he cried out for God’s mercy. These 
entries at times call on the power of the Spirit of God, so it is possible that the return to 
Trinitarian thought as a religious truth was born out of his sense that only the Divine Spirit could 
save.641 However, it is less clear that Coleridge’s “adherence to the Church of England was 
complete and unswerving” from the time that he returned to Trinitarian orthodoxy, as Barth 
contends.642 Barth can point to instances in both 1808 and 1820 where Coleridge wrote of having 
been zealously subject to the Church of England.643 In the same article, though, Barth points out 
that Coleridge attended services very infrequently from 1805 to 1816 and then only slightly more 
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frequently while living at Highgate from 1816 until his decision to re-commune in 1827. It is 
possible, as Barth describes, that this was merely the result of a distance between Coleridge’s 
belief and practice and that his failure to commune until so late was from either the cultural 
norms of infrequent communion or out of his own sense of deep unworthiness.644 
 Both points are possible and I do not think that the position I put forward excludes them 
in their specifics. However, I think it plausible that these were lower motivating reasons and that 
Coleridge’s return to the Church of England was not nearly as certain and unwavering as Barth 
contends. I think that these two statements can at least be tempered somewhat either as 
attempting a greater show of public adherence to the church or of a mind oscillating between 
positions, because one can look to other statements that indicate uncertainty about allegiance to 
the Church. In the month before Coleridge finally re-communed, he wrote an entry in which he 
proclaimed uncertainty about what church he could remain with, and he ultimately believes the 
Moravians may be the most faithful:  
Am I or is the non-existence of a Christian Community, in fault?— —God knows how much I feel the want 
of Church Fellowship! But where can I find it? Among the Methodists? How can I call you Britons? Only 
in Vide the Cuts & Frontispieces to the Methodist, Arminian, Evangelical &c Magazines. Among the The 
Quakers? —I want heart of Oak—& here is the Rind and Bark in wondrous preservation, counterfeiting a 
tree to the very life./ —. The C. of Eng? — the Churches, and Chapels? O yes, I can go to <a> Church, & 
so I can to a Theatre—& go out again —& know as much as my fellow-goers in the one as in the other — 
— The Moravians? — If any where, among them (CN V 5636).  
 
 While Coleridge seems to have eventually resolved his conscience in the direction of the 
Church of England, this entry reflected an ongoing conflict he had that prevented him from fully 
returning to the Church of England through full participation in the community. If one avoids 
assuming that he was merely rationalizing his own infrequent worship attendance, one sees in 
Coleridge the feeling that the Church of England did not represent authentic Christian 
community because it did not sufficiently distinguish itself from popular culture. Alternatively, 
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or relatedly, one can see Coleridge’s conflict with his fellow Anglicans as resulting from their 
ecclesial participation going no deeper than a sense that passive attendance, as one would at a 
theatre performance, sufficed for proper religiosity. In other words, Coleridge did not find 
sufficient “seriousness” in his fellow Anglican church-goers.645  
 I would offer an alternative hypothesis for Coleridge’s relationship to the Church of 
England and church-going practices that takes account of the frequency of attendance at worship 
and his continued reservations even up to the few months before he finally re-communed in the 
Church: As Coleridge wrestled with Trinitarian orthodoxy, he would have known that there 
existed other Christian groups that accepted this doctrine beyond the Church of England; given a 
strong aversion to the Church of England during his commitment to Unitarianism, any 
acceptance of the Church of England, especially early in the 19th century, would have more 
likely only been undertaken with significant reservations. Given these reservations, one may 
plausibly also expect that Coleridge would have entertained joining a Dissenting community that 
allowed him to follow the beliefs he was coming to embrace without having to return to the 
Church of England. While he may have declared himself part of the Church of England, 
particularly from the period of 1805-1816, this seems to have been more like a fallback if his 
searches did not yield what he was looking for.  
 Coleridge’s living with the Gillman’s at Highgate after 1816 gave him greater impetuous 
to give the Church of England a chance, although he probably resigned himself to not finding 
any other existing community that would give him room for the beliefs and practices he came to 
embrace. More importantly, though, this move to Highgate followed his great spiritual crisis, his 
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finding solace in Leighton, and his encounters with the Anglican Evangelicals Hannah More and 
Thomas Methuen. It is likely then that Coleridge began to gain a sense that there was a 
community within the Church of England with whom he could find great spiritual affinities 
(hence his claim that his creed was much closer to that of Methuen’s and the sense that the 
Evangelical clergy really were saving the Church; it may be that they were not only saving it 
institutionally but saving it also for Coleridge himself). After going to Highgate, he developed a 
close relationship with the rector of the local Church, Samuel Mence, and they conversed more 
frequently than Coleridge attended services. His interest in Irving in the early 1820s and then his 
ultimate parting of ways with him over theological concerns could possibly be Coleridge once 
more having his hopes stoked of an option other than the Church of England only to resign 
himself in disappointment again that only the Church of England offered the capacity for his 
religious beliefs. This would then track with a trajectory in which Coleridge came to speak with 
increasing favor about the Church of England, albeit still with the undercurrent of uncertainty 
that came through in his November 1827 statement of internal conflict. Coleridge’s return to 
communion with the Church of England at Christmas, 1827 would represent his complete return 
to the Church of England.  
 While there is no room to go into deep description of it, there is significant evidence to 
incline one toward something like the reconstruction I presented above. To begin with, James 
Vigus has written that Coleridge started to take an interest in the Quakers from 1799 onward 
after his engagement with William Law, Jacob Böhme, and George Fox, without ever being able 
to bring himself to the join the modern Quakers. His problem stemmed from his acceptance of 
the intellectual system of the early Quakers and a sense of discontinuity between the system that 
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he read about and the beliefs and practices of his contemporary Quakers.646 Despite all of this, 
Coleridge continued to attempt building bridges with the Quakers, and the fact that he named his 
periodical The Friend in 1808 was an attempt to attract Quaker readership.647 If the period of 
1797-8 was a first stage in Coleridge’s long conversion, it makes sense that he would turn to the 
Quakers in 1799, the same year that he describes seeking the union of Methodist warmth and 
Socinian light. One gets the impression that he found something in his experience of Calvinist 
(and likely Arminian) Methodism lacking in Unitarianism, but at this point they went too far to 
the opposite extreme, meaning that Methodism would not have, at this stage, been open to 
Coleridge. 
 It is interesting, then, that one sees Methodism remerging as a significant theme in his 
writing as he began to speak with greater negativity about the Quakers and during his first 
significant affirmations about affiliation with the Church of England. In 1808, Coleridge stated 
that “I say aloud everywhere, that in the essentials of their faith I believe as the Quakers do,” 
except that he cannot bring himself to accept their “notion and practice” (CL 3 156). This echoes 
a similar statement that he made in his critique of Sedgwick, namely that Sedgwick went wrong 
in attacking the Methodists on their doctrine, which conformed to that of the Church of England 
and was the point on which they were (in Coleridge’s estimation) correct, when what should 
have been attacked was “their practices, their alarming Theocracy, their stupid, mad, and mad-
driving Superstitions” (CM IV 657-8). In addition, he gives several indications here that he felt 
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the lumping of all Methodists together unfair, since there were legitimate differences between the 
Calvinist and Arminian Methodists, and one may even detect a sense of greater defensiveness 
toward true Calvinist Methodists. Against the claim that the doctrine of election or justification 
by faith alone leads to immorality, Coleridge contended that “the Calvinist Methodist are the 
austerer and more watchful Censors of the two [branches of Methodism]” (CM IV 647). 
Interestingly, one finds at this same time a dramatic uptick in the number of notebook entries that 
Coleridge makes from January to April 1809 regarding Methodism in which he seems to struggle 
with the movement’s merits and deficiencies.648 This interest died down and then reemerged 
again in 1810, starting with Coleridge’s problems with the moralistic and consciously un-
Methodist preaching in Church of England pulpits (CN III 3790) and continued with various 
struggles with literature about Methodists (CN III 3900), problems with their doctrine of 
perfection (CN III 3901), and even the positive affirmation that along with Theresa of Avila, 
representing pious Catholicism, Whitfield represented pious Calvinism and Wesley and John 
Fletcher represented pious Arminianism (CN III 3907).  
 Now, Coleridge was in part researching Methodism at this point to help Robert Southey 
in his increasing interest in the movement and in John Wesley in particular. However, that 
Coleridge would provide the same final critique of the Methodists as of the Quakers, seem to 
hold the Calvinist Methodists in higher esteem (something that continues through the rest of his 
life), and show such a sustained interest for two years, indicates that he was not so assured about 
the status of the Church of England. It is telling also that Methodism and Quakerism represent 
the two ecclesial groups that Coleridge rejected in the November 1827 notebook entry. This was 
not merely him running through the list of Christian churches in England at the time. Were it just 
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a matter of ticking off the checklist, one would expect to see at least Unitarians (even if he no 
longer considered them Christian, which would seem to be what his grounds for rejection would 
have been) and Baptists, since Coleridge had engaged in correspondence with John Ryland, a 
prominent Baptist minister in Bristol, in 1807649 and because, in addition to Mence, Coleridge 
had developed a relationship with E. Lewis, the pastor at the Baptist Church in Highgate. This is 
to say nothing of Coleridge’s apologia for infant baptism in Aids to Reflection written with a real 
Baptist friend in mind. One is left then with the sense that the groups Coleridge lists in this entry 
were ones that he had at least at one time seriously considered or ones he still could not resolve 
his doubts about.  
 The final piece that helps to make the case for my proposed chronology is Coleridge’s 
relationship with the Rev. Samuel Mence, who became the schoolmaster at Highgate in 1816. 
Little is published about Mence’s views outside of Coleridge’s descriptions, but if Coburn and 
Christensen, the editors of Coleridge’s fourth volume of Notebooks, are correct that Coleridge is 
referring to Mence as the Neighbor Minister designated N,650 then Coleridge describes Mence in 
a way very similar to how one would describe an Evangelical minister. Coleridge says about him 
that he was “a man of deep yet stern mind, which has been formed & colored by the study of the 
earliest Reformers & those Divines, who by the name of Puritan adhered to the Bishop of 
Edward IV & Elizabeth in opposition to the learned but less Anti-Romansh Prelates and Doctors 
who obtained the Rule of the Church during the Stuart Dynasty” (CN IV 5398). Furthermore, he 
“clings to the articles & Homilies – but feels scrupulous and uneasy at some part of the 
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Liturgical Offices” (CN IV 5398). If this is the case, then Coleridge, having just had several 
important encounters with Anglican Evangelicals in 1814-15, would continue his journey toward 
greater acceptance of the Church of England in direct conversation with an Evangelical.  
  This chronology needs to be more fully explored and collated with greater precision to 
Coleridge’s published works, events in his life, and events in the world around him, but even this 
short outline provides a compelling case that Coleridge’s movement toward a full, rather than 
nominal, adherence to the Church of England, did not come until later in 1827. Furthermore, it 
indicates that Coleridge’s “conversion” began well before his acknowledged return to Trinitarian 
orthodoxy, and that it began with possibly the definitive evangelical doctrinal emphasis, viz., 
conviction of original sin and depravity and the need for God’s redemptive grace through Christ. 
One also sees a continuity from Coleridge’s early adult life, when he seems to have come under 
the influence of Cowper, Newton, and other Calvinist evangelicals and his later affinity for the 
more Calvinist Anglican Evangelicalism.  
 This argument for understanding Coleridge as an Evangelical is meant not only as a help 
for intellectual historians, but also as a foundation for further constructive use of Coleridge. In 
this way, it has both a positive and a negative function. Positively, Coleridge offers possibilities 
for the development of an authentic Anglican theology, as well as pointing toward solutions to 
certain issues inherent in contemporary theological discourse. The negative, corrective function 
that this reading offers is that it challenges the interpretation that John Milbank applies to 
Coleridge to enlist Coleridge as a resource for Radical Orthodoxy. One of the main sources for 
understanding Milbank’s engagement with Coleridge comes from his article “Divine Logos and 
Human Communication: A Recuperation of Coleridge,” and the subtitle is telling; there is some 
final gesturing toward the possibilities Coleridge’s thought can offer to contemporary thinkers, 
		322 
but the purpose of this essay seems more to fashion an interpretation of Coleridge’s thought that 
will make him acceptable for later use. Milbank essentially offers a Coleridge amenable to 
Radical Orthodoxy, but he can only do this, it seems, by taking advantage of certain ambiguities 
located more properly in the interpretive tradition rather than Coleridge’s work itself. Ultimately, 
an understanding of Coleridge as an Evangelical helps to explain as central certain features of 
Coleridge’s thought that Milbank seeks to mark off as disposable, and it shows that certain of 
Milbank’s conclusions are only possible by employing works as emblematic of “stages” of 
Coleridge’s development that were not necessarily Coleridge’s most thorough or representative 
treatments of those subjects. This gives the impression that Milbank is “proof-working”651 
Coleridge’s opus to create a version of Coleridge amenable to his own project, but not 
necessarily a portrait that is fair to what Coleridge himself thought.  
 Milbank argues that the shape of Coleridge’s life provides a trajectory from his early 
“Unitarian Christian Socialism, through an idealist justification of liberalism, to a critique of 
liberalism on Christian Trinitarian grounds” and that this represents “an astonishing trajectory 
across three major types of ‘political theology’ within English tradition.”652 In line with 
Milbank’s larger project, he attempts to show that the inability to challenge the political and 
economic problems of modernity result from opposition to liberal orders that “turn out to be only 
liberalism after all.”653 Milbank places Kant squarely within the “liberal” tradition; because 
Coleridge clearly was influenced by, or made positive use of, Kantian and other German idealist 
philosophical language and categories, Milbank has to demonstrate that Coleridge transcended 
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these Idealist commitments to be of any use in this larger project. Milbank describes his 
periodization of Coleridge’s thought as “three integrated phases,” but it appears that he actually 
needs Coleridge to have these three phases in a more discrete and detachable way whereby 
Coleridge begins in a “biblically based political radicalism” followed by a middle period “lapse 
into political conservatism that coincides with his conversion to Kantian Idealism” and finally a 
“resurgence of a political biblicism in an altered form.”654 While Milbank believes that this last 
stage represents the most important (in his reading, Coleridge at this time accepts an absolute 
metaphysics, Christian orthodoxy, and the grounds of critiquing the liberal order), precisely 
because “liberal Capitalism” is placed as the central point upon which Coleridge can offer a 
position of opposition, Milbank seems to think of Coleridge’s early “Christian socialism” as a 
kind of sui generis Christian socialism that was radical even for its own time and worthy of 
admiration as well. This laudatory character comes from Milbank seeing Coleridge’s thinking at 
this early stage as not actually the result of Enlightenment, but instead coming “from the 
‘underground’ survival of the ideas of the Levellers and Diggers” that led him beyond an 
Enlightenment view of equally shared private property to the elimination of private property all 
together.655 Early on Milbank signals a desire to show that Coleridge’s “authentic” or “core” 
thought can be separated off from a kind of Enlightenment ephemera.656  
 The overall structure of Coleridge’s thought presented in this work may still allow one to 
see definite stages of Coleridge’s intellectual and spiritual development. However, it is either not 
the fall/return journey that Milbank puts forward, or the location of the “fall” and point of 
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“repentance” do not allow for the periodization that Milbank needs. In terms of his religious life, 
Coleridge’s move away from Unitarianism began much earlier than is normally thought (in 1797 
or 1798), and it was his struggling with the question of evil, not the speculative metaphysical 
problems of Unitarianism, that led to his gradual and stepwise abandonment of his 
Priestlian/Hartlian theology and philosophy. While Coleridge certainly changed his mind after 
1797 on certain key philosophical points, this intellectual trajectory appears more like a unified 
progressive conversion toward Evangelical Anglicanism as he gradually clarified his own 
position. Various thinkers have challenged the idea that Coleridge experienced a “conversion” to 
Kantian thought that marks a clear break with earlier thinking. For instance, Hedley argues that 
Coleridge was not so much perpetuating German Idealism as such, but sought to “employ ideas 
from German Idealism in order to revive an anthropology and theology of the Cambridge 
Platonists and other philosophical mystics.”657 Coleridge repurposed Idealist language to convey 
in a contemporary idiom ideas from authors who seemed “positively antiquated in their methods 
and interests in the 1820s.”658 While I disagree on the specifics of Hedley’s thinking659, his 
insight seems largely correct that Coleridge was not seeking to merely promulgate German 
Idealism in England. This line of thinking follows Stephen Prickett’s interpretation, which sees 
even in Coleridge’s appropriation of Hartley and Priestly the attempt not to merely parrot other 
philosophies, but a lifelong attempt to find adequate philosophical language to express his own 
developing intellectual insight. Speaking specifically about Coleridge’s use of Idealist language 
for the imagination, Prickett states that Coleridge was “constantly struggling to articulate what he 
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already knew, existentially, in his own experience,” and when he used other people’s systems of 
thought, it was “insofar as they served to illuminate his feelings of joy or dereliction – and if they 
did offer an insight into these conditions of his creativity, their compatibility was irrelevant.”660   
 This earlier conversion timeframe meant that Coleridge did not so much convert to 
Kantianism as Kant provided him the philosophical language to help express his conversion. If 
this challenges the schematization that Milbank puts forward by questioning how much it is 
proper to say that Coleridge “converted” to Kantianism, then a critical look at the “emblematic” 
works that Milbank uses to provide his periodization further challenges his schema. On the front 
end, there is no problem with Milbank’s choice of using the Lectures on Revealed Religion as 
indicative of Coleridge’s early political-philosophical-theological thought. From here, though, 
Milbank makes choices that seem strange, to say the least. Including The Friend as part of what 
could be a “middle stage” for Coleridge certainly seems chronologically correct, but if one were 
to look to a work that is emblematic of Coleridge’s Kantian/Idealist stage, one would think it 
more natural to turn to the Biographia Literaria, the work that has garnered the most attention 
from scholars because of legitimate claims that Coleridge plagiarized German idealist 
philosophy. However, the problem with using the Biographia is that it was published the year 
after The Statesman’s Manual (and the first lay sermon most guides Milbank’s thought).661  
 One could argue that the continued use of German Idealism in the Biographia does not in 
and of itself show that Coleridge maintained a kind of Kantian political liberalism, so Milbank’s 
use of The Friend could still be defended insofar as it was not necessarily an intentional attempt 
to select works that create his chronology rather than truthfully representing Coleridge’s 
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intellectual development. Things begin to look more dubious when you see how Milbank 
grounds his understanding of the function of the Bible for Coleridge. One would expect that in 
describing how Coleridge understood the Bible, Milbank would make copious use of 
Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit. However, he only makes one reference to this work.662 One 
may see why Milbank would avoid Confessions when one sees what understanding of the Bible 
Milbank wants to attribute to Coleridge. Milbank argues for Coleridge’s “non-foundationalism” 
through the assertion that Coleridge saw the Bible as an “irreplaceable store of archetypes” that 
“alone is able to ‘explain’ its own textual being and the being of all subsequent texts that it has 
generated.”663 Milbank flattens the world “behind the text” with the world of the text for his 
understanding of Coleridge’s Bible, saying that “the point here is not that the Bible is a poetic 
record of real events, but rather that it is an account of primitive events which had to take place 
poetically, that is to say were instantiated in poetic writing.”664 For Milbank’s Coleridge “the 
Bible is the text” and “there is an implicit anti-foundationalism in Coleridge’s placing of 
textuality at the origin.”665 What is troubling about this is that it side-steps the great lengths that 
Coleridge goes to in Confessions not to reduce the Bible to the text. Coleridge did reject the 
Bible as constituting objective evidence for faith, but he also did not see an encounter with the 
Bible, serving as its own self-interpreting expression of the divine Logos, as the foundation of 
faith either. Rather, one comes to appreciate the divine origin of Scripture precisely because 
there is a logically prior conversion experience that opens one to seeing the Spirit speaking 
through Scripture. Reducing the Bible to the text is precisely Coleridge’s reason for rejecting 
																																																						
662 Milbank, “Divine Logos,” 19n29. 
 
663 Milbank, “Divine Logos,” 20. 
 
664 Milbank, “Divine Logos,” 18.  
 
665 Milbank, “Divine Logos,” 20.  
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plenary inspiration because it removes the human element behind the text. The Bible in 
Confessions is exemplary, showing the working of the Spirit in the lives of real believers, but it 
cannot be archetypical precisely because of this function. To be archetypic would be to remove 
the individuality of those who Coleridge believes truly, historically existed and because of this 
particular historical existence can serve as examples for contemporary faith. Furthermore, 
Coleridge was clear that he did believe that the divine origin in Scripture is in the events 
recorded – and not only the recording – thus accepting a distance between the world of history 
behind the text and the world of the text.  
The problem with Milbank’s attempt to make of Coleridge a thinker whose “implicit 
critique of Kant is that the possibility of human meaning is tied not to a priori categories, but to 
contingent, historical, linguistic constructions,” is that it requires Coleridge to have moved from 
an acceptance of Kant and idealism to a rejection of that same philosophical idealism. However, 
Milbank’s chosen texts seem intentionally curated to fit his vision of what he needed from 
Coleridge rather than what Coleridge actually thought. Beyond the texts described above, 
Milbank makes no reference to either Aids to Reflection nor to the Opus Maximum, which, while 
fragmentary and not published, was available when Milbank wrote his article. While these 
works, especially the Aids to Reflection, are critical for understanding Coleridge’s developing 
thought, they at the same time pose a problem for Milbank’s argument that Coleridge rejected a 
“Kantian stage.” The discussion of reason and understanding which forms the core of 
Coleridge’s Kantian inspired psychology in Aids to Reflection reflects similar points in The 
Friend. Ultimately, rather than providing a description of Coleridge’s actual intellectual 
development or thought, Milbank appears to have created a Coleridge who anticipated Milbank’s 
own commitment to a kind of radical linguistic constructivism. Paul DeHart said in his 
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conclusion to Aquinas and Radical Orthodoxy that “meanings have been continually foisted 
upon the texts that they cannot bear, and the radically orthodox Aquinas that emerges from their 
pens is (reluctantly as it must be admitted) largely a work of fiction. Better to avoid this exercise 
in destroying the village in order to save it.”666 Unfortunately, this seems to be the case not only 
for the Radical Orthodox Aquinas, but also for the Radical Orthodox Coleridge.  
Even if Milbank is more egregious in trying to claim Coleridge in toto (or in parte at 
least) as having put forward roughly the same philosophical bearings as contemporary Radical 
Orthodoxy, he is not the first person to have appropriated Coleridge’s thought for his or her own 
purposes. Newman in the generation after Coleridge found inspiration for his understanding of 
the relationship between faith and reason in Coleridge’s conception of understanding and reason. 
Maurice and other architects of the 19th century Broad Church movement took Coleridge’s 
political vision of the Church and his understanding of the Church’s capacity to encompass 
multiple viewpoints as a launch pad for their own proposed schema of relatively flexible 
interpretations of doctrine and an emphasis on the ambiguity of the liturgy to hold together a 
variety of theological and liturgical forms in one Church.667  
This observation points toward the second, positive way for how this understanding of 
Coleridge can prove fruitful for contemporary theology. If my interpretation is correct, Coleridge 
sought to provide a more thoroughly philosophical understanding of Evangelical Anglican 
thought while also being able to provide partial inspiration for the other two main theological 
traditions to come out of 19th century Anglicanism, viz., Oxford Movement High Churchmanship 
and the middle of the road Broad Church movement. With this being the case, Coleridge acts as 
																																																						
666 Paul DeHart, Aquinas and Radical Orthodoxy: A Critical Inquiry (London: Routledge, 2014), 188. 
 
667 See Charles Richard Sanders’s Coleridge and the Broad Church Movement (Durham, NC: Duke University 
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a kind of pivot figure not only between the 18th and 19th centuries in Anglican theology but also 
between the three main forms of Anglican liturgical-theological style that persist until the 
present. This points to the possibility of more theological cohesion between these branches, and, 
insofar as Coleridge’s theological thought was forged in dialogue with Calvinist and Wesleyan 
Methodist thought, with contemporary Methodist and Wesleyan churches. The robust nature of 
Coleridge’s theology, even though it maintains a certain Evangelical “practicality” points 
furthermore to the possibility of a truly and distinctly Anglican theology, rather than the much 
more common theology done by Anglicans (but actually originating in continental, and mostly 
German, thought) or the tendency to reduce Anglican “distinctness” as an ecclesial tradition to 
shared liturgy.  
Of possibly greater important is that Coleridge presents the contemporary reader of his 
thought with the merging of a certain Pietistic and a certain Enlightenment impulse that one can 
see winding through modernity. Both impulses appear thoroughly modern, so long as modernity 
is not conceived as fully convertible with “Enlightenment.” That Coleridge was so rooted in his 
Evangelical (and British) tradition, more so than many other early 19th Romantic and Evangelical 
thinkers, provides insight into a way forward past some of the problems bequeathed to the 
present by the post-Kantian turn in philosophy. Coleridge can provide a vision of theology that 
does not neglect the turn toward history or subjectivity. At the same time, with Coleridge’s 
rooting in the classical Augustinian tradition, he can avoid the pitfalls that occurred in German 
Idealists like Hegel and Schelling, at least so long as one desires to maintain a traditional 
doctrine of God rather than some kind of process or pantheist scheme.  
Coleridge’s understanding of the Trinity and what it means for the relationship between 
God and the world presents one of his most intriguing contributions, and I believe this part of his 
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work can resolve certain problems or impasses at play in contemporary constructive/systematic 
theology. Theology in the last two centuries, in the wake of dealing with the rapid scientific, 
philosophical, cultural, and technological changes associated with modernity, has seen the pre-
modern intellectual foundations, and assumptions, of so much Christian doctrinal exposition 
thoroughly unsettled. The Renaissance, Reformation, and Scientific Revolution all challenged 
the sources of authority and the views of the cosmos that allowed these traditional Christian 
theological concepts to stand secure, both in their formal scholarly expositions and as popularly 
held and believed. This unsettling introduced radical skepticism into the world through the very 
act of unsettling and as it was codified and elaborated in figures like Descartes and Montagne. 
As the rationalism of the Enlightenment failed to overcome this doubt and it was exacerbated 
and elevated to axiomatic status in thinkers like Hume and then Post/Late-Modern philosophy 
and critical theory, it has become an unavoidable and often overwhelming challenge for 
contemporary philosophy and theology. The radically new scientific conception of the human, 
the cosmos, and history combined with this doubt have meant that theology has had the difficult 
task not only of making sense of concepts like a non-static, evolutionary/developmental view of 
natural and human history and the overwhelming immensity of the universe – to say nothing of 
the incredible suffering, cruelty, and marginalization these changes have made possible – but it 
has had to so while in a state of epistemic free-fall. 
While the last 20-40 years have seen theology focus on the epistemic side of this 
question, particularly in its preoccupation with method, the last 200 years have really been a 
history not so much of progression in theological thinking as the ebb and flow of either 
reconstructing Christian doctrine to meet the challenges of a contemporary worldview or of 
answering the question of how theology can be epistemically justified at all. Theologies of 
		331 
people like Karl Barth and the Barthian tradition (broadly conceived) may offer solutions to the 
epistemic question, but they often do so by removing theological discourse from connection with 
other areas of human knowledge and (as with Postliberalism) going round and round a fideistic 
cul-de-sac in which it seems impossible to rise above prolegomena about the bare possibility of  
Christian belief to actually begin expositing doctrine in a meaningful way.668 On the other hand, 
thinkers and movements like Hegel, American Process Theology, and Moltmann present 
systematic accounts of doctrine that attempt to meet paradigm shifts in history and the natural 
and social sciences, but they often do so while requiring the acceptance of deeply unsettling 
conclusions or departures from historic Christianity significant enough to wonder whether they 
actually constitute breaks rather than transformations.669 Finally, whether they come in a 
sophisticated philosophical garb, as is the case with Radical Orthodoxy, or in the much ruder 
clothing of Fundamentalism, attempts to simply circumvent these intellectual and societal 
transformations seem the least plausible and satisfying solutions to issues facing contemporary 
theology. Just as the splitting of the atom has meant that the nuclear genie (or demon) cannot be 
put back in its bottle, neither does it seem that we can ever un-view the world in terms of deep 
time, an evolutionary cosmos, and the relativity of culture and history. 
																																																						
668 Because the main point of this dissertation is not to critique trends in 19th, 20th, and 21st century theology, I offer 
my summary of the problems I see in the theologies I here put forward, but I am unable to provide a thorough 
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problems are attributed do not exactly match the scheme I provide, these are indeed problems that one encounters in 
modern thought. If these actually prove to be problems with contemporary theology, then hopefully this sketch can 
point to the ways that Coleridge may provide solutions. Of course, if one accepts the situation as I present it but does 
not feel troubled in the way I do, then my sense of Coleridge’s potential contributions means very little.  
 
669 It seems almost unnecessary to repeat that there are, at the very least, significant problems with Hegel’s concept 
of the dialectic of history. Likewise, most Process Theology cannot maintain eschatologies or doctrines of God that 
bear much resemblance to the Christian tradition, and they often do so while moving God to the same metaphysical 
order as creation and thus prove no more capable of answering ultimate cosmological questions than agnostic and 
atheistic scientific materialism.  Moltmann, in so strongly rejecting “traditional theism” and proposing a “self-
limiting” God may end up with many of the problems of both Process Theology and Hegelian philosophy, and both 
he and Pannenberg may even require an acceptance of tritheism – highly problematic given that almost the entire 
Christian tradition has sought to show that the Trinity does not undue its fundamental claims to monotheism.  
		332 
Back, then, to Coleridge’s possible contribution and how his understanding of the Trinity 
and creation address many of these issues: Coleridge presents a view of the human intellect such 
that the Divine Word grounds what is distinctively human and our subjectivity and rationality are 
only ever a gracious gift; this allows him to both acknowledge the gratuity of revelation and 
knowledge of God that someone like Barth seeks without destroying a real recognition that 
humans can actually know something about God and the world through human rationality. That 
the Trinity proves to be the ultimate ground, pattern, and possibility of unity between God and 
the world while also functioning as that which prevents the world from being subsumed into God 
allows one to move past someone like Hegel’s problematic views of history. Coleridge could 
accept a certain true insight in the view that something about the unfolding of human history 
corresponds to the nature of God; however, for Coleridge this has more to do with the continual 
striving and failing of humans to recognize and live into the true structure of the world that is the 
analogue to the Trinity than with the world being the necessary unfolding of God’s self-
realization. Because God is self-sufficient and can thus provide a truly gratuitous creative love, 
Coleridge can actually maintain a true sense of creation and distinction between God and the 
world that Hegel, in making the world a necessary part of God’s self-realization, likely cannot. 
Because the unfolding of history is not only the natural human striving to realize its created 
purpose of union with God, but is in significant ways the result of a sinful human failure to 
realize that telos, Coleridge can offer a developmental view of the world and history that 
accommodates Rahner’s or de Chardin’s sense of the world moving toward union with God 
without the diminished emphasis on human sin and evil in history accompanying these latter 
thinkers. Because the Trinity provides the pattern for all created reality, and this pattern 
permeates all levels of creation, one can move beyond an either/or thinking in the debates 
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between Social and non-Social Trinitarians; one need not ask whether it is the individual human 
mind or human society that evinces the Image of God in Creation because both fulfill this 
function in different and important ways. Finally, Coleridge can affirm with Schelling the 
primacy of Will in God, allowing for a dynamism in God’s being instead of the more static view 
that classical Platonic theism is often charged with engendering. However, by seeing Will qua 
Will as necessarily coterminous with intellect, Coleridge can maintain a Christian concept of a 
personal God in contrast to Schelling’s more emminationist view of the ultimate foundation and 
source of the world as beyond personality and distinction.  
This is not to say that Coleridge is perfect; there are certainly critiques that can be made 
of his boarder-line gnostic sense that embodiment in the material world as it is now is a result of 
the fall (even if it is a more positive, restorative result than Karl Barth’s logic in the Römerbrief 
that moves in the direction that creation is fall). Coleridge never could finish his final synthesis 
of all knowledge through the Logos as creative principle, but it is possible that this 
incompleteness is as much opportunity as it is detriment. The problems Coleridge faced as he 
saw them were greatly under appreciated in his time, particularly in a Britain that scoffed at or 
viewed suspiciously Coleridge’s preoccupation with metaphysical problems. It may be, then, that 
one should look at Coleridge’s incomplete work as itself a representation of the union of warmth 
and light that he found in the Church of England: imperfect, but nevertheless offering one of the 
best opportunities for thinking through and living the Christian life that is available to those who 
have come after him. 
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APPENDIX 
 
From the Canones Synodi Dordrechtanæ (Canons of the Synod of Dort) 
 
 
Primum doctrinæ caput, de divina prædestinatione. 
(First Chapter of Doctrine, concerning divine predestination)  
 
Articulus Primus. (First Article.) 
Cum omnes homines in Adamo peccaverint, et rei sint facti maledictionis et mortis æternæ, Deus 
nemini fecisset injuriam, si universum genus humanum in peccato et maledictione relinquere, ac 
propter peccatum damnare voluisset, juxta illa Apostoli, Totus mundus est obnoxius 
condemnationi Dei. Rom. iii. 19. Omnes peccaverunt et destituuntur gloria Dei. Ver. 23. Et, 
Stipendium peccati mors est. Rom. vi. 23. 
(Since every human has sinned in Adam, and by this act brought about condemnation and eternal 
death, God would have caused no one an injury if God had wished and leave the whole human 
race in Sin, and condemn [them] on account of Sin, just as those things said by the Apostle, the 
whole world is liable to the condemnation of God Rom. 3.19. All have sinned and have been cut 
off from the glory of God. Ver. 23. And, the wages of sin are death. Rom. 6.23) 
 
Tertium et Quartum Doctrinæ Caput, de Hominis Corruptione, et Conversione ad Deum ejusque 
Modo. 
(Third and Fourth Chapters of Doctrine, concerning the Corruption of Humanity, and the Return 
to God and its way) 
 
Articulus Primus. (First Article.) 
Homo ab initio ad imaginem Dei conditus vera et salutari sui Creatoris et rerum spiritualium 
notitia in mente, et justitia in voluntate et corde, puritate in omnibus affectibus exornatus, 
adeoque totus sanctus fuit; sed Diaboli instinctu, et libera sua voluntate a Deo desciscens, eximiis 
istis donis seipsum orbavit: atque e contrario eorum loco cœcitatem, horribiles tenebras, 
vanitatem, ac perversitatem judicii in mente, malitiam, rebellionem, ac duritiem in voluntate et 
corde, impuritatem denique in omnibus affectibus contraxit. 
(A human was constituted in the beginning in the image of God and was furnished in his mind 
with a true and advantageous conception of his Creator and of spiritual things, and with 
uprightness in the will and heart, and with purity in every affection, and all this to such a degree 
as to be completely holy. But falling away from God by the instigation of the Devil and from his 
own free will, [the human being] has by his own doing deprived himself of these very special 
gifts: and brought about from that opposite place blindness, terrible darkness, vanity, and a 
perversion of the capacity for judgement in the mind, malice, rebellion, and obduracy in the will 
and heart, and thereupon impurity in all the affections) 
 
II. Qualis autem post lapsum fuit homo, tales et liberos procreavit, nempe corruptus corruptos; 
corruptione ab Adamo in omnes posteros [solo Christo excepto] non per imitationem [quod 
Pelagiani olim voluerunt], sed per vitiosæ naturæ propagationem, justo Dei judicio, derivata. 
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(The human being was in such a state after the fall that this corrupt one truly certainly brought 
into being corrupt children; with this corruption having been derived from Adam in all who came 
after [except Christ alone] not through imitation [which the Pelagians at one time preferred], but 
propagated through a nature full of vice, by the just sentence of God) 
III. Itaque omnes homines in peccato concipiuntur, et filii iræ nascuntur, inepti ad omne bonum 
salutare, propensi ad malum, in peccatis mortui, et peccati servi; et absque Spiritus Sancti 
regenerantis gratia, ad Deum redire, naturam depravatam corrigere, vel ad ejus correctionem se 
disponere nec volunt, nec possunt. 
(Accordingly all human beings are  conceived in sin, and are born children of wrath, unfit for 
every beneficial good, with a propensity to evil, dead in sin, and slaves to sin; and without the 
grace of the regenerating Holy Spirit, they neither want to nor can return to God, restore [their] 
depraved nature, or dispose themselves to its restoration) 
 
 
From the “Articles of Religion” in 1662 Book of Common Prayer670 
 
9. “Of Original or Birth Sin” 
ORINIGAL sin standeth not in the following of Adam (as the Pelagians do vainly talk) but it is 
the fault and corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the off-spring 
of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature 
inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit; and therefore in every 
person born into this world, it deserveth Gods wrath and damnation. And this infection of nature 
doth remain, yea, in them that are regenerated, whereby the lust of the flesh, called in Greek 
φρόνηµα σαρκὸς, which some do expound the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, 
some the desire of the flesh, is not subject to the law of God. And although there is no 
condemnation for them that believe and are baptized, yet the Apostle doth confess, that 
concupiscence and lust hath of it self the nature of sin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
670 The Church of England, The Book of Common Prayer: The Texts of 1549, 1559, and 1662, ed. Brian Cummings 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 676. 
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